SWEDEN AND THE JACOBITE MOVEMENT (1715-1718)

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Abstract:
During the second decade of the century of the Enlightenment, a short interesting episode occurred between the Kingdoms of Britain, Sweden and the Russian Empire. In the context of Sweden’s downfall as an imperial power, Charles XII, after the return from his stay in the Ottoman Empire, instructed his minister, Görtz, to surreptitiously journey to the Netherlands in search of finances. The purpose was to revitalize what was left of Sweden’s maritime power. The only ones interested in funding Charles XII’s fleet were the Jacobites. They were those English, Scots, Irish and Welsh who were still loyal to the dynasty of James II Stuart of England, exiled during the Glorious Revolution of 1688-1689. James II having died in 1701, they now gathered around his son, Francis Edward Stuart (the Old Pretender). In 1715-1716, the Pretender attempted to invade Britain in order to prevent the succession of George I of Hanover, but failed. Through the Swedish envoys in London and Paris (Gyllenborg and Sparre, respectively), Görtz tried to obtain an agreement from the Jacobites that money would be secretly loaned to Charles XII in exchange for Sweden helping a new Jacobite invasion. British counterintelligence was well aware of these negotiations. Eventually the government of George I arrested Gyllenborg, furthermore publishing his documents. This was done in the hope of internationally isolating Sweden, as the British Hanoverian monarch feared a Russian-Swedish-Jacobite alliance. The topic cannot be fully understood without taking in consideration the position of the Russian Empire, so a section of the article is also dedicated to the role played by Russia in this affair.

Rezumat:
Un episod interesant a avut loc în relaţiile dintre Marea Britanie, Suedia şi Imperiul Rus în timpul celei de-a doua decade a Secolului Luminilor. În contextul decăderii puterii Suediei, regele Carol XII, la întoarcerea sa din Imperiul Otoman, l-a instruit pe principalul său ministru, Görtz, să întreprindă o călătorie în Țările de Jos pentru a obține împrumuturi. Scopul era revitalizarea puterii maritime a Suediei prin construirea unei flote performante. Singurii care au putut însă
promite o finanţare au fost iacobiţii. Aceştia erau englezi, scotieni, irlandezi sau galezi încă loiali familiei lui Iacob II Stuart al Angliei, exilată în timpul Glorioasei Revoluţii din 1688-1689. Iacob II a încetat din viaţă în 1701, speranţele iacobiţilor îndreptându-se acum către fiul său, Francis Edward Stuart (cunoscut drept Bătrânul pretendent). În 1715-1716 Francis Stuart a eşuat într-o încercare de înălţurare a noului rege al Marii Britanii, George I de Hanovra. În aceste condiţii, Görtz a încercat ca prin emisarii suedezi la Londra şi Paris (Gyllenborg, respectiv Sparre) să negocieze în secret, aparent fără ştirea lui Carol XII, un împrumut de la iacobiţi în schimbul ajutorului Suediei într-o viitoare invazie a Angliei. Scrisorile le fuseseră interceptate aşa că guvernul britanic aflase de aceste planuri. A urmat arestarea lui Gyllenborg şi publicarea scrisorilor sale, provocându-se astfel o criză cu scopul de a izola internaţional Suedia. George I al Marii Britanii şi Hanovrei în special s-ar fi temut de încheierea unei păci între Suedia şi Rusia. O secţiune a articolului tratează şi rolul jucat de Imperiul Rus în această criză, deoarece subiectul de faţă nu poate fi înţeles fără o privire Nord-europeană de ansamblu.

Keywords: Charles XII, Sweden, Jacobites, Britain, George I, Görtz, Gyllenborg, Sparre, Peter the Great

Introduction: the context of the events*

Son and successor of Charles XI of Sweden and Ulrika Eleonora of Denmark, Charles XII of Sweden (Karl XII; b. 17 June 1682 d. 30 November 1718; regnant 1697-1718) ranks among the best known monarchs of early modern Europe. His fame derives mostly from his monarchical absolutism and his involvement in the Northern Wars, while less is

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1 Since Scottish clansmen formed the bulk of the Jacobite armies during the rebellions of 1715 and 1745, it is interesting to note that the rule of Charles XI of Sweden (1655-1697) represents the end (Queen Kristina also was not eager to recognize the Protectorate) of an interesting Scottish-Swedish alliance. See Alexia Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance Scotland and Sweden 1569-1654 (Boston: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2003), 239.

2 He was actually not the 12th king of Sweden bearing the name Charles (Karl), but the 6th, as earlier kings used numerals based on myths and legends. See Frans Gunnar Bengtsson, The life of Charles XII, King of Sweden, 1697-1718 (London: Macmillan, 1960), passim; Ragnhild M. Hatton, Charles XII of Sweden (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969);

3 All dates in the current article are old style, unless specified otherwise.

4 See Peery Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (Bath, The Bath Press, 1974), 184, 188-190
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Generally said about the interesting episode of his position regarding the succession of George I of Hanover to the throne of Britain.

As is well known, the Great Northern War (1700-1721) broke out in 1700 when Sweden had to oppose the alliance of Denmark, Saxony and Russia. During these restless times, Britain and the Netherlands would soon confront France and Spain in the Wars of Spanish Succession (1701-1714), the larger part of Europe thus becoming engulfed in wars. 5

Peter the Great of Russia, Frederik IV of Denmark and Norway, and August the Strong of Saxony and Poland-Lithuania saw the expansion of the Swedes as a threat to their own position in the Baltic area and thus formed the Northern Alliance, hoping to at least maintain the status quo. This is the basis of the future Swedish-Hanoverian hostility. As the allies would soon find out, “pacifying” Sweden would be difficult to obtain, as the ‘warrior king’6 Charles swiftly acted against them. First the King of Sweden invaded Denmark, forcing his cousin, Frederik IV, to settle for peace as soon as 1700 (the Peace of Travendal), while in the same year defeating a Russian army three times more numerous at Narva.

Then, moving against Saxony and Poland-Lithuania, he defeated the armies of August the Strong at the Battle of Kliszów (1702), and again at the Battle of Fraustadt (1706) followed by the Treaty of Altranstädt, finally installing Stanisław Leszczyński as king of Poland-Lithuania and thus obtaining a favorable peace. This aggravated the envy of Hanover. Despite this initial success, Charles XII would be one of the first great commanders in history to become stuck in Russia. The battle of Poltava (1709) brought not just a change of fate for the ongoing war, but especially one for Charles XII. Badly injured, the King of Sweden had to retreat south in the Ottoman Empire and remained near Bender (Tighina)7 for 5 years. In 1712, given the


5 Irene Scobbie, Historical Dictionary of Sweden (Oxford: The Scarecrow Press, 2006), 105
7 There he tried to instigate war between the Russian and the Ottoman Empires, and received the nickname Demirbaş Şarl, meaning Charles the Pensioner in Turkish. For more on this interesting “long stay” and especially for his view on the nearby Moldova and Wallachia see Silviu Miloiu, Oana Lăculeceanu, Elena Dragomir, O concepție Românească a
weakness of Sweden, which was now being ruled by letters from the Ottoman Empire, Denmark occupied Bremen-Verden, and 3 years later would trade it to George I of Hanover (1714-1727) in exchange for his help against Charles XII.

In the meanwhile, Britain successfully faced its first important Jacobite rebellion in 1715, when the forces of John Erskine, Earl of Mar, acting in the name of the Old Pretender, were defeated at the battles of Preston and Sheriffmuir. There were discussions with Charles XII and the Jacobites in Sweden took some actions (some supply ships were sent), but in a very limited manner since the Swedish army was heavily needed on the continent.

This rebellion took place in the context of the Hanoverian succession, when the Earl of Mar, a Tory, was quickly catalogued as a Jacobite traitor by the Whig politicians in London, which recently ascended to power thanks to the change of dynasty. In vain had the Earl of Mar sent

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Nordului [A Romanian Conception of the North], vol. I (Târgoviște: Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2009), 12-14. Also see: Amira Alessandro, Storia del soggiorno di Carol XII in Turchia [History of the stay of Charles XII in Turkey] (București: Nicolae Iorga Press, 1905); Veniamin Ciobanu, Charles XII et les Roumains – Cărăl XII-lea şi Românii (București: Domino, 1999); Veniamin Ciobanu, Les pays Roumains au seuil du 18e siècle. Charles XII et les Roumains (București: Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1984); Federico-Ernst von Fabrice, Anecdotes du Séjour du Roi Charles XII de Suède a Bender (Hamburg: 1760); G. L. Ionescu-Gion, Călătoria lui Carol al XII-lea prin Țara Românească [Charles’ XII Travel through Wallachia] (București: 1890); Nicolae Iorga, ‘Charles XII a Bender,’ Revue Historique du Sud-Est Européen 4-6 (April-June 1926); Nicolae Iorga, ‘Karl XII och Româniyen,’ Svenska Dagsbladet (12 December 1929); Mihail Kogâlniceanu, Fragments tires de Chroniques Moldaves et Valaques pour servir a l’histoire de Pierre le Grand, Charles XII, Stanislas Leszczyński, Démêtrire Cantemir et Constantin Brancovan (Iași : 1845); V. Mihordea, Carol XII la Tighina [Charles XII in Tighina] (Bucharest : 1943).

These valuable bibliographic indications are found in Silviu Miloiu, O concepție Românească a Nordului [A Romanian Conception of the North] vol. II Repertoriu de documente și trimiteri bibliografice [Vol. II Repertoire of Documents and Bibliographic References] (Târgovişte: Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2009), 75, 77-81.

8 James Francis Edward Stuart (1688-1766), son of the exiled Roman-Catholic James II of England, and whose birth, among other factors, lead to the Glorious Revolution of 1688.


letters of loyalty to George I of Hanover, as he was removed from his position as Secretary of State in Scotland, which led to his hasty and reckless, as he soon found out, assumption of the Jacobite cause.\footnote{Molly Davidson, \textit{The Jacobites – Scottish Histories} (New Lanmark: Geddes & Grosset, 2004), 68-69; John L. Roberts, \textit{The Jacobite Wars: Scotland and the Military Campaigns of 1715 and 1745} (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002), 16; Lenman, 2004, 126-127} After his defeat, the Jacobites who could escape went back to France together with James Francis Edward Stuart (The Old Pretender), where they would again begin to seek help against George I of Great Britain and Hanover.

\textbf{The Swedish-Jacobite Plot}\footnote{The subject has been extensively treated in the past, see John J. Murray, ‘Sweden and the Jacobites’ \textit{Huntington Library Querterly}, Vol. VIII (1944-1945), 259-276; Gabriel Syveton, ‘L’erreur de Goertz’ \textit{Revue d’histoire diplomatique}, Vol. IX & X, No. 3, 5 & 1-4 (1895-1896); Thomas Westrin (ed.), ‘En redögoresle af Baron Georg Henrich von Görtz rörande hans förhållande till Jakobiterna 1716-1717 [An account of Baron Georg Henrich von Görtz regarding his relationship with the Jacobites 1716-1717]’ \textit{Historisk Tidsskrift} Vol. XVIII (1989), 276-286; Thomas Westrin (ed.), ‘En förklarling af Greve Carl Gyllenborg angående hans förhållande till Pretendenter [An explanation of Count Carl Gyllenborg about his relationship with the Pretender]’ \textit{Historisk Tidsskrift} Vol. XXIII (1903), 283-288; Thomas Bussemaker, ‘De Arrestatie van Gyllenborg en Görtz in 1717’ \textit{Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, Land- en Volkenkunde} Vol. XVI (1901), 65, 129, 193; Baron F. C. von Moser, \textit{Rettung der Ehre und Unschuld des Freyherrn von Schlitz, gennant Goerz – mit XXX Beylagen [Salvation of the Honour and Innocence of the Baron von Schlitz, called Goerz - with 30 supplements]} (Hamburg: 1776); and for documents especially see, among many others such as the \textit{Stuart MSS at HMC, Handlingar rörande Skandinaviens historia [Documents Relating to Scandinavian History]}, Vol. VIII, X; Carl Gyllenborg, \textit{Letters which passed between Count Gyllenborg, the Barons Görtz, Sparre, and others: relating to the design of raising a rebellion in His Majesty’s dominions, to be supported / by a force from Sweden} (London: S. Buckley, 1717); and William Cobbett (ed.), \textit{The Parliamentary History of England Vol.} (London: Thomas Osborne and William Sandby, 1806-1818). This precious bibliographical information is found in Horace Walpole, John Joseph Murray, \textit{An Honest Diplomat at the Hague: The Private Letters of Horatio Walpole, 1715-1716} (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1955), 347.} Briefly, in Britain rumors circulated that the Old Pretender had been offered money by France and up to twelve thousands Swedish soldiers, as various intercepted Jacobite letters testify.\footnote{William Kirk Dickson, \textit{The Jacobite Attempt of 1719. Letters of James Butler, second Duke of Ormonde, Relating to the Cardinal Alberoni’s Project for the Invasion of Great Britain on Behalf of the Stuarts, and to the Landing of a Spanish Expedition in Scotland} (Edinburgh: Printed at the University Press by T. and A. Constable for the Scottish History Society, 1895), xxi} As was often the case, these also proved to be but a dream of the exiled rebels. Still, this kind of information was useful to those who needed to prove themselves as stalwart allies and protectors of the Hanoverian government, such as the
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Earl of Stair\(^{14}\) whose father was one of those responsible for the infamous massacre of Glencoe.

In spite of being official allies, the seeds of conflict between Britain and Sweden were planted before these moments, during the reign of William II & III (1688-1702) and Queen Anne (1702-1714), when contrary to English maritime interests, the Baltic region consisted of an area almost completely controlled by Charles XII’s Sweden.\(^{15}\) It is very important to take note of this fact in order to demolish the impression that George I solely attracted Swedish hostility by promoting the interests of his native Hanover.\(^{16}\)

Conversely, as Hanover had the interest of acquiring Bremen (held by Denmark), it even allied itself with Sweden in this endeavor (to no avail, because Hanover obtained Bremen-Verden peacefully from Denmark in exchange for help against Charles XII, as we have seen). Another problem was the British succession.\(^{17}\) George of Hanover not only had one of the most influential positions in the Holy Roman Empire, but he also inherited one of the most powerful kingdoms, and as Charles VI’s Austrian succession\(^{18}\) was questionable, it seemed like he could become even more powerful.\(^{19}\)

A short and clear example of English enmity against Sweden is the negative opinion\(^{20}\) of Bolingbroke (Queen Anne’s Secretary of State) on Sweden and Charles XII, as he complains about the “unaccountable . . . and intolerable” Swedish attacks upon the English navy. Continuing to express his total discontent for Charles XII’s warlike policy and ambitions, and threatening the feeble Swedish navy with the might of the British fleet he shows that Sweden “is reduced to the last extremities, oppressed by taxes,

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\(^{14}\) J. F. Chance, “The “Swedish Plot” of 1716-1717” *EHR*, Vol. 18, No. 69 (January 1903), 83-84


\(^{18}\) The Pragmatic Sanction of 1713 which decreed that the Empire could be inherited by Charles VI’s daughter, the future Marie Therese (born in 1717 and regnant 1740-1780), was controversial and would only be universally accepted after the Wars of Austrian Succession (1740-1748).

\(^{19}\) J. F. Chance, ‘George I in His Relations with Sweden’ *EHR*, vol. 17, No. 65 (January 1902), 51

\(^{20}\) Also see *The London Gazette* No. 5478 of Saturday, October 20, 1716.
starved by the decay of trade, and dispeopled, as well by the frequent draughts of recruits, as by the pestilence.”

On the Swedish side, since Charles had to stay in the Ottoman Empire, someone else ruled Sweden for him, and that person was Georg Heinrich von Görtz (1688-1719), diplomat and statesman. He was one of the few who, despite widespread popular discontent, believed that Sweden’s power had not been depleted, and hence made a perfect prime minister avant la lettre for the bold and adventurous king. It is no wonder that upon Charles’ return to Swedish territories, Görtz quickly greeted the King and even obtained greater power, being made responsible only to His Majesty.

After Charles XII’s return followed a quick invasion of Norway: in 1716, the capital Christiania (Oslo) was captured and siege begun on Akershus. Still, a counterattack by Denmark-Norway relieved the capital the same year, and considerable casualties were inflicted upon the invaders at Fredrikshald, while a similar Danish force at Dynekilen defeated the small Swedish supply fleet. These events provided for an intensification of the efforts of the Danish envoy (Söhlenthal) at the British court, while in the same time his Swedish counterpart, Carl Gyllenborg, proposed the ceding of Bremen and Verden to Hanover in exchange for British support against Peter the Great.

But Townshend and Sunderland shared the opinion that Charles XII was rather prone to adopting the Jacobite cause, and thus assured Söhlenthal of their support in trying to convince Parliament of the necessity of sending ships to Denmark’s aid.

Gyllenborg thought just like most of his continental contemporaries, who overestimated George I’s decision power in his new kingdom, simply placing Britain and Hanover in a political equation where they did not fit. Britain’s interests were larger by far than those of Hanover, as British statesmen and diplomats struggled for world trade domination and

22 “Plenam potestatem damus in usum Nostrum conquirendi comparadique pecunias in exteris Regionibus…” (30 May 1716) in von Moser, 1776, ii.
23 The London Gazette No. 5420 of Tuesday, March 31, 1716; No. 5448 of Saturday, July 7, 1716.
24 See Hugo Larsson, Grefve Karl Gyllenborg i London åren 1715-1717.
25 Sir Charles Spencer, 3rd Earl of Sunderland (1675-1722), British politician who was serving as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and Lord Privy Seal at the time. He is mostly remembered for his involvement in the South Sea Bubble. Together with James Stanhope and Viscount Charles Townshend, he is considered one of the first informal leaders of the cabinet of ministers before Sir Robert Walpole.
26 Chance, 1903, 83
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colonial expansion at the expense of the other colonial powers (Netherlands, France, Portugal and Spain). Hanover mostly sought the acquisition of Bremen and Verden, and could in no way improve worldwide British trade.27

The question is where did the interests of Britain and Hanover meet? Since Hanover already had claims on Swedish territory, the meeting point could only occur when, as I have mentioned in the beginning, Britain saw its commercial interests threatened at the Baltic Sea.28 Although it was not important who owned the ports and the territories there, it was important that the respective powers allowed British merchants to distribute wares from all over the world there, in exchange for wood, pitch and other shipbuilding materials. This no longer happened with the rise of Charles XII, who moreover was suspected of Jacobite sympathies.29

Speaking again of Jacobite sympathies, some did understand that Earl Stair and others were only spreading rumors in order to seek revenge on their enemies, but the fact that the French regency30 still provided the Stuarts for their residence and the news of Charles’ western campaign into Norway certainly did not calm the spirits. George I obtained that a defensive fleet was armed and the admiral (John Norris) specifically instructed to be vigilant against any Swedish operations (1716). Also the envoys of George I in Denmark, Lord Polwarth and General Bothmer, tried to secure a Russian-Danish alliance against Sweden, but ultimately they failed in doing so,31 as the Baltic interests of these two made negotiations difficult at least.

During this time Gyllenborg and Görtz were not idle, being quite busy with testing the waters of Jacobitism. Despite the severe disapproval of Swedish public sentiment, “Grand-Vizier” Görtz began to raise funds for the building of a fleet. On this occasion, although not actually holding Swedish citizenship,32 he was made chief responsible of finances. This intensified public hatred against him, making his execution after the death of Charles XII more easily justifiable.

He attracted the enmity of both the commercial bourgeoisie and the nobles because of the following factors: the uproar caused by his

27 Chance, 1902, 52-53
28 Also see The London Gazette of April 26 to April 29, 1718.
29 Chance, 1902, 54
30 Phillipe d’Orleans, le Régent of the Kingdom of France from 1715 to 1723, when Louis XV (1715-1774) attained his majority.
31 Chance, 1903, 84
32 He was from Holstein.
announced four years delay in paying the merchants’ loans, his unexpected issuing together with Casten Feif (a man of Scots descent and devotee of Charles XII) of copper coins in April 1716 and the fact that he was a stranger especially attracted the hostility of the prospective heirs and their entourage.

Considering this extremely uneasy situation, it was thought that money for the anti-Hanoverian project (and not just yet clearly Jacobite) should be sought for on the continent, specifically in the Netherlands, and Görtz arrived at The Hague on 10 July 1716. Despite the recently formed Swedish fleet of a dozen vessels, the Danes still managed to intercept their

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33 Actually being forceful loans, these de facto extortions were called in Swedish by the very gentle names of “förskottar till kronan” (1710 and 1713), “förskottar till Pommerska Arméen” (1716), “förskottar till flottans utrusting” (1716) - i.e. loan (Germ. Vorschuss) to the Crown, loan for the purpose of paying the armies in Pomerania, loan for the fitting out of a fleet, etc. See Jonas Berg, Bo Lagercrantz, Scots in Sweden (Stockholm: Nordiska Museet, 1962), 8.

34 “Kasten Feif was the son of Peter Feif and grandson of the Scot, James Fife who had originally migrated to Sweden from Scotland. Kasten was born to Peter and his wife Maria Hoff in Stockholm in September 1662. Apparently in 1670 Kasten was sent to Finland as a hat-maker, but his master's business failed, and Kasten returned to Sweden. Through his knowledge of the Finnish language he obtained work in royal service. Twenty years later he joined the chancellery and from then on was steadily promoted in the civil service. By 1697 he was registrar and in 1704 a senior secretary. His ennoblement followed in 1705. Two years later he transferred to the Finnish chancellery. He apparently became one of King Karl XII’s ‘right hand men’ particularly whilst the king was away on campaigns. The great Northern War saw him take on military duties as ‘Ombudsrad' in 'Krigs Expedition'. Kasten allegedly issued the passport for ‘Peter Frisk’ (Karl XII's pseudonym) in 1714... Feif had become a Swedish baron n 1715 and married Anna Kristina Barckhusen (1674-1724). Kasten died on 17 March 1739.” taken from University of St. Andrews Institute of Scottish Historical Research, The Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern European Biographical Database (SSNE), Record ID: 6281, http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/history/ssne/index.php, accessed 4 November 2010.

35 Although Casten Feif was born in Sweden, it should be noted that Scottish warriors did not go to Sweden to serve under Charles XII out of special devotion to the Jacobite cause. A romantic view is also that they were “fascinated by the commanding personality of one of the most extraordinary monarchs the world has ever seen”, as it is said by George A. Sinclair, ‘The Scottish Officers of Charles XII’ The Scottish Historical Review, Vol. 21, No. 83 (April 1924), 178.

36 Of which Ulrika Eleonora, the sister of Charles XII named after their mother, would succeed him.

37 Chance 1903, 85-86

38 Consisting mostly of frigates, while the money was necessary for the bigger and better armed ships-of-the-line. For methods of war in the eighteenth century navy see Jeremy Black, Warfare in the Eighteenth Century (London: Cassell, 1999), 128-154.
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enemies’ envoys but Görtz and General Poniatowski escaped with their documents intact.

Nevertheless, the British had a better position in Holland, and Görtz saw himself trying to accomplish an almost impossible task. All he could obtain was some promises in Zeeland, so he journeyed in extreme secrecy to Paris, where he stayed until 13 September.

Still, Görtz did not obtain anything seriously here so he returned to The Hague where he made a desperate plea:

“Nothing less will come than the destruction of the [Swedish – ed.] kingdom. If France wants to contribute to our safety it is time to do so. Aut nunc aut nunquam. If Sweden is driven back, neither the King of England nor the King of Prussia will treat lightly with France”

Help from France could have encouraged creditors in Holland also, which also had to suffer from the enmity of George I’s ministers. With the help of their agents in The Hague, the British tried to frustrate Görtz’s efforts by pointing to the danger posed by the Danish ships which supposedly were to capture transports going to Sweden, by printing pamphlets to uncover the plans underway and ultimately by placing themselves under the service of the Swedish envoy, as double agents.

This is when the Jacobite plot really starts to take shape. Görtz still required a large sum of cash (over 100,000 crowns) in order to acquire large ships for his master, Charles XII, but this money was still nowhere to be found, as both le Régent and the moneyed men of The Hague asked for warranties that could not be satisfied only with promises of future glory.

Although in the past Charles summarily rejected any negotiation with the exiled Stuarts, his agents were clever enough to suggest that maybe in the future conditions would provide for a different point of view, and this is the moment that they had in mind, when Sweden would find itself isolated and at war with Britain.

The Scottish Jacobites first entrusted a cousin of the said John Erskine, Earl of Mar, with a mission to Charles XII. Görtz engaged in secret diplomacy with the Jacobites via the Swedish delegates in Britain and

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39 Count Stanisław (Stanislas) Poniatowski (1676-1762), father of the last king of Poland (Stanisław II August Poniatowski).
40 Handlingar rörande Skandinaviens historia [Documents Relating to Scandinavian History], Vol. VIII, 268 apud Chance, 1903, 86-88.
41 Chance, 1903, 88-89
43 Chance, 1903, 90
France: Gyllenborg kept in touch with crypto-Jacobite MPs in London and other discontent Englishmen while Sparre\textsuperscript{44} had to treat with the Jacobite exiles in Paris, the court of James Edward Stuart at Avignon, and sympathizing French Foreign Affairs heads such as Nicolas Chalon du Blé (marquis d’Uxelles, in office 1715-1718) and the marquis de Torcy (in office prior to 1715).

Speculations began on 25 September 1716 when a dialogue of Gyllenborg with the Jacobites was again unfruitful (as they had the strong tendency to exaggerate their chances and popular support\textsuperscript{45}), but at least he wrote to Görtz that discussions did take place with them asking for a military force of ten thousand Swedes, to which he received the answers that more details ought to be known, and until then Charles XII should not be informed of this.\textsuperscript{46}

As Hanover had one of the most advanced intelligence services, the British were aware of the Jacobite agitations\textsuperscript{47} and even correctly assumed that although Sweden seemed a likely ally of them,\textsuperscript{48} Charles XII’s energies were exhausted, just like it is proven in the extract of a letter of the Secretary of State in England (dated 15 September 1716):

“… it seems fully as improbable that the king of Sweden in his present circumstances should think of assisting them. But as the behavior of that prince has ever been most unaccountable, and as the dilatory proceedings of the northern allys may protract the descent upon Schonen to such a season of the year as will render it impracticable, it is not possible in such a case to answer how far his passion may carry him towards pouring a body of forces into Scotland or the north of England from Gottenburg…”\textsuperscript{49}

Dialogue between Görtz and the Jacobites went further and sooner than intended money became the subject. James Butler (Duke of Ormonde)\textsuperscript{50} went as far as to promise the payment of 60,000 pounds as a

\textsuperscript{44} Carl Gustaf Jacobsson Sparre, born in Ulvåsa, south-west of Stockholm in 1688, came from an important Swedish family and served as ambassador to Paris until 1719.

\textsuperscript{45} Lenman 2004, 113

\textsuperscript{46} Chance 1903, 91

\textsuperscript{47} Paul S. Fritz, ‘The Anti-Jacobite Intelligence System of the English Ministers, 1715-1745’ \textit{The Historical Journal} Vol. 16, No. 2 (1972), 271

\textsuperscript{48} Also appears in \textit{Observations upon a Pamphlet called An English Merchant’s Remarks upon a Scandalous Jacobite Paper Published in the Post-Boy, under the Name of A Memorial presented to the Chancery of Sweden, by the Resident of Great Britain} (London: Printed and Sold by the Booksellers, 1717), 36-37

\textsuperscript{49} Apud Chance 1922, 92-93

\textsuperscript{50} He went into exile to France to elude being arrested after his rebellion in Richmond in the West of England during 1715 was swiftly suppressed by the government. See Davidson, 2004, 68.
token of the Pretender’s benevolence. Still the Swedish envoys, Sparre, Gyllenborg and Görtz, treaded lightly and it was decided that a formal treaty with the Jacobites was out of question considering that it brought nothing more than danger of the plan being disclosed. Initially it was decided that the money should be sent by December 1716 in exchange for promises of returning them in case Charles XII would refuse the plan. The said sum of money would have provided for the soldiers’ transportation, but it could not cover the required food or horses, which presumably were to be procured in Scotland.

Even so, December 1716 passed and the first days of January 1717 found Görtz, Gustavus Gyllenborg (the brother of Count Carl Gyllenborg, the Swedish envoy at London) and Sparre all in Paris. The first one came to investigate the impartial position of the Regent’s court towards Sweden and the second was to try to obtain the money from the Jacobites. Peter the Great had also secretly sent Field-Marshal James Daniel Bruce to Paris as one of his plenipotentiaries in case an anti-Hanoverian treaty was going to be signed.51

On 13, 16, 18 and 27 January and on 10 February 1717 letters were exchanged between the Swedes in Paris and those in London in which money was also the main subject, and furthermore it was clear that it finally started moving through decoys and would eventually reach Charles XII’s envoys in Paris.

Another important aspect of this correspondence is that, although Görtz and Sparre were in the same team, it is clear that they did not get along that well, as the second was accused of abandoning the plan. Sweden had enough of Charles XII’s wars by that time and it should not surprise anybody if his brother, a general of Sweden, might have advised him regarding the state of spirit among the higher classes.52

Furthermore, Charles recalled him, officially at Sparre’s own request due to sickness, but the real reason was the coldness of Louis XV’s Regency towards Sweden. These new conditions certainly did not impress the Jacobites, and the whole deal was slowed. The government of George I correctly appreciated that this would be a good moment for their intervention (we must never forget that mail was intercepted very easily during those times).53

51 Murdoch 2006, 320
53 Chance 1903, 95-100
In the meanwhile, George I was in Hanover and supposed to return to England just before February 1717, so his ministers decided to wait and pursue peaceful methods. As much as Gyllenborg was an able and respected diplomat, having done all his best to foster the help of any MP sympathetic to Sweden, any merchant who feared Russian rivalry and also having appealed to the public opinion by pamphleteering, the issue of Bremen and Verden was still too great to be settled by agreement right now.\footnote{Chance, 1903, 102-103}


The British envoy in the United Netherlands, William Leathes, pressed for the arrest of Görtz (an easier feat, because even though he was the first minister of Charles XII, he had not been empowered by diplomatic credentials to any court) and that of his secretary, Gustavus Gyllenborg. The rationale was that the Dutch were supporters of the Protestant Succession\footnote{One might as well use Hanoverian Succession, but this would imply that Britain’s foreign policy is influenced by that of Hanover, which is forbidden by the Act of Settlement.} and since Gyllenborg and Görtz were plotting against it, they should act against them. Görtz was arrested in Gelderland as he was trying to leave the Netherlands while Gustavus Gyllenborg was already in arrest in The Hague.\footnote{John J. Murray, ‘The Görtz-Gyllenborg Arrests-A Problem in Diplomatic Immunity’ The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1956), 325-326}

The fact that the United Netherlands as well as Britain were, at least by treaty, allies of Sweden (even though Hanover was at war with Charles XII\footnote{Hanover was allied with Russia, Denmark, Brandenburg-Prussia and Poland-Saxony against Sweden. Just by looking at this list of states one can begin to suspect this Northern Alliance of being rather a loose one, which was exactly the case. See Murray 1956, 327.}) made these events sensational, as the breach of diplomatic immunity was not common. It is no wonder that the British ministers did not
authorize such a deed before the arrival of George I from Hanover. In order to prevent the flagrant breach of the Act of Settlement by directly involving Britain in a war on behalf of Hanover’s interests, the whole affair would become a quest for the safeguard of the Anglican Protestant Church against the Popish Jacobites, which just happened to be supported by the Swedes. This was important in order to obtain parliamentary support, as arming a fleet against Sweden was impossible without new taxes, and things had to be hurried while the Russian Empire was still at least formally at war against Charles XII.61

The earlier promised proofs were issued by Stanhope on 4 March 1717 to all the diplomatic envoys in the form of a publication (“Whitebook”) containing the incriminating correspondence between the Swedish envoys and the Jacobite leaders.62 Furthermore, pamphlets were issued explaining how by their vigilance, the British ministers prevented another war from starting in Europe. If the breach of diplomatic immunity was considered quite vexing, the publishing of a diplomat’s secret documents was even more so, considering that the usual practice of the times63 was to ask for a recall, and in any case excluded the confiscation of diplomatic documents.64

61 Murray 1956, 326
62 The London Gazette 4 March 1717, the price for the book was set to 6 d.
63 In early modern diplomacy a foreign minister represented the reflection of the “glory and honour” of his very monarch. Even though diplomatic ritual and ceremony tended to be the same for agents of the same rank, it was not unusual for some agents to be treated differently based on their virtues (or like in the present case, based on their errors). See William Roosen, ‘Early Modern Diplomatic Ceremonial: A Systems Approach’ The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 52, No. 3 (September 1980), 452-476. Moreover, “a public agent is absolutely exempt from the operation of the local criminal law of the land to which he is sent. Even if he conspires against the prince to whom he is accredited, his punishment at the hands of that prince is limited to dismissal”, as is shown in Thomas A. Walker, A History of the Law of Nations: from the Earliest Times to the Peace of Westphalia, 1648 (Cambridge: Elibron Classics, 2000), 252. There were scholars who did agree that ambassadors should not be above the laws of the country where they served. Dr. Richard Zouche from Oxford (Professor of Civil Law) even wrote A Dissertation Concerning the Punishment of Ambassadors (dedicated to James Stanhope – sic!) drawing from German scholars of Roman law. See Murray, 1956, 332. Also, many sources treating this diplomatic arrest point to a similar event during the reign of Queen Elizabeth (1558-1603), when the envoy of Spain, Don Bernardino de Mendoza, engaged in conspiracy. Even given the conditions that this Spanish case was serious and truly dangerous, the diplomat was still untouched as the English simply waited for his recall.
64 Murray 1956, 327
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The case of the arrest of Görtz was much more complicated, as he did not present ambassadorial credentials in The Hague but after all, he did not conspire directly against it either.\textsuperscript{65}

News of Gyllenborg’s arrest arrived in Sweden a month later, on 28 February 1717, and the source was a newspaper from Königsberg (also part of the Northern Alliance), so it was taken with a grain of salt until it would be confirmed by sources that are more reliable. Charles XII was outraged and wanted, like all his court, to retaliate and arrest Robert Jackson, the British minister in Sweden.

As the rumors were confirmed,\textsuperscript{66} Jackson was apprehended until 10 October 1717, when he was sent back to England, while Rumpf, the Dutch envoy, had only been denied access to Charles XII’s Court. In his formal declaration, which was delayed on purpose in dissatisfaction, the King of Sweden told the French Régent (who was mediating the crisis) that at no time did he have any intention of offending Great Britain and that he would deal with his ministers according to law if they were found to have exceeded their attributions.

One might wonder about the sincerity of the Swedish King, after all he did send Görtz to obtain finances in The Hague, where he found out that only the Jacobites could help him in such a matter.\textsuperscript{67} Whether Görtz was only following his master’s orders or not, he would receive his cruel punishment a year later, at the death of his King, when the hatred of the Swedes against absolutism passed on to him and he was executed.\textsuperscript{68}

The Role of the Russian Empire

Considering that the “only thing about which Charles XII and Peter the Great agreed on was the Jacobite movement”\textsuperscript{69} and that “the events of 1716 … generated the first outburst of genuine anti-Russian feeling ever seen in Britain”,\textsuperscript{70} and taking in consideration the recent historiography on

\textsuperscript{65} See \textit{The London Gazette} No. 5509 of Tuesday, February 5, 1717; No. 5513 of Tuesday, February 9, 1717.

\textsuperscript{66} \textit{The London Gazette} No. 5530 of Saturday, April 20, 1717.

\textsuperscript{67} J. F. Chance 1903, 106

\textsuperscript{68} The news is presented in \textit{The London Gazette} of December 27, 1718.


\textsuperscript{70} Matthew S. Anderson, ‘English Views of Russia in the Age of Peter the Great’ \textit{American Slavic and East European Review} Vol. 31, No. 2 (1954), 206
this matter, some clarifications must be made regarding the role of the Russian Empire in the affair presented here.

The Russian Empire and the Kingdom of Sweden make for the two North-European destinations where the Jacobites sought help. As we have seen in the introduction, Russia and Sweden were frequently at war, a fact that of course made difficult the task of the Jacobites in Northern Europe. However, who were the Jacobites in the Russian Empire? One of the most prominent ones was the said cousin of the Earl of Mar, named Dr. Robert Erskine, who was also physician to Peter the Great, and had worked in Russia since 1704. It is very interesting that when the Earl of Mar wrote his cousin asking him to offer the services of the Jacobites to the Tsar, he was replied to that Peter the Great received the proposition positively. Thus, during his visit in Holland, the Tsar recruited Jacobites such as Thomas Gordon, William Hay, Robert Little and Adam Urquhart.

Still, Peter the Great did not openly admit his negotiations with the Swedes and Jacobites and continuously officially denied the presence of any of them at his court, including the one of Dr. Erskine. Conversely, as

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72 Murdoch 2006, 314; Wills 2002, 40
74 Murdoch, 2006, 317-318; Wills, 2002, 36
75 “.. Your Majesty’s ministers persisted in their Animosity against his Czarish Majesty, and they gave from time to time proofs that it was continually increasing,”, “... the Confidence of his Czarish Majesty put in your Majesties greatness of Soul, and the many solemn Engagements, Assurances and Promises made by your Majesty, both by word of Mouth... would not permit his Czarish Majesty to give credit to those Advices, nor to several others which he received from different places... and some secret Emissaries sent to Sweden for Treating for a separate peace between your Majesty and the Crown of Sweden...”, “...there was no interview at all between his Czarish Majesty and him [Baron Göritz – ed.], he came to Loo while his Czarish Majesty was there, but he spoke only to Prince Kourakin his Embassador, whom he desired to procure him his Czarish Majesties leave to pass through his Dominions, in order to return to Sweden” found in The Memorial of M. Bestuchef His Czarish Majesties Resident in London. Presented Oct. 17 1720 to the Court of Great Britain (1721).
76 Murdoch 2006, 319; Wills 2002, 68
we have seen, he acted contrarily and did send an envoy\textsuperscript{77} to Paris while Görtz was there too. Furthermore, when the Tsar visited France he also promised to help the Jacobites provided the Regent of France would also support the project.\textsuperscript{78} As we have seen, for now France would stay out of offering new support to the Jacobites.

What is even more surprising is that in 1718 the Tsar supposedly proposed the marriage of his daughter, Grand Duchess Anne, and James Edward Stuart. This project fell because this time an agreement could not be reached with Sweden.\textsuperscript{79}

Unfortunately for the Jacobites, the Great Northern War continued its course with the peace between the Russian Empire and Sweden being signed in 1721 at Nystad. The Jacobites would continue to act in Russia and press for their interests throughout the rest of the first half of the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{80}

**Epilogue**

Since eventually the arrested diplomats were exchanged\textsuperscript{81} between England and Sweden, one rightfully wonders what George I was planning when he authorized such a seemingly useless breach of diplomatic courtesy. He was thinking that this crisis would prevent a separate peace between Charles XII and the Russian Empire (consequently Swedish-Russian-Jacobite alliance), which would have greatly disadvantaged Hanover as part of the Northern Alliance.\textsuperscript{82}

He was partially correct, as he could not foresee the death of Charles XII at the siege of Fredrikshald in 1718,\textsuperscript{83} which meant the end of Swedish imperial ambition. Bremen-Verden, regarded as keys to North-West Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, had to be ceded to Hanover in a year’s time,\textsuperscript{84} while in the same pacification project, half of Swedish Pomerania was given to Prussia.\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{77} In the person of James Daniel Bruce (see Murdoch, 2010).
\textsuperscript{78} Murdoch 2006, 321; Wills 2002, 86
\textsuperscript{79} Murdoch 2006, 321; Wills 2003, 57-59
\textsuperscript{80} For further reading see Murdoch, 2006, 323-349; Wills, 2002, 68-231
\textsuperscript{81} Görzt was released by the state of Gelderland and eventually returned to Sweden, while Gyllenborg’s office as minister of Sweden in London was taken by Sparre (sic!).
\textsuperscript{83} Reflected in The London Gazette No. 5707 of Tuesday, December 30, 1718; No. 5711 of Tuesday, January 13, 1719;
\textsuperscript{84} Roberts, 1979, 127-128
\textsuperscript{85} Also see J. F. Chance, ‘The Northern Pacification of 1719-1720’ EHR, Vol. 22, No. 87 (July 1907), 478-507; J. F. Chance, ‘The Northern Pacification of 1719-1720 (continued)’ EHR, Vol. 23, No. 88 (July 1908), 508-525
The Jacobites, as ever, did not become discouraged and continued plotting, this time turning to Spain. Here, Philip V ruled together with his wife, Elisabeta Farnese (of Parma, the same place where his principal minister, Cardinal Alberoni, came from). The one leading negotiations here was the same Duke Ormonde, and it is highly probable that the whole plan was supposed to just distract the British attention away from the Mediterranean and the New World. Unlike the case of Sweden, the Spanish were serious in this matter although the invasion was forfeited by naval storms, with only a smaller part of the fleet reaching Scotland in 1719. Even so, Spanish soldiers did fight in Britain together with Scottish Jacobites and were defeated at Glen Shiel (9 June 1719). After this failure the prestige of the exiled Stuarts was diminished even more and soon they had to accept the hospitality of the Pope and move to Rome, as the French Court could no longer shelter them.

In conclusion, this “Swedish invasion was a chimera” (and a splendidly convenient casus belli I might add), if we take into consideration the slow and mostly unfruitful negotiations between Charles’ envoys and the Jacobites, and especially the fact that the King of Sweden had not authorized such a project and allegedly, had not been informed about it by either of his ministers abroad, Görtz, Gyllenborg or Sparre.

It is important to note that although the events are rather small in amplitude, they reveal interesting aspects of incongruity in the Westphalian concept of international relations: Görtz’s involvement in the foreign affairs of Sweden based on the powers he received from Charles XII without diplomatic credentials, the negotiations of the Swedish ministers in London and Paris (Gyllenborg and Sparre) with the representatives of the exiled Stuarts (a non- sover eign entity) and the intentional mismanagement of the Gyllenborg question by George I’s ministers.
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