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Editorial Foreword

Silviu Miloiu

Revista Română pentru Studii Baltice și Nordice, E-mail: silviu.miloiu@arsbn.ro

Having been set up on November 27, 2008, the Romanian Association for Baltic and Nordic Studies (ARSBN) has established as its fundamental goals the promotion of research activities in the field of Baltic and Nordic studies, the encouragement of knowledge in public benefit regarding this geographical area, including by the means of education, especially of higher education, the cooperation with similar institutions and associations from Romania and abroad, the promotion of the dialogue and cooperation on the axis the Baltic Sea – the Black Sea. In this regard, the establishing of a scientific publication to further our knowledge of Baltic and Nordic societies and to spread information about the Romanian society to Baltic and Northern Europe was essential. The magazine was also regarded as a springboard for the mutual acknowledgment of the bonds and relations between Romanians and the Baltic and Nordic peoples throughout their history and in contemporary times. It was our understanding and hope that the magazine will become a multidisciplinary publication hosting articles in fields such as history, history of international relations, international relations, literature and philology, economics and business, and various other sciences. When established, the editorial college also considered that it will be in the advantage of the magazine to include also book and article reviews, assessments of scientific conferences or notes of doctoral studies in the fields covered by the publication which will promote the dialogue between the two peripheries of the European continent.

A year after the project was decided upon, the first issue of Revista Română de Studii Baltice și Nordice (RRSBN) comes out bringing forth articles published by scientists from Estonia, Finland, Lithuania and Romania. Although as it was expected to happen the articles included in the first issue are mostly dealing with historical developments, it must be pointed out that the themes and the approaches differ significantly. Chronologically, the articles cover the interwar period, the Cold War, and larger time periods as it happens with Alexandru Popescu’s notes. Thematically, two articles focus on processes taking place in one particular
country, but with larger regional or international connotations. Thus, at a time when the scholarly research focuses on the transition to market economy, Olaf Mertelsmann goes back in time and shows how the opposite process happened. The large scale of changes in the structure of property and the gradual loss of private entrepreneurial skills as well as the human and economic costs should be remembered when dealing with post-1989 transition. In terms of outcomes, Mertelsmann concludes that “transition to command economy was something like the worst possible scenario”. Instead, Elena Dragomir approaches the Cold War from a different perspective. With the Soviet Union collapsing and the self-censure gradually being renounced at, the recent past started to be reinterpreted in order to fit the new Finnish foreign and domestic policy aims. The debate over the legacy of Finlandization was passionate, but the mainstream political opinion tended to practice a sort of “protochronism” by inventing roots and traits to developments that have emanated in the post-Cold War environment. This kind of ideology rapidly acquired some sort of legitimacy and pass through to younger generation which could not be judged as pursuing a hidden political agenda.

Two articles carried in this issue of RRSBN approach, based on new archival findings, the intersections between the populations from Romania and those in Baltic area and Scandinavia. Cezar Stanciu’s article focuses on the state relations between a Communist totalitarian regime and the democratic states of Northern Europe at a time when a rapprochement was contemplated. Desirous to reconnect to the words trade flow and acquire a more autonomous profile in the international relations, Romania was nevertheless wavering in the relations with Scandinavia and was more astute in relation to Finland, a country trusted in Moscow to a larger extent. On contrary, Vasile Ciobanu has approached the “transnational” approach between German minorities in Transylvania and the Baltic states. By sharing numerous common concerns and facing common challenges and nurturing common projects, the communities of Sibiu Saxons and Estonia and Latvia’s Balts have developed networks and contacts of mutual benefit. Ciobanu’s discoveries thus add to the recent publications by John Hiden1 and Martyn Housden2 on this topic.

The role of perceptions and the Danish travelers mindsets about Romanians are approached in Oana Lăculiceanu’s contribution. Although the article may be fitted into the same category of transnational history, it

2 Martyn Housden, Neighbours or enemies?: Germans, the Baltic and Beyond, Rodopi, London, 2007.
brings forth no new conceptual interpretations, but contributes with interesting and sometimes hilarious facts to the encounters between Romanians and Danes. Citizens of Denmark, a developed agrarian country according to the European standards, were sometimes shocked when they encountered the Romanian realities, especially as they looked in some rural or town periphery areas. Their descriptions of Bucharest, of the Romanian peasant and of the dynamics of development in a “third world country” – to put it so – are rude expressions of the differences between Northern and South Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 20th century and a reminder of the reasons for which the relations between those societies were so limited.

Alexandru Popescu’s contribution enriches the chronology and bibliography of the Romanian-Finnish relations with new facts and is a testimony of the recent developments to which the author himself, a former diplomatic counselor in the Romanian Embassy in Helsinki, has contributed.

Nerijus Babinskas’ theoretical contribution compares the approaches to the concept of tributalism of Samir Amin, Hohn Haldon and H.H. Stahl., a Romanian sociologist and historian from Dimitrie Gusti’s school of thought. The author discovers a gap between the Western and Eastern historiography traditions by the importance the concept has acquired in West and emphasizes why the debate is still important and topical.

In the end, I hope that the novelty of interpretation and the new findings behind the articles included in the first issue of RRSBN will attract scholarly and public interest and give birth to fresh academic debates on the exchange of cultural values between the Romanian space and Baltic and Nordic Europe in the past and – as this new magazine shows – in the present. The new networks created between Romanian and Baltic and Nordic scholars can open new avenues of cooperation and contribute to the progress of our scholarly and public agendas and the magazine is ready to become a mirror of those developments.
THE COST OF TRANSITION FROM MARKET TO COMMAND ECONOMY: THE CASE OF ESTONIA

Olaf Mertelsmann

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An earlier version of this paper has been presented at the XIVth International Economic History Congress in Helsinki 2006

Abstract:
While the post-socialist transition of central and eastern European economies has produced a large amount of research, the transition to the command economy has been explored mainly in the cases of Russia and East Germany. This paper is an updated summary of the results of a larger research project which is dedicated to the Stalinist reconstruction of Estonia’s economy and the postwar years. It is based mainly on archival research in Estonian and Russian archives using documents of the state and the Communist Party.

Rezumat:
Studiile științifice au abordat adesea subiectul tranziției economice post-socialiste în cazul țărilor central și est-europene. Rareori a fost tratată însă tema tranziției de la economia de piață la economia de comandă, după intrarea acestor țări în sfera de interes a Unuiii Sovietice. Studiile care există în acest domeniu se concentrează mai ales asupra cazului Rusiei sau al Germaniei de Est. Acest articol îmbogățește tocmai această arie de cercetare, tratând subiectul tranziției de la economia de piață la economia de comandă în cazul Estoniei, fenomen care s-a produs în perioada 1940-1941, respectiv 1944-1955. Lucrarea se constituie în mare măsură din concluziile aduse la zi ale unui vast proiect de cercetare dedicat reconstruirii staliniste a Estoniei în anii postbelici. Sursele de documentare au fost constituite în principal de documente din arhivele de stat și partid estoniene și rusești, precum și de statisticile sovietice. Acest studiu arată că trecerea la economia de comandă a produs o serie întreagă de efecte negative asupra economiei estoniene, atât pe termen scurt, cât și pe termen

**Keywords**: Estonia; transition; market economy; command economy

While the post-socialist transition of central and eastern European economies has produced a large amount of research, the transition to the command economy has been explored mainly in the cases of Russia and East Germany.¹ The Republic of Estonia which was occupied and annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940 and occupied by Nazi Germany 1941-44 provides us with the opportunity of a case study of one former independent state transferred into a Soviet republic. This paper is an updated summary of the results of a larger research project which is dedicated to the Stalinist reconstruction of Estonia’s economy and the postwar years.² It is based mainly on archival research in Estonian and Russian archives using documents of the state and the Communist Party. Of course, Soviet economic statistics bear a lot of methodological

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problems. Because of this, the original sources are quoted or well-founded estimations used.

For several decades the Socialist countries claimed to possess a planned economy, but recent research on the mechanisms of Soviet economic policy supports the argument to characterise the economic system as a command economy. Comparatively few areas were really ‘planned’, fixed prices, resource allocation, personal networks and direct interference from higher standing authorities played a major role in economic policy.

In Estonia, the transition from the market to the command economy happened gradually and was more or less finished after the forced collectivisation of agriculture, the largest sector of the Estonian economy, in the first half of the 1950s. Since the beginning of the process of the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s, there was an ongoing discussion on the benefits the incorporated Baltic States may have received from becoming part of the USSR. Especially industrialisation, investment, and economic growth were stressed as positive results, because in the interwar period Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were mainly agrarian. This paper tries to address some of the costs of the transition process and asks whether a country like Estonia did in fact benefit from being part of the Soviet Union. From today’s perspective, obviously economic backwardness and a low level of per capita GDP seems to be directly related with the experience of nearly half a century of command economy. Stalinist terror, the war damages, and the German occupation influenced economic performance negatively, too. This means, not all costs and losses might by ascribed to economic transition only. Still, measures like a mass deportation in 1949 with roughly 20,000 victims to prepare the country for

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4 For a broader discussion, see Mertelsmann, 2006. A recent publication provides us with some solid data series based on official statistics: Martin Klesment and Jaak Valge, eds., Eesti rahvastiku majandustegevuse näitarve XX sajandil / Estonian 20th Century Economic Indicators (Tallinn:EKDK, 2007).


6 Archival research revealed that the war damages were in fact substantially smaller than officially claimed by the Soviets. Mertelsmann, 2006, 88-93.
collectivisation had also an economic agenda and cannot be seen only under the category of terror and cleansing.\footnote{Rein Taagepera, ‘Soviet Collectivization of Estonian Agriculture: The Deportation Phase’, \textit{Soviet Studies} XXXII (1980): 379-97.}

Statistical data for independent Estonia offers with 1938 a good year of comparison, because Estonian GDP has been recalculated up to this time and a first economic census has been conducted in this very year.\footnote{Jaak Valge, ‘Uue majanduse lätteil. Eest sisemajanduse kogutoodang aastatel 1923-1938’ [On the Border of a New Economic Level: Estonian GDP 1923-1938], \textit{Akadeemia} 15 (2003): 2202-28, 2443-86, 2712-35; Riigi Statistika Keskbüroo, \textit{I majandusloendus Eestis} [The first economic census in Estonia], 4 vols. (Tallinn: Riigi trükikoda, 1939-1940).} In the post-war period the year 1955 is another good point of comparison, because post-war reconstruction was finished officially and a number of important statistics use 1955 as a benchmark year.

\section*{The human costs}

The first period of economic transition 1940-41 followed basically a timeframe developed in Eastern Poland from 1939 onwards after the region was occupied and annexed as Western Ukraine and Western Belarus by the USSR. This is revealed from the Zhdanov files in the former Party Archives in Moscow. Andrei Zhdanov served during the communist takeover in Estonia as Stalin’s plenipotentiary in the country to coordinate Sovietisation. On the 21 July 1940 he received a nine pages telegram from Moscow, which outlined the economic restructuring in Western Ukraine from summer 1939 until spring 1940.\footnote{Telegram to Zhdanov, 21 July 1940, Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’nopoliticheskoi istorii (Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, RGASPI) f. 77, o. 4, d. 40, l. 62-70.} The content of this telegram served obviously as a blueprint for the economic reforms to take place in the Baltic republics, some measures were implemented exactly one year later then in Eastern Poland.

Enterprises employing 20 or more and all banks were nationalised, bank accounts frozen, stocks and bonds confiscated. Owners of larger houses were expropriated and a maximum norm for living space per capita was introduced. The Soviets closed the borders and international trade diminished. A first land reform reduced larger farms to a maximum size of 30 hectares. Fixed prices were introduced as was state procurement at fixed, too low prices in agriculture. Apart from agriculture, roughly only one tenth of enterprises remained privately owned. With the communist take-over, inflation started and did not stop after the introduction of a new currency – the rouble. During one year, inflation was at least twice as high...
as the increase in nominal salaries. Reports on the sentiment of the population stressed that a fast decline of the standard of living was the major topic of complaining.\textsuperscript{10} Obviously, the economy was shrinking as a result of transition. In addition, the Soviets conducted a policy of plundering local resources. Exports to the ‘old republics’ of the USSR at low prices outnumbered several times imports at high prices from there. Estonia had also to take the burden to feed and to house the units of the occupying Red Army constituting of roughly 100,000 soldiers or the equivalent of nearly one tenth of the Estonian population.\textsuperscript{11}

According to the famous calculation of Soviet national income by Abram Bergson less than half of the Soviet national income of that time was used for private consumption.\textsuperscript{12} In independent Estonia private consumption consisted of approximately 75-80 percent of national income. In other words, even if the economy did not shrink, consumption was severely constrained. As a result, the standard of living fell dramatically and the crude death rate increased rapidly. This fact might be seen as a clear indicator of an economic catastrophe 1940-41. The usual crude death rate in the 1930s was between 14 and 15 cases per thousand inhabitants per year.\textsuperscript{13} The increase was so dramatic that it outnumbered the average level of the period from 1901-1914.\textsuperscript{14} In December 1940 the death rate peaked at 27.7, nearly twice the usual level. Mainly small children and the old aged composed the additional deaths.\textsuperscript{15} From January to April 1941, the rate averaged at 20.0.\textsuperscript{16} Of course, there are seasonal changes in the death rate, but such a dramatic development indicates clearly a drastic decline in nutritional standards. In a country like Estonia which was a natural food exporter with originally 0.8 hectares of land under culture and a total of 2.7 hectares agricultural land per inhabitant, food scarcity could have occurred, if the distributional system was collapsing and large amounts of food were exported to the Soviet Union or consumed by the Red Army.

\textsuperscript{10} Local reports on the sentiment of the Estonian population 1940-41, Eesti Riigiarhiivi Filiaal (Branch of the Estonian State Archives, ERAF) 1-1-45 – 1-1-59.

\textsuperscript{11} See chapter 1 in Mertelsmann, 2006, 29-74.


\textsuperscript{14} Arnold Veimer, \textit{Kompleksnoe razvitie i specializatsii promyshlennosti Estonskogo Ekonimicheskogo Administrativnogo Raiona} (Tallinn, 1961), 77.

\textsuperscript{15} Statistical information concerning the death rate in December 1940, Eesti Riigiarhiiv (Estonian State Archives, ERA) R-10-1-486, l. 1-4.

\textsuperscript{16} Analysis of mortality in the first four months of 1941, ERAF 1-1-187, l. 3.
One has to bear in mind that in 1940 per capita roughly 350 kg of rye, wheat and barley, more than one ton of potatoes, 700 litres of milk and more than 50 kg of meat were produced in Estonia.\(^ {17}\)

As a result of transition, the middle and upper classes lost property. Many former entrepreneurs or managers were arrested, deported or even killed later. Often members of their families were deported, too, or at least discriminated for decades because of their social background. For the vast majority of the population transition meant a rapid decline of the standard of living. If we are searching for answers to the question, why the German invaders were greeted as liberators in the summer of 1941, in the opinion of the author there were three main reasons: 1) Stalinist terror; 2) the loss of independence; and 3) the desperate economic situation as a result of the first year of transition.

In 1944, the Red Army re-occupied Estonia. War damages, casualties and a mass flight to the West had changed Estonia and her population. Population losses of a country with originally only 1.13 million inhabitants were enormous (see table 1) and could be compensated only by immigration of Russian speakers and return migration of ethnic Estonians. Approximately 200,000 Russians settled down in Estonia until 1959,\(^ {18}\) the year of the first Soviet population census in the country. With the beginning of collectivization in 1949, the size of rural population started to decline. At first because of a mass deportation, later the main reason was the unbearable situation on the kolkhozes. Urbanisation grew rapidly, but this should not be seen as the result of a ‘natural’ process or modernisation. For immigrants it was easier to settle down in towns and collectivised agriculture was not attractive. The peasants referred to it as a ‘second serfdom’ and tried to leave the countryside.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>854</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>305.7</td>
<td>575.3</td>
<td>881</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>363.4</td>
<td>593.7</td>
<td>957</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>415.9</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>1,022</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>439.9</td>
<td>589.2</td>
<td>1,029</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>593.7</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>516.1</td>
<td>580.6</td>
<td>1,096.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>519.1</td>
<td>568.8</td>
<td>1,087.9</td>
<td>548.4</td>
<td>555.6</td>
<td>1,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>550.1</td>
<td>563.5</td>
<td>1,113.6</td>
<td>579.5</td>
<td>542.2</td>
<td>1,129.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^ {17}\) Calculation based on Klesment, Valge, eds., 2007, 62, 66, 68.

\(^ {18}\) Mertelsmann, 2006, 129.
Without military personnel.

Columns 4 – 6 corrected after the census in 1959.

At least a part of the population losses were also a direct result of the transition to command economy and the exploitation policy of the Nazi occupiers. For three years, the birth rate was below the death rate and the recorded death rate for at least six years above normal levels (see table 2). As earlier mentioned, hunger should usually not occur in an agricultural surplus country like Estonia, because there was an abundance of land and food production would be sufficient to feed the entire population. Of course the war and infectious diseases were responsible for part of the increase in the death rate. The given table should only be seen as indicating the tendency in development, because especially the death rate was in the opinion of the author not calculated correctly. From other sources we might get slightly different data. Victims of state terror were excluded, the data on the German period seems not to be accurate and there might have been some manipulations concerning infant mortality. The decline of the death rate in the 1950s was not so much caused by increasing nutritional standards, but by a certain improvement in medical care which took place all over the Soviet Union in the post-war period. The high birth rate after the war appears to be related to two factors, a catching-up effect and a higher number of births among immigrants, who were mainly in a fertile age. According to the known statistics, approximately 40,000 additional deaths might be ascribed to low nutritional standards in the 1940s. This was nearly the size of the number of the victims of Stalinist terror, clearly outnumbered the war casualties and exceeded the amount of Estonians killed by the Nazis five times.19

Tab. 3: Registered Births and Deaths per Thousand Inhabitants, 1938-56

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Births</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Natural Growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>+ 1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>+ 1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>- 0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the entire 1940s, the population faced severe cuts in their nutritional standards and real incomes, but we do not have precise budget data. In the 1950s, the situation improved in the towns, while it worsened in the countryside thanks to collectivisation. Based on state prices, it has been estimated that average incomes had lost at least half of the purchasing power in 1955 compared to the late 1930s, but this estimation could not regard the availability of goods in an ‘economy of shortages’. Real incomes are hard to estimate for a country, where not the nominal money incomes but the accessibility of food, goods and services determined the standard of living. Because of this, budget data on food consumption provides somehow better information about living standards. In 1938, a large survey of households of industrial workers and state employees was conducted (see table 3). The peasant diet was not researched, but seemed to be quite similar to the situation of workers. The diet appears to be diverse and sufficient, while state officials were able to consume more quality food. Compared to other European countries, Estonians were obviously better fed than the majority of South and Eastern Europeans, and the Germans or the Irish. They were nearly reaching the food standards of Western European countries. Human development factors like infant mortality

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941-4</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>+ 1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>- 6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>- 0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>+ 1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>+ 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>+ 5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>+ 3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>+ 4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>+ 4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>+ 5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>+ 6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>+ 6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>+ 6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Without victims of terror or war.

Column 4 calculated based on 2 and 3.

Source: ERA R-10-43-155, l. 6.

---

indicate a similar relation.\textsuperscript{21} The share of food in Estonian household expenditure was 40 percent in 1937.\textsuperscript{22}

Tab. 3: Food Consumption of Families of Workers and State Employees in 1938 per Capita in Kilos

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Worker per year</th>
<th>Worker per month</th>
<th>State employee per year</th>
<th>State employee per month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruits</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bread</td>
<td>175.7</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>178.9</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>159.2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>180.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Having a closer look on the relation between incomes per capita and food consumption reveals that there was an important difference in food intake in 1938 (see table 4). Lower wages meant less food, but at least the average seems to be somehow sufficient. Of course, in independent Estonia there existed poverty especially among unskilled workers, smallholders and farmhands with larger families.

Tab. 4: Per Capita Food Consumption of Workers’ Households in 1938

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per capita income in Estonian crowns</th>
<th>Daily calorie intake</th>
<th>Protein</th>
<th>Fat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 and less</td>
<td>2,935</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>3,189</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-45</td>
<td>3,305</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-55</td>
<td>3,527</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-65</td>
<td>3,705</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{21} See \textit{Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich 1938} (Berlin, 1938), pp. 382-5, 307*-310*.

Comparing the data from 1938 with surveys from the early 1950s demonstrates that real incomes and food provision did not fully recover from the decline in the 1940s. This was a result of the policy of constraining consumption for the sake of investment and military expenses in the early Cold War.\textsuperscript{23} Food consumption of workers was far below of the standards of the pre-war period (see table 5). They did not go hungry in the early 1950s, but a certain lack of fats, proteins and vitamins might be seen clearly. More than before the war, the diet was based on bread and potatoes. In addition, there were current complaints on the quality of food provided by the state owned retail shops. For example, Estonians referred to Soviet bread of that time as ‘pig’s cake’. The average calorie intake per capita in Estonia was still the highest among all Soviet republics in 1954 according to Soviet statisticians.\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Year} & \textbf{Flour} & \textbf{Grey bread} & \textbf{Dark bread} & \textbf{Barley etc.} & \textbf{Pasta} & \textbf{Potatoes} & \textbf{Vegetables} & \textbf{Fresh fruits} & \textbf{Dried fruits} \\
\hline
1952 & 0.83 & 6.09 & 9.0 & 0.9 & 0.6 & 12.4 & 3.1 & 0.7 & 0.1 \\
1953 & 1.3 & 5.7 & 8.8 & 0.9 & 0.6 & 12.2 & 4.5 & 1.2 & 0.1 \\
1954 & 1.3 & 5.6 & 7.9 & 0.8 & 0.6 & 10.8 & 4.2 & 1.9 & 0.1 \\
1955 & 1.4 & 5.2 & 8.6 & 1.0 & 0.6 & 11.2 & 4.5 & 1.6 & 0.1 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Food Consumption of Estonian Worker’s Households, per Months and Capita in Kilo, 1952-56}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{23} A certain share of investment was in fact used for the military, but it did appear in the statistics as civil investment. For example the investment plan for the first half year of 1946 was only fulfilled by two thirds, 23 percent of the money was needed for military installations. Statistical overview, RGASPI f. 598, o. 1, d. 9, l. 117.

\textsuperscript{24} Elena Zubkova et al., eds., \textit{Sovetskaia Zhizn 1945-1953} (Moscow, 2003), 129.
The sources of food, except for bread, reveal that the majority was privately produced (see table 6). The prices on the kolkhoz market were substantially exceeding the ones of state retail trade. The Soviet state was unable to feed the workers and was forced to allow all sort of private economic activities to avoid starvation. Thus, private garden plots in the towns and in the countryside provided for the majority of food. Survival strategies were needed and included all sort of illegal activities from stealing state property to the black market or moonshining.\(^{25}\)

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**Tab. 6: Sources of Food for Estonian Workers 1952-6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Potatoes in kg</th>
<th>Vegetables</th>
<th>Fresh fruits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State trade</td>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Private hands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The situation of the food producers, the collectivized peasants, was even worse (see table 7). Because of collectivisation, peasants did not only loose their property and personal freedom being now tied to the kolkhoz, but also their standard of living declined. As a result, incentives to work on the kolkhoz in an efficient manner were barely existent. Several kolkhozes were so poor that collective work was not even paid at all.

Tab. 7: Peasant Food Consumption in 1952 per Capita and Month in Kilo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bread and flour</th>
<th>Barley etc.</th>
<th>Potatoes*</th>
<th>Vegetables</th>
<th>Fruits</th>
<th>Animal Fat</th>
<th>Meat</th>
<th>Fish</th>
<th>Milk</th>
<th>Eggs (pieces)</th>
<th>Sugar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Partly fed to animals.


Vassilii Popov estimates that the share of food in the household expenditure of workers and employee in the USSR in 1950 was 79 percent.26 It seems safe to argue that this share should have been at least 70 percent in the early 1950s in the Estonian case. The Estonian population was forced to

---

sacrifice potential incomes in the name of Socialist reconstruction, industrialisation, and the Cold War. While Western Europe could recover much earlier from the war during the first half of the 1950s partly due to American support, it took longer in many parts of Eastern Europe. Obviously the transition to the command economy played a key role in the delay in the Estonian case. One might ask whether sacrificing incomes for investment did pay off in the perspective of long-term economic growth.

In addition to lower real incomes and the temporary increase of the death rate, there were other human costs caused by the transition. Traditional rural life was destroyed by the collectivisation. Because the Stalinist state did not bother to construct sufficient housing for a rapidly growing urban population, urban living space per capita declined from 15.5 square meters in 1940 to 8.8 in 1955.\(^{27}\) The population in general was impoverished; the largest material losses were inflicted to members of the former middle and upper classes, but for the poor – especially the elderly and large families – transition could pose an existential threat. While we know a lot about the scale of political persecution, an unknown number of people – obviously more than 20,000 – was sent to the work camps or to prison because of ‘crimes’ conducted as a result of poverty and economic transition: peasants, who could not pay the high taxes imposed on them or did not fulfil their norms of ‘forced’ labour in wood cutting and road maintenance; ‘speculators’ and black market traders; people, who stole because of hunger; or victims of the draconian labour laws. In Stalin’s Soviet Union after the war, the number of those ‘criminals’ exceeded the number of political prisoners several times.\(^{28}\)

**Economic performance of the different sectors**

Since Socialist economies operated with so-called unchanged fixed prices and official growth statistics seem not to be very reliable, it is quite difficult to throw a glimpse on their performance. For the Soviet Union exist different estimates which indicate general trends. In the case of Estonian agriculture one might use data on physical production of certain products to understand the general development. For industry, statistics on gross production at fixed prices are available. Concerning the service sector, employment offers some help. It is quite clear that such kind of data


\(^{28}\) For the period 1946-1952, Donald Filtzer offers a figure of 495,000 convictions for political crimes and 4.8 million criminal offenders for the entire USSR. Roughly 34,000 Estonians were arrested during Stalinism for political reasons. Following the figures of Filtzer, approximately 25,000 Estonians might have been convicted for criminal offences.
might form only the base for a rough estimation, while we have much more information concerning independent Estonia. According to the calculations of Jaak Valge, the distribution of employment and the GDP in different sectors in 1938 shows that the country was still mainly agrarian (see table 8). The highest per capita GDP was reached in industry and services, the lowest in agriculture, but differences were not huge.

Tab. 8: Distribution of Employment and GDP in Estonia in 1938

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Million crowns</td>
<td>Employment in percent</td>
<td>Million crowns</td>
<td>Employment in percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total in million crowns</td>
<td>250.1</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>130.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Valge, Uue majanduse lätteil, pp. 2451, 2718.

When regarding the development of agriculture until the 1950s, one has to divide it into two different periods: before and after collectivisation. Up to 1949, agriculture was privately owned and run except for state farms (sovkhozes). A second land reform after the first one in 1940 was finished in 1947. Peasants had to deliver part of the production at fixed prices to the state, had to pay increasing agricultural taxes often in kind and were able to consume or market the rest. Since 140,000 farms were hard to control there was room to evade at least partly from state procurement and taxation. In independent Estonia, agricultural prices were mainly related to the world market price. Under Soviet rule, a price system with several layers evolved for agricultural products: fixed state procurement prices, sales to state institutions or enterprises at higher prices, and market or black market prices. Since wholesale trade was in control of the state, private marketing faced enormous difficulties like the lack of transport or the threat being called a ‘speculator’. This increased transaction cost and reduced the amount of marketable products. In addition, because of the scarcity of consumer goods peasants could not buy much for the money they earned on the market. Thus incentives for agricultural production declined. In addition, isolating the country from the outside world meant that new machinery, tools, spare parts, fodder and fertiliser could only be purchased at a reduced scale – if at all. There is evidence that peasant ceased to invest in their capital stock since 1940 because of their unclear future perspective.\(^{29}\) Lack of labour force thanks to population losses

\(^{29}\) This was noted for example by the contemporary eye-witness Paul Hinnov in a manuscript from 1960 which could be published only nearly 40 years later. Paul Hinnov, Kui need talud tapeti [When those Farms were killed], (Tartu, 1999), 13-4.
hampered production, too. Collectivisation reduced private agriculture to small garden plots of the size of roughly 0.5 hectares per kolkhoz family. The state was able to purchase more agricultural output at fixed prices which were below production costs. Thanks to low or non-existent incomes there were few incentives to work on the kolkhoz and garden plots became basically the only location of intensified agricultural production.\textsuperscript{30} The Soviet calculation of the national income of the Estonian SSR for 1955 put the net value of private agricultural production as being twice as high as the net output of kolkhozes and sovkhozes together.\textsuperscript{31} The main purpose of collectivisation was channelling incomes from agriculture into other sectors, referred to as ‘primitive socialist accumulation’.\textsuperscript{32}

Since meat and milk production were crucial for Estonian agriculture, the number of farm animals is a first indicator of the development (see table 9). Compared to 1939, there was a substantial decline and military action in the summer of 1941 and in fall 1944 left also a trace. Obviously, the animal population could not recover to the pre-war level thanks to the circumstances of the command economy. But the number of farm animals is still overstating potential animal production, because for example weight at slaughter or milk production per cow is also important and did decline substantially. Official time series of meat production seem not to be plausible at all given the decline of the number of farm animals and the availability of fodder.\textsuperscript{33} In addition, in many kolkhozes farm animals starved to death each spring during the 1950s.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Farm Animals in Estonia in Thousands 1939-1956}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & Cattle (total) & Cows & Pigs & Sheep and goats \\
\hline
1.7.1939 & 675.4 & 458.9 & 425.9 & 657.9 \\
1940 & 597 & 419 & 371 & 488 \\
1.1.1941 & 504.8 & 382.4 & 290.4 & 316.1 \\
1943 & 460 & No data & 274 & 258 \\
End of 1944 & 336 & 193 & 169 & 206 \\
1945 & 401 & 226 & 196 & 264 \\
1946 & 410 & 234 & 201 & 250 \\
1947 & 436 & 248 & 237 & 264 \\
1948 & 445 & 259 & 232 & 268 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{31} ERA R-10-19-1, l. 8.
\textsuperscript{33} For the official data see Klesment, Valge, eds., 2007, 68.
The following tables offers a glimpse on the situation of milk production which declined due to a lack of fodder (see tables 10 and 11). A first decline happened in the 1940s, a second one after collectivisation. The same might be said for the weight at slaughter. Because of manipulation of statistics the official total output data is not helpful for measuring animal production, since it was heavily overstated in the opinion of the author. When estimating with the help of available information, milk production declined from 1940 to 1955 by more than a half, meat production fell by more than 40 percent.

### Tab. 10: Milk per Cow 1940/41 – 1947/48

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Milk per cow in kilo</th>
<th>Number of controlled cows</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940/41</td>
<td>2,924</td>
<td>62,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944/45</td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td>15,147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945/46</td>
<td>2,257</td>
<td>16,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946/47</td>
<td>2,187</td>
<td>18,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947/48</td>
<td>2,311</td>
<td>21,416</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ERAF 1-47-49, l. 69.

### Tab: 11: Milk per Cow in the kolkhoz ‘Ühisjõud’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Milk per cow in kilo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>1,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1,299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Crop production faced a similar development. The structure of the use of land changed in favour of lower income crops (see table 12). Meanwhile, the size of land under culture declined as well from approximately 900,000
hectares in 1940 to roughly 700,000 hectares after the war. Concerning the size of land under culture, there were huge manipulations in official statistics, but data from the Statistical Office seems to be the most reliable which indicates such a decline. In addition, this developments seems logical in regards to diminishing incentives, workforce and draft power.

Tab. 12: Structure of Land under Culture 1940-1955 in Percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1955</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fodder</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes and vegetables</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical cultures</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Even official data series demonstrate a tremendous fall in grain production (see table 13). Of course, the weather influenced grain output as did the lack of fertiliser, draft power or workforce. Still, the major reasons seem to be less effort by the peasants after collectivisation and the reduction of the size of the sown area. In this series the drop of the size of land under culture was not included, thus, total grain output seemed to be in fact one fifth smaller.

Tab. 13: Official Grain Harvest Data and estimated Net Harvest 1940 and 1945-56

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Grain harvest in thousand tons (gross)</th>
<th>Grain harvest in thousand tons (net)</th>
<th>Per hectare in tsentner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

34 See Statistical overview, ERA R-10-43-124, l. 3; Karotamm to Malenkov, 26. October 1949, ERAF 1-14-113, l. 71-2; Documents for the protocol of the meeting of the Central Committee Bureau of the Estonian Communist Party, 28. September 1950, ERAF 1-4-1045, l. 17
To sum it up, agricultural output declined substantially as a result of the transition. This situation was already known to contemporary researchers, but the newly available sources allow the conclusion that the fall in production was even larger than expected. This result does not astonish, since collectivisation in the Soviet Union led to a man-made famine, a kind of catastrophe Estonia was spared of. In the Soviet case, Stalinist industrialisation has been stressed at least as one ‘positive’ result of the command economy. So maybe the agricultural decline was compensated by industrial growth. Official data of industrial gross production (this is total output at fixed prices) might suggest a kind of fast transformation from an agrarian into an industrial society (see table 14).

Tab. 14: Official Index of Industrial Gross Production, 1940-55

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Estonia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>3.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


At the first glance the increase of production by 6.7 times seems to be a miracle and the index needs explanation. Actually, Soviet fixed prices were introduced in industry only step by step. In case of the base year 1940, accounting was originally done in Estonian crowns at prices of 1939 and simply converted at the official Soviet exchange rate of 1.25 roubles per crown into Soviet fixed prices. Since a realistic conversion into plan prices would be 6 roubles for 1 crown, the index starts with an extreme underestimation of the base year. In addition, there were certain index problems and hidden price inflation was included in Soviet production

36 Meeting in the ESSR People’s Commissariat of Light Industry, January 1941, ERA R-12-1-31, l. 58.
Since the major target for Soviet managers was to fulfil the output plan in roubles, they had incentives to shift to more lucrative products, offering a higher fixed price which required less efforts and real inputs. Because of the fact that at the beginning of the base year the variety of products was determined by market conditions, Estonian managers had room to shift production during time. For example, the furniture producer ‘Rahvamõöbel’ could increase output per worker at fixed prices by 7.6 times and the metal factory ‘Metallmärk’ by 5.4 times during the period of 1940-47, applying obviously this technique.39

More doubts concerning ‘industrial growth’ occur when regarding different factors. In the post-war period the infrastructure in Estonia was not improved sufficiently compared to the pre-war times.40 According to official data, industrial employment increased until 1955 to roughly 125,000.41 But this is not a rise in comparison to the 19.8 percent of employment in the secondary sector in 1938 offered by Jaak Valge.42 Soviet industrial employment included a large amount of employees and by melting small enterprises and artisans into trusts, people, who have been not counted as industrial workers in the 1930s, became included. The industrial workforce was like their managers not well prepared and inexperienced.43 Mark Harrison has argued that the productivity per Soviet worker did not increase substantially during the period of 1928 to 1950.44 The decline of the standard of living in Estonia was a factor which could not improve the motivation of workers. In fact, turnover rates and absenteeism reached a peak in 1947, when in Republican enterprises 12 percent of the workers were absent and three thirds of the workers changed the place of employment.45 In other words, it is highly doubtful that the composition, motivation, and size of the workforce were responsible for industrial growth. In addition, investment and new technology were not provided to a sufficient extent to recover from the war damages and the

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39 For more examples see statistical overview, ERAF 1-47-38, l. 28-31.
40 Centralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie ESSR, Estonskaia SSR za gody sovetskoi vlasti (Tallinn, 1967), 105.
41 Statistical overview, ERA R-1-5-406, l. 5.
42 Valge 2003, 2451.
45 Statistical overview, ERA R-12-3-27, l. 11-3; report by Gosplan of the ESSR, 4 December 1948, ERAF 1-7-27, l. 33.
losses of capital stock until the second half of the 1950s.\footnote{See Mertelsmann 2003} As mentioned above, part of industrial investment was in reality consumed by the military, a certain amount of large projects were finished only years later and misallocation of capital into the wrong industries did take place substantially.

It is difficult to estimate when industrial output reached again the pre-war level, but in the opinion of the author it is even possible that it happened only at the end of the 1950s. The rapid industrial growth officially announced did obviously not happen. The reduction of consumption did not lead to expected results, because the investment did not create fast growth. The command economy was unable to provide the institutional setting for a sustainable development in the post-war period in Estonia. In addition, the Soviet Union favoured heavy industry over light industry producing consumer goods.

Because Soviet fixed prices did not mirror sufficiently production costs, the scarcity of resources and demand, the probability of wrong resource allocation grew the longer the command economy existed. In fact, it was not even always possible to decide whether an industrial plant was a constant loss maker or was profitable.\footnote{See Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes: \textit{Russia’s Virtual Economy} (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2002), 47-9.} In post-war Estonia for example, the oil shale industry was given high priority and absorbed 40 percent of entire investment.\footnote{Kalev Kukk, ‘Industry’, Juhan Kahk (ed.), \textit{World War II and Soviet Occupation in Estonia: A Damages Report} (Tallinn, 1991), 64.} Under market conditions in the inter-war period, oil shale mining and processing received subsidies and were protected by tariffs,\footnote{Jaak Valge, ‘Riiklik põlevkivitööstuse majandustingimused ja -tulemused 1920. ja 1930. aastatel’, \textit{Akadeemia} 7 (1995), 1712-1740, 1929-1949.} it might be doubtful whether this industry was ever profitable in the given period, but the Soviets even increased the scale. Apart from making the wrong economic decision and burdening the country up to today with industrial dinosaurs, the use of oil shale inflicted enormous environmental damages.\footnote{The use of oil shale as a source of energy is only profitable, when energy prices are high like in recent years. In regards of the natural resources of the Soviet Union, the exploitation of Estonian oil shale made economically only sense in the immediate post-war situation, when many coal fields could not be operated due to war damages.} The enormous expansion of the oil shale industry, which triggered immigration into the mining region, might clearly be seen as a negative result of transition.

If agriculture did suffer from transition and industry did not recover quickly, maybe the service sector could benefit? Indeed, a large expansion
of services happened, because of an increase in the provision of public goods like medical care, education, science or culture. In addition, operating a non-market economy created the need for a large bureaucracy, and employment in defence or security in the USSR was highly above a normal level. Since in the system of fixed prices, services were due to ideological reasons to a large extent undervalued, estimations of the importance of the service sector have to take the employment structure into consideration (see table 15).

Tab. 15: Distribution of Estonian Workforce according to the Plan 1955 in Thousands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total (“Labour reserve”)</th>
<th>702.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.) Employment in state or cooperative institutions</td>
<td>356.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of this in: Industry</td>
<td>122.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and communication</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovkhozes and forestry</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.) Cooperatives of craftsmen</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.) Kolkhozes</td>
<td>154.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.) Learning, 16 and older</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.) Independent farmers and craftsmen</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.) Working age population employed at home or in private economy (“domashnie ili lichnoe khozaistvo“)</td>
<td>139.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Mainly garden plots, but also petty trade and other forms of minor employment.

Without military and security.

Source: ERA R-1-5-406, l. 5-6.

Based on table 15 and including the Estonian share in the armed forces, one might estimate the size of employment in the single sectors. The primary sector should include the majority of those persons being “employed at home or in private economy”, too, because they were taking care of the garden plots and private farm animals. A minority of the last category belonged to the service sector working for example as self-employed petty traders. Thus approximately one fifth of the workforce was employed in industry and two fifth in agriculture and roughly the same amount in services. One has to add that a large share of the non-agrarian population was generating additional incomes on private garden plots which might have been for a certain time even more important than their
salaries. This was for example the case of the majority of teachers in the countryside. Nearly the total rural population and approximately half of the urban households possessed some kind of garden plots.

Compared to 1938 when one fourth of the workforce had been employed in services, the share of service employment rose substantially. This implies that the sector should have faced some real growth which could not be said about agriculture and industry. While per capita GDP in industry and services seemed to be quite similar before the war (see table 8 above), the situation in 1955 was obviously different. According to wage statistics, incomes in services fell far below the level of industry in the 1950s.\(^51\) While higher ranking administrators were well paid, the mass of bureaucrats received low salaries. Medicine, culture, or education lost substantially ground. Compared to the pre-war period, educational levels of physicians, teachers or scientists had declined, while their number increased. Many people faced marginal employment in services. Because of the inefficient institutions, more persons were needed to adjust the deficits of the command economy. For example the volume of retail trade was much smaller, because of lower real incomes, still more people were employed in the state trade sector or worked as petty traders to sell less goods than before the war. This increased transaction costs and the number of persons receiving marginal incomes. It might be argued that like in other sectors productivity per capita declined in the service sector.\(^52\)

According to a Soviet calculation of the national income of the Estonian SSR, net production reached 4.6 billion roubles (see table 16). Usually in Soviet publications gross production was used which measured total output without reducing this figure by costs or inputs of each sector. Thus, net production seems to be a better indicator. Because the fixed prices reflect the preferences of the planers, industrial output was overrated, agriculture and the service sector undervalued. A direct comparison with the pre-war GDP at market prices in crowns seems nearly impossible. In the opinion of the author, on the average one Estonian crown should be the equivalent of approximately 10-12 roubles at current plan prices of 1955.

\(^{51}\) Veimer, Kompleksnoe razvitie, 328.
\(^{52}\) See chapter 7 in Mertelsmann, 2006, 241-56.
Tab. 16: Official Estimation of Gross and Net Production per Sector at Current Plan Prices in Million Roubles and of the Distribution of Workforce in 1955

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Gross Production</th>
<th>Net Production</th>
<th>Estimated Distribution of Workforce in Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2,675</td>
<td>1,473</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>6,532</td>
<td>1,993</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,907</td>
<td>1,157</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11,114</td>
<td>4,623</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Net production = gross production less costs

Column 4: estimation by the author.

Source: National income 1955, ERA R-10-19-1, 3; estimation based on ERA R-1-5-406, l. 5-6.

Transition to command economy implied cutting down international trade and the exchange of technological innovation. Less economic integration meant a rise in tendencies of autarchy of single households, enterprises, ministries or regions. The command economy needed a special way of managing enterprises, based on plan fulfilment and not economic efficiency. Special solutions developed to cope with the situation, but those topics should be discussed in a different paper. After the transition to command economy was finished, Estonia participated in the general development pattern of the Soviet Union. Under Khrushchev and in the early Brezhnev years continuous economic growth and a steady improvement of the standard of living led to the image of the ‘Golden Sixties’, arguably the best period in Soviet history. In the second half of the 1970s the setting was replaced by ‘stagnation’, which meant in the economic sphere a slow-down of growth.

**Conclusion**

Because of the transition to command, Estonia could not recover from the war even ten years after the end of fighting. The conditions did not allow for rapid real growth. In the opposite, agricultural policy destroyed the potential of growth and reduced output substantially. Consumption was constrained in the name of investment and defence. This caused thousands of additional deaths and a dramatic decline in the standard of living in the 1940s, but led to no positive results. On the long run, the

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country was brought on a less efficient path of development. Transition to command economy was something like the worst possible scenario. Concerning the population, Stalinist command economy in the 1940s had a similar outcome like Nazi exploitation policy during German occupation. Only in the 1950s should the situation substantially improve, first in the towns and in the second half of the decade in the countryside, too. Seen in the perspective of the last century, the transition to command is clearly responsible for Estonia’s weaker economic performance in comparison to countries which have been considerably poorer in the 1930s like Spain, Portugal or Greece. The catch-up process of the inter-war period ended and the gap to more developed economies widened thanks to the transition to command economy. Only after regaining independence, Estonia could successfully continue to catch-up after a second, post-socialist transition. The future will show, when the levels of Estonian GDP and incomes will reach the average of the European Union, but there should be no doubt that without the experience of the command economy the country would have followed at least the example of Southern Europe.

TO BE OR TO BECOME ‘EUROPEAN’? ‘WESTERNIZING’ NARRATIVES IN POST-COLD WAR FINLAND

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Abstract:
The Finnish ‘westernizing’ narrative emphasizes Finland’s ‘westernness’, i.e. the idea that Finland and Finns have always been western and part of the ‘European family’. The recent past is not seen as an obstacle for this interpretation. Thus, according to this type of discourse, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and ‘liberated’ from the constraints of the Cold War, Finland could finally ‘return’ to the West, to Europe, to its ‘natural’ origins. This article examines in short what might be called the post-Cold War narrative of Finnish westernness as it appears in the English language sources. It argues that the westernizing narrative is very important in justifying Finland’s post-Cold War position in the international politics, especially its position in the European politics. The article is divided in two parts. The first one examines the narrative of the westernness of Finland, Finns or Finnish ‘identity’ as it appears in some scientific writings, press materials and political texts. Within this narrative an important element is the re-evaluation of Finland’s international position during the Cold War. Therefore, the Finnish security ‘solution’ – by some called ‘Nordic and neutral identity’ – is either criticized, attacked and characterized as an aberration and betrayal of the ‘Finnish western identity’, or accepted as the only possible ‘instrument for pursuing national security interests’ in those times. The second part of the article advances some explanations for this narrative and addresses questions such as: why was it developed, by whom, and how successful was it? The article shows how highly political is the (re)presentation of Finnish history

1 Sami Moisio and Vilho Harle argue that the Finnish neutrality policy ‘represents not identity or identity politics per se but rather a realistic foreign policy’. Sami Moisio and Vilho Harle, ‘The Limits of Geopolitical Remote Sensing’ Eurasian Geography and Economics, 47, No. 2 (2006): 208
and how much its ‘western character’ is related to Finland’s current political situation and goals in Europe. It also reveals how important the ideology is in backing a political choice.

Rezumat:
Discursul întoarcerii către Occident în Finlanda, subliniază ideea că Finlanda și finlandezii au fost dintotdeauna occidentali și parte a “familiei europene”. Conform acestei interpretări, după colapsul Uniunii Sovietice și “eliberată” de constrângerile impuse de realitățile Războiului Rece, Finlanda a putut în sfârșit să se întoarcă spre vest, către Europa, către originile sale “naturale”. Acest articol tratează pe scurt ceea ce s-ar putea numi discursul post-Război Rece al întoarcerii Finlaniei către Occident, așa cum apare el în sursele de limbă engleză. Se susține ideea că acest discurs este un element foarte important în justificarea politicii internaționale pe care a dus-o Finlanda mai ales pe plan european după sfârșitul Războiului Rece. Articolul este structurat în două părți. Cea dintâi prezintă acest discurs așa cum apare el în texte științifice, declarații politice sau materiale de presă, arătând cum este (re)prezentată istoria Finlandei în acest proces. Iar cea de-a doua propune o serie de explicații privind cauzele dezvoltării acestui tip de discurs. Articolul arată cât de puternic sunt influențate de factorul politic scrierea și interpretarea istoriei finlandeze.

Keywords: Finland, European Union, westernizing narratives, finlandization debate

Introduction
Anywhere in the world, debates are predominantly for the domestic public. In Finland, as anywhere else, any type of debate takes place in the official/national languages – in this case Finnish and, to a minor extent, Swedish. The ‘westernizing’ narrative is in Finland present in historical or political writings, official documents, newspapers, journals, magazines, parliament minutes, seminar proceedings, TV interviews, political campaigns etc. Concerning the language of the debate, I assume that the importance and nature of the sources in the Finnish language differ to some extent from publications in the English language. The findings of this article are unfortunately limited by the low number of sources available in English on the topic of the ‘westernizing’ narrative in Finland. Nevertheless, four types of primary sources are used in this respect, hence all published in English: 1) articles and books written by Finnish scholars, 2) texts by Finnish present or former politicians or diplomats, 3) materials published by the government of Finland, and 4) other materials: press
comments, university students’ papers etc. A fundamental problem in regard to this material is related to its representativeness. In other words, how representative is the material available in English for the ‘westernizing’ narrative in Finland? Although I limited my research to materials produced only by Finnish authors (scholars, politicians, journalists), another problem raises, namely the ‘committed’ quality that many of them have. Some are politically active scholars with strong personal ambitions. Others are very conservative historians. Some are politicians dedicated to certain political projects within which the argumentation is presented as ‘facts’, as hard evidence of the Finnish history or Finnish European/western ‘identity’. Others are students brought up with this type of discourse. How much of their background can be known by a foreigner? How many of them were politically motivated? Are they consciously trying to construct through this discourse a new form of identity? Or they just believe that this identity exists by itself and now they have the conditions to express it. I cannot pretend that the article could exceed all these problems. Therefore, its limited purpose is only to present in short the narrative of Finnish westernness as it appears in the English language sources. One might ask why the question of the Finnish westernizing narrative, as it appears in the English language sources, needs to be addressed. The answer lies in two levels. Even though these sources do not offer a complete and accurate image of the westernizing narrative as it is in Finland, they still offer the image of how Finns (at the official state level at least) want to be seen by the non-Finns, by the European (English language) readers. On the other hand, the westernizing narrative is present not only in Finland, but – more or less – in the entire former Eastern Europe and an insight – however modest – in the Finnish case could be of interest for the study of this post-Cold War European phenomenon.

1. What is the ‘westernizing’ narrative?

The term westernizing narrative\(^2\) describes in this paper a set of ideas and beliefs according to which Finland has always been European and Western, it always aspired to Europe and to the West, it has always been part of the ‘European family’ in terms of civilization, culture, values. Many contemporaries – scholars, historians, political scientists, economists, journalists, but also politicians – developed and/or accepted this line of interpretation. In the foreword of his 1999 book, *Europe’s Northern Frontier: Perspectives on Finland’s Western Identity*, Tuomas Lehtonen

\(^2\) I use interchangeably the terms ‘westernizing narrative’ and ‘westernizing discourse’ in this text.
wrote that Finland after the end of the Cold War ‘has taken its natural place as part of western Europe to which is bound by centuries of history’.3 O. Kivinen advances a similar idea. According to him, Finland had to enter the EU in order to defend its political identity and values, its shared European history and philosophical tradition. Thus, membership was fundamental since Finland’s western values were not necessarily always evident for the West Europeans.4 Moreover, J. Tarkka showed in 1994 that Finland had not only to join the EU, but to join the EU simultaneously with Austria and Sweden. Had it joined the EU later, with the former socialist European countries, it would have proved that it had been part of the socialist bloc.5 Therefore, by timing its membership application correctly, Finland could prove that Finlandisation was based on false beliefs perpetrated by others and that the ‘natural’ tendency of the Finns was towards the West.6

This is also the official, state position in Finland. After the accession to the European Union, President Martti Ahtisaari claimed that by supporting the Western integration Finland rejoined the ‘correct’ family of nations.7 According to the Finnish Government Report on EU Policy published in April 2009, the European ‘membership’ [of Finland] has not only offered the means to promote Finland’s agenda, but has also represented a fundamental choice based on a particular set of values. EU membership has firmly anchored Finland in the European community to which it naturally belongs in terms of its social and political systems, historical heritage and values’.8 Another example is offered by Finland’s president Tarja Halonen. In a speech held at the National Library of Estonia on September 9, 2003, Halonen made the following consideration: ‘today our languages [Finnish and Estonian] bears traces of our history and cultural relations with other nations. Both Finnish and Estonian include plenty of loan words from European languages. These are a living reminder that both countries have always been part of Europe. Sometimes interaction has been quite intense.

3 Tuomas M.S. Lehtonen, Europe’s Northern Frontier: Perspectives on Finland’s Western Identity (Jyväskylä: PS Kustannus, 1999), 5
5 J. Tarkka, ‘Äänen paino’ Suomen Kuvalehti, 36 (9 September 1994): 71
6 Moisio, 2008, 77-93
When our continent has gone through hard times, our links to Europe have also suffered.9

Despite this official pro-West discourse, some considered neutrality a better option for post-Cold War Finland. Thus, during the 1990s, the debate concerning Finland’s membership divided the Finnish society in two major groups, called ‘traditionalists’ and ‘westernizers’. While the traditionalists emphasized neutrality, loyalty and nonalignment as the best way to guarantee the security of the Finnish state, the westernizers supported the idea of a political alliance with western countries. Westernizers emphasized the cultural difference and the threat posed by Russia as reasons to create political ties with the West. Their intention was to distance Finland from the neighboring country’s culture and sphere of influence. For the westerners, EU membership was a historical opportunity to return ‘home’, to the West, from the dark Russian East. While the East represented everything negative from the past, the westernisers portrayed the West as the sphere to which the ‘Finnish nation’ had belonged for the past ‘one thousand years’. By refusing EU membership, the westernizers argued, Finland would drop off the political map of Europe and find itself once more in the ‘wrong’ reference group of states.10 The westernizers were clearly supported by the national media. Helsingin Sanomat,11 Suomen Kuvalehti (Helsinki), Aamulehti (Tampere) and Turun Sanomat (Turku) were all in favor, and they became important players in the EU debate. The largest political parties – the Finnish Social Democratic Party, the National Coalition and the Finnish Centre – officially supported integration.

They all claimed Finland’s ‘natural’ westerness. This implied or led to the necessity to revise past policies and histories. Scholars reviewed the main historical and political events of the state and/or nation, and many identified within them the elements of a ‘natural path’ towards Western Europe and the Finns’ Western European origin and identity. The re-writing of history from this ‘westernizing’ perspective went so far that even the question of the racial origins of Finns has been revised by some to fit into the western paradigm. Thus, during the 1990s, many Finnish scholars played down Finland’s genetic eastern origins. This question of how Finns

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10 Moisio, 2008, 77-93


should be understood in terms of genetics was always controversial. By the beginning of the 1990s, generally it was accepted the idea that genetically Finns were ¾ western and ¼ eastern or Uralians. Pertti Antonen analyzes the evolution of how Finns’ genetic origin is presented by some Finnish scholars. According to him, ‘the emphasis on the Westernness of the Finns is a recent phenomenon’ related to Finland’s European accession. Antonen notes that in their 1962 edition of A History of Finland, Jutikkala and Pirinen considered that ‘Finns are part of the East Baltic race and partially the Nordic race’. In the 1996 edition of the same book they stated that ‘genetic research indicates that the genes carried by the Finnish population are ¾ European [read western] and ¼ Uralian or Siberian’, while in the 2003 edition the idea that Finns are eastern was dropped altogether.

Another scholar who considers that Finns are either hardly eastern or completely European is Aira Kemiläinen. She criticizes the previous racial theories that placed Finns among the ‘barbarian’ Mongolian nations and tries in return to prove that Finns cannot be left out of the ‘good’, ‘white’, civilized European nations. According to Eduard Dutton, Kemiläinen constructed in fact a myth of the Finnish westernness in genetic terms. Dutton also shows how the European idea has become especially significant since Finland joined the European Union in 1995. In his opinion, by developing the thesis (he calls it myth) of the Finnish Europeanness, Kemiläinen’s book Finns in the Shadow of the ‘Aryans’ does not take into consideration the scientific evidence. Dutton identifies two reasons. On the one hand, there is the ‘Finnish insecurity’ of some ‘about race and Europeanness’ and their ‘attempts to promote – regardless of the evidence – the idea that Finns are “European”’. On the other, there is the intention to promote in Europe the image Finland wants to have. Precisely because the book is in English, says Dutton, ‘reflects how the author and her backers would like Finland to be perceived by the non-Finns’. In this regard, Dutton emphasizes that Aira Kemiläinen’s book was published in 1998 by a substantially government-funded publisher, The Finnish Historical Society, and thus ‘is likely to reflect the worldview of the elite that fund it’. The volume was re-published in 2000 by the Finnish Literature Society, a

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13 See for instance, Eino Jutikkala, Kaukko Pirinen, A History of Finland (Helsinki: WSOY, 1996), 21
14 Pertti Anttonen, Tradition through Modernity: Postmodernism and the Nation State in Folklore Scholarship (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2005), 132
16 Aira Kemiläinen, 1998, 58-59
government-funded organization run by established academics and is therefore very likely to reflect the cultural view favored by the Finnish establishment – a view that Finns are ‘Western’ – in its academic publishing. 17

Although the revision of the genetic origin of Finns is spectacular, probably the most visible historical revision in the sense of the Finnish westernness is found in the reevaluation of Finland’s Cold War international stand. After decades of an Eastern oriented foreign and strategic policy, a natural question raised, precisely how European/western could Finland claim to be considering its (recent) past? How could the new West oriented policy be legitimized taking into consideration the way Finns saw themselves and their relation to the world by then?

Concerning Finland’s Cold War foreign policy, there are two revisionist discourses within the westernizing narrative. The first one considers – more or less implicitly – that Finland Cold War international stand did not represent a betrayal of the Finnish westernness, but rather a pragmatic solution that, according to some, also allowed Finland to be as western as possible. Scholars and politicians alike supported this view. Teija Tiilikainen is one of the scholars. In a 1996 article, Tiilikainen considered that Finland’s policy of concession with the Soviet Union was shaped by the two presidents Paasikivi and Kekonnen ‘with broad [internal] political support’. The author stressed that this policy ‘was legitimized by the legacy of Finland’s recent wartime experiences’ and that, despite the pro-Soviet orientation, Finland ‘never completely lacked a Western orientation’. 18

From this perspective, the Finnish Cold War policy was justified by the international context of the moment, especially by the geopolitical position of the state. Finland had to develop during those times ‘a cautious attitude towards the Western political and economic cooperation’ and a policy of neutrality designed to keep the country out of the eventual conflicts occurring between superpowers. 19

Kari Möttölä, Sami Moisio, Vilho Harle and Tapani Paavonen are few of the scholars that represent this line of interpretation. According to Möttölä, ‘during the Cold War, the policy of neutrality – and military non-alliance

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and non-involvement in great-power disputes, complemented by active international diplomacy and constructive cooperation with neighbors — served Finland effectively as an instrument for pursuing national security interests and promoting wider international causes. For Moisio and Harle ‘the “between East and West” realistic foreign policy introduced by Kekkonen (and his predecessor J. K. Paasikivi) during the Cold War years’ should be seen ‘as a pragmatic assessment of the need for Finland to deal with the Soviet Union in realistic terms’. For Tapani Paavonen, from the late 1950s onwards, ‘Finland mainly observed the progress of [international] situation in order to join the general West European development at the moment when a concrete solution was at hand and the content of arrangements could be outlined’. He also argues that, for the Cold War period, Finnish ‘organizations of the consensus society, representing the large majority of citizens, were generally supporters of Western integration’.

Politicians also supported the thesis that Finland, despite its pro-Eastern policy, kept during the Cold War a Western orientation. For example, in 2002 Paavo Lipponen, the Prime Minister of Finland, considered that ‘the accession of Finland to the European Union in 1995 was a logical and decisive step in Finland’s long-standing policy of participation in European integration. Successive governments have pursued that policy with success since the time of the last war’. Another example is given again by the President of the Republic, Tarja Halonen. In a lecture held at the University of Jyväskylä, on November 13, 2006, Halonen declared that during the Cold War ‘our [Finnish] foreign and security policy has been successful. We managed to retain our independence and freedom of action in highly difficult circumstances’. In a more recent speech held at the gala dinner hosted by the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on November 24, 2008, President Tarja Halonen declared that ‘Finland’s accession to the European

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21 Sami Moisio and Vilho Harle 2006, 208
22 Tapani Paavonen, ‘The Period of Free Trade Integration in Finland’s Relationship to Western Europe’ (paper presented at The XIV International Economic History Congress, Helsinki, August 21-25, 2006)
Union in 1995 has deepened our bilateral [Finnish-Danish] relations. We have also visibly become members of the same family’, 25 ‘also visibly’ meaning that until this moment Finland was a member of the European family, but, for different geopolitical reasons, this western character was less visible.

Former politicians were even more tempted then the present politicians to support this kind of interpretation. They needed to justify and legitimize a policy that became challengeable once the Cold War ended. Thereby, the former Finnish Minister for Foreign Trade, Jermu Laine, in a public debate held at the University of Helsinki in May 2005 on the phenomenon of finlandization, stated that ‘the major goal’ of the policy of that moment ‘was to integrate Finland with the West, and to that end, it was necessary to be adaptable’. 26 Max Jokobson, a former Finnish diplomat, considered also that neutrality represented Finland’s solution to avoid its involvement into superpower conflicts. 27 Both Laine and Jakobson were actively involved in the foreign policy of the state during the Cold War. How they present now the past policy is difficult to interpret. Are their statements expressions of what they believe? Or their claims are mainly meant to justify a questionable past political attitude that creates now a sentiment of guilt and therefore the necessity of a public justification? In my opinion, the statements of former politicians or diplomats express more than just – real or not – personal beliefs. They are also the expression of a social trend. As Henrik Larsen argues, actors and their beliefs cannot be in opposition to the world, to the ‘reality’, they rather adapt to the social beliefs that constitute a central framework. 28 Hence, their interpretation could be very well designed to justify a ‘blamable’ personal past attitude, or they could represent their ‘real’ current beliefs within the social trend of the moment. Or they could be both.

To summarize, this discourse considers that the neutrality policy and the position of being in between was therefore simply a strategic tool to


27 Max Jakobson, Finland in the New Europe (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 52

28 Henrik Larsen, Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 10
keep the Soviet Union at a distance, whilst also facilitating the country’s steady integration with the economic institutions of the west. But, as Cristopher S. Browning showed, ‘seeing neutrality this way, denies that Finland was ever really between East and West at all’, and suggest that it ‘was rather a western outpost fighting its own largely misunderstood battle against the East. The argument is then that, with the end of the Cold War, Finland geopolitical position has changed and Finland no longer needs to be so careful in its policy and it can instead adopt the “western” orientation that it always desired’.29 According to this view, Finland’s Cold War political elite should be praised and not criticized. The argument is that the political elite did not sell out the country to the Soviet Union, but managed to keep Finland as far West as possible and to avoid the most onerous of the Soviet advances.30 The most discussed figure of the elite is of course the former president Urho Kekkonen.31

I mentioned two revisionist types of westernizing discourses. The second revisionist discourse within the westernizing narrative considers that the pro-Soviet Finnish policy represented a betrayal of the Finnish westernness. Thus, if the apologist narrative presents neutrality as having been a pragmatically and strategically deployed device of foreign policy grounded in Realpolitik32, the critical narrative on finlandization on the other hand uses very powerful adjectives and images to describe its ‘real’ negative dimension. Timo Vihavainen, in its A nation on its stomach. A short history on finlandization, published in 1991, depicted Cold War

30 Urho Kekkonen (Agrarian League, later Centre Party) has been a greatly discussed figure in Finnish society during the last decades. Public discussions on the president and the phases of his era have been analysed, criticised, supported and researched on the academic, political and popular levels of Finnish society. Tuuli Lähdesmäki, ‘From personality cult figure to camp image – the case of President Urho Kekkonen’, Participations: Journal of audience and reception studies, Volume 6, Issue 1 (May 2009): 56. An overview of the debates on Kekkonen’s role can be seen in a series of articles for the journal Books from Finland. See, for instance, Risto Penttilä, ‘King of the Castle’, Books From Finland, No. 1 (1991); Risto Penttilä, ‘Official Religions’, Books From Finland, No. 1 (1992); Olli Kivinen, ‘Cold War Perspectives’, Books From Finland. No. 4 (1992); Simopekka Virkkula, ‘Sins of the Fathers?’, Books From Finland, No. 1 (1993); Jaakko Tapaninen, ‘End of the Line’, Books From Finland, No. 2 (1994).
31 In Finnish historiography, the most influential proponent of Urho Kekkonen’s politics has been his official biographer Juhani Suomi, who has written a massive eight-part work on Kekkonen’s life.
32 Christopher S. Browning 2005, 16-19
Finland as a nation grovelling on its stomach\textsuperscript{33}, an image meant to express Finland’s situation in its relations with the eastern ‘master’. According to this type of interpretation, Finns made painful compromises that were often questionable. Hence, president Kekkonen sometimes used his good relations with the Kremlin as a stick with which to beat domestic opponents, many Finnish politicians fawned upon the Russians, and self-censorship restricted open debate about real conditions in the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{34} According to Browning, these critiques ‘had the goal to ‘liberate’ the Finns from the perceived distasteful “legacy of the past” by exposing the past for “what it really was”. Through their denunciations of the past, of the politics of Cold War Finland and the society which evolved around it, such critiques de-legitimize the continuation of past policies and are therefore an attempt to break out of post-war Finnish identities in favor of a reconstructed ‘Western’ identity for the nation.’\textsuperscript{35}

Not only was the political level of Finland’s Cold War situation revised, but so was also the economic level. Thus, the westernizing narrative interprets the Cold War economic relations between Finland and different economic West European organisms as ‘natural steps’ intentionally oriented towards Finland’s European integration. In these circumstances, the background of the Finnish European integration policy is identified by many deep into the ‘Finnish’ Cold War history. In this interpretation, the beginning of Finland’s European integration lies in a series of actions that Finland took in its trade and foreign policy long before the 1990s. Many Finnish scholars consider that the chronology of the Finnish European integration contains moments such as Finland’s 1955 Nordic Council membership, its associate membership to EFTA in 1961, its free trade agreement with the EC in 1973\textsuperscript{36}, its full membership of EFTA in 1986 or its accession to the Council of Europe in 1989.\textsuperscript{37} All these are seen as ‘natural

\textsuperscript{33} Timo Vihavainen Kansakunta rähmällään: Suomettumisen lyhyt historia [A Nation on its Stomach: A Short History of Finlandization] (Keuruu: Otava, 1991), cited in David Arter, Scandinavian politics today, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 289
\textsuperscript{36} Teija Tiilikainen, 1996, 118
\textsuperscript{37} Tapio Raunio, Teija Tiilikainen, 2003, 12-23. For a more detailed analysis on Cold War Finland’s approaching of Western integration see Hanna Ojanen, ‘If in ‘Europe’ then in its
steps’ intentionally drown on the path to Finland’s European integration. Tapani Paavonen is a leading figure of this line of interpretation. According to him, Finland’s integration policies started during the 1950s at both levels, economic and politic, and continued up to the 1990s when Finland entered the European Union. ‘Finland’s membership in the European Union began in 1995 without any separate transitional period. In fact, Finland’s transition to EU membership took place with a transitional period of about thirty five years. The implementation of the FINN-EFTA Agreement and the Free trade agreement with the EC formed the most essential elements of this transitional period’, claims Paavonen. During the Cold War, he continues, ‘Finland's international position in the strategic sphere of influence of the Soviet Union made participation in the Western integration especially delicate, since the Soviet Union opposed to western integration in general and Finland’s Western commitments in particular’. But this did not make the western integration impossible since ‘the most conspicuous characteristic feature of the Finnish integration policies was the connection to the country's international position in the Soviet sphere of influence’.

A similar position is expressed in this regard by the official Finnish state circles too. For instance, the Internet portal of the Finnish presidency of the EU presents the chronology of Finland’s European integration starting with the 1961 FINN-EFTA agreement. The discourse of politicians and diplomats is built on comparable bases. Thus, for Paavonen, the Prime Minister of Finland, ‘the accession of Finland to the European Union in 1995 was a logical and decisive step in Finland’s long-standing policy of participation in the European integration. ‘Successive governments have pursued that policy with success since the time of the last war’. Finland’s President Tarja Halonen made similar declarations. In a speech held in Budapest on June 27, 2009 at an event marking the fall of the Iron Curtain in Hungary, she declared that ‘for Finland, the birth of a new Europe’ after 1989 ‘meant reaching the goal, for which we had been working through the

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38 Tapani Paavonen, ‘The Period of Free Trade Integration in Finland's Relationship to Western Europe’ (paper presented at The XIV International Economic History Congress, Helsinki, August 21-25, 2006)

39 See, for instance, the portal of the Finnish presidency of the EU at http://presidency.finland.fi/doc/eu/fin_3chro.htm, (accessed 1st of July 2009)

40 Paavo Lipponen, 2003, ix.
Security and Cooperation in Europe process since the 1970’s, namely ‘the building of a new foundation for cooperation’ in Europe.41

This Finnish interpretation was successful abroad and therefore generally accepted by both the international political or scientific communities. Therefore, Finland’s Cold War economic relations with the Western Europe have been recognized, more or less implicitly, either as intentionally steps towards Finland’s European integration, or as the expression of Finland’s clear intention to reach that goal.42 I will give just two examples, one from each community. Firstly, on November 4, 1992 the European Commission, delivering a reasoned opinion on Finland’s application for accession to the European Communities, considered that through the Cold-War economic relations with the EEC ‘Finland has already established a high level of integration with the Community’.43 Secondly, for Hans Slomp, among the Nordic countries, ‘only Finland wholeheartedly joined the European Union as an expression of its belonging to Europe’.44

In my opinion, Finland’s economic cooperation with the west-European institutions cannot be considered ‘natural steps’ towards the European integration. The reasons behind these agreements were indeed economic and political, but to argue now that Finland wanted then and acted then for European integration is difficult to prove since no one could have anticipated the evolution of the world situation. The decision of European integration was taken at the beginning of the 1990s and not earlier. Only after the end of the Cold War, and after the economic depression in the early 1990s, Finland began to undertake the first steps on the road to EU-membership. There was a wide spread consensus among the Finnish political elite that Finland had, under any circumstances, to become a member of the EU. Consequently Finland became the most pro-integration country of the Nordic Member States, even though voters were not as

43 The challenge of enlargement. Commission opinion on Finland’s application for membership (4th of November 1992), Bulletin of the European Communities, No (supplement) 6 (1992): 7-26
44 Hans Slomp, European politics into the twenty-first century: integration and division (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2000), 158
supportive of EU integration as the political elite.\textsuperscript{45} To consider that the process of Finland’s integration started during the Cold War is just an exaggeration and an interpretation. The explanation of this type of reasoning lies within the westernizing narrative again. The Finnish economic cooperation with the western European organisms during the Cold War is used as an argument that Finland was always ‘western’. Therefore, the practical expression of the Finland’s westernness is found in its desire to become member of the European institutions. ‘Joining the EU’, considers Pekka Korhonen, ‘was an attempt to move Finland closer to Central Europe’.\textsuperscript{46} This means that the desire to ‘join the west’ is one of the causes of the European integration and not the other way around. However, in my opinion, the European membership led to the development of the westernizing discourse. There was no naturally born Finnish western identity that needed to come back home after the end of the Cold War, using, among other instruments, the means of the EU accession. As Browning wrote, ‘such (re)presentations of Finnish history are highly political. This is because the stories we tell of a society’s past not only condition what we think of ourselves now, but also point to directions for future development, by shaping what relations and actions with others are acceptable to us’.\textsuperscript{47} For Finns this meant to push Finland further into integration with Western institutions, membership of which had been previously denied by the Soviets’ categorization of them as anti-Communist.\textsuperscript{48}

In my opinion, the westernizing narrative was initially designed to justify and legitimize both the political decision of choosing the European integration as a solution for the security question,\textsuperscript{49} and the former Cold

\textsuperscript{45} Tapio Raunio, ‘The Parliament of Finland: A Model Case for Effective Scrutiny?’, eds. Maurer, Andreas and Wessels, Wolfgang, \textit{National Parliaments on their ways to Europe: Losers of Latecomers?} (Baden-Baden: Schriften des Zentrums für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI), Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Bd. 44), 173-198


\textsuperscript{47} Christopher S. Browning, 2002, 48

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid. 55

\textsuperscript{49} The security reasons for EU accession were usually not said out loud, because the Eastern neighbor still had to be considered. Therefore, this justification did not have only a domestic destination. It had also a foreign policy dimension and an ideological dimension. It moved the stressed of the Finnish European Union accession from the security issues to a higher ideological level. Finland wanted and had to become ‘more European and western’ not for security reasons mainly, but for ideological reasons. Finland has always been part of Europe. Its culture, history, values, beliefs, norms etc. have always been and still are Western.
War policy. It was also a way of dealing with the shameful past. Rapidly, this type of discourse became successful and very rapidly the Finnish 'identity' gained the characteristic of 'its belonging to the West and to Europe'. One of the best ways of measuring the success of this narrative is probably an analysis of the way students in schools and universities write on this topic. Their writings generally stress the idea that Finland is 'a true European country', which always had a western dimension. However, the historical circumstances, the geopolitical situation and the interests of the great powers stopped it from showing its 'real western nature'. Annukka Kataja, for instance, in her BA thesis in 2001 wrote: 'The location of Finland has been peripheral in the world and European framework. The position of Finland in this framework has been changing over time. It has been a country that has once in the history left Europe and joined East (1809), and later on returned back to Europe. In this light it may better be understood why Finland has had to perform better than average to prove that it really is a European country'. Kataja also considers that Finland's Cold War security strategy – neutrality and 'finlandization' – was the only possible choice that could allow Finland to keep friendly relations with the Eastern neighbor USSR, without forgetting the West. After the collapse of USSR in 1991 and Finland accession to EU, 'the identity problem of Finland was solved: it became truly part of Europe, part of the Western world without [having] to prove that to anybody'. I cannot say that students like Kataja want to justify or prove Finland’s ‘Europeanness’, but I can agree that they really believe in it. In less than one decade, the social and political trend as well as the westernizing narrative constructed this ‘real’ belief, both in Finland and abroad.

2. The reasoning behind the 'westernizing' narrative

The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union allowed Finland to move towards European integration through the EU while preserving its own independent defense posture. Finland’s reasons for moving towards the EU have been identified on two levels, economics and

50 Annukka Kataja, NORTHERN DIMENSION: as a Strategy for a Small Nation State Finland to Survive (BA-thesis, Tartu University, Department of Political Science, Tartu, 2001), 13-14
51 Ibid., 55. To some the impossibility to state openly its western and European nature during the Cold War was an ‘identity problem’. The Finnish dilemma was that Finland was European and western, it wanted to state its west-European place, but the geopolitical situation forced it to keep a close relation with the East, even though it was not ‘eastern’. For others the neutrality policy should not be seen ‘as a challenge to national identity politics’, because ‘political realism as represented by statesmen like Kekkonen is not about identity but power’. Sami Moisio and Vilho Harle, 2008
security\textsuperscript{52}; in its ‘new’ economic vulnerability to trends in the European economy\textsuperscript{53}, and its determination that the security challenges of the post-Cold War world no longer included the Cold War threat of military invasion. Rather now the dangers involved the risk of a collapse of Russia’s social or political infrastructure which could then confront Helsinki with challenges that it could not meet alone. Therefore, Finland needed to find ways of associating with other states to meet those nonmilitary challenges and, at the same time, terminate its erstwhile political isolation by participating in European integration. It chose the EU over the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)\textsuperscript{54} because the expansion of NATO to its border would have alarmed Moscow and because Helsinki viewed the threats to Europe as being essentially nonmilitary, and thus outside NATO’s mandate or purview.\textsuperscript{55}

This major official reorientation of the foreign policy of the state – which is explained by economic and security considerations mainly – has been accompanied by a new ideology and by a new propaganda. The terms ‘ideology’ is used here as defining a system of ideas, beliefs, fundamental commitments, and values about social reality. Ideology is both a system of meanings that justifies the vested interests of existing or contending groups in society and a set of knowledge and beliefs that provides meaning and

\textsuperscript{52} ‘For a country in the position of Finland, Union membership offers – also without military alliance – significant added security which we must actively exploit’ said the Undersecretary of State in the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jaako Blomberg, in a speech in Kuopio, Finland, September 28, 1994, cited in Christine Ingebritsen, Nordic States and European unity, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000, 100; See, for instance, also the Speech given by President Martti Ahtisaari, in Tampere, September 24, 1994, available at http://www.ena.lu/(accessed 25\textsuperscript{th} of June 2009)

\textsuperscript{53} As Finland emerged from the Cold War, it found itself exposed to severe economic dislocations, if not crises, that pressured it further towards integration.

\textsuperscript{54} Nevertheless, Finland started its cooperation with NATO in the early 1990s. It joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NACC, as an observer in 1992. It has participated in the NATO Partnership for Peace Programme ever since the programme was launched in 1994. It joined the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, EAPC, which replaced the NACC when it was founded in 1997 etc. See, for instance, Antti Sierla, Effects of Finland’s possible NATO membership, December 2007, 21-23 available on the website of the Finnish Mission to NATO at http://www.finlandnato.org/public/download.aspx?ID=26424&GUID={DE78551A-B95A-471B-9018-1469DA535ED9} (accessed on 2\textsuperscript{nd} of July 2009)

enables people in their everyday lives to make sense of their social reality. If ideology is understood as a set of ideas, beliefs, values, then the westernizing narrative is just one of the expressions of this ideology. The term propaganda does not have in this context a negative sense. Propaganda is here, as defined by Jowett and O’Donnell, ‘a deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desires intent of the propagandist’. If applied this definition, the westernizing narrative is also an instrument of propaganda, not only an expression of an ideology. Ideology and propaganda are related. According to Jowett and O’Donnell, in political science, propaganda is the ideology of the practitioner.

Was the westernizing discourse elaborated intentionally in order to justify the pro-West-European political orientation of the state or was it ‘only’ the expression of what people believed in? Was the westernizing narrative an instrument built up and used to reach a certain political goal or is it the objective description of ‘reality’? In my opinion, its initial purpose was to give ideological support to the security and economic-based decisions and to persuade people of the rightness of these decisions, and ended (or will end) as being what people believe in. It wanted to justify and legitimize the pro-Europe political orientation to a superior level, not in terms of state politics, but in terms of civilization, culture, morality, to justify it not only for the domestic public, but mainly for the European public and European officials. As Max Jakobson has put it, those who voted ‘yes’ for Finland’s European integration did so, for the most part, because membership was seen ‘to affirm Finland’s Western identity’, not only internally, but mostly externally.

Emphasizing publicly the economic and security reasons of Finland’s European integration would have presented a series of disadvantages: would have negatively affected Finland’s relation with its still very powerful and very suspicious Eastern neighbor; would have showed its advantages.

58 Ideology and propaganda are related. According to Jowett and O’Donnell, in political science, propaganda is to some extent the ideology of the practitioner. ‘To examine propaganda in the light of political science is to analyze the ideologies of the practitioners’, Garth S. Jowett, Victoria O’Donnell 2006, 1-2
59 The westernizing narrative appeared during the time when the pro-European projects were developed.
60 Max Jakobson, 1998, 111
economic and security weakness in its relations with Western Europe, therefore its need to find ‘protection’ and guarantees in Western Europe – and that would have meant to keep a position of inferiority and subordination in the European politics; and finally would have created confusion within the Finnish masses. The Finns had been told that their state security could be guaranteed only by a pro-Eastern policy and that this policy secured their economic interests, too. Now the same security reasons ask for a pro-Western policy. The state politics discourse cannot be so drastically changed overnight without the backing of an ideological explanation. Not if the politician wants to keep its credibility. Thus, the association with Europe was presented as more than an economic or security-type based relation. It became a question of civilization, culture, identity, values, even morality.

Why did the westernizing narrative continue to develop after the accession process was completed and Finland became member of the European Union? It had not only the role to explain one particular political stand, but also the role to give a meaning to the new social reality. This narrative had not only the role of supporting domestically the political goal of the European integration. It has also the role of supporting Finland’s moral right to participate in the European politics in terms of equality with any other European state. It was also an instrument of gaining the recognition of Finland’s ‘rights’ in European politics. Tarja Väyrynen has a similar opinion considering that, by claiming that it always belonged to the ‘Western European family’, Finland could depict itself as a moral actor in world politics.61 Finland used so well abroad this westernizing discourse – corroborated with its political actions – that now Finland is one of the most appreciated, respected and trusted state in the European politics. It has the prestige, reputation and credibility that not many states have. Tapio Raunio and Matti Wiberg consider that Finland’s ‘European commitment was primarily driven by the need to secure a place among the western European countries and to influence EU decisions in order to protect national economic and political interests’.62 The westernizing narrative just supported ideologically (at the level of ideas) this goal.

On the other hand, by entering the European institutions Finland and Finns became Europeans *de jure*, but to become Europeans *de facto* they needed to go through a transitional period, they needed to be not only institutionally, but especially ideologically ‘Europeanized’. Finland’s place in the world changed dramatically and rapidly after 1991. But what people think about the world, how people see the world and their relation to that world cannot change that rapidly and by itself. The process was only half a way. They became ‘Europeans’ and ‘westerners’ institutionally, in terms of state politics, economy and security. The next step was to start to develop the belief that they were ‘Europeans’ and ‘westerners’, to see themselves as such. This Europenization in terms of values and beliefs had to be made from inside, by the Finns, and I believe that this was one of the explanations of the continuation of the westernizing narratives after 1995.

**Conclusions**

The way Finns defined Finland’s relation to Europe and to the West was always a part of the foreign policy, which in turn was subordinated to the security policy and linked to the geopolitical position of the state. Browning analyzing the historical debates as to where Finland was located between East and West over time showed how the dominant narratives of Finnish ‘identity’ explicitly constructed the Finnish ‘identity’ whether ‘as an outpost of the West’ against the Soviet Union (during the interwar period, during the Second World War) or as being close to Russia (during the Grand Duchy period, during the Cold War). After the end of the Second World War there was chosen a third position, and Finland’s ‘identity’ was defined in terms of its relation to Europe as in between, as being neither Eastern, nor Western, despite the emphasis on the friendly relations with the Soviet Union. After the end of the Cold War, the Western dimension of the Finnish ‘identity’ was again stressed, both domestically and externally. The Finnish westernizing discourse affirms the Finnish western ‘identity’ and its belonging to the ‘European family’. It considers that Finland has always been *European* and *Western*, it always aspired to Europe and to the West, it has always been part of the ‘European family’ in terms of civilization, culture, values etc. The claim of Finland’s ‘natural’

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63 The term ‘Europenization’ is usually defined as a process in which states (Central and Eastern European states) adopt EU rules, a process that can be EU driven or domestically driven. See, for instance, Frank Schimmelfennig, *The Europenization of Central and Eastern Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 7-14. For a detailed discussion, see further Kevin Featherstone, *The politics of Europenization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)

64 Christopher S. Browning 2005, 14-19
westernness has implied the necessity to revise past policies and histories, especially Cold War policies.

The westernizing narrative is related to Finland’s accession to EU and is headed not only towards the Finnish population, but also towards the foreign European population and official European levels. At the European level, politically or scholarly, the claims of this narrative are generally accepted, and Finland is considered western and European as it wants to be considered. The westernizing narrative is very important in justifying Finland’s post-Cold War position in the international politics, especially its position in the European politics. The article shows how highly political is the (re)presentation of Finnish history and how much its ‘western character’ is related with Finland’s current political situation and goals in Europe. It also reveals how important the ideology is in backing the political choice.
SCANDINAVIAN PERSPECTIVES.
OVERCOMING THE COLD WAR PRESSURES IN ROMANIA’S POLICY TOWARDS NORTHERN EUROPE

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Abstract:
During the first years of the Cold War, Romania was isolated in terms of foreign policy, and forced to develop relations mainly with the USSR and other socialist states. During the de-Stalinization period, the East-West relations improved and Romania started to rebuild its relations with the West, especially economic relations. This article briefly presents the re-establishment of Romania’s relations with the Scandinavian states, in the context of the improved Romanian-West relations.

Keywords: Romania, Scandinavia, perceptions, foreign relations, East-West cooperation
Very few Romanians knew anything about Northern Europe when Communist dictator Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej decided to approach these countries in the hope of improving Romania’s economic relations. Nor can we say that there was a special interest towards this part of Europe among the Romanian Communists. This is why Romania’s relations to Northern Europe have long been delayed. In 1960, when a governmental delegation was sent by Gheorghiu-Dej in Copenhagen, Stockholm and Helsinki, Northern Europe was almost unknown territory for the Romanians.

One of the main causes for such a situation consisted in the complete foreign isolation of the Communist regime in Romania. During the hard troubled years of Stalinism, the Romanian regime had surrounded itself with an ideological, political and mental barrier, trying to keep all Western influences at bay. Except for the peoples’ democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, the entire foreign horizon was limited to an ideological image, an abstract description of a terrible menace defined in Leninist terms. The regime did not have any credibility or freedom to maneuver, but at the same time, it didn’t want it either.

As Gheorghiu-Dej later confessed, the political climate in foreign policy making was dominated by prejudice. In a discussion with a Czechoslovak delegation, Gheorghiu-Dej recalled: “ne era frică înainte să trimitem oameni în afară, ne era frică mare. Ce o să facă oamenii așa, n-o să-i mănânce capitaliștii? Și am început să trimitem. La început mai puțin. Spuneam așa, dacă i-o mâncă, să nu-i mănânce pe toți.” Romania’s Western relations were therefore limited to strict necessities, deriving from its industrialization program. Economy acted as a bridge in developing constructive relations across the Iron Curtain.

Involved in a large industrialization program, elaborated according to the Stalinist model of forced development, Romania relied mainly on the USSR and the other people’s democracies for technology and raw materials. Customarily, though, these countries failed to satisfy Romania’s industrial needs, due to their limited capacities or domestic requirements. In such cases, the Communist regime turned its eyes towards the West. The “imperialist camp” had the possibility to supply Romania’s industrialization plan with virtually everything, but there were factors acting against such rapprochement. First of all, the political factors: under
the American pressure, the Western European countries limited their exports of strategic products towards the satellite countries. At the same time, these countries were not very keen on making the necessary efforts in order to overcome such difficulties. The prejudices mentioned above acted strongly against long term commitments. On the other hand, Romania, as well as other people’s democracies, had very limited means of payment in foreign currencies.

Nevertheless, economic contacts represented the only form in which relations with the West were maintained, during 1948-1953. Also, economic exchanges represented the starting point for future development in relations. During the first postwar years, economic exchanges represented the only contact between Romania and Northern Europe. In 1949 and 1950, an analysis of foreign exchanges reveals that Romania had such relations with: Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway. The first two countries were the most important partners. The exchanges were dominated by Romanian exports of raw materials or agricultural products, amounting to a value of a few million rubles. The dynamic of the exchanges can be observed in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1949 Import</th>
<th>1949 Export</th>
<th>1950 Import</th>
<th>1950 Export</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1,1</td>
<td>9,9</td>
<td>2,1</td>
<td>1,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>3,0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9,4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0,04</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>3,2</td>
<td>2,2</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures represent million rubles

Except for the very low amount of commercial exchanges, it is also noticeable the downfall marked by 1950. It was the year when the Korean War broke out, which later determined Stalin’s decision to increase military preparations for a future war against “imperialism”. These were some of the most tensioned moments of the Cold War which certainly acted against cooperation.

The only remarkable contact between Romania and Northern Europe in this period was represented by the third Congress of the International

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2 ANIC, folder CSP – CAER, Comerț exterior, file 33/1950, 23-24
Organization of Journalists, held in Helsinki, Finland, in September 1950. Controlled by Moscow, the Organization was nothing more than another instrument for Soviet propaganda, from which American and British journalists withdrew. Romania sent three delegates to Helsinki and they were quick to notice the Finish prime-minister’s difficulties for accepting to host the event. Kekkonen, as they reported to Bucharest, was the target of intense criticism in the “reactionary” Finish press, because of his support for the Organization. Kekkonen was present at the inaugural session of the Congress. Minister of education Heljas also offered a cocktail for the participants. The Finish government’s support for the event caused negative reactions domestically, as the Romanian delegates reported. In spite all this, the prejudices worked again: Finland and Helsinki left no significant impression on the Romanian delegates.

Urho Kekkonen was known for his pro-Soviet policy which sometimes went beyond the political needs of Finland. He pursued close relations with Stalin and relied on the USSR economically. This generated a world perception that Kekkonen and Finland were speaking on behalf of the Kremlin. Still, Finland’s economic relations with the Soviet Union were beneficial. Finland had an active commercial balance with its Eastern neighbor and, after September 1952 when the payment of war reparations was complete, the commerce became more and more profitable.

The death of Stalin represented a turning point, both for Kekkonen and for the Romanian policies towards the Western countries. Moscow seemed less interested in Kekkonen initially but the Finnish politician continued to play the Soviet card and it succeeded in the end. Moscow expressed its intention of offering a consistent loan to Finland, should Kekkonen remained prime-minister. After a short intermezzo in 1953-1954, Urho Kekkonen returned to power in the fall of 1954. This coincided with a radical change in the Soviet policies towards Eastern Europe which opened the way for a different approach in Romania’s relations with the Western countries.

Stalin’s successors pursued a far more relaxed policy towards the satellites. Reform was the key word in the entire “Socialist camp”. Malenkov’s “New Course” demanded radical changes in both party leadership and the economical policy of the satellite countries. Gheorghiu-Dej managed to stay in power, taking advantage of the workers’ riot in East

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3 ANIC, folder CC al PCR – sectia Cancelarie, file 24/1950, 119-123
4 Silviu Miloiu, O istorie a Europei nordice şi baltice. De la războiul rece la era globalizării, vol. II (Târgovişte: Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2005), 157-159
5 Ibid., 160-161
Berlin in June 1953. The events in Berlin moderated the Soviet tone of criticism. In August 1953, when the Romanian leadership was summoned to Kremlin, Beria – fervent promoter of reforms – had already been removed and Moscow was concerned about the consequences of radical changes. Gheorghiu-Dej stayed in power and focused on limiting the consequences of the “New Course” in Romania. The Soviet leadership demanded profound changes in the Romanian economic policy, especially in industrialization. The Romanian Workers’ Party was asked to reduce the rhythm of industrial development and pay special attention to increasing the standards of living. Gheorghiu-Dej didn’t really agree with this approach. He was too vulnerable in power to afford opposition – as he later did – but the regime did try to elude some of Moscow’s requirements regarding industrial development.

In the spring of 1954, Khrushchev redirected his criticism towards the Council of Mutual Economic Aid. He accused the static character of the organization, its lack of functionality and efficiency in promoting economic cooperation. An interesting aspect regarding the CMEA meetings of 1954 was the Soviet position towards Finland. The USSR needed commercial exchanges with the West for the same reasons as all the other people’s democracies did. Furthermore, Khrushchev admitted that the USSR was not able of satisfying the needs of all satellites. This is why he advised towards a rapprochement with the “capitalist” world, from an economic point of view. In this perspective, a special attention was apparently paid to Finland. In May 1954 a CMEA meeting adopted a decision regarding the relations with the “capitalist” countries, which specified: „să se considere ca oportună dezvoltarea schimbului de mărfuri cu Finlanda, în special prin majorarea livrărilor de utilaje industriale și materii prime, contra mărfurilor finlandez, ținând seama de faptul că țările membre ale CAER sunt în măsură să livreze Finlandei utilaje, pe care aceasta le-a importat până în prezent din țările capitaliste”6.

The reasons for which Moscow imposed such a decision are obviously complex. The USSR certainly wanted to keep Finland very close, as shown above. Involving the peoples’ democracies in this strategy was mutually beneficial. These countries needed partners from the “outside world” and Finland was the best partner in Moscow’s vision. It was preferable to

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6 ANIC, folder CAER, file 14/1954, 149-150. [“…to be considered as convenient to develop the exchange of commodities with Finland, especially by increasing deliveries of industrial machineries and raw materials, for Finnish goods, considering the fact that the CMEA member countries have the capacity to deliver machineries to Finland, which this country had previously imported from capitalist countries” – author’s translation]
develop exchanges with neutral and friendly Finland rather than Britain, France or Western Germany. It is also interesting that in the initial project of the decision, the recommendation to improve relations regarded all Scandinavian countries, but the final decision only mentioned Finland.

These transformations had sensible consequences on the Romanian-Finnish relations. In March 1951 the two countries had signed a new Trade Agreement but the commercial exchanges remained at a very low level until 1953-1954, when the situation improved. An analysis of the Romanian Minister of Foreign Trade mentioned that in 1953 the value of Romanian-Finnish exchanges had increased six times as compared to 1952. This was due to a profitable exchange: Romania imported large amounts of technical paper from Finland, exporting black oil. The figures were still extremely low: in the total amount of the Romanian exports of oil, Finland represented 1.8% of the market and Norway 1.9%. In December 1953 the Romanian government decided to send foreign trade specialists in Denmark and Norway, in order to study the market and the possibilities of economic cooperation. Romanian imports of paper and staple fiber from Finland continued to increase in 1953, as well as the exports of oil, reaching 3.47 million rubles (imports from Finland) and 4.57 million (exports to Finland). Among other Northern countries, the only one which maintained a noticeable position was Norway. Basically, Romanian-Norwegian trade consisted of the same exchanges: Romanian oil for Norwegian staple fiber and paper.

A Trade Agreement between Romania and Norway was signed in 1956. Between May 23 and June 9, 1956 negotiations were conducted in Oslo, followed by the signing of a Protocol regarding commercial exchanges. The value of mutual trade was established at almost 55 million Norwegian crowns. The Romanian imports from Norway, as mentioned in the Protocol, consisted in staple fiber and aluminum. Just as in the precedent years, the Romanian exports consisted mainly in oil and oil products. It’s worth mentioning that another article in the document mentioned that Romania would enjoy the same status as the OEEC countries in what concerned taxes and tariffs. This was very profitable for Romania, given the fact that for many years the satellite states had been discriminated in matter of tariffs, due to the export restrictions imposed by the United States.

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7 ANIC, folder CAER, file 14/1954, 145
8 ANIC, folder CAER, file 117/1952-1953, 4-6
9 ANIC, folder CAER, file 160/1953-1954, 143-149
10 ANIC, folder CAER, file 267/1955-1956, 114-115
As the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union improved, after the Geneva conferences of 1954-1955, initiatives aimed at improving relations became more frequent. In 1954, members of the Swedish Communist Party contacted the Romanian Workers Party offering their services for mediating an increase in commercial cooperation. The Swedish Communists requested permission, at party to party level, to approach the Romanian Legation in Stockholm for a meeting. Having a discussion with Romanian diplomats in Stockholm, they argued, would help them convince the public opinion and decision-making factors that Romania, as well as other peoples’ democracies, was indeed interested in developing commercial exchanges with Sweden\textsuperscript{11}. The Romanian Politburo discussed this proposal and agreed to it in January 1954. Similar signals were coming from Finland as well. The Romanian Ambassador in Hungary, Ion Popescu-Puţuri, reported to Bucharest in March 1956 about a conversation he had with a Finnish diplomat. Apparently, he informed Popescu-Puţuri about Kekkonen’s election as President, weeks before it happened. Furthermore, Popescu-Puţuri noticed that Finish diplomats were very open to discussing sensitive matters in private and refrained from such discussions when accompanied by large groups. Popescu-Puţuri was committed to inviting Finish diplomats to the Romanian Embassy, for private conversations\textsuperscript{12}.

Although Swedish authorities were interested in working out their relations with Romania on constructive bases, real progress was very difficult to achieve especially because unsolved economic issues of the past. In 1949 the Swedish government took the initiative of negotiating a Trade Agreement with Romania but under the condition of solving the Swedish demands of compensation. These demands consisted in almost 1 million USD for the proprieties of Swedish citizens affected by the Nationalization Act, apart from an industrial lease contract from the interwar period. In 1929 Swedish company STAB had signed an agreement with Romania for the lease of safety matches production, but the contract was annulled by a Romanian court of justice in 1947 because of some unpaid taxes. The Swedish government requested the debts to be deducted from the 30 million USD which STAB had paid to Romania. All together, the Swedish demands rose to approximately 4 million USD\textsuperscript{13}.

\textsuperscript{11} ANIC, folder CC al PCR – Cancelarie, file 12/1954, 4
\textsuperscript{12} ANIC, folder CC al PCR – Cancelarie, file 47/1956, 18
\textsuperscript{13} ANIC, folder CC al PCR – Relaţii Externe, file 25/1952, 20-23
When Sweden offered to sign a Trade Agreement with Romania in exchange for a convenient settlement of these issues, Romania strongly refused. The main argument was that the two aspects (trade and compensation) should not be connected. Romania was willing to pay a part of this money under the form of gradual drawings (up to 5%) from the Romanian exports to Sweden, but Bucharest was not keen on settling the problem. According to a study of the Foreign Relations Section in the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers Party, the economic relations with Sweden were not considered essential for the Romanian economy. Most of the products imported from Sweden, the study concluded, could easily be obtained from elsewhere\textsuperscript{14}.

The Swedish government submitted an aide-memoir to Bucharest in October 1954, containing new conditions for solving past issues, but Romania found the document unacceptable. Generally, the Gheorghiu-Dej regime refused to pay any compensation for the losses of foreign citizens due to the Nationalization Act. Certain concessions have been made to France, for example, but only after tough negotiations during which the French government gave up most of its claims.

The Romanian Legation in Stockholm admitted that it found it difficult to intervene at the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the Romanian diplomats didn’t have any contacts. A report of the Legation acknowledged that Romanians didn’t even have contacts among the “progressive” (pro-Communist) journalists in Stockholm\textsuperscript{15}. Once again, the prejudices mentioned above had shown their effects.

Regarding such shortcomings in the diplomatic activity, the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized a meeting with most of its diplomats in January 1956. The main aspect discussed was the attitude towards Western politicians and journalists. The Ministry demanded its workers to overcome their reticence in approaching Westerners and to establish active contacts in the “imperialist” countries\textsuperscript{16}.

As Gheorghiu-Dej was trying to elaborate a more independent course of action in relation to the Soviet Union, Romania grew increasingly active in its relations with the West. Its policy towards Northern Europe was strongly influenced by this trend. Just as before, economy acted as a bridge across the Iron Curtain. Economic interest was a common denominator because it didn’t involve political concessions on either side. Khrushchev’s

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 14
\textsuperscript{15} ANIC, folder CC al PCR – Cancelarie, file 10/1956, 82
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
dynamic policy in the West as well as the stabilization of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe favored a nuanced approach towards the “imperialist world”.

Romania’s interest in expanding its relations outside the “camp” limits and finding economic alternatives to the USSR was obvious from 1959, when a governmental delegation paid a long successful visit in the West and signed profitable contracts in France, Britain, Belgium and Holland\(^\text{17}\). One year later, the Romanian policy-makers turned their eyes to the North and to its growing opportunities for business. In the fall of 1960, Gheorghiou-Dej sent a numerous governmental delegation in a long visit to Scandinavia. Headed by Mihail Florescu, minister of Oil and Chemistry, the delegation visited Denmark, Finland and Sweden with the purpose of establishing new economic contacts.

The first stop was in Denmark, where the group was received by the Danish prime-minister, social-democrat Viggo Kampmann, apparently very interested in Romania’s industrial development\(^\text{18}\). Gheorghiou-Dej’s efforts to rapidly develop the industry (machinery and chemistry mainly) along with the high percentages of investments in these fields insured a high rhythm of development (one of the highest in Europe at that time). This raised a lot of curiosity abroad. Most of the politicians and businessmen the Romanians met in Scandinavia expressed interest regarding Romania’s industry.

Florescu visited many ship yards and factories of wood and timber processing, being interested in acquiring Danish ships with Diesel engines, as well as entire technological lines for wood processing, build by Danish model. At the same time, Florescu insisted that signing such contracts was conditioned by the increase of Romanian exports to Denmark which would create the necessary funds required for payments. Danish officials agreed to sell oil tankers to Romania, as well as fully automated production lines\(^\text{19}\).

Finland was the next stop on the tour. Florescu and the group were welcomed by the minister of Commerce, a close collaborator of Kekkonen’s. From the very beginning, the Finns were clear about their increasing interest in trading with Romania and most especially in importing oil. Mihail Florescu tried to open new opportunities, emphasizing Romania’s capacity of exporting chemicals, as well as food and agricultural products. Florescu was informed that Finland was...

\(^{17}\) Lavinia Betea, *Alexandru Bărlădeanu despre Dej, Ceaușescu, Iliescu* (București: Evenimentul Românesc, 1997), 133

\(^{18}\) ANIC, folder CC al PCR – Cancelarie, file 211/1960, 2

\(^{19}\) Ibid., 4-5
importing chemicals from West Germany where they had large debts due to the fact that the Finnish export in that country was very limited. Finnish officials agreed that it was very convenient for them as well to discuss enlarging their imports from Romania, in what concerned those categories of merchandises\textsuperscript{20}.

Romania, Florescu explained, was very interested in continuing to import cellulose from Finland and also requested price offers for technological lines in the field of wood processing. He visited a few Finnish factories and seemed satisfied with what he saw, although, in his report to Gheorghiu-Dej, Florescu mentioned that the Danish factories appeared to be more efficient than the Finnish ones. President Kekkonen made time to meet with the group and made optimistic assessments regarding the future of Romanian-Finish trade. Its total value, by that time, had already increased to approximately 30 million rubles.

From Helsinki, the Romanian delegation went to Stockholm. This visit in particular was a bit more sensitive in its implications, because of the still unsolved issue of the Romanian debts. The visit was well organized by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially by count Berghe, apparently a great \textit{tuica} drinker\textsuperscript{21}. The Romanian debt was only brought up twice, but in a non-aggressive manner. Swedish governmental officials expressed their desire to put an end to the dispute with Romania regarding the debt. At one moment, the delegation participated in a meeting with Swedish bankers. Some of them were directly involved in the debt issue, having money to collect from the Romanian government. In spite all this, none of them brought the issue into discussion. The Swedish bakers preferred to discuss the future of Romanian-Swedish economic cooperation\textsuperscript{22}.

Florescu made the same offers concerning the export of chemicals, food and agricultural products and, of course, oil. The Swedes were highly interested in oil, as well. It was at that time Romania’s most important export item. Florescu used the oil export to convince the Scandinavians to enlarge cooperation. Nevertheless, his purpose was to find markets for the newly developed Romanian industry and to obtain the technology needed to continue the industrialization program. It was for this last reason that he accepted to increase the export of oil. Usually, Romania avoided exporting crude oil, given the fact that it had quite large refineries to process it.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 10-11
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 17
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 18
Upon his return, Florescu and the entire delegation reported to Gheorghiu-Dej, explaining everything they have seen and discussed in the Northern countries. The visit was considered an important step in enlarging Romania’s economic horizon abroad, in an area with a great potential for economic complementarities. Hoping to preserve the positive conclusions of the visit, a Romanian parliamentary delegation visited Finland next fall.

The delegation was in Helsinki from 21 September to 1 October 1961, invited by the Finnish Parliament. They had several meetings with Karl-August Fagerholm, President of the Parliament and a prominent social-democrat with anti-Soviet political views. The Romanians were actually surprised by the enormous attention paid to them by Fagerholm and blame it on his anti-Soviet attitude that caused his political difficulties in the past. He was trying to escape the image of virulent anti-Communism, the Romanians presumed. Even the Finnish Communists like Herta Kuusinen were amazed by what they considered Fagerholm’s unusual courtesy for the Romanian guests.

Although less visible, this visit had a clear political character. In their report to the party leadership, the members of the delegation made some interesting remarks concerning the domestic politics in Finland and the precarious balance between reality and appearance in the Finnish-Soviet relations: “președintele Kekkonen duce o politică realistă și el este, probabil, sincer în exprimarea sentimentelor sale prietenesti față de Uniunea Sovietică. Sunt însă mulți alții în jurul lui care, fățiș sau însarcuns, gândesc altfel și caută să-i contracareză acțiunile. Este o stare de spirit antisovietică, întreținută de cercurile reacționare și, în primul rând, de social-democrații lui Tanner, sub impulsul acestuia. Se întreține un spirit irredentist. În urma cu 5 ani am fost dus să vizitez o școală-internat din Helsinki, foarte mare, foarte bine organizată – pentru ca, la urmă, să aflu că elevii școlii în număr de câteva sute erau exclusiv copii ai refugiaților din Carelia.”

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23 ANIC, folder CC al PCR – Cancelarie, file 127/1961, 64
24 Ibid., 63 [“President Kekkonen conducts a realistic policy and he is probably sincere in expressing his feelings of friendship towards the Soviet Union. But there are many around him who, plainly or secretly, have different opinions and try to counteract his actions. There is an anti-Soviet spirit, cultivated by reactionary circles and first of all by Tanner’s social-democrats, under his impulse. An irredentist spirit is fostered. Five years ago I was taken to visit a school in Helsinki, very big, very well organized – and later I found out that the pupils, a few hundreds, were exclusively children of Karelian refugees” – author’s translation]
The visits in the city also raised some questions for the Romanians. They carefully noted: “de reţinut că, în centrul oraşului Helsinki, nu departe de Parlament, a fost înălţat, în urmă cu doi ani, un monument criminalului de război Mannerheim, care este înfăşurat călare, în uniforma de campanie din iarna anului 1938. De altminteri, portretul lui se găseşte în multe edificii publice, bulevardul cel mai mare din Helsinki poartă numele său iar mormântul său se găseşte în loc de onoare în cimitirul eroilor”25. The time, when Romanian prime-minister I. Gh. Maurer will visit the grave and lay down flowers in Mannerheim’s memory, was not there yet. It was only 1961.

The Soviet plans for CMEA integration, inspired by the Common Market, became explicit starting with 1962. Romania opposed these plans with unusual vigor, mainly because they were in contradiction with Gheorghiou-Dej’s plans for development. Romania’s emphasis on its own national way towards Socialism became explicit. Gheorghiou-Dej had been implementing numerous measures meant to consolidate his regime since 1956, hoping to obtain a large degree of invulnerability in front of Moscow. When the divergences became explicit, Gheorghiou-Dej’s efforts to improve his relations in the outside (non-Communist) world grew more intense. This was the political climate which favored a rapprochement between Romania and the Scandinavian countries. Economy acted as an intermediary across the Iron Curtain. Interests focused on satisfying economic needs by means of complementarities. Romania found reliable partners in the North, able to provide her with the much-needed technology for industrialization. As the Cold War pressures grew weaker, political steps will become more facile, completing the economic rapprochement.

A few years later, Nicolae Petre, president of the People’s Council of Constanţa County signed an article in the Communist party’s newspaper Scânteia, after a visit to Turku. After describing the historical wonders of centuries-old Turku and the magnificent sights he had seen, the author concluded: “pretinsa glacialitate nordică a finlandezilor este imaginări. Peste tot am fost priiţi cu căldură şi prietenie.”26

25 Ibid., 64 [“downtown Helsinki, not far from the Parliament, was erected, two years ago, a monument to war criminal Mannerheim, shown on horseback, in the uniform of the 1938 campaign. Also, his portrait is found in many public edifices, the largest boulevard in Helsinki carries his name and his grave is honorably placed in the heroes’ cemetery” – author’s translation]
26 Scânteia (23 June 1964) [“…the so-called iciness of the Fins is imaginary. We were welcomed everywhere with warmth and friendship” – author’s translation]
CONCEPT OF TRIBUTALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF S. AMIN, J. HALDON AND H. H. STAHL’S APPROACHES

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Abstract:
By this article the author wants to revive the discussion about Marxist schemas of social development and their applicability for constructing models of universal history. The viewpoints of three scholars are presented in the current text: Samir Amin’s who is known in the Western historiography tradition as the main creator and promoter of the concept of tributary mode of production, John Haldon’s who has paid much attention to the above-mentioned concept and has dedicated an entire book to this issue, Henri H. Stahl’s who created an original alternative approach to the issue of tributalism. The author rejects J. Haldon’s concept of „mode of production“ as being too narrow. In fact J. Haldon identifies the mode of production with the mode of exploitation. The author proposes a wider definition of the mode of production which is based on the analysis of Karl Marx’s texts. According to the author, the most important elements of mode of production are exploitative subject (it is defined by property of conditions of production, which realises as the social power) and productive/obligatory unit which can be manifested as a household of an individual direct producer or as a community. The author proposes the following classification based on his conception of a mode of production:

1. A proprietor of land is a monarch/state and the productive/obligatory unit is the community (of Asiatic/Slavonic type);
2. A proprietor of land is a monarch/state and the productive/obligatory unit is the household of an individual direct producer;
3. Proprietors of land are private landowners and the
productive/obligatory unit is the community (of Asiatic/Slavonic type);
4. Proprietors of land are private landowners and the productive/obligatory unit is the household of an individual direct producer.

The most important conclusions of the author’s are as follows:
1. H. H. Stahl’s statement that there were alternatives in the social development of precapitalist societies are definitely reasonable.
2. Keeping in his mind the controversies between the conceptions of tributalism the author emphasizes that for the moment the question of the typology of antagonistic precapitalist societies remains open; so further researches and discussions are necessary.
3. As a point of departure for further researches and discussions the author proposes his classification of antagonistic precapitalist societies based on the criteria of an exploitative subject and a productive/obligatory unit.

Abstrakcija:
1. Žemės savinininkas yra valdovas/valstybė ir gamybinis/prievolinis vienetas yra (azijinio/slaviško tipo) bendruomenė;
2. Žemės savinininkas yra valdovas/valstybė ir gamybinis/prievolinis vienetas yra individualus tiesioginio gamintojo ūkis;
3. Žemės savinininkai yra privatus ir gamybinis/prievolinis vienetas yra (azijinio/slaviško tipo) bendruomenė;
4. Žemės savinininkai yra privatus ir gamybinis/prievolinis vienetas yra individualus tiesioginio gamintojo ūkis.

Svarbiausios autorius išvados yra šios:
1. H. H. Stahlio nuostata apie žmonijos iki kapitalistinės socialinės evoliucijos alternatyvumą yra visiškai pagrįsta.
2. Aptartų alternatyvių tributarizmo koncepcijų prieštaravimas parodyo, kad iki kapitalistinių antagonistinių gamybos būdo tipologijos klausimas ir XXI amžiaus pradžioje išlieka atviras, todėl visiškai galimos esamų koncepcijų revizijos, tolesnės diskusijos ir tyrimai.
3. Tolesnių tyrimų ir diskusijų išeities tašku siūlome mūsų pateiktą gamybos būdu klasiifikaciją paremtą eksploatacinio subjekto ir gamybinio/prievolinio vieno kriterijais.

Rezumat:
Cu acest articol, autorul îşi propuse să redeschidă discuţia despre modelele marxiste de dezvoltare socială şi despre aplicabilitatea acestora în construirea unor modele de istorie universală. Sunt prezentate şi analizate, în acest context, viziunile a trei cercetători: Samir Amin, John Aldon şi Henri H. Stahl. Primii doi au scris extensiv asupra conceptului de tributarism în relaţie cu mijloacele de producţie, în vreme ce Stahl a propus o abordare alternativă, respingând conceptul de 'mijloc de producţie'. Pornind de la aceste trei viziuni, autorul acestui articol avansează propria interpretare şi abordare asupra conceptelor de 'tributarism' şi 'mijloace de producţie'.

Keywords: Marxism, tributary, mode of production, obligatory unit, exploitative subject

Discussions about the models of universal history based on Marxist conception of modes of production in the postcommunist countries’ historiography have extinguished soon after the fall of the Soviet Union. The only obvious exception in this context is the Russian historiography where despite the fact that the conceptual crisis was honestly declared¹, serious efforts have been made to renew the paradigm of modes of production. A quite different trend can be seen in the Western (at least Anglo-Saxon) historiography. The Marxist interpretations are still vivid among Western scholars and the discussions about the validity of the Marxist schema of human development have continued even after the Cold War was over². I suggest that the above-mentioned radical shift in the post-

¹ Look, for example: Н. Н. Крадин, Кочевье общества (проблемы формационной характеристики), (Владивосток, 1992); Л. Б. Алаев, История Востока, (Москва, 2007).
² Look, for example: J. Haldon, The State and the Tributary Mode of Production (London, New York, 1993); C. Wickham, Land and power: studies in Italian and European social history, 400-1200 (London, 1994); T. Bottomore, er., Dictionary of Marxist thought, Second
communist countries’ historiography is due more to ideological reasons than to a real crisis of Marxist methodology (I refer here to creative Marxism not to its vulgar dogmatic version). One can find very original and persuasive solutions based on Marxist methodology in the post-communist Russian historiography. A case in point is Nikolay Kradin’s conception of the exopolitician mode of production in applied to nomad societies.4

The author of the current article by considering himself as a representative of post-communist countries’ historiography wishes to revive the discussion about the validity of Marxist schema of social development and its applicability for sketching models of universal history. At the outset, I underline that I treat unilinear Marxist-Leninist schema of socioeconomic formations as entirely un-adequate to historical reality. Instead, I suppose that alternative ways of social development in pre-capitalist societies of various regions of the world are probable. Therefore, my purpose is to find alternative concepts which would help us to sketch more adequate models of social evolution. In this article, I will approach the concept of tributalism/tributal mode of production and consider its place in general Marxist models.

There is a suggestion that the Japanese Marxist Jiro Hoyakawa was the first to use the concept of tributary mode of production (TMP) but he has not published his texts in the Western languages so that his ideas have remained unknown in the West. Instead, it was Samir Amin who has popularized the concept of TMP there, which is the reason why I want to assess his notion of the concept. A historian of British origin and a well known byzantologist, John Haldon was the one who has examined the concept TMP most systematically and who has dedicated an entire book to the concept. Therefore, there is no doubt that Haldon’s approach deserves attention.

During my studies of the Romanian historiography, especially concerning the discussion about the Asiatic mode of production and the

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3 In the case of this mode of production the main process of surplus product appropriation takes place outside society/state, i.e. the exploitation of other societies is the most important.
alternative un-dogmatic conceptions of typology of socials structure of Moldova/Valahia, I have found a more original notion of tributalism. The main ideas of this conception are expounded in two books published in Romanian. Actually, the author of this conception was a Romanian sociologist called Henri H. Stahl. In this article I intend to briefly present his viewpoints, too.

I must also state that the British historian Chris Wickham has formulated an alternative conception of TMP in the 1980s. Nevertheless, he has changed his opinion eventually and therefore I am not going to approach his opinions separately. I shall consider Wickham’s ideas only in the context of the critique of Haldon’s conception.

I treat the concept of tributalism as a tool of typology of pre-capitalist societies’ social structure. Keeping this in mind, I set the goal of estimating the validity of various notions of TMP and reveal stronger and weaker sides of every conception mentioned before. If it turns out that no one’s attitude is acceptable, I shall try to sketch an alternative conception.

Samir Amin’s field of academic (and not only) interest includes the causes of unequal economic development and the problems and perspectives of peripheral countries’ development. He elaborates on the Marxist so-called dependency theory. Amin distinguishes three stages in the development of productive forces and relations of production: tribal, tributary, and capitalist modes of production. Tributary form of land property prevails in case of TMP and Amin considers property more as social control than as juridical and ideological forms. The Egyptian scholar emphasizes that if one treats the process at the level of abstraction (i.e. at the level of modes of production) the development of humankind

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9 Look: Wickham 1994, 74-75.
10 Samir Amin was born in Cairo, the son of an Egyptian father and a French mother (both medical doctors). In 1947-1957 he studied political sciences, statistics and economy in Paris. In 1963-1970 he worked in African Institute For Economic Development And Planning, in 1970-1980 he was a director of the Institute, in 1980 became director of Forum du Tiers Monde in Dakar. He has published more than 30 books in French and Arabian.
13 Ibid. 49-50.
should be defined as universal. Amin opposes to the British sociologist of history Perry Anderson who does not distinguish between mode of production and social formation and in this context he speaks about a variety of formations and negates the unifying principle\textsuperscript{14}. Therefore, I will classify Amin’s approach as unilinear. Amin regards TMP as the universal form of pre-capitalist societies\textsuperscript{15}.

According to Amin, in case of TMP the surplus product is extracted by non-economic means, the essential organization of production is based on use value and not on exchange value. The latter means that the product has a value of direct consumption for the direct producer as well as for the exploiting class\textsuperscript{16}. Commodity exchange also exists at some scale but it is not the main feature and function of the economy of a tributary society\textsuperscript{17}. Amin argues that in case of TMP the superstructure is a dominant element and it takes the form of ideology (Christianity, Islam etc.). This is a consequence of the dominance of use value in the economic base\textsuperscript{18}. The latter factor also determines stability and stagnation in the development of TMP type societies (including European feudalism, which Amin treats as a peripheral and undeveloped case of TMP). Those societies make progress but this does not imply qualitative change in the tributary relations of production\textsuperscript{19}. According to Amin, there is no doubt that societies of TMP type are class societies and that class struggle takes place in the TMP. Victories of the exploited class weaken the exploiting tributary class in favor of a nascent class, the bourgeoisie, and thus open the way to the capitalist mode of production\textsuperscript{20}. All the characteristics enumerated are common to all pre-capitalist formations\textsuperscript{21} slave and feudal modes of production included. Amin also insists that slavery as a mode of production was an exceptional phenomenon because it affected a small number of societies. According to Amin, two main reasons explain why slavery did not spread wider: everywhere it was linked with commerce and commodity production (the latter was the exception in pre-capitalist world) and its reproduction of labour force needed external sources\textsuperscript{22}.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid. 50.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. 69.
\textsuperscript{16} Look for more about political economy based on „use value“: G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History – a Defence (Oxford, 1978); Bottomore, ed. 1983, 504.
\textsuperscript{17} Amin 1980, 51-52.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. 52-53.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid. 53-54.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid. 54.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.. 56.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid. 58-60.
Amin regards feudal mode of production (FMP), as I have already mentioned, as a primitive undeveloped form of TMP. It means that all general characteristics of TMP can be applied to feudalism. Yet, according to Amin, some additional characteristics should be formulated: the lord organizes the process of production within the framework of domain and he also enjoys political and jurisdictional prerogatives, that implies one more peculiar feature, i.e. political decentralisation. Eventually, feudalism tends to evolve to a more developed form of TMP (for instance, absolute European monarchies).23

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As I understand it, John Haldon24 is the scholar who has elaborated the concept of TMP most thoroughly. According to him, FMP should be treated as a basic and universal mode of production of the pre-capitalist societies. These are the most important characteristics of FMP: 1) the extraction of rent in the political economy sense, under whatever institutional or organisational form it appears; 2) the non-economic coercion is the basis for appropriation of surplus by a ruling class or its agents; 3) the relationship between the rulers and the ruled is exploitative and contradictory in respect of control over the means of production. Haldon also emphasizes that the term „feudalism“ is quite confusing since historians of various views attributes it different meanings. Consequently, Haldon proposes to change term „feudal“ into „tributary“ whenever one talks about modes of production.26

The scholar of British origin defines a mode of production as an ideal-type of a set of economic relationships consisting of a specific combination of forces and relations of production.27 Despite the fact that the definition was his construct, Haldon is nonetheless inclined to reduce the concept of mode of production to a mode of surplus appropriation. In this sense Haldon and Wickham’s attitudes are akin: both historians treat mode of surplus appropriation as the most important element of mode of production and as a sufficient criterion to distinguish one mode of production from another. In the 1980s Wickham suggested the idea that rent and tax (tribute) should be regarded as different modes of surplus

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23 Ibid. 60-62.
26 Ibid. 67-68.
27 Ibid. 56.
28 Ibid. 77; Wickham 1985, 167-168.
extraction and this distinction has separated two different modes of production (feudal and tributary) correspondingly\textsuperscript{29}. According to Haldon, a difference between tax and rent means only a difference in the level of superstructure. Therefore, there exists no different modes of production\textsuperscript{30}. Referring to Marx\textsuperscript{31}, Haldon states that Marx itself did not differentiate tax and various forms of rent as a basis for distinguishing between different modes of production\textsuperscript{32}. The scholar also rejects the argument that private landowners intervene in the process of production in a larger scale than state (or its agents)\textsuperscript{33}. Besides, the structure of state’s taxes and services usually was intermingled: taxes in kind and in cash as well as various labour services. So in this case there is no any essential difference between tax and rent either\textsuperscript{34}. According to Haldon, in both cases the object of surplus extraction is the class of peasants and it does not matter what is their status (free holders or dependent tenants) and whether they are grouped in independent communities or not\textsuperscript{35}.

Elaborating his arguments, Haldon implies that if one suggests that tax and rent represent different modes of production one should expect to find two contrasting ways of combining the direct producers with the means of production and, respectively, two different types of surplus appropriation. That would mean that the state and the ruling class make entirely independent socio-economic categories. That, in turn, implies that wherever one finds the state and the class of landowners one deals with a case of combined feudal-tributary mode of production which contains permanent contradiction. The members of the fiscal apparatus, on the one hand, and the provincial agents to whom the function of tax-raising is delegated, on the other hand, should make a different class which is not the case. There are only different groups of the same ruling class. These factions can function as a unity but they may also contradict each other. The character of relation between the above-mentioned factions determines

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid. 166-196.
\textsuperscript{30} Haldon \textit{1993}, 77.
\textsuperscript{31} „Should the direct producers not be confronted by a private landowner, but rather [...] under direct subordination to a state which stands over them as their landlord and simultaneously as sovereign, then rent and taxes coincide, or rather, there exists no tax which differs from this form of ground-rent.” Marx K. \textit{Capital} Vol. III Part VI: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894-c3/ch47.htm (accessed 23 September 2009).
\textsuperscript{32} Haldon \textit{1993}, 78-79.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid. 79-80, 82-84.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid. 82.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid. 77.
not a different relation toward the direct producer but in respect of the degree of their control over the means of distribution of surplus product. According to Haldon, this is an internal contradiction and not a confrontation between different modes of production\textsuperscript{36}.

Conversely, although Haldon does not imply any crucial differences between FMP and TMP. He underlines that slave, ancient and capitalist modes of production differ from TMP essentially. In case of the slave mode of production direct producers themselves are a private property of their owners; direct producers are totally separated from the means of production. When the capitalist mode of production prevails, hired workers dispose only of their labour force, which they are forced to sell to the owners of the means of production because of the economic pressure. Under the ancient mode of production state controls the privately owned means of production only on a limited scale: as much as it appropriates of surplus product in a form of taxes which is necessary to maintain political, juridical and military structures. They are indispensable to guarantee the security of citizens and their property. On the other hand, Haldon adds that then the division of labour develops the ancient mode of production and evolves eventually toward TMP or to the slave mode of production\textsuperscript{37}.

The Romanian sociologist Henri H. Stahl (1901-1991) was a partisan of historical materialism as he emphasizes in many of his texts. He often refers directly to the works of Marxism founders. Stahl gives a clear exposition of his methodological attitudes and creates an original conception of socioeconomic formation in his late works\textsuperscript{38}.

The Romanian scholar has distinguished five “classic” formations (primitive communal, slave, feudal, capitalist, socialist)\textsuperscript{39}. Additionally, Stahl tends to differentiate one more: oriental despotism\textsuperscript{40}. The Romanian sociologist strictly opposed the unilinear approach to social development. He also criticised determinist attitude to social evolution, i.e., the statement that every society moves by the only possible way toward capitalism\textsuperscript{41}. According to Stahl, the fact that feudalism is located chronologically exactly before capitalism does not mean in itself that feudalism is pre-

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid. 84-85.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid. 77-78.
\textsuperscript{38} H.H. Stahl, Teorii şi ipoteze privind sociologia orînduirii tributale, Probleme confuze în istoria socială a României (Bucureşti, 1992).
\textsuperscript{39} Stahl 1980, 26.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid. 191.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid. 52-56.
capitalist, i.e. that it evolves toward capitalism inevitably. In Stahl’s opinion this course occurred only in some regions of the world (Western Europe) and under specific circumstances which are external in respect of feudalism (industrial revolution, colonial policy, primary accumulation of capital). Therefore, he supports the view that there are alternative ways of social evolution. If one wants to interpret social history adequately from the point of view of historical materialism, one should research every case as thoroughly as possible and separate technological processes from relations of production (modes of exploitation).

Stahl states that mode of production should not be identified with socio-economic formation. The Romanian scholar underlines that there are three social phenomena which should not be merged: mode of production (mod de producție), mode of production’s exploitation (mod de exploatare a producției) and type of formation (tip de orânduire). In case of capitalism, mode of production and mode of exploitation are connected in an indistinguishable way but in other cases they are separate phenomena. For example, according to Stahl, in case of tributalism „tributal mode of production“ does not exist (the communal mode of production prevails instead) – there is only a „tributal mode of exploitation“. The Romanian scholar also argues that even several modes of production coexist within the same formation but one of them is dominant. The mode of exploitation of the dominating mode of production determines the type of formation. In some cases the prevailing mode of production remains the same despite that modes of exploitation change.

Stahl is also inclined to emphasize the importance of mode of exploitation from another point of view. He insists that to explain the rotation of formations only by a shift of corresponding modes of production means a vulgarization of materialistic approach to historical development. He gives an example of such an interpretation. Since the base of peasant’s exploitation is their bounding to ground, tithe and corvée some historians treat the society as feudal. The Romanian scholar produces a
counterargument stating that these forms of exploitation can also be found in the ancient Roman and in late Byzantine societies (i.e. so called colonatus) but, according to Stahl, one does not treat these societies as feudal. In case of the genuine feudalism, in Stahl’s opinion, the forms of peasant’s exploitation already mentioned coexist with a ruling class which is consolidated in a shape of feudal ladder based on seignior-vassal relations. These feudal lords have their own economic base which should be differentiated from the mode of production. According to Stahl, it is this structure which constitutes the mode of exploitation in case of feudalism. This is a social aspect of formation which should be treated as an element of superstructure\textsuperscript{52}.

In addition to the six „fundamental“ formations\textsuperscript{53} that have been mentioned before, the Romanian scholar distinguishes one more which he names as tributal (orînduirea tributale). Stahl treats it as a variation of oriental despotism\textsuperscript{54}. The latter differs from tributalism, first of all, by the functions of state. In case of oriental despotism, state interferes more into the life of direct producers by organizing large scale public works (building and maintaining irrigation system etc.). On the other hand, communities of direct producers in both cases are exploited by raising a tribute\textsuperscript{55}. This characteristic is common for both subtypes of the formation. Nevertheless, in case of tributalism the communities of direct producers are considerably less controlled by state (ruler). This is the main difference between oriental despotism and tributalism.

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I have already represented here three concepts of tributalism and now I will proceed to a critical comparative analysis. I begin with Haldon because I suppose that his approach deserves most critique in this context.

To begin with, as I have already mentioned, according to Haldon the mode of exploitation is the core of mode of production. The main characteristic of TMP as a class society is raising a tax (rent or tribute) in a way of non-economic violence. Among the others, Haldon also differentiates the ancient mode of production. In the latter case, the state appropriates a part of surplus product in the form of taxes raised from the proprietors of the means of production in order to maintain political, juridical and military system (these structures defend interests of the proprietors themselves). In what way does the appropriation of surplus

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 62.
\textsuperscript{53} I.e. primitive communal, slave, feudal, capitalist, socialist and oriental despotic/Asiatic.
\textsuperscript{54} Stahl 1980, 191.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 156-160.
product take place? According to Haldon, at first it takes place on the basis of internal clan and tribal reciprocity, later on formalized and contractual basis\(^{56}\). Haldon’s statement shows clearly that here we are dealing only with redistribution of surplus product and not with a mode of exploitation. I argue that to distinguish the ancient mode of production defined in this way is wrong\(^{57}\). Haldon himself recognises later in his book that the so-called ancient mode of production he distinguishes is rather an intermediate stage between primitive (tribal) society and class (antagonistic) society\(^{58}\).

The second Haldon’s statement which in my opinion is not acceptable is related to his notion of productive forces and its accordance with relations of production. The theoretician of British presents an excessively generalized definition of the level of forces of production which corresponds with TMP. It can be applied not only to every pre-capitalist society but also to some primitive/tribal societies. It does not reveal sufficiently dialectic relation between productive forces and relations of production. According to Haldon, the level of productive forces emerged with Neolithic revolution, and comprises field cultivation based on organic energy plus hands implements, capable of sustained surplus production as reproduction of peasant family. Wherever these conditions and relations of production are based on raising of rent in a way of non-economic violence we have a case of TMP\(^{59}\). First, let’s remember that Haldon speaks also about slave and ancient mode of production. It means that the level of forces of production characterized before does not correspond only with relations of production of TMP type. On the other hand, as we already know, Haldon treats ancient mode of production as an intermediate stage between modes of production rather than a self-sufficient mode of production. As a matter of fact, he interprets slave mode of production as a marginal phenomenon, too\(^{60}\). It sounds like my critique is not sufficiently well grounded. Nevertheless, if one considers an issue of productive forces level in a wider context, one should notice that Haldon’s definition do not even answer to the question why some societies become antagonistic (class) and others do not. For example, in Africa south of Sahara (the only clear

\(^{56}\) Haldon, 199378.

\(^{57}\) C. Wickham has suggested another and more persuasive conception of Ancient mode of production, look: C. Wickham, The Other Transition: from the Ancient World to feudalism // Past and Present (1984, № 103): 3-36.

\(^{58}\) Haldon 1993, 90.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., 65.

\(^{60}\) Ibid., 89-90.
exception is Ethiopia) despite the early using of iron tools and agriculture
the societies did not evolve to TMP except for a few ephemeral
exceptions\textsuperscript{61}. In this context, one should remember that Karl Marx himself
wrote that „community itself appears as the first great force of production“, which on its
turn is determined by conditions of production (the structure
of branches of production, farming methods etc.) as mode of production
itself\textsuperscript{62}. In the meanwhile Haldon entirely ignores the factor of communities
in his typology of modes of production\textsuperscript{63}.

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Now, we can return to Haldon’s call for rejecting FMP/TMP
dichotomy. As it has already been mentioned, the scholar argues that Marx
himself has not made any essential difference between raising of rent by
private proprietors and raising of taxes by state\textsuperscript{64}. In fact, I agree that Marx
treats the extraction of state taxes as one of the possible variations of rent in
the above-mentioned context. This confirms Marx’s statement which could
be found in the same text: „The direct producer, according to our
assumption, is to be found here in possession of his own means of
production, the necessary material labour conditions required for the
realisation of his labour and the production of his means of subsistence. He
conducts his agricultural activity and the rural home industries connected
with it independently. This independence is not undermined by the
circumstance that the small peasants may form among themselves a more
or less natural production community, as they do in India, since it is here
merely a question of independence from the nominal lord of the manor“\textsuperscript{65}.

Here is the case to formulate the question which is the most important
in the context: if Marx treats the state tax raised in some Asian countries as
a specific sort of rent does it mean that he ascribes these countries to the
same mode of production with countries in which prevails the sort of rent
extracted from direct producers by private proprietors? In order to answer

\textsuperscript{61} There is a Russian theoretician of history Yuri Semenov which elucidated connection
between productive forces and relations of production consequently and persuasively, look:
Ю. И.Семёнов, Об особенностях развития производственных сил
dокапиталистических классовых обществ // Философские науки (1985, № 1).


\textsuperscript{63} Haldon 1993, 77.

\textsuperscript{64} „Should the direct producers not be confronted by a private landowner, but rather [...] under
direct subordination to a state which stands over them as their landlord and
simultaneously as sovereign, then rent and taxes coincide, or rather, there exists no tax
which differs from this form of ground-rent. “

this question properly I need to consider the Marx’s concept of mode of production itself more thoroughly.

I would like to remind again that Haldon defines mode of production in substance as a mode of exploitation, i.e. as a mode of surplus product appropriation. Such a definition of mode of production is quite popular among Western Marxist historians. There is no doubt that both Haldon and other Western Marxist scholars refer to the same Marx’s statement from the same paragraph: „The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of direct producers, determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself and, in turn, reacts upon it as a determining element. Upon this, however, is founded the entire formation of the economic community which grows up out of the production relations themselves“.

Nevertheless, one can raise the question: is it such a narrow definition fully adequate to Marx’s concept itself? According to the quotation cited above, the founder of Marxism understands mode of production, first of all, as relations of production. And what are relations of production, according to Marx? The answer can be found in Marx’s work in the sentence following the one quoted above: „It is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers — a relation always naturally corresponding to a definite stage in the development of the methods of labour and thereby its social productivity“. And how do these direct relations between the owners of production conditions and the direct producers (i.e. relations of production) manifest? In this case one can find the answer to the question in another well-known passage of Marx: „At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or – this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms – with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto“. And how, according to Marx, these relations of production are manifesting? It is the quotation of „Das Kapital“ vol. 3, which gives the answer: „the property relationship

must simultaneously appear as a direct relation of lordship and servitude, so that the direct producer is not free” 70. Thus, I can conclude that the aspect of socioeconomic power and not the juridical one is the most important aspect of property for Marx71.

Let me summarize some essential things. I can draw two important points:

1. The aspect of exploitation of mode of production is manifesting as a direct relation between owners of production’s conditions and direct producers;

2. Relation of subjugation and domination (mode of exploitation) is manifested as property relation which, in its turn, should be understood as socioeconomic power (which permits to realize one’s title toward any property).

Keeping in mind these two points, I can return to the main question formulated before: does Marx ascribe those Asian societies in which state is owner of land and sovereign simultaneously to the same mode of production as those societies in which rent is extracted from direct producers by private owners. Before answering to this question, I would like to produce a passage from Marx’s works in which he describes the case of the Asian societies considered here: „Should the direct producers not be confronted by a private landowner, but rather, as in Asia, under direct subordination to a state which stands over them as their landlord and simultaneously as sovereign, then rent and taxes coincide, or rather, there exists no tax which differs from this form of ground-rent [...] The state is then the supreme lord. Sovereignty here consists in the ownership of land concentrated on a national scale. But, on the other hand, no private ownership of land exists, although there is both private and common possession and use of land” 72.

In this case which Marx describes quite clearly, unlike the societies in which rent from direct producers is extracted by private owners, one can not find:

1. direct relation between private owners of land (i.e. of conditions of production) and direct producers;

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71 Amin treats property in the same way. Wickham also emphasizes that if one wishes to compare precapitalist modes of production then power is more important aspect of property than juridical one, look: Wickham 1985, 184.
2. private owners of land themselves; it means that socioeconomic power is concentrated in the hands of ruler (personifying the state) and not of private owners which do not exist at all.

One can talk about private possessors not owners of land. They acquire power only when they become state’s (ruler’s) agents (i.e. members of state administrative or fiscal apparatus). It means that their relation to power (as a real expression of property) is determined by status. This is an essential difference between the two types of societies considered before. I argue that this is a sufficient reason to talk about different modes of production.

In addition to the essential point revealed before, if a state/ruler as an owner of production conditions correlates with a community during the process of tax/rent raising that means that there is no direct relation to the direct producer. Consequently, I can conclude that a question of productive/obligation unit (cell) is no less important. In turn, it means that the typology of communities elaborated by Marx\(^{73}\) is also fundamental when one envisages to define mode of production in a proper way. Next, I can conclude that the statement about TMP as a universal pre-capitalist mode of production is baseless because it is grounded on a too narrow conception of mode of production. Apart from the fact that TMP and FMP should be distinguished, one can also formulate even more complicated classification based on exploitive subject (owner of productive conditions) and productive/obligation unit criteria:

1. Owner of land is a ruler/state and productive/obligatory unit is a community of Asiatic/Slavonic type;
2. Owner of land is a ruler/state and productive/obligatory unit is an individual household of direct producer;
3. Owners of land are private and productive/obligatory unit is a community of Asiatic/Slavonic type;
4. Owners of land are private and productive/obligatory unit is an individual household of direct producer\(^{74}\).

I have already contrasted my arguments with Haldon’s concept of universalistic TMP. Now I can pass to the critical analysis of Amin’s approach. First, I must emphasise that in my opinion Amin and Haldon’s attitude toward TMP are very akin, no serious differences separating their viewpoints. Both scholars treat TMP as an universal pre-capitalist stage of

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\(^{73}\) Marx, 1964.

humankind development. However, Amin makes a specification that FMP was a peripheral, undeveloped case of TMP and as such FMP was more favourable for the genesis of capitalism; nevertheless he does not treat feudalism as entirely autonomous mode of production). Accordingly, we can reckon both Amin and Haldon among partisans of unilinear Marxist scheme of historical development. Conceptions of both authors are not acceptable to me.

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Now we can proceed to the critical analysis of Stahl’s conception. We are going to enumerate and discuss the main points where the approach of the Romanian sociologist differs to those of Amin and Haldon.

The first. Stahl recognizes the existence of alternative ways of social evolution. The Romanian scholar criticizes deterministic unilinear formations/modes of production scheme consistently. According to Stahl, only under certain circumstances (and it is not inevitable) one formation evolves into the other. In contrast, Amin underlines that development of humankind is strictly unilinear (in the sense of development of productive forces and relations of production, respectively). As regards Haldon, he treats TMP as a basic and universal pre-capitalist mode of production so that he denies possibility of alternative precapitalist social development too.

The second. There is a difference in the usage of main concepts between Stahl and Amin/Haldon (especially as regards the term mode of production). There is the concept of formation (orînduire) which is the widest one in Stahl’s works. It includes both mode of production (mod de producție) as technical processes of production (this is what I tend to name productive/obligatory unit) and mode of exploitation, i.e. mode of surplus product extraction, as well as some social structures which, according the Romanian sociologist, are no less important when one wants to identify a type of formation (for example, feudal hierarchy based on seignior-vassal relations in case of feudalism75). The latter are elements of superstructure76. Mode of exploitation, according to Stahl, determines a type of formation since mode of production is able to endure for a long time without any changes, but meanwhile modes of exploitation change.

As a result I can summarize that the basic unit of societies’ typology for Stahl is the formation (orînduire). Meanwhile, there is a mode of

75 The approach to feudality as to hierarchic structure based on seignior-vassal relations was criticized very convincingly by British medievalist Susan Reynolds, look: S. Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals: the Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted (Oxford University Press, 1994).
76 About importance of this element look: Stahl 1992, 62.
production which is a category of the same rank for Amin and Haldon. The latter defines mode of production as an ideal type: a set of certain economic relations (some combination of productive forces and productive relations)\textsuperscript{77}. It means that the British theoretician uses the concept of mode of production as a tool of typology procedure which is abstracted from historical reality. In the meanwhile, Haldon understands social formation as an expression of a historical society, i.e. a particular expression of some mode of production in a given space and time (it includes political, cultural and institutional aspects).

As much as I know, Amin does not define the difference between mode of production and formation in a precise way but, according to some hints which one can find in his book, his attitude is very similar to Haldon’s. As already mentioned, Amin criticizes Anderson for not separating mode of production from social formation and denies the universality of humankind’s development on that base. Meanwhile, Amin emphasizes the conceptual difference between the concepts (“To the extent I emphasize this conceptual distinction”) and rejects arguments based on the variety of immediate reality\textsuperscript{78}.

There is an essential difference between Stahl’s notion of mode of production and Amin’s/Haldon’s. According to Stahl, there are, first of all, technical processes which include the concept mode of production (also labour organization since Stahl talks about mode of production of villages possessing common property [sat devâlmaş], i.e. productive/obligatory unit). Haldon considers such a notion of mode of production as misleading. I tend to agree with Haldon. It is a so called fetishizing of organizational forms. The conception of mode of production of this kind includes only a productive unit and excludes any wider set of relations of production\textsuperscript{79}. As already mentioned, Stahl treats mode of exploitation as the most important element of formation which determines the type of formation. Conversely, Haldon considers mode of exploitation as the most important element of mode of production which determines the type of mode of production. The latter conception of mode of production, as my analysis of Marx’s concept of mode of production has showed, is more similar to the conception of Marxism founder’s himself.

Conversely, as Stahl attributes some structures which should be treated as elements of superstructure to the set of components of formation, I

\textsuperscript{77} Haldon 1993, 56.
\textsuperscript{78} Amin 1980, 50.
\textsuperscript{79} Haldon 1993, 53.
consider Stahl’s conception of formation as the second case of incorrect conception of mode of production distinguished by Haldon. In that case, conception of mode of production as an ideal type is intermingled with conception of mode of production as a particular society at a particular historical time. In this case, particular institutional forms are treated as important attributes of a certain type of production mode.

At this point, I want to pass on to the comparison of the conceptions of tributalism/TMP itself. Stahl considers tributalism as a variation of „fundamental” formation – Oriental despotism (i.e. Asiatic mode of production). On the contrary, Amin does not recognise the conception of Asiatic mode of production at all (he considers it not as scholarly but as mythological). As regards Haldon, he does not distinguish any differences between TMP and FMP since he regards TMP as an unified pre-capitalist stage of humankind’s economic development. Stahl’s conception of tributalism is more akin to Wickham’s. Once upon a time this British medievalist historian considered TMP and FMP as two different but coexisting modes of production because they were based on different methods of surplus product extracting (state tax and private rent respectively). Thus, TMP is an universal pre-capitalist mode of production in Amin/Haldon’s unilinear scheme of universal history. Tributal formation is one of alternative variations of pre-capitalist development in Stahl’s bilinear scheme of universal history.

The Romanian sociologist produced a wider definition of the tributal mode of exploitation in his main theoretical work. These are its main characteristics:

1. Ruling class appropriates surplus product from villages possessing property in common (satele devălmașe) in a centralized way;
2. Appropriation of the surplus product has a form of tribute since quantity of extracted product and terms are fixed in advance and extracted products go directly to ruler’s treasury at first;
3. Rights of ruling class are entirely fiscal and exploitation is purely parasitic because exploiters do not intervene into process of production at all.

Let me consider now to what degree Stahl’s definition of tributal mode of exploitation is acceptable. We should keep in mind the conclusions

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80 Haldon 1993, 53-54; Haldon even gives an example analogous to Stahl’s statement (feudalism is authentic only in case if institutions are analogical to those of medieval Western Europe).
81 Wickham 1985, 166-196.
82 Stahl 1980, 192.
drawn after reconstructing Marx’s conception of mode of production (which includes mode of exploitation as an essential element of it). First, I can make out the relation between exploitative subject and productive/obligatory unit from Stahl’s definition. Second, I can make out the relation between means of production and a direct producer: the relation is not direct but mediated by community. Third, a ruling class consists of ruler’s agents entirely; their social power is determined by status. Thus, according to my classification of modes of production, one can find all necessary characteristics of mode of production in Stahl’s definition of tributal mode of exploitation.

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From the considerations above, I can draw conclusions as follows:

1. I define Amin and Haldon’s conceptions of development of pre-capitalist societies as deterministic unilinear evolutionism; they are totally not acceptable to me.
2. I regard Stahl’s attitude about probability of alternative ways of pre-capitalist social evolution as well-grounded although it is based on some vagueness in using some essential categories.
3. Stahl’s conception of process of universal history which I define as bilinear do not reflect entire the spectrum of pre-capitalist modes of production in a fully adequate way.
4. Haldon’s definition of mode of production as an ideal type of a set of economic relations (some combination of productive forces and productive relations) is totally acceptable.
5. I also regard as acceptable Haldon’s distinction between mode of production and social formation as between an ideal type of a set of economic relations and a particular manifestation in society which has really existed.
6. I reject Haldon’s idea that the essence of mode of production should be understood only as a method of exploitation.
7. In my opinion, these are the most important elements of mode of production:
   a. Exploitative subject; it can be identified by its relation toward property of means of production which in its turn should be understood as social power;
   b. Productive/obligatory unit; it can be manifested as an individual direct producer’s household or community.
8. Stahl’s conception of mode of production is too narrow and therefore unacceptable.
9. I regard Stahl’s conception of formation as too ambiguous (in a sense of intertwining meanings of ideal type and particular historical case) and therefore not enough conceptualized.

10. I reject Haldon/Amin’s conception of TMP as an universal pre-capitalist mode of production.

11. I treat Stahl’s definition of tributal mode of exploitation as acceptable in general although it needs some reformulation.

12. Contradictions of alternative conceptions of tributalism proves that even at the beginning of the 21st century the issue of typology of antagonistic pre-capitalist modes of production is not yet solved; so revisions of existing approaches, further discussions and researches are relevant.

13. I propose a classification of modes of production based on exploitative subject and productive/obligatory unit as a starting point for further discussions.
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN TRANSYLVANIAN SAXONS AND BALTIC GERMANS DURING THE 1920s

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Abstract:
The relationship between the Saxons and the German Balts has been already investigated, but the available archival material, however, allows me to deepen the problem of cultural relations between the two German minorities. This relationship has taken both an institutional and a personal form. The first form involved cooperation between clubs, societies and editors of publications, while the second consisted of direct contact between cultured people. The two kinds of cooperation have created in the 1920s a network of mental relations based on the solidarity of all Germans living abroad. A special contribution in the establishment of these relations was brought forth by the Cultural Office of the Germans in Greater Romania, founded in 1922 in Sibiu by Richard Csaki, and by the “Ostland” magazine, which was also published in Sibiu starting with 1926. Csaki and others worked in the field of cultural policy together with representatives of the German Balts such as Ewal Ammende, Werner Hasselblatt, Axel de Vries or Max von Ravick. This article investigates these bonds as part of the wider frame of German cultural networks operating in-between the Baltic and the Black sea.
Rezumat:

Keywords: Saxons, Balts, cooperation, networks, cultural policy

The study of the interwar relations between Transylvanian Saxons and Baltic Germans is not an entirely new scholarly subject. Authors such as Max Hildeberg Boehm and Michael Garleff have already approached this issue, while the interwar relations between the two German groups have aroused the interest of numerous scholars.

Transylvania and the Baltic States, two European regions situated at the opposite periphery of the German colonization in the East, have been united by their common fate and by the connections established between the German inhabitants of the two historical provinces after the First World War. On the basis of the works published with regard to these relations thus far, of the documents from the Cultural League of the Romanian Germans held in the Sibiu archives, of the mass-media of the time and


especially of the Sibiu magazine Ostland, I try to reconstitute a series of events and facts regarding the connections between the Saxons and the Baltic Germans in the 1920s. If the connections between the political leaders of the two groupings in their struggle for the rights of minorities have been already dealt with\(^3\), without the issue being however entirely worked out, very little is still known about the contributions of cultural figures such as Richard Csaki (1886-1943) or about the Cultural League of the Romanian Germans (CLRG) and the 1926 to 1931 series of the Sibiu-based Ostland magazine.

Culture is the main field where the struggle for cultural identity is undertaken and herein the battles for the rights of minorities are always waged. The relations between the Transylvanian and the Baltic Germans have embraced in the 1920s an institutional and a personal shape. The cooperation between associations and societies, magazines’ editorial boards and press services are examples of the former, while the bonds between cultural and scientific personalities are examples of the latter form of cooperation. Both types of interactions have been intensely cultivated in the 1920s with the aim of creating a “network of spiritual relations” among the German minorities situated in Central-East Europe with the aim of mutual knowledge.\(^4\)

The CLRG set up in Sibiu in February 1922 has brought an important though little known contribution to reaching this goal.\(^5\) The idea of such an organization has originated from Csaki in 1919 when it was understood that Greater Romania included about a million Germans coming from three different countries with little awareness of each other.\(^6\) Consequently, the CLRG envisaged the unification of Romania’s Germans around the Saxons. Additionally, its 1922 programme aimed at creating a spiritual bond with Germany and with the other European German minorities. The League, based in Sibiu, has undertaken a fabulous activity until 1931 when it was shut down bankrupt. The model of CLRG has been copied by the Estonian Germans, within their cultural autonomy, and by the Upper Silesia Germans.\(^7\) In May 1923 Csaki and his wife, the painter Margarete Depner


\(^4\) 'Auslanddeutsche untereinander', Ostland, 1 (1926): 46.


\(^6\) Richard Csaki, 'Unser Kulturprogramm', Ostland, 3 (1921): 231–233.

\(^7\) 'Kulturämter', Ostland, 2 (1927): 255–256.
Csaki (1885-1970), paid a visit to the Baltic states where he presented his cultural organization thus arising the enthusiasm of local leaders such as Werner Hasselblatt (1890-1958)8 from Estonia. On the other hand, Csaki has noticed a series of common features between the history and folk art of Saxons and Balts. His observations following this visit to Latvia have been eventually presented in a series of conferences.9 The chairman of CLRG has eventually visited all the European German minorities returning to the Baltic states in 1928 and getting to know well the Baltic Sea rim Germans. Following this visit, he has published an article in his magazine Ostland meaningfully entitled The Baltic Germans now: Transylvanian dedication to our friends from Estonia.10 The author declared himself “shaken” by the expropriation of the land of 25,000 Estonian Germans, which he deemed the most radical land reform in Europe, and seemed fascinated by their national conscience.

The action plan of CLRG included the education of the people by popular libraries, slide conferences, educational and cultural movies, didactic materials, exhibitions, postgraduate summer courses, conferences, musical and drama shows and publications. A special section hosted German mass-media and had a reading room for the 250 newspapers and magazines received worldwide, a filing cabinet and a press service. There also existed an economic section, a section for professional orientation and a section dealing with the magazines issued by the league.11 In all these fields there existed preoccupations for contacts with the Germans living abroad. The study of the working methods of other cultural organizations, the dissemination of their own results, the spreading of various kinds information of abroad and “the strengthening of the self-consciousness of the German people” were all envisaged by the league.12

One of the main achievements of CLRG, with beneficial effects on the bonds with Germans living abroad, was the organization of postgraduate summer courses in Sibiu between 1920 and 1930. The idea behind these courses was a pre-war product of the Sibiu-based Modern Library organization that aimed at cultural unification of South-East European

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10 Ostland, 3 (1928): 33.
12 Ibid. 49.
Germans. According to other sources such courses had already taken place before the Great War in Salzburg and Reichenberg (Czechoslovakia). The courses organized in Sibiu were attended yearly by Germans from all Romanian provinces and by dozens of Germans from other countries “united in a German lofty atmosphere”. The speakers were university professors from Romania, Austria, Switzerland and especially from Germany. Among them, one can find Prof. Dr. H. Phelps from Danzig/Gdansk (1923), Prof. Dr. M. Ebert and Prof. Dr. Fuchs (Königsberg) and a team of Baltic Germans led by Prof. Dr. Ernst Seraphim (Königsberg). In 1925 invitations to deliver lectures at the “cultural-political weak” organized in Sibiu were sent to the Balts’ leaders Axel de Vries (1892-1963), Ewald Ammende (1893-1936) and Hermann von Berg from Tartu. In the end, this intention was at first postponed and then never materialized.

Such summer courses have also been organized in the Baltic states, an exchange undertaken between the summer conferences organized by the Herder Society in Riga, the Tartu-held conferences and the Sibiu summer school. Except for the Sudetenland Germans who enjoyed their own university, all the other minorities would attempt to make up for lacking such an institution with these courses which were also serving the purpose of setting up a link with their motherland culture and science. The convener of the courses in Tartu was Dr. R. v. Engelhardt who was of the opinion that they “had to offer a principled basis for the detailed study of the humanistic and natural sciences.” The summer courses were attended by 500-700 participants among whom were also intellectuals belonging to the majority ethnic groups (Romanians, Latvians or Estonians). Thus, the German minorities were also facilitating the access of locals to Western culture and science. As Csaki has underscored the courses were not only disseminating practical competencies, but were also renewing the spiritual bonds with the motherland. “The community of German consciousness” was according to him “the main driving force behind these manifestations”. The CLRG has witnessed the summer courses in

13 Ostland, 1 (1919): 107, 201.
14 Ibid., 163; ANR.DJS, Liga Culturală, file. 8, 1926, 525.
15 Siebenbürgisch-Deutsches Tageblatt, 54 (1927), no. 16.253/3 septembrie, 5.
16 See for details O. Balling, 126.
17 ANR.DJS, Liga Culturală, file 5/1925, 4, 584, 592.
18 Ibid., file. 8/1926, 189.
19 Ostland, 1 (1926): 36-40.
20 Richard Csaki, 'Auslanddeutsche Hochschulwochen', Ostland, 2 (1927): 337.
Romania, Latvia, Estonia, Czechoslovakia and Poland and has published in its magazine reports and articles in which the experience of each country was analyzed.\textsuperscript{21}

The CLRG has developed contacts, albeit weak as the correspondence recorded in the archives proves, with similar institutions of the Baltic Germans. Thus, in October 1926 Csaki dispatched to the Herder Society in Riga a report about the activity of the Cultural League and requested articles for the magazine \textit{Ostland} about the achievements of the Latvian organization. Prof. Dr. Paul Sokolowski has preferred instead to send a confidential report.\textsuperscript{22}

The Herder Society was set up in Riga in 1921 after the German university there was closed down. A group of professors such as Sokolowski, Kupfer and Klumberg have established an academic institute at university level which was recognized on May 14, 1927 as a private institution, this being the first such institution for minorities in Europe. On the occasion of its fifth anniversary, Csaki wrote that “the most productive achievement of the Baltic Germans after the war, besides the establishment of the cultural autonomy in Estonia, is the setting up of the Herder Institute.”\textsuperscript{23}

The CLRG requested from the Central Office for the Activity of the Baltic Germans in Riga a report about the aims and activity of this organization. In his letter, Csaki expressed his desire to contribute to the strengthening of the relations between the German national communities from Romania and Latvia and invited a representative of the latter to the Cultural-Political Week organized in Sibiu in September 1925.\textsuperscript{24}

The organizational chart of the CLRG was also sent to Lithuania where Csaki’s activity was known. One of the leaders of the German Party in Lithuania (Partei der Deutchen Litauens), Martin Labrenz wrote that the efforts of the Cultural League constituted a stimulus for the national endeavour of the Lithuanian Germans who were asking for advices for setting up a German library; they also requested German magazines and the addresses of the Romanian German societies.\textsuperscript{25}

The most important contribution to the relations between the two regions, the Baltic and Transylvania, was brought by the second series of


\textsuperscript{22} ANR.DJS, Liga Culturală, file 8/1926, 188, 190–191.

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Ostland}, 1 (1926), p. 399; 2 (1927): 256.

\textsuperscript{24} ANR.DJS, Liga Culturală, file 5/1925, 351–354.

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Ibid.}, file 8, 1926, 451–452.
the monthly magazine *Ostland* edited by CLRG between 1926 and 1931. The subtitle of the journal succinctly expresses its programme: “From the spiritual life of the Germans living abroad” (Vom geistigen Leben der Auslanddeutschen). In a letter to Rudolf Brandsch, the chairman of the German Union in Romania, Csaki called the magazine “a spokesman of the special endeavours of the Cultural League”26 for upholding and affirming the cultural identity of the eastern Germans, of all the German minorities. The editorial board of the magazine has informed about the publication preparations for the new periodical and has requested the support and cooperation of personalities from among the German minorities in the East, the Balts included (R. v. Engelhardt, E. Ammende and so forth).27

The magazine has set up the aim of being a mirror of the cultural and national activity of the German communities in Eastern Europe. As far as the Baltic Germans are concerned, this aim was achieved to a large extent at least in the first years from its publication. In the pages of the magazine articles about the life28 and history29 of the national communities of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania have been published. On the request of the editorial board, Axel de Vries has presented the national-cultural autonomy of the Estonian Germans as established according to the 1925 law and its achievements.30 This system of minority politics was followed with interest by other minorities who aspired to the status of cultural autonomy. The description of specific elements has approached the foreign influence on the language spoken by German Balts.31 Mention should be made here that a well known linguist from Transylvania, Andreas Scheiner (1864-1946)32 made a comparative study on the language spoken by native Baltic Germans and the Saxon dialects. His study was published in another journal from Sibiu, “*Deutsche Politische Hefte aus Großrumänien*”, edited by Rudolf Brandsch33, where other contributions of several Baltic authors were also published. In this way, the question of Baltic minorities, the

26 Ibid., file 5, 1925, 655.
27 Ibid., 914, 918; file 7/1926, 132, 134.
33 *Deutsche Politische Hefte aus Großrumänien*, 7 (1927):154-163

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agrarian situation in Estonia\textsuperscript{34}, were presented to the Transylvanian readers. Articles about the Baltic Germans appeared also in the Saxon newspapers, but the greatest contribution to the knowledge of the realities of the German Baltic society must be attributed to \textit{Ostland} review. In this magazine were also published several literary works of German Baltic authors like Otto von Schilling, Arthur Kerkovius (poets), Albert Kivikas, Irene von Styrk, Monika Hunnius (prose writer)\textsuperscript{35}. The editorial secretary of the magazine, Konrad Nussbacher, argued in a letter from February 1926, addressed to the Riga prose writer Werner Bergengruener (1892-1964), that the mutual knowledge of literature of the German groups from abroad was one of the most appropriate ways for their intimacy and \textit{Ostland} had made that its main goal\textsuperscript{36}. But the magazine would not publish any kind of literature. Nussbacher exercised his abilities of literary critic on several poems send by a professor from Tartu.\textsuperscript{37}

The writer Mia Munier-Wroblewska (1882-1965) had a more close connection with the Saxons in the 1920s. During a visit, in 1927, she participated to the May Day festival of the Sibiu Saxons and was highly impressed by the festivities in the city and from Dumbrava Sibiului. She published her impressions in \textit{Rigasche Rundschau} and from there they were collected by the \textit{Siebenburgish- Deutsches Tageblatt} daily newspaper\textsuperscript{38}. In the same year, Adolf Schullerus, Locum bishop, ethnographer and president of the Saxon National Council, wrote a eulogistic review of a novel by Mia Munier-Wroblewska, inspired from the life of Baltic Germans. The author underlined that, although the Baltic Germans were a people of counts and barons yielding to the Tzar, they were brought to fight in 1914, against their German brothers from the \textit{Reich}. Scullerus found in the novel of the Baltic writer a new perspective upon the Germans from the foreign countries\textsuperscript{39}. The writer from Latvia had been in Transylvania on several occasions and she was inspired by a local legend about the building of the Evangelic church from the town of Sebes. In 1932, a short novel was published in Germany with the title \textit{Der Bauermeister zu Muhlbach} (The Sebes Architect), which had a great success to the public, as the number of the published copies exceeded ten thousands.

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Deutsche Politische Hefte aus Großrumänien}, 2(1922), no.3: 17-20, no. 10: 7-11
\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Ostland}, 2 (1927), 7-8; Ostland, 3 (1928): 12-14,325-328, 343
\textsuperscript{36} ANR DJS, Liga Culturala, file 10/1926, 628
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 868-869
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Siebenburgisch- Deutsches Tageblatt}, 54, no. 16.175 (7.08.1927): 3
\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Siebenburgisch- Deutsches Tageblatt}, no. 16 252 (2.09.1927): 2-3
The pages of *Ostland* offer a clear image of the German Baltics’ education system, beginning with its history (German schools attested already from the 13th century) and up to the situation of the German schools from Estonia, which enjoyed autonomy in the cultural administration, but they were facing great difficulties in collecting the necessary money after the agrarian reform had destroyed their basis of support through the expropriation. Here the situation was similar to that of the Saxon educational system. Like the Saxons, the Baltic Germans proved their self-denial and discipline capabilities in order to maintain their schools. On the occasion of the 125th anniversary of the German University in Tartu/Dorpat, Johannes Beermann recreated, for the readers of *Ostland*, the history of this institution, where 14,000 young people had studied up to its transformation into an Estonian institution, after the war.\(^{40}\)

In March 1926, The Union of the German Teachers from the Baltic Countries invited the CLRG and the associations of the teaching board from Transylvania at its seventh annual reunion, thus trying to establish professional connections.\(^{41}\)

The readers of the magazine also found out about the role played by the evangelical priests in the spiritual life of the Saxon community and of the German Balts. The occasion for this comparison was brought by the centenary of August Bienensteins, the founder of the Latvian linguistics and ethnography.\(^{42}\)

The editorial board of the magazine was on the Germans from Estonia’s side also on Emil Fahle’s death (1875-1929), the general director of the Factory of Cellulose and Paper from Tallin, a remarkable personality who granted a great financial support to the culture and the church of the German Balts.\(^{43}\)

An issue that the journal approached starting with the presentation of the *Yearbook of the Baltic Germans* from 1928, was that of their presence in Germany. R. Csaki highly appreciated the fact that the Balts’ associations from the *Reich* were preoccupied with the preservation of their conscience and of their identity. He wrote that the way in which they solved this problem and their contacts with their mother country was exemplary for all other German minorities. This preservation of self-conscience and identity Csaki considered as useful to “the German idea”.\(^{44}\)

\(^{40}\) *Ostland*, 3 (1928): 59-60

\(^{41}\) ANR DJS, Liga Culturala, file 10/1926, 1210; file 158/1927, 14-15

\(^{42}\) *Ostland*, 1(1926): 174

\(^{43}\) *Ostland*, 4, (1929): 272-273

\(^{44}\) *Ostland*, 3, (1928): 63
The preoccupation of the Ostland magazine for the German Balts was greater than for any other groups of Germans living abroad, who were more numerous, and made possible that this publication be well regarded in the intellectual circles from the Baltic states. The magazine was requested for exchange by local German periodicals but it had few subscribers. In 1926, Max von Ravick welcomed the magazine as an “organ who was gathering all the Germans from the East” and promised to make lobby for it and to become a collaborator. But, he argued, “for our situation, the high price allows only few persons to become subscribers. The German magazines, which before the war were not missing from any intellectual’s house, today can be subscribed only by certain associations and libraries”\(^45\).

Ostland was received with great interest also by the publications of the Baltic Germans. Thus, Rigasche Rundschau appreciated the magazine from Sibiu because all its articles “resonated the national conscience and spiritual finesse”, wished it good luck and “a long echo from Brasov and Levoca to Riga and Tallinn”\(^46\).

Moreover, the Ostland magazine also followed with great attention the German Baltic press. It was presented by Konrad Nussbacher in the special issue dedicated to the German press from abroad. He argued that Revaler Bote (chief editor A. de Vries) and Rigasche Rundschau (led by dr. Paul Schiemann) were above the level of the provincial newspapers and were “true examples for the way the German newspapers from abroad fulfilled their missions”\(^47\). In 1929, Revaler Bote daily newspaper with 30,000 copies, was gratified on the occasion of its 10th anniversary. The newspaper was considered a success of the Estonian Germans, who were appreciated as “the bravest minority of the German people”\(^48\). The daily newspaper had a few readers also among the Saxons\(^49\).

In 1928, the editorial board of Ostland magazine gladly welcomed the issuing of a new magazine in Tallinn, Baltische Geistesleben. Zeugnisse aus deutscher Kulturarbeit (The Baltic spiritual life. Testimonies of the German cultural work), which had among its collaborators some of the most remarkable intellectuals from Estonia and Latvia (R. v. Engelhardt, H. Oncken, Alex Keyserling). In the same year, after a gap of twelve years, in Riga was published Baltische Monatsschrift (The Baltic monthly review) edited by Waldemar Mulsius, Werner Hasselblatt and Max Boehm. Ostland

\(^{45}\) ANR, DJS, Liga culturala, file 9/1926, 378
\(^{46}\) Apud R. Csaki, Tätigkeitsbericht 1922-1927, Hermannstadt, 1927, 26
\(^{47}\) Ostland, 1 (1926): 219
\(^{48}\) Ostland, 4 (1929): 339
\(^{49}\) ANR.DJS, Liga culturala, file 10/1926, 1002
wished that both periodicals would become distinctive voices in the choir of the “spiritual life of the Germans from Eastern Europe”\textsuperscript{50} and maintained a regular exchange with them\textsuperscript{51}.

The publication of the Ostland magazine, its distribution in the Baltic states and the finding of German collaborators from this area, allowed close relations between the editorial boards and several local German personalities.

From the recorded correspondence one finds out that the efforts of the Sibiu Saxons were highly appreciated in Riga, Tallinn, Tartu and the other centres inhabited by Germans, where the magazine was known and read. Sometimes, the editorial board received, besides support and advices, proposals for the improvement of its content\textsuperscript{52}. On the other hand, due to this interest, from the Baltic Germans’ experiences, the editors were permanently trying to present as many aspects as possible from the life of their co-nationals from the Baltic Sea rim (cultural autonomy, artistic life, educational system, press, social life).

The publications of the Baltic Germans numbered among the 250 newspapers and magazines the press office of CLRG received in exchange for Ostland and the bulletin Pressenachrichten, it edited. In the office the main news and information were processed, the data being introduced in a card index which offered an ample image of the political, economic and cultural situation from the entire Eastern Europe\textsuperscript{53}. In this sense, Csaki was searching for connections also with Oriental Prussia and Lithuania in 1926\textsuperscript{54}.

The exchange of books between different German cultural societies and associations from the Baltic states took place and was equally intense. The Cultural League was sending especially papers published by its own publishing house: Was jeder Deutsche von Siebenbürgen und den Siebenbürger Sachsen wissen muß, Aus den siebenbürgisch-sächsischen Volksdichtung, the yearbooks of the Germans from Romania.

The experience of CLRG in the field of the popular libraries was also known in Lithuania (Jurburg Department), where Martin Labrenz asked for support in order to found a local library, which would had been the first German library from Lithuania, at the service of the national activity of the Germans from this country. Csaki sent them magazines, books and

\textsuperscript{50} Ostland, 3 (1928): 131, 156
\textsuperscript{51} ANR.DJS, Liga culturala, file 14/1928, 164-165
\textsuperscript{52} ANR.DJS, Liga culturala, file 10/1926, 117-118, 507-518, 866-867
\textsuperscript{54} ANR.DJS, Fond Culturala, file 9/1926, 19
technical expertise and promised to counsel other associations to donate books to the new library.\textsuperscript{55}

In other area of interest of counsel, the theatre, Konrad Nussbacher noticed that the Transylvanian Germans had to learn from the experience of their Baltic states compatriots regarding the organization, the financial support and superior education of the public.\textsuperscript{56}

The conferences organized by CLRG served to the reciprocal acquaintance of the Germans from the two regions. Thus, in 1925, in Transylvania, dr. P.G. Luig and Mia Munier-Wroblewska spoke about \textit{“The Problems of the Germans from the Baltic states”}, focusing on a small Baltic town.\textsuperscript{57} In the fall of 1924, CLRG tried to send a Saxon choir in Latvia and Estonia but the attempt failed as several artistic tours from Germany and Austria were already going there.\textsuperscript{58}

The CLRG struggled to mediate also business relations between the Baltic states and Transylvania, although the results were very modest. Thus, in 1924, Samuel Karres, a leather manufacturer from Medias, asked for the support of the Cultural League, in order to create a market for his products in the Baltic states.\textsuperscript{59}

The visits of small groups of Baltic Germans made in 1923, 1926 and 1928, played a major role in the establishment of the economical relations.\textsuperscript{60} This fact was signalled also by Max Ravick in a letter to Csaki: \textit{“Through your visit here and our citizens’ trip to your country, the interest for Transylvania rose very much”}.\textsuperscript{61} During these visits to the Baltic states, the associations of the German cooperatives from Transylvania and the Baltic states exchanged their experience; the Balts were especially interested in the organization of the Land Credit Institute of Sibiu as a cooperative, a real bank, with a special contribution in supporting the Baltic agriculture. Csaki was also received warmly in the Baltic states in 1923 and 1928. As he later confessed to a friend, nowhere did he receive such a warm reception as in Riga, where he wanted to return.\textsuperscript{63}

Moreover, Csaki was very appreciated among the Baltic Germans for his knowledge in the field of the politics of culture. In December 1925, Ewald

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., file 8/1926, 445-451
\item\textsuperscript{56} Ostland, 1 (1926): 83-88
\item\textsuperscript{57} ANR.DJS, Liga culturala, file 6/1925, 242, 886, R. Csaki, 1927, 22
\item\textsuperscript{58} ANR.DJS, Liga culturala, file 4/1924, 446, 456
\item\textsuperscript{59} Ibid. 51-52
\item\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., file 9/1926, 887; file 10/1926, 437
\item\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., file 9/1926, 379
\item\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., file 4/1924, 692,921
\item\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., f. 1175
\end{footnotes}
Ammende asked from Pärnu for his advice in regard to Estonians’ administrative organization in the cultural field. This aspect was of particular importance for all national minorities interested in the question of cultural autonomy. In a paper on the question of the cultural organization of the German minorities, presented in July 1925 in Vienna, Csaki appreciated that Estonia ranked first in the world in regard to minorities’ right of cultural self-administration. Csaki’s advice was also asked because of his good relations with important political figures in Germany.

The relations between the Baltic Germans and the Saxons were very complex. Although I will not discuss them in detail with this occasion, there is another aspect that deserves to be mentioned, namely the contacts among students. CLRG mediated the contact between The Union of German Students from Riga and The League of German Students from Romania. The later edited also a magazine, Akademische Blätter that was regularly sent to Riga. In 1926 a plan for a student exchange between students from Transylvania and their counterparts from Baltic States was elaborated. The students of the two regions interacted with each other also in the framework offered by The Central Union of German Students from Abroad, which functioned in Germany. This Union numbered, in 1927, 317 members from Romania, 135 from Latvia, seventy two from Estonia and ten from Lithuania. In the meetings of this organization, problems concerning the country of origin were sometimes discussed, and that contributed to a better mutual understanding.

The leaders of the Balts and Saxons have always considered and emphasized the historical similarities between the two ethnic groups: both descendent of the oldest German colonies, one from the Baltic Sea, the other from the Black Sea and Carpathians. In January 1926, Csaki asked Max Hildebert Boehm, one of the leaders of the Germans living abroad, to write an article for Ostland, focused on a comparison between the situation of the Germans from the Baltic States and those from Romania. Boehm will publish the article only in 1945. In February 1926, Csaki addressed a similar request to the philosopher and writer Hermann Keyserling (1880-
1946), native from Livonia.\textsuperscript{70} It was also in 1926, when Dr. K. Stavenhagen, from the Office of Baltic Germans from Riga, reading an article by the Saxon journalist Emil Neugeboren, about the ‘Transylvanian soul’, concluded that geographical landscape and coexistence of the same ethnicities within the same space lead to the appearance of a ‘community of soul’ and therefore he claimed that it also existed a ‘Baltic soul’ as a result of the coexistence of Baltic Germans and Latvians.\textsuperscript{71}

In the same sense, Csaki asked different personalities of the Weimar Republic, who had visited both Transylvania and the Baltic states, to compare the two peoples on the basis of their travel notes.\textsuperscript{72} Despite his efforts, Csaki never received the study he wanted on this theme. In the same year, 1926, in Dresden, he promised to an editor of a youth magazine to send an article focused on the comparative study of the Baltic and Transylvanian Germans.\textsuperscript{73} Becoming a real organizer of the cultural activities of the German minority in Romania and one of the most informed people on the issue of the German minority in Europe in general, Csaki kept his promise and send the article during the next year, in 1927.\textsuperscript{74}

The relations between the Baltic and Transylvanian Germans represent just one aspect of the intensive campaign started in 1919 and designed to rebuild Germany’s prestige and greatness. During the first inter-war decade, the German minorities from Europe had to face the nationalism of the governments of the new European states. By developing the relations and networks among the German communities, the leaders of the minority sought to keep and strengthen their national identity. Later, these communities were to be used by the leaders in Berlin to impose their political will and influence abroad. Although, during the 1920s the German leaders acted prudently, in the 1930s, the German minorities had been completely subordinated to the political will of the German government.

The close relations between the Baltic and Transylvanian Germans represent a less known aspect of the relations between Romania and the Baltic states during the inter-war period in general. However, recent well documented studies have shed some light on these issues.\textsuperscript{75}

\begin{itemize}
\item[(70)] ANR.DJS, Liga Culturală, file10/1926, 745.
\item[(71)] Ibid., 510.
\item[(72)] Ibid., 728.
\item[(73)] Ibid., 48.
\item[(74)] Richard Csaki, 'Balten und Siebenbürgen Sachsen', Roland-Blätter, I (1927), nr. 2: 3–4.
\end{itemize}
Abstract:
In the interwar period, Romania and Denmark were two distant countries, which were separated by great cultural, social, political and economic differences and which had just begun to discover each other. Their diplomatic relations were established in 1917, when a Romanian envoy was appointed to Copenhagen whereas the first Danish minister was appointed to Bucharest in 1924. The establishment of the diplomatic offices in the two capitals led to a strengthening of bilateral Danish-Romanian relations. The two people started to know each other’s cultural, social and political patterns. In this article I look at the representations generated by Romansians in the Danish conscience, which I assume is interesting for the study of Romania’s bilateral relations with the peoples from this part of Europe. The Danish image of the Romanian space during the first half of the 20th century is characterized by a series of prejudices and stereotypes formed along time because of a scanty knowledge about the realities in this space.

Resumé:
I mellemkrigstid, Rumænien og Danmark var to fjerne lande, som var adskilt af store kulturelle, sociale, politiske og økonomiske forskelle og som lige var begyndt at opdage hinanden. Deres diplomatiske forbindelser var blevet etableret i 1917, når en rumænske minister blev udnævnt i København henviser til den første danske minister blev udnævnt i Bukarest i 1924. Oprettelsen af det diplomatiske kontorer i de to hovedstæder førte til en styrkelse af de bilaterale dansk-rumænske forbindelser. De to folk begyndte at kende hinanden `s kultur, deres sociale og politiske mønstre. I denne artikel vi kigge på repræsentationer genereret af rumænere langs gang i samvittighed en nordisk og fjernt folk som danskerne, som vi mener er interessante for undersøgelsen af den rumænske bilaterale forbindelser med mennesker fra denne del af Europa. Den danske billede af den rumænske plads i løbet af første halvdel af det
20. århundrede er kendetegnet ved en række fordomme og klichéer dannet langs tid, på grund af en sparsom viden om realiteter inden for dette rum. I de følgende linjer er det viste, hvor var rumænerne opfattes af den danske befolkning, hvilke fælles interess interesser de havde, som førte til deres tilnærmelse.

Rezumat:
În perioada interbelică România şi Danemarca erau două state îndepărtate care erau separate de diferenţe mari din punct de vedere cultural, social şi politic, care abia începuseră să se cunoască una pe cealaltă. Relaţiile lor diplomatice au fost stabilite în 1917 atunci când un trimis extraordinar român a fost numit la Copenhaga, în vreme ce primul trimis extraordinar danez la Bucureşti a fost desemnat în 1924. Stabilirea ofiiciilor diplomatice în cele două capitale a contribuit la strângerea relaţiilor bilaterale româno-daneze, iar cele două state. Acestea au început să ia seamă la cultura, societatea şi sistemul politic al celeilalte naţiuni. În acest articol analizez reprezentările asupra românilor în consătienţa danezilor. Pentru prima jumătate a sec. al XX-lea, imaginea danezilor asupra românilor este caracterizată de o serie de prejudice şi stereotipuri formate în timp datorită cunoaşterii fragmentare a realităţilor din acest spaţiu.

Keywords: Danes, Romanians, prejudice, stereotypes, images, backwardness

In the interwar period Romania and Denmark were two distant lands, separated by great cultural, social, political and economic differences, which had just started to discover each other. Their diplomatic relations had been established in 1917 when a Romanian minister was appointed to Copenhagen whereas the first Danish minister was appointed to Bucharest in 1924. The establishment of diplomatic offices in the two capitals led to a strengthening of the bilateral Danish-Romanian relations. The two people started to know each other`s culture, their social and political patterns.

In this article I look at the representations of Romanians in the conscience of a Nordic and distant people like the Danes, which are interesting for the study of the Romanian bilateral relations with the peoples of this part of Europe. The image of the Other has a significant impact on the bilateral relations between states. The representations that nations have acquired of each other are a result of their contacts and relations. The accuracy of the others` image depends on factors such as the importance and interest they show to each other, geographic distance and so forth. From this point of view, it should be noted from start that the Romanians and the Danes were separated by geography and culture. The
little importance the Danes granted to the Romanians explains why their image of Romania is not that substantial and expressive.

The Danish image of the Romanian space during the first half of the 20th century is characterized by a series of stereotypes and clichés formed along the time, due to a scarce knowledge of realities within this space. Often this kind of false representations have a negative impact on the bonds between countries. For example, Romania was regarded in Denmark as a piece of the larger group of Balkan countries which for the Danes were some kind of “brigand countries where people were walking on streets with their pockets full of guns”\(^1\). Romania from the end of the 19th century was considered a half barbarian country, devastated by upraises and clashes between political parties\(^2\).

In these conditions, one question comes naturally: what were the reasons for the Danes entering in contact with the Romanians during the first half of the 20th century? One will find the answer thinking at the changes produced on the European political scene as a consequence of the First World War and their impact on countries from South-East Europe. Romania’s changed statute acquired at the end of the war through its national unification boosted her international prestige, bringing her in the attention of both the great and small powers, which saw in her a viable partner in the effort of keeping a peaceful climate on the continent. Its efforts of securing the peace and stability in south-east Europe generated favorable echoes to the Scandinavian countries governed by the same pacifist principles\(^3\). Its evolution within the Little Entente and its alliances with Poland, Italy and France were followed with interest by Denmark for which Romania had become a European state on which one could count\(^4\).

Very little known in the Nordic countries, merely in the economic circles, the new Romania established during the interwar period was „destined to occupy a significant place in the Scandinavian conscience” as C. E. Hansen affirmed in his book entitled *Rumænien arbejder!* (København, 1935)\(^5\). The ample transformations produced on the political, economical and social fields, the rich natural resources that Romania

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\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Note no. 1056/16.07.1935, from the Romanian legation in Copenhagen to Nicolae Titulescu, Arhivele Diplomatice ale Ministerului de Externe al României (hereafter A.D.M.A.E.), file Copenhagen, vol.13,
\(^4\) Hans Frederik Ulrichsen, *De nye Lande- Polen, Rumænien, Tjekkoslovakiet og Jugoslavien* (København:1929), 16
\(^5\) C.E. Hansen, *Rumænien arbejder!* (København, 1935) 7
possessed, pointed her as an excellent trading partner. After the war, states such as the United States, Great Britain, Italy, Sweden and Czechoslovakia turned their attention to Romania, a series of companies from these countries sent their representatives here and trade intensified.

Romania was for a long time for the Danes and Northerners in general, a **terra incognita**, about which nothing was known except that it was “a small agrarian country that fought in the Balkan wars”, although after the war it reached 18 million inhabitants, becoming a medium power among the European states. Romania has gained Danish attention not only through its new political statute in Europe, its size or population, but especially through its economic potential and the ascendant evolution of its political and economic organization\(^6\). For a state with very old trade tradition like Denmark, the new Romania on its way to modernization represented a valuable ground for new businesses.

Romania’s image-makers were Danish travelers, politicians, diplomats, or businessmen who regarded the Romanians according to their own interests in Romania. Several of these people wrote down their impressions gathered as a result of their interaction with the Romanian space. Most times these writings were addressed to the large Danish public who, in this way, could make themselves an idea about Romanians.

Due to the large distance, news about Romania reached Denmark indirectly, mostly through the foreign press. This explains why the Danish public often acquired a false image of Romania, especially because the mass-media depicted a declining Romania, “a country invaded by bolshevists, where daily a revolution takes place and the royal family is divided because of misunderstandings between its members”\(^7\). Responsible for this negative image was mainly the weak propaganda which the Romanian state was conducting in Denmark, as well as in the other European states, a fact pointed out by some of the Romanian envoys to Copenhagen at that time. The lack of information about Romania was so obvious that a series of individuals less well intended took advantage of that and tried to create an unfavorable image of Romania by spreading often false and alarmist news about it\(^8\). Sometimes, the ignorance could be hilarious: a provincial Danish newspaper published a greeting article for

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\(^6\) Ibid.

\(^7\) ‘Interview with a Romanian diplomat’, National Tidende and Dagens Nyheder (19.01.1928), A.D.M.A.E., file Danemarca, vol.15, 85-88

\(^8\) Note no. 492/19.03.1930 from the Romanian legation in Stockholm to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (from now on R.M.F.A.), A.D.M.A.E., file România, vol. 477, 162
the Romanian king Ferdinand’s birthday, when in fact he had died 3 years earlier9.

This state of affairs was noticed by different Danes, often on a tone of regret. The Danish deputy, Hans Frederik Ulrichsen, in his booklet entitled *De nye Lande- Polen, Rumænien, Tjekkoslovakiet og Jugoslavien*, showed that foreigners often associated Romania and the Romanians with “the easy and superficial life of Bucharest, with traces of corruption from the Ottoman era, or with the wastage of the dominant class, a remnant of times when the boyars exploited the peasants” 10. The author of the booklet highlights the fact that Romania of 1929 was completely different; it was a country in a full development process. On this occasion, he addresses to his compatriots who might wish to get to know Romania by encouraging them to go there in order to inform themselves and not to let themselves influenced by the false rumors that were going around11.

Romania was little known in the North as a tourist’s country, but it is exactly this aura of exotic land making of it an attractive destination. Habitually, the country was called the “country of the sun”12. It was considered a very beautiful country, due to its enchanting landscapes, with high mountains, covered by forests, large plains, rivers and lakes which represented an attraction to the Nordic travelers. The folk culture passed from one generation to another, from ancient times, and the national costumes worn by peasants during the national holidays were interesting attractions for the Danish travelers, who were great fans of trips, a trait inherited from their Viking ancestors, well known for their incursions on the continent13. In 1924, the director of a Nordic travel agency, Georg Neeborg, asked the Romanian minister of Industry and Commerce, for some travel propaganda materials about Romania. Neeborg undertook for himself to make travel propaganda for Romania in the Nordic countries by publishing a series of articles about Romania in the leading Scandinavian daily newspapers and by organizing trips of the Scandinavian travelers on the Romanian land14.

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9 *Nationaltidende* (25 august 1930)
10 Ulrichsen, 1929, 16
11 H.F.Ulrichsen refers to the anti-Romanian propaganda deployed by the Magyars after the First World War through false news on Romania.
12 *Politiken* (3 august 1931)
13 Hansen, 1935, 99
14 Letter from Georg Neeborg to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Romanian National Central Archives, (from now on A.N.I.C.), file Ministerul Propagandei Naționale (from now on M.P.N.), file no. 95/1927, 1-2
Romania: “the richest and the poorest country in Europe”

Most of the Danish references to Romania from the first half of the 19th century highlights the abundance of the natural resources of this country and the deep poverty in which most part of the Romanian people lived. A Danish journalist, Axel Breidahl, who visited Romania during the German occupation from the First World War, noticed: „There is almost no other country in the world that has so excellent conditions in order to make happy a people, like Romania has. The country has in the underground such great resources that she could feed easily the double of its population”15. Romania was indeed a large country, rich in natural resources but compared to the Western Europe, it was way behind. This paradox characterized Romania for centuries and it is available in some cases even today.

For the Danes of that time, descendants of the peasants who in the 19th century had managed to transform by their own work the poorest land into the most fertile land, thus making Denmark one of the largest granaries in Europe, the state of things from Romania was unconceivable. Significant in this sense, are the observations of the Danish journalist, Ejnar Black made in one issue of Berlingske Aftenavis from Copenhagen, in December 1939: “In Romania, where one can find the best farming land, where the oil is springing from the earth, where gold and silver are abundant and the forests are the third richness of the country, where the natural resources are phenomenal, here are living those who should be the elite of this country, the peasants, who anyway, are the majority, in conditions similar with those from the Middle Ages and in a poverty that a Dane who has not seen it, could not even imagine it”16. The improvement of the living conditions of the Romanian peasants was, in his opinion, an essential condition for the economic development of Romania, mainly an agrarian country.

Romania was a country of contrasts. The Romanian society was split into social categories with great differences in terms of welfare and culture. For the Danes who were used to live in an egalitarian society, existed “nether great richness nor great poverty”, all these seemed aspects detached from a novel. The observations of the same Danish journalist,

15 Axel Breidahl, Fra det erobrede Rumænien, Skildringer fra en etapperejse (København: Nordiske Forfatteres Forlag, 1918) 14
who captures the features of each social category from Romania, are illustrating in these sense. In a single day spent in Romania, he meets people belonging to all social classes. Among them, a member of the royal family, perhaps Queen Helena, who was in a bad state of health but living in a distinguished apartment. Then he passes to the meeting with a general secretary of a ministry, which takes place in a “precious office”, situated in a new building, with marble frames. The secretary, having on his desk “more phones than one can imagine that a simple human can use, spoke to him in an in comprehensible language for five minutes in the audience which was not easy to obtain\(^\text{17}\). Then follows the visit into a modest home where a young woman was embroidering sitting on a couch, while the man, with grey hair and intelligent eyes behind the glasses, speaks politics, “which was strictly forbidden”\(^\text{18}\).

The Dane is astonished by the similarity between Romanian peasants` life and that of the Danish peasants 500 years earlier, so great was the difference between the Romanian and the Danish peasants in 1939. While the Danish farmers were living in a nice houses situated in the middle of the cultivated land, the Romanian peasants were living in houses made of dried clay, without proper windows and lacking comfort, as they had to shelter up to eight members of one family\(^\text{19}\). Poverty was doubled by a lack of education, the majority of the Romanian peasants being illiterate.

The author of the article completes the suite of characters with his own image, willing perhaps to illustrate by this juxtaposing the contrast between the exponent of the society he belongs to and those belonging to the Romanian society: “a room in a hotel, where an able Dane, dressed with a navy blue costume, speaks with a Fyn accent. The Dane is still strong, he has seen thirty countries in four continents, and now, lastly, Romania, for whom he sacrificed fifteen months and he knows it perhaps better than an ordinary Romanian. Anyway, when you sit in your own hotel room and let the rumors of the day enter into your ears, you have the impression that this country is the richest and poorest in Europe”\(^\text{20}\).

If most of the Danish references to Romania are reduced to the description of a certain state of the affairs, in an article from \textit{Politiken} of August 3, 1931, entitled “Romania looked into the face”, one finds a description of the social, political and economic situation of Romania at

\(^{17}\) Ibid.  
\(^{18}\) Ibid.  
\(^{19}\) Ibid.  
\(^{20}\) Ibid.
that time, followed by an analysis of the factors that have determined this state of things. Although sixty years had passed since Romania had detached herself from the Balkans and entered into “the European family”, it had kept numerous of its Balkan features. The corruption that had seized as an octopus all the state institutions seemed inescapable and the lead of the country was in the hands of incompetent politicians, although Romania was not lacking valuable people. The deplorable state of the Romanian economy was a result of the lack of coordination between state institutions, the chaotic adoption of laws according to the fantasy of a certain minister, laws that were often contradicting each other, the waste of money which most times reached the wrong people. Romania needed a steel hand of a courageous man who could start the work for the organization of the Romanian society on principles adapted to the realities of the time21. In the Danish journalist’s opinion, Romania was confirming the conviction that “only in rich countries, with old traditions and a high culture, one can find capable politicians that not only have ideas but they also have the courage to put them into practice. Denmark could make “honest business” with the Romanians only when Romania’s leaders “will learn to value the notion of honesty and the trust granted by the people”22.

The political organization and the system of governance in Romania were far from being ideal. For the Danes, the parliamentarian regime in Romania as well as in the other Balkan states was just a “useless illusion”. The organization of the elections in order to obtain the results desired by the authorities was just one of the arguments used by the author in support of his theory23.

Behind all these aspects noticed by Danes when they were coming to Romania, one can detect their understanding for the fact that this country had to face after the war a series of national, social, political and economic problems which were not at all easy to solve. In spite of the difficulties it had encountered, Romania was making visible progresses24.

Andreas Sørensen in his article entitled “An interesting excursion in Transylvania”, published in several Danish newspapers in January 1930, describes this evolution which he could notice on the spot. Traveling with the Orient Express from Bucharest to Oradea, he was surprised by its comfort and the modernity compared to other Romanian railways. For the

21 Politiken (3 august 1930)
22 Ibid.
23 Christensen 1918 2
24 Berlingske Aftenavis, 27.02.1940,
Danish used to living on a plain, the long way through Transylvania’s Alps was “a race to a fabulous world” 25. The traveler notices that Transylvania was above all the industrial province of Romania, a literally gold mine due to its underground rich in oil and natural gas. The agricultural land, one of the most fertile in Europe, equally allowed the development of agriculture. Sørensen also affirmed that the history of Transylvania was “the best example of the vital force of a national minority”. For thousands of years, the province was under foreign rule but in spite of all persecutions the Romanians remained as a minority in the region. The Magyars’ critics against the Romanian government are considered baseless. Since the unification, Romania had reformed its entire educational system but the Magyars did not have to suffer because of it. A great number of schools financed by the state for the minority’s education had been established, while before the Union there was no Romanian school financed by the Hungarian state.

Bucharest, a place where the Orient meets the Occident

As it was natural, the capital was one of the most often visited places of Romania and, consequently, it created the first impression to the Danish visitor. Bucharest was the subject of many articles in the Danish press during the first half of the 20th century. Bucharest was perceived as a city of contrasts, where the buildings of banks with architecture in American style were next to boyar houses. The daily activities were concentrated on Calea Victoriei, (The Victory Avenue) which resembled to the main street of a provincial town on a great national holiday 26. The people were walking between the Royal Palace which resembled a French town hall and the Post Palace. Beyond the centre filed with restaurants, hotels, new boulevards and beautiful parks with lakes started the dirty and poor neighborhoods traversed by River Dambovita. Here poor people were living, wearing ragged cloths, earning their money by selling corn and vegetables. The streets were small and dark, filled with houses where lamps with oil were twinkling. One Danish visitor argued that the name “Paris of the Balkans” was inappropriate. Bucharest had become an East European Paris more “because of its luxury and vices than by its culture and fineness”. Thus, the foreigners traveling by carriage on Calea Victoriei might think being on a

26 Dispatch nr. 716/G, Copenhaga (25 May 1944), A.D.M.A.E., file Copenhaga, vol.7
boulevard in Paris although their coachman had an “air of eastern barbarianism” 27.

The general impression was of an unfinished city. Bucharest was in a continuous development. The spectacular transformation of the Romanian capital in the first decades after the war pleasantly surprised the Danish MP, Hans Frederik Ulrichsen, arrived here for the third time in 1936, on the occasion of the Bucharest Interparliamentary Congress. Back into his country, he wrote an article in Nationaltidende in which he described the city’s transformation compared to his last visit: “Never a capital has changed so fast. Bucharest could easily be called the city of the future, of traffic and constructions instead of Paris of the Orient” 28.

Bucharest had evolved from a “Balkan borough” as it was at the beginning of the 19th century into a modern city, with a railway station in Italian style, “with new large boulevards, although a bit too monotone”. The city centre looked completely American, reminding the Danish traveler of the second Brazilian city, Sao Paolo. Here were the headquarters of banks, assurance societies, phone companies, newspapers and hotels with nine up to twelve levels. The main road, Calea Victoriei, had also changed becoming larger. New buildings and squares were under construction everywhere. Visiting the new headquarter of the Law Faculty, Ulrichsen points out that “law is a specialty of the country; people like to discuss, the Romanian is a native jurist. It is almost natural here that most of the deputies are lawyers or teachers” 29. One can observe a light irony in his tone, but that is not malicious. After all, he declares himself charmed by the general outlook of “this city full of life where in the evening, Calea Victoriei is full of people, as in Bucharest dinner is served at 8 or 9 like in Budapest, Athena or Belgrade. Brilliant officer uniforms, beautiful and well dressed women, multiple special editions of the newspapers, the cafes full of people, the luxury shops, all these are reminding of the Paris boulevards, but with more uniforms, with a more suggestive traffic, with a stronger current” 30.

It seems that the Danish observer was not so much impressed by the new buildings, large parks or war monuments which were anyway “too many and too pompous”, as by the elements that were giving the city and

27 Christensen, 1918, 3
29 Ibid., 152
the people’s life an oriental character and by the originality of the peasants’ costumes. He expressed his wish that the modernization process will keep something from the picturesqueness of the Romanian traditions.

In one article carried by the Danish newspaper Berlingske Aftenavis of February 1940, a change of statute of the Romanian capital is pointed out. Bucharest, which a few years before seemed to the Danes a faraway city with romance stories and several yearly murder attempts, had acquired a new significance. In Bucharest all important decisions are taken, “now that Warsaw and Prague lost their influence” 31. The author of the article explains this fact through the order and quietness established by King Charles II in his authoritarian rule starting with 1938. Although the Danes, a traditional democratic people, did not sympathize with this form of government, they recognized its contribution to the assurance of a certain internal stability of the country. Stability was absolutely necessary in a country where poverty was widespread, in spite of the precious natural resources it possessed. In Denmark, the situation was exactly the reverse. The soil riches were lacking, but the economy of the state was one of the most competitive in Europe and the level of living was high.

The Romanian peasantry

The Romanian peasant occupies an important place in the Danish representations of Romania. This is very natural since Denmark had a predominant agrarian population like Romania. The Romanian peasant is constantly depicted in contrast with the Danish farmers.

The situation of the Danish peasants during the first half of the 20th century was the result of an ample process of social transformations which began at the second part of the 18th century. In 1788 the Danish peasants became free, being the firsts in Europe to be freed from the feudal vow32. The peasants became owners and set the basis of small and medium farms which later became models for the entire Europe. These transformations took place under the strict control of the Danish state that put at the peasants’ disposal a system of credits in order to support their work. The performing level of the Danish agriculture was largely due to masses education and the cooperatist movement which gained momentum in the second half of the 19th century.

31 Berlingske Aftenavis, 27.02.1940, A.D.M.A.E., file Copenhaga, vol.7
32 Adrian Sfintescu, Cooperația agricultorilor danezi - metode de lucru (București: Tiparul Românesc,1940), 24
At the beginning of the 20th century, the Danish farmers had the fight for the transformation of their economic and juridical liberty achieved through the agrarian reforms of the previous century into a real political influence gained when the Liberal Party (Venstre) formed its first government33. Taking into consideration all these, one can understand the consternation the Danes regarded the condition of the Romanian peasantry. An article from the Danish press of 1939 presented the peasant’s life and working conditions, which seemed detached from the Middle Ages. The Romanian peasants were cultivating only two types of vegetables, grain and corn, and this only for their own consume, as they served them as a basic alimentation. In a Dane’s eyes this was a “grotesque tradition”. The cloths were indicative for the poverty in which they lived. It seemed a turn back in time “to get the poorest crop from the richest land”. The reduced efficiency of the Romanian peasant’s work is attributed to his indolence and inclination to drink plum brandy, a strong aromatic drink. He had though some excuses: the large number of holidays established by the orthodox religion, around 200 every year, that he doesn’t even remember all of them. The peasants lacked the impulse to work, as they were living surrounded by priests and monks who encouraged them to think at Saints Peter and Pavel and to light candles in church while they were “either disgusting rascals or excellent people”.

Axel Breidahl, another Danish journalist, dedicated the Romanian peasant an entire chapter in one of his books about Romania, published in 1918. Lacking the aspiration to economic wealth, the Romanian peasant was content with cultivating so much land as he could pay the lease to the boyars and to support his family37. The fertility of soil which needed no additional fertilization was encouraging the peasant’s idleness who “was not too hardworking anyway”. Some of the Romanian villages resembled the poor regions form North Africa. Houses built of clay mixed with straw sheltered the peasant’s family and cattle. Agriculture was done by the use of plough carried by oxes. The cattle did not have any shelter and were badly nourished38.

33 Kund J. V. Jespersen, A history of Denmark (Palgrave Macmillan 2004), 69
34 Excerpt from Berlingske Aftenavis, 18.12.1939,
37 Axel Breidahl, 1918, 17
38 Ibid.
The Romanian peasants were not lacking qualities though. Although they were not educated in schools, they were intelligent enough and were learning fast. In spite of their hard living conditions, they were not lacking life’s happiness. Breidahl notices the beauty of the peasants, especially that of women, their proud attitude and straight going. Their costumes which they were very proud of, drew the attention in a pleasant way: “One does not see the most humble peasant or youngster without a beautiful embroidered waistcoat, usually beautifully colored and with splendid drawings. The women’s blouses beautifully embroidered are famous.”

The ignorance of the rural population from Romania was attributed by Breidahl to the maintaining of feudal relations between the boyars and the peasants. The land distribution was unfavorable and unequal unlike any other country. The boyars were leasing land to the peasants who had to cede the largest part of their crop from which they kept only what was necessary to feed their family. As a consequence, the Romanian peasant could not be blamed for being “lazy and indifferent and worked only for filling its belly with polenta and tzuica made of plums”. For a Dane coming from a land with “talented, independent, educated and wealthy peasants”, it was hard to understand how in a European civilized state could exist such relations, “more than primitive”.

To draw a conclusion, I can say that the Romanians and Danes were little known to each other during the interwar period. The few contacts between the two nations revealed significant differences in social, cultural and economic between them. Although the general impression of the Danes about Romania was an unfavorable one, their interest should not be overlooked. Beyond all criticism, one can notice the Danish understanding of international circumstances less favorable under which the Romanian state has evolved along the time, surrounded by big powers that have disputed its dominance and set serious obstacles in its development. The observations made by the Danes who got to know Romania as it truly was, are of great significance and help us understand better what place Romania occupied in Europe during the interwar time.

39 Ibid., 19
40 Ibid., 18
41 Ibid., 24
42 Ibid., 21
THE ROMANIAN-FINNISH CULTURAL RELATIONS: HISTORY, TRENDS, BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Abstract:
The scientific interest for the study of the Romanian-Finnish relations considerably increased during the last years. Within this trend, this article focuses on the Romanian-Finnish cultural relations and briefly presents the most important events and moments in the history of these relations, from the 19th century to the present. It also includes a selective bibliography on the Romanian-Finnish cultural relations, with works published both in Finland and Romania. The article stresses the need for further research in the field of Romanian-Finnish cultural relations, noticing that when the quality of the political relations was negatively affected by different historical circumstances, the cultural contacts have been maintained and even developed.

Rezumat:
Interesul științific pentru studierea relațiilor româno-finlandeze, și mai ales a relațiilor culturale româno-finladeze, a crescut în ultimii ani. Acest studiu, în prima sa parte, trece pe scurt în revistă principalele momente și evenimente din istoria acestor relații culturale, începând din secolul al XIX-lea și până în prezent. În cea de-a doua parte prezintă o bibligrafie selectivă a lucrărilor dedicate acestor realtii și apărute atât în România, cât și în Finlanda. Dacă în domeniul relațiilor politice contactele dintre cele două țări și națiuni nu au fost întotdeauna ușor de menținut la nivele înalte, în domeniul cultural, interesul reciproc a existat în permanență.

Keywords: Finland, Romania, cultural relations, bibliography

A focused analyse proves that the Romanian-Finnish relations, including those in cultural area, are framed by a context in which the major
historical objectives such as the gaining of the independence and the creation of a modern state were similar. Spiritually, the process of setting up the national cultures followed the same course especially in the second half of the 19th century. The two cultures distinguished themselves at the European level in the first decades of the following century. Certainly, the relations between Romania and Finland became stable and significant after the gaining of their independence and after the establishment of their diplomatic relations. But I must also point out that even before this moment the Romanian-Finnish cultural relations were constant and have made a real contribution to the European cultural identity.

**Beginnings (The 19th century)**

Contrary to the first contacts of Romania and Finland that followed the sinuous military conflicts, the cultural relations were continuous and ascendant. Soon after the publication of the *Kalevala* some of the most representative intellectuals such as Bogdan Petriceicu Hasdeu and Alexandru Odobescu, made meaningful comments on the importance of this masterpiece of the Finnish national culture. In 1846, eleven years after publication of *Kalevala*, Mihail Kogălniceanu remarked some similarities to the Romanian folk epos. Zacharias Topelius, writer and journalist, a great pioneer of the Finnish spirituality, wrote, in his turn, about 1848 Revolution in Wallachia and Transylvania.

In 1854, Timotei Cipariu published the first translation of a Finnish folkloric poem into Romanian. In 1894, a part of *Kalevala* and a poem by Johan Ludwig Runeberg were published in Iași in the translation of G. Lazu (with a foreword by A.D. Xenopol). This was followed by a number of translations from the works of the most important Finnish authors. In 1914 a volume of Finnish short stories was published. Another premiere came up in 1906, when the volume entitled *Countries and peoples* was published in Helsinki, a chapter about the Romanian Kingdom having been integrated there.

Certainly, a relevant event of the Romanian-Finnish cultural relations was the creation within the Royal Hungary University of the comparative Finno-Ugrian cathedra.

**Another meaningful events:**
- 1828-1830: During the Russian-Turkish war, which will end with the Peace of Adrianopole, thirty six Finnish officers were in the Russian army, crossing the Romanian Countries. Some of them left journals and letters, for example, Colonel Gustav-Adolf Ramsay, Berndt Johan Rosenström.
Frederik Nyberg remarked that in Bucharest in bookstores are "to find books, translations from different languages, which is quite extraordinary"

- **1915**: In the magazine „Românul” (Arad) is published the translation of a sketch of the Finnish writer Zachriás Topelius (translation is signed "RC" probably Ana Alex. Codreanu)

**Books and exhibition (The interwar period)**

Regardless the political contacts, the cultural relations are more intense in the context of a real interest in both countries for the reciprocal knowledge of history traditions and arts. The organization in 1935 of a Romanian exhibition of folk art enjoyed such a great success that Finnish Society for Geography held a festive session dedicated to Romania. Consequently, the next year, a Finnish folk art exhibition was opened in Bucharest.

A special importance had also the publication of some works such as a monographic volume about Finland written by Ion Simionescu and the work *Romania. People and country* signed by Professor V. J. Manisikka. This trend continued with the publication of the book entitled *Finnish testimonies regarding Romania* by Raoul Bossy, in 1937.

The Romanian Academy is represented in a certain number of homage events dedicated to some prominent personalities of the Finnish culture and the national epic *Kalevala*. The translation of Romanian literature continued, Panait Istrati´s novels having enjoyed a great success.

In the context of numerous cultural events in Finland regarding the Romanian culture, such as book exhibitions, concerts, or mutual visits of journalist, a special moment turned out to be the inauguration of the Romanian language courses at the University of Helsinki.

**Another events:**

- **1929**: Constantin Brâncuși and Alvar Aalto met in New York.
- **1934**: Raoul Bossy begins his diplomatic mission as Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Finland (until 1936). The Romanian diplomat distinguished himself by the energetic actions to represent country interests, and to develop bilateral relations in the cultural field. He is the author of the works on the historical relations between the two countries.
- **1932**: Number 1-2 of the magazine „Boabe de grâu” is dedicated to Finland. Here is the translation of the study *Educația poporului in Finلندا (Education of the people in Finland)* by J. Castrense.
The continuity of the traditions (The World War II)

Despite the war conditions, the cultural relations followed a natural trend. In this regard, a significant event was the creation the associations „Romania-Finland” and „Finland-Romania” envisaged to the development of the cultural, artistic and touristic relations between them. Among the founding members of these two associations were significant personalities of the public and cultural life of the two countries.

Professor Väinö Tanner, the Finnish minister accredited to Bucharest is the author of the work Romania. The Land and the people. Professor V.J. Mansikka form Helsinki University has researched the Romanian folklore.

The publication of some important works continued, regarding not only the history but also issues of current interest. In this sense, it should be mentioned the publication in Romania of the volumes Finland. The Country of Cooperatives written by Ioan Manof, The Green Gold of Finland edited by Romania-Finland Association, Romania in Confusing Times by Britta Wrede and Romanian Issues. The Question of Transylvania by Gustav Bolinder who considered the Vienna Dictate unjust. In 1944, the volume Romania. The Latin island from South-Eastern Europe was published in the Finnish language, edited by the Finland-Romania Association, a book comprising general information, as well as references to the Romanian art, science and history.

A significant event is represented by the publication, in 1942, of the first complete Romanian translation of the national epic Kalevala achieved by Barbu Brezianu. This evoked a letter of gratitude by Marshal Mennerheim who pointed out that the translation of Kalevala had positive repercussions for the Romanian-Finnish relations. In this regard, Barbu Brezianu has been awarded medals and decorations.

Another premiere developing an older tradition is the setting up, in 1942, in Bucharest, of the Chair of Finnish, and of a Romanian lectureship in Helsinki.

Visits of some Romanian writers to Finland are organized, as well as a book exhibition, concerts in Bucharest and Helsinki (among which Dinu Lipatti´s concert should be remembered), the distribution of Romanian movies, translations into Romanian of significant Finnish writers such as Eemil Sillanpää, laureate of the Noble Prize, and the translation into the Finnish language of some volumes by Mihail Sadoveanu and Lucian Blaga.

Another events:
- 1940-1944: Gedeon Meszöli teaches comparative courses of Ugro-Finnish philology at the University of Cluj;
- **1942 April 18**: Representation of Romanian movies in Helsinki: „Monasteries in Bucovina”, „The Moțiilor Country”.

***A concert in Bucharest, in Athenaeum Hall with Finnish music, conducted by Georg Schneewoigt takes place.***

***The translation into Romanian by George Sbârcea and Al.I. Popp of Mika Waltari’s novel *The Alien and the woman*.***

- **1944**: The Finnish translation of the novel *Baltagul* by Mihail Sadoveanu.

- **1945**: With the occasion of the 50 anniversary of Lucian Blaga an Anthology of his poetry, *Aura ja Huilu (Plug and Fluier)*, is published. The translation is signed by the famous Finnish writer Martti Larne, the selection and presentation by Gr. Dobrinescu.

**A normal course (1945-1989)**

Even during the Cold War, culture and art were areas where further developments in the Romanian-Finnish relations took place.

The cultural and scientific relations developed on the basis of the implementation programs of the “Agreement of cooperation in the fields of culture, science and other related fields” (April 29, 1974). Programs concluded for a three-year period and renewed thereinafter.

In 1950, the Romanian-Finland Friendship Association is set up, which will organize in the course of time a lot of events regarding the cultural cooperation. In 1975, the Romanian lectureship within the Turku University and the Finnish chair in the University of Cluj Napoca were inaugurated. Professor Lauri Lindgren, who was also the author of some translations and works of reference regarding the Romanian-Finnish cultural relations, played a significant role for the better knowledge for the Romanian language in Finland.

The translations and printing activities were also very fruitful in that period. In 1985, the book *Kantelar. Culegere de Rune finlandeze alcătuite de Elias Lönröt* was published at Turku. Next year, the bilingual edition of the volume *Antologie de poezie romaneasca* was published at Turku, consisting in translations of poetry of thirty Romanian poets.

Ever since the 1960s many translation of significant Finnish writers have been published in Romanian: Kivi Alexis, Mika Waltari, Silvy Kekkonen, Martti Larne and so forth. In 1959, the epic *Kalevala* is for the first time translated in verse into Romanian by Iulian Vesper, which has also been re-edited ever since. The forth complete translation of the *Kalevala* epic into Hungarian, by Kalman Nagy, is published in Bucharest.
George Sbârcea published, in his turn, a volume devoted to the most important Finnish composer Ian Sibelius. *His life and work*.

In 1982, appears the *Columna Magazine*, publication of the Romanian lectureship at the University of Turku. The magazine has published valuable studies and translation in the course of time. Alongside, a certain number of volumes concerning Finland were published. In 1982 a special issue of *The 20th Century* magazine dedicated to Finland was also published.

In 1968, the Romanian section of the Toijala library was set up.

**Another events:**
- **1947**: Romanian language lecturer at the University of Helsinki, Grigore Dobrinescu, publishes the first Romanian language manual in Finnish.
- **1959**: Academician Perspessicius published an article about the first evidence of knowledge of epos *Kalevala* in Romanian culture.
- **1963**: Starting with this year, writers from Romania participate at international annual meetings of the writers in Lahti (for instance, Marin Sorescu, Nicolae Manolescu, Ana Blandiana, Mircea Iorgulescu and others.
- **1965**: From this year appears the magazine of the Association of Friendship Finland - Romania.
- **1968**: Piroska Gergel, teaches courses in Finnish language at the University of Cluj.
- **1969**: During the commemoration of 50 years after the proclamation of the Republic of Finland, writers Iulian Vesper, Brezianu Barbu, Ion Pas are assigned a commemorative medal.
- **1970**: Starting this year, Prof. Lauri Lindrgren teaches Romanian language courses at the University of Turku.
- **1976**: The volume of George Radu *Finland*, is published.
- **1977**: The beginning of the collection of music from Romania in Valkekoski.
- **1978-1979**: Professor Nicolae Constantinescu teaches Romanian language courses at the University of Turku.
- **1980**: It is established at the University of Turku, the association "Ciocârlia".
- **1982**: Concerts of the folklore ensemble "Rhapsody at Somes" from Cluj are staged in Helsinki, Turku and other cities in Finland.
- **1982-1986**: Ioan Stăvăruș works as lecturer for the Romanian language at the University of Turku.
- **1984**: The representation of the play *O scrisoare pierdută* at the Municipal Theater Kupio directed by Dan Micu.
- **1989**: Barbu Brezianu is elected honorary member of the association "Kalevi".

**Open perspectives (Cultural relations after 1989)**

On May 21, 1997, the “Program of cooperation in the fields of culture, education, science and technology” between Romania and Finland was signed in Bucharest, for the period 1997-2000. On the basis of this program, annually a number of students and specialists are being granted scholarships for training and specialization in the fields of interest for Romania.

To begin with relations in the scientific field, it should be mentioned that a large number of young Romanian researchers work in research institutions in Finland, especially at the prestigious Nokia company, some of them earning international prizes. Exchanges between the research institutions in the two countries take place.

In January 2002, the third Program for the Application of the Cooperation Agreement in the Culture, Scientific and Other related fields between 2002-2006 was signed in Helsinki. This event provides new opportunities for contacts and exchanges in this field through the actions and initiatives of some institutions but also of some persons and authors in various domains of activity.

The translation activity also continues. First, it should be mentioned the publication in 1992, in Helsinki, of the first selection from Mihai Eminescu’s poetry, *Runoja*, translated by Liisa Ryoma.

The translation of some books by contemporary Finnish writers such as Mika Waltari, Ann-Leena Härkönen, Arto Täpio Paasilinna was made due to the efforts of Teodor Palic. In this context, one must also recall the Romanian translation of the Marshal Gustav Mannerheim’s *Memoirs*.

In 2001, the courses of Romanian language and literature at the University of Helsinki have been put on a permanent basis. Eventually, they have been transferred to the University of Turku. The *Columna* magazine, edited by the Romanian Chair from the Turku University, continued the publication of series of translation of Romanian folklore into
Finnish language as well as some literary works by the most important classical and contemporary authors.

The first Romanian-Finnish-Romani an dictionary was published in 2005. The Romanian Chair also drafted the Romanian-Finnish and Finnish-Romanian scientific dictionary with the support of some institutions from Romania and Finland.

Another special event was the exhibitions entitled Eighty years of diplomatic Relations between Romania and Finland consisting in the diplomatic documents and photos, opened on October 28th, 2000 at the National Archives in Helsinki. On this occasion a brochure was also published a consisting of diplomatic documents concerning the Romanian-Finnish relations and a study by Lauri Lindgren entitled Contacts between Finns and Romanian within the Past Centuries. Professor Lindgren was awarded Romanian medals and decoration.

A similar exhibition was organized in 2006 in the same place where new documents about relations between the two countries were exposed, through the collaboration of foreign ministries of Romania and Finland.

In 2002, the seminar entitled Nicolae Titulescu. A Romanian Diplomat as President of the League of Nations took place in Helsinki.

From the artistic point of view, one can mention the exhibitions of fine arts, photo, and movies galas organized both in Finland and Romania.

A special interest was paid, in Finland to the tours of „Constantin Nottara” and „Ion Creangă” theaters and to the show of Dan Puric of the Bucharest National Theatre (2007), with his non-verbal theatre performance “Visul” (“The Dream”).

During this period, there were numerous tours of musical bands, orchestras such the concerts of cords quartet “Transilvania”, of the folk music formation “Ciocârlia” and the participation in 2003 of the Helsinki Symphonic Orchestra at the “George Enescu Festival” where compositions by the most important composers from two countries, Jan Sibelius and George Enescu, were performed. Another musical event dedicated to George Enescu took place in 2007, in Turku, at the Philharmonic Concert Hall, on the occasion of the anniversary of 125 years from the birth of the Romanian composer.

After 1989 the presence of Romanian film in Finland was intense. In this respect it is to recall the Romanian Film Festival in Finland in August 2006, in Tampere, Oulu and Helsinki. Movies by well known Romanian directors (Cristian Mungiu, Corneliu Porumboiu, Cristi Puiu) were presented at International Film Festival “Love & Anarchy”.

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A certain number of significant exhibitions were organized in Finland, such as the varnishing of the Ştefan Petrescu’s exhibition of photos entitled „Romania from an Inedited Perspective” and „Trip of Ancestors. Folk Art objects and Handcrafts from Maramureş”, the exhibition of the city Sibiu, the European Capital of Culture (2007).

A number of events were dedicated to Constantin Brâncuşi such the first exhibition with his works in Finland and photo documentary exhibitions (2004, 2007)

A series of artistic and cultural events were organized with the support of „The Finnish-Romanian Friendship Association” (“Suomi-Romania-Seura”). The aim of the Association, according to its statutes, is "to spread information on Romania, its culture, literature, art and social life and to promote the relationships between Finland and Romania in the fields of culture, tourism and personal relationships."

In 2005, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania and the Romanian Embassy in Helsinki published in Bucharest the book Romanian Finnish Confluence. Three Centuries of Connections. 85 Years of Diplomatic Relations. This work has an informative and documentary purpose, envisaging to give the possibility to be realized a new theoretical synthesis, in the future, interesting not only because of the ties between the two countries in the frame of European Union, but also in universal perspective.

Another events:
- August 13 - September 10, 2006 - Hauho, Hovinkartanon Taidekesku:
  Varnishing of Romanian-Finnish-German art exhibition, "With Pleasure", organized by Finnroart XXI.
- December 12, 2006-Helsinki: Concert of the „Ad Libitum String Quartet” of "Moldova" State Philharmonic of Iasi
- February 20 - March 6, 2007-Tampere: The exhibition "Ecumenism: an Architectural Point of View from Romania" is open in the Lobby Gallery RG2 of the Department of Architecture of the Tampere University of Technology.
- November 15, 2007 – Tampere: The Embassy of Romania and the Finnish-Romanian Cultural Association of Tampere organizes the photo exhibition "Sibiu - Cultural City".
- January 12, 2008 - Helsinki: A „Mihai Eminescu” cultural evening has been organized, in cooperation with the Finnish-Romanian Friendship Association, in order to honor the birth of the Romanian national poet.

- February 7, 2008 - Pori: The Pori Symphonic Orchestra has performed a concert entitled “Romantic Romania”

-March 5-9, 2008-Tampere: The 38th edition of the Tampered Film Festival included the presentation of picture "Valerie/Waves" directed by Adrian Sitar


- August 22, 2008, - Helsinki: As part of the Helsinki 20th "Night of the Arts" festival, the Embassy of Romania and the Finnish-Romanian Friendship Association have organized, with the support of the Romanian Language Lectureship of the Turku University, a Romanian poetry evening with Finnish translations of well-known works by Romanian poets (such as Mihai Eminescu, Tudor Arghezi, Marin Sorescu, Nichita Stanescu etc.).

- February 12, 2009 - The cultural program of the Embassy of Romania, "Golden Romanian Cinema" was inaugurated with a screening of films "Orient Express" directed by Sergiu Nicolaescu and "Nea Mărin Miliardar".

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The outcome of a Ph.D. work defended in the “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iassy, the book published by the prestigious Romanian Printing House “Junimea” represents a fresh investigation into the aims of British diplomacy in what was termed at the beginning of 1920s by some authors the “cordon sanitaire” area surrounding Soviet Union. In contrast to Elisabeth Barker¹, Patrick Salmon² and Anita Prazmowska³’s monographs or to my comparative research facilitated by Glasgow University based mostly on British archival documents and focused on the British policy on Romania, Finland and Estonia (March 1939-March 1940)⁴, Bogdan Alexandru Schipor deals with the British policy in the entire area from Helsinki to Bucharest and approaches the period 1938-1941, i.e. from the Anschluss to the “vanishing” of the states of this area or to their relegation to a status of dependency on Germany. The author is a researcher in the “A.D. Xenopol” Institute of History of the Romanian Academy and teaches university courses at the “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iassy, while also being the chairman of the Section for Nordic Studies of the Romanian Association for Baltic and Nordic Studies.

The book consists of five chapters which systematically and thematically approach the British policy in above mentioned area. It must be

remembered that, as a traditional balance power, British presence in European affairs was considered by smaller states useful to the maintenance of European equilibrium and order. Thus, the first chapter tries to catch the underlying factors in British policy towards this area between 1919 and 1938. Special chapters are dedicated to topics such as the British understanding of “cordon sanitaire” in the 1920s and the basis of British appeasement in the 1930s. The place of the two mid-sized actors in this equation, i.e. Poland and Romania, is approached in chapters two, three and five. The author investigates the British policy in the area in the wake of the Anschluss and the German occupation of Czechoslovakia the “revolution” in the British policy of March 1939 and the British interests and expectances from the tripartite discussions with France and Soviet Union in Moscow in the summer 1939. Schipor considers the question of “indirect aggression” raised and insisted upon by Viatcheslav Molotov as an important factor which undermined the possibility of reaching an agreement regardless the preparedness of the Western Powers to make concessions to Soviet demands (p. 192). The last chapter of the book is dedicated to Romania’s place in British policy from the outbreak of World War II to 1941 when Romania was inescapably attracted into German sphere of influence. The author states his opinion that Romania started to acquire a “quite significant” role in British policy once the World War II started, the British being particularly interested in blocking the German access to Romanian oil. The author pays a consistent chapter to British policy regarding the Baltic states and Finland in the first two years following the outbreak of World War II when the independence of the former subsided until it was lost altogether while Finland was a victim of Soviet mixture of imperialism and search for security.

In his conclusions the author professes his inability to give an answer to the question whether Britain has drawn a coherent plan regarding “the East European states that have sought its sympathy and help” (p. 324). The author estimates that at least regarding Poland and Romania the British Government at least in 1938-1939 has pursued a predetermined policy.

The research for this book is based on investigation of the Romanian and British archives. To supplement the lack of access in the Baltic, Finnish and Polish archives, the author makes use of an important number of published documents, memoirs, diaries, special and general works.

As a professor of Baltic and Nordic studies, I consider this book as marking a progress in our knowledge of British policy in the area and in the East European states’ policies of enlisting British help to their independence strivings and, therefore, I strongly recommend this book to both specialist and non-specialist Romanian and foreign readers.
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- The maximum length for consideration of an article is 6,000 – 8,000 words (including footnotes), and 700 words for a review.
- Please submit double-spaced papers in 11-point Book Antiqua font with 2 cm margins. Footnotes should be in 9-point.
- All research articles must include a 100-200 word English language abstract (and in Romanian or one of the Nordic and Baltic languages when applicable) and at least five English language key words.
- Submissions should include complete bibliographic references (including page numbers) in footnotes.
- Final bibliography should be inserted at the end of the article.
- For general rules of grammar, form, and style, authors should refer to The Chicago Manual of Style (The University of Chicago Press).
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