

## CALL FOR ARTICLE PROPOSALS

for a special issue of the *Revue Française de Sociologie*

### Governing through markets

Issue editors:

Matthieu ANSALONI (Centre Émile Durkheim, Université de Bordeaux)

Pascale TROMPETTE (PACTE, Université Grenoble Alpes)

---

The market is a key form of contemporary political regulation. This phenomenon, often perceived to reflect diffusion of the neoliberal vision in the sphere of politics, has elicited much research. Some studies identify the disciplinary mechanisms at work (Hibou 2012; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2008); others seek to determine the mechanisms of convergence—coercion, competition, learning—between countries that are nonetheless facing specific policy challenges (Simmons et al. 2006; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002); still others have analyzed state restructuring (King and Le Galès 2011).

In this special issue we will be shifting the perspective and looking directly at the market as a technique of government, and therefore as a means of dealing with public problems. Our hypothesis is that contemporary forms of market-based political regulation are designed to be instrumental—as is reflected by the increasing use of such expressions or neologisms as “market instruments,” “market mechanisms” and “market-based solutions” in internal and academic literature concerning public problems such as climate change, poverty, biodiversity protection, waste management, etc. The making of carbon markets, biodiversity markets and the like represents a kind of culmination of the process of autonomizing the market as an instrument for handling public problems (Aykut 2014; Boisvert et al. 2013; Erhenstein 2014). Two complementary observations support this view. First, while rhetoric about the instrumental efficiency of the market is not new—its roots may actually be found in classic political economy (Foucault 2004)—it now systematically develops out of a critique of alternative types of regulation (incentives, constraint, etc.) and/or the actors that practice and support them (states), a critique whose arguments are understood to prove that the alternatives cannot work. Second, in the making of these markets, scientific and technical knowledge are granted increasing importance as intellectual models, resources and means of expertise to be used in producing commodities, formatting regulation instruments and frameworks (Muniesa 2014; MacKenzie, Muniesa and Siu 2007) and above all, in the near-experimental steering of these markets, including the continual revisions and readjustments made in response to reality tests (Callon 2009; Overdevest 2011).

Technicizing the debate in this way seems sufficient—without regard for political or moral considerations—to justify the extension of the market to areas that used to be reserved exclusively to state action and more generally to spheres traditionally understood to concern the public or common good (Steiner and Trespeuch 2014; Geiger et al. 2014).

This special issue will give priority to detailed empirical studies that analyze diverse uses of the market as an instrument for managing public problems at the transnational, national or local scale (externalization through competitive market making, privatization, public-private partnerships, market-based solutions). We lack studies that explore governance through markets on the basis of rigorous fieldwork and develop concrete analyses of actors, problematization and instrumentation (Halpern et al. 2014) and studies of the policy choices that shape the various forms through which such governance is practiced (Gingrich 2012). The objective is to offer deserved space to empirical understanding of governmentality problematics; i.e., to what is involved and at stake in “commoditizing” public goods—allocation of property rights, price control (Mackenzie 2009), introducing specific market structures and systems, in monitoring them when they turn out to have perverse effects or flaws or to create new externalities (Veal and Mouzas 2012), etc. Recent but historically contextualized empirical observations are particularly welcome. Knowledge of concrete markets will help us to develop generalizable analytic grids and thereby fuel both new and inclusive or cumulative theoretical discussion of the market as a technique of government.

Matthieu Ansaloni  
Pascale Trompette

- 
- Aykut, S., 2014, “Gouverner le climat, construire l'Europe: l'histoire de la création d'un marché du carbone (ETS).” *Critique internationale* 62(1): 39–55.
- Boisvert, V., Méral, P., Froger, G., 2013, “Market-Based Instruments for Ecosystem Services: Institutional Innovation or Renovation?” *Society & Natural Resources: An International Journal* 26(10): 1122–36.
- Callon, M., 2009, “Civilizing Markets: Carbon Trading Between in Vitro and in Vivo Experiments.” *Accounting, Organizations and Society* 34(3): 535–48.
- Djelic, M.-L., Sahlin-Andersson, K., 2008, “Marketization: From Intellectual Agenda to Global Policy-Making.” In M.-L. Djelic, K. Sahlin-Andersson, eds., *Transnational Governance. Institutional Dynamics of Regulation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 53–73.
- Foucault, M., 2004, *Naissance de la biopolitique: cours au Collège de France*, Paris: Gallimard.
- Fourcade-Gourinchas, M., Babb, S., 2002, “The Rebirth of the Liberal Creed: Paths to Neoliberalism in Four Countries.” *American Journal of Sociology* 108(3): 533–79.
- Geiger, S., Harrison, D., Kjellberg, H., Mallard, A., eds., 2014, *Concerned Markets: Economic Ordering for Multiple Values*, Dublin: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Gingrich, J.R., 2011, *Making Markets in the Welfare State: The Politics of Varying Market Reforms*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ehrenstein, V., 2014, *Géopolitique du carbone: l'action internationale pour le climat aux prises avec la déforestation tropicale*, PhD in Sociology, École nationale supérieure des Mines de Paris.

- Halpern, C., Lascoumes, P., Le Galès, P., 2014, *L'Instrumentation de l'action publique*, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
- Hibou, B., 2012, *La bureaucratisation du monde à l'ère néolibérale*, Paris: La Découverte.
- King, D., Le Galès, P., 2011, "Sociologie de l'État en recomposition." *Revue Française de Sociologie* 52(3): 453–80.
- MacKenzie, D.A., 2009, "Making Things the Same: Gases, Emission Rights and the Politics of Carbon Markets." *Accounting, Organizations and Society* 34(3): 440–55.
- MacKenzie, D.A., Muniesa, F., Siu, L., eds., 2007, *Do Economists Make Markets? On the Performativity of Economics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Muniesa, F., 2014, *The Provoked Economy: Economic Reality and the Performative Turn*, Routledge: London.
- Overdeest, C., 2011, "Towards a More Pragmatic Sociology of Markets." *Theory and Society* 40: 533–52.
- Simmons, B., Dobbin, F., Garrett, G., 2006, "Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism." *International Organization* 60(4): 781–810.
- Steiner, P., Trespeuch, M., 2014, *Marchés contestés. Quand le marché rencontre la morale*, Toulouse: Presses universitaires du Mirail.
- Veal, G., Mouzas, S., 2012, "Market-Based Responses to Climate Change: CO2 Market Design versus Operation." *Organization Studies* 33(11): 1589–616.

**Please send article proposals of 1,000-1,500 words (not including references) in French or English to Revue editorial assistant Christelle Germain ([christelle.germain@cirs.fr](mailto:christelle.germain@cirs.fr)) before October 30, 2015.**

**Submissions will be read by the editors of this special issue and a member of the *RFS* editorial board. Authors of accepted article proposals will be notified by November 30 at the latest.**

**Completed articles—maximum length 75,000 characters including spaces, bibliography and figures—must be submitted by April 30, 2016. They will be assessed independently by the special issue editors and an anonymous *Revue* reading committee.**