Pourtant: Argumentation by exception

Marion Carel

Université Paris X, UFR de Psychologie, Dépt. de Mathématiques, 200, av. de la République, F-92000 Nanterre, France

Abstract

This study aims at testing, through the analysis of several uses of pourtant, the present descriptive tools (topoi and topical forms) of the Theory of Argumentation Within Language. It is first shown that little can be gained from the reduction of pourtant to donc (whereby the use of pourtant is seen as acknowledging the possibility to use a donc while refuting to do so). Instead, donc and pourtant are regarded as two different expressions of the same argumentative principle: the first one is of the ‘regular’ form, while the second one is of the ‘exceptive’ form. This, it will be shown, leads us to reject the logical hypothesis (implicitly accepted by Anscombe and Ducrot) according to which argumentation is a form of inference.

“Ich weiß, du liebst Albert sehr, aber du hast doch in deiner Zwar: denn versteht sich’s nicht von selbst, daß jeder allgemeine Satz Ausnahmen leidet?”

(Goethe, Die Leiden des jungen Werthers, erstes Buch, Brief vom 12.8)

1. Introduction

The theory of ‘argumentation in language’ (AL) developed by Jean-Claude Anscombe and Oswald Ducrot over the last twenty years, is intended to analyze all linguistic structures as introducing or realising discursive sequences. More precisely, Anscombe and Ducrot’s semantic descriptions are opposed to all descriptivist...
approaches to meaning, in that they rely exclusively on sequential structures with *donc* (so).\(^1\)

Descriptivist semanticians analyse a discourse fragment like *Pierre est riche* 'P is rich' without reference to the sequential structure or contextual links. They can then associate it with a constant semantic value which will be preserved in all other realisations of the same segment, and which is independent of any implicit or explicit conclusions which may lie behind the utterance. This semantic value will be found in any realisation of that segment whatever the explicit conclusion, as in (1) *P is rich: he must be happy*, or (2) *P is rich: he can do whatever he likes*.

In AL, on the contrary, to describe (1) is only to associate it with an argument, here based on the principle 'if you are rich, you are content'. And to describe (2) is only to associate it with the principle 'if you are rich, you have power'. As these two arguments are distinct, the semantic descriptions of these two sequences have nothing in common.

Thus AL associates the semantic type 'P is rich' with a set of possible values; an utterance of that phrase cannot be completely interpreted unless it is possible to determine which of these values the speaker is referring to. The preliminary hypothesis is that linguistic structures must be analysed as *donc* sequences. This means that 'P is rich' is analysed by reference to the particular argumentative conclusion intended by the discourse segment.

Such a hypothesis affects the analysis of word meanings. As (1) and (2) are not associated with the same conclusions, they cannot both make use of the same notion of richness. The semantic description must use values which allow definitions of richness-which-makes-you-happy and richness-which-gives-you-power. But Anscombe and Ducrot's general framework allows to determine the value intended by the speaker in other ways.

This is the possibility exploited here. The connective *pourtant* (however) will be treated as a primary, basic connector, which cannot be analysed as introducing sequential structures with *donc*. Just as Anscombe and Ducrot define the semantic structures by reference to *donc* sequences, it is possible to define them in the same way by reference to sequences with *pourtant*. As these are two different types of argumentation, it will be necessary to define not just the notion of richness exemplified in *Pierre est riche: il doit être heureux* but also that found in *Pierre est riche et pourtant il est malheureux*. In other words, it is necessary to define, as well as the notion of richness which makes you content, the notion of richness which does not prevent you from being unhappy.

Before showing how this new hypothesis allows us to reformulate the general framework, I propose to examine the difficulties of an argumentative analysis of *pourtant*. This requires an exposition of Anscombe and Ducrot's theory as at present formulated.

---

Informally, the topos is the general principle which allows the speaker of a donc sequence to justify his conclusion. The speaker of Pierre is rich, he must be happy refers to the topos according to which richness makes you happy. In order to account for the sequences realised by the utterances of a sentence, the sentence is therefore characterized by the set of topoi which can be applied. The different connectives and operators are distinguished by the different constraints on the topoi introduced by the discourse segments.

Their study of operators has led Anscombe and Ducrot to introduce certain rules concerning the topoi. Thus a sequence A–C with argument A and conclusion C is supposed to be based on the same topos as the sequence nonA–nonC, made up of the negation of A and the negation of C. Such a hypothesis allows for what the sequences P has worked, he will pass and P has not worked, he will fail have in common; but it is now necessary to distinguish between them. For Anscombe and Ducrot, they evoke different forms of the same topos. Thus it is the notion of topical form (TF), rather than the topos itself, which represents the classic notion of warrant. The speakers of these sequences use respectively the TFs according to which work helps you to succeed, and the absence of work causes you to fail. The role of the topos is now to express what the two TFs have in common.

Anscombe and Ducrot then introduced a second rule: an A–C sequence where the argument and the conclusion can include beaucoup ‘very’ or très ‘much’ is based on the same TF as the sequences très A–très C, très A–C, or A–très C, obtained by the insertion of très or beaucoup in the argument or the conclusion. Again, this hypothesis allows us to account for what the sequences have in common, and it is now necessary to distinguish between them. This is the function of graduality. TFs are supposed to be graded, or gradual entities. The sequences given as examples are based on TFs according to which the more you work, the more you succeed, and the sequence P has worked hard, he will pass refers to a higher ‘level of work’ than that referred to in P has worked, he will pass.

Summing up, given two notions P and Q standing for example for work and success, it is possible to construct four TFs (O and O’ refer to whatever object):

1. The more O is P, the more O’ is Q.
2. The less O is P, the less O’ is Q.
3. The more O is P, the less O’ is Q.
4. The less O is P, the more O’ is Q.

These TFs will be written respectively as [+P,+Q], [-P,-Q], [+P,-Q], and [-P,+Q], or more generally, [+P,βQ]. They have the role of warrant in donc sequences. In order to reach his conclusion, the speaker of A donc C, makes use of a TF.

As a (or alternatively β) represents the word ‘more’ (or the word ‘less’), let ‘–a’ represent the word that is not represented by a. The TFs are defined in such a way that [+P,βQ] and [–aP,–βQ] are based on the same topos, whereas [αP,–βQ] and [–aP,βQ] are based on a different topos. Note that it is for reasons of graduality that Anscombe and Ducrot group the TFs in this way: in [+P,+Q] and [–P,–Q], the
notions P and Q have the same type of ordering relations, while in [+P,−Q] and [−P,+Q] they have different relations.

Let us see how these principles are applied to the analysis of *mais* ‘but’. For Anscombe and Ducrot, the speaker of *A mais C* relies on two argumentative sequences *A donc r*, and *B donc non r* with contrary conclusions. So he evokes two TFs:

- The TF: [αP,γR], which justifies a sequence like *A donc r*.
- The TF: [βQ,−γR], which justifies *B donc non r*.

Thus the speaker of *il fait beau mais je suis fatigué* ‘the weather is fine but I am tired’, uttered as a refusal to go for a walk, evokes:

- The TF: [+FW,+AW] according to which the better the weather the more agreeable the walk, which is a justification for the sequence *the weather is fine, let’s go for a walk*.
- The TF: [+T,—AW] according to which the more tired you are, the less the walk is agreeable, a justification for *I am tired, let’s not go for a walk*.

Thus the speaker is supposed to evoke two *donc* sequences:

- The weather is fine, let’s go for a walk
- I am tired, let’s stay at home

But he cannot have the same intentional attitude towards these two sequences or his utterance would be contradictory. The function of *mais* is to avoid such contradictions, by presenting what precedes it as a concession. Only the argument following *mais* is presented as decisive. For Anscombe and Ducrot, the linguistic description is completed by reference to the different attitudes of the speaker regarding the TFs evoked by his utterance. The speaker accepts [+FW,+AW], but makes use of [+T,—AW].

More generally, the segment *A mais B* can be described as follows:

- The speaker accepts [αP,γR], the topical form underlying the sequence *A donc r*.
- The speaker uses [βQ,−γR], the TF underlying *B donc non r*.

After this general recapitulation, we come to the study of *pourtant*. In Anscombe and Ducrot’s present theoretical framework, certain uses of this word are problematic. It is proposed here to consider these uses of *pourtant* as basic, and not as reducible to uses of *donc*. The description of these uses of *pourtant* requires the introduction of a new form of argumentation within AL.

More exactly, *donc* sequences and *pourtant* sequences will be analysed in the same way, and a new theoretical entity will be introduced which will serve as a warrant for *pourtant* constructions, just as the TF justifies the *donc* constructions. As this step brings into question the notion of topos itself, it will be necessary to return to a discussion of the general problems involved in the analysis of argumentation.

*NB* The notion of argumentation developed until now by Anscombe and Ducrot will be referred to as the **standard theory** of argumentation. The expression ‘argumentative theory’ will be used to refer to any non-descriptivist semantic approach.
Although it will be shown that the standard theory must be revised, the approach proposed here is still ‘argumentative’, and can be integrated into Anscombe and Ducrot’s general project.

2. Difficulties in the standard argumentative approach to **pourtant**

Take first the following well-known phenomenon:

(3) *Il fait beau pourtant Jean n’est pas content.*

‘The weather is fine, however J is not happy.’

and:

(4) *Jean n’est pas content pourtant il fait beau.*

‘J is not happy, however the weather is fine.’

can both be analysed as implicating\(^2\) that, as fine weather is agreeable, Jean should have been happy. Thus interpreted, these two discourse segments are comparable to the single sequence *Il fait beau donc Jean est content* ‘It is fine so J is happy’ even though they do not link the two segments *Il fait beau* and *Jean est content* in the same order. To take account of this, it is claimed that the two utterances have the same argumentative deep structure *Il fait beau pourtant Jean n’est pas content*. More generally, the deep structure underlying the two utterances *A pourtant C* and *C pourtant A* (which both imply *A donc non C*) is noted as *A pourtant C*.

It is implicit in such an approach that the meaning of the utterances *A pourtant C* and *C pourtant A* must be determined by their relation to the implicated *donc* sequence. Of course other instructions, which may only concern the segments *A* and *C*, can also apply, and the order of the segments may have a discursive role. But it is assumed that when uttered in the same context, these two *pourtant* sequences must be analysed by reference to the same *donc* sequence, and will only be distinguished by surface effects. Thus the assumption that *A pourtant C* implicates *A donc non C* has a central semantic role.

According to the way this ‘implicature’ is defined, two main types of solution may be distinguished. Either:

- The description of the sequence *A donc non C* is directly written into the description of *A pourtant C*.

or:

- *A pourtant C* is described independently of *A donc non C*, the relations between the two sequences being defined later.

\(^2\) In a non-technical sense: one of the aims of this article is to define the sense of ‘implicating’ used here.
In the first case A donc non C and A POURTANT C refer to the same theoretical entity, but in the second the descriptions of the two sequences no longer have anything in common.

As Anscombe and Ducrot’s theoretical tools only account for the relations between the argument and conclusion of a donc sequence, the first solution is the one adopted in the standard theory. Note [αP,−γR] the warrant for the sequence A donc non C. As the speaker of A POURTANT C does not conclude non C, he does not exploit this TF. Like the speaker of A mais B, who concedes A donc r, the speaker of A POURTANT C only concedes A donc non C. Approaches developed in the standard Anscombe and Ducrot framework claim, not that the speaker uses [αP,−γR], but that he accepts it.

Various standard argumentative analyses of A POURTANT C will be studied. The difficulties encountered will make it necessary to propose a description of pourtant which adopts the second of the two alternatives mentioned above. A new type of argumentative relation will then be required.

More precisely, three standard approaches will be studied. They are distinguished as follows.

Note first that the instruction ‘the speaker accepts [αP,−γR]’ cannot give a complete argumentative description of A POURTANT C, because in Anscombe and Ducrot’s general framework, both the segments A and C must be associated to donc sequences. As this instruction concerns the sequence A donc non C, it can only be part of the description of segment A. Segment C can only be described by reference to another donc sequence.

Note that it is the general Anscombe and Ducrot hypothesis which makes this second donc sequence necessary. In another theoretical framework it would be possible to describe the meaning of A POURTANT C for example by:

– The propositional content of A
– The propositional content of C
– The speaker concedes that he should have concluded non C.

This would make unnecessary the introduction of a second donc sequence because the contribution of C would be described by a ‘propositional content’. Thus only one donc sequence could be mentioned, namely A donc non C. A second donc sequence is only necessary to describe the contribution of C because Anscombe and Ducrot suppose that to attribute a meaning to a discourse segment is to associate it with donc sequences.

At this point there appear to be three possibilities:

– the C segment could be associated with a kind of C donc C sequence
– the C segment could be associated with a sequence like r donc C.
– the C segment could be associated with a sequence like C donc r.

These are the three standard approaches which will be studied.

2.1. Standard approach 1

In attempting to analyze A POURTANT C as a particular case of A mais C, Anscombe and Ducrot sometimes propose to reduce the first structure to the second. Since A mais C is described as:
- The speaker accepts \([\alpha P, \beta Q]\), TF of a sequence like \(A \text{ donc } r\)
- The speaker uses \([\gamma R, -\beta Q]\), TF of a sequence like \(C \text{ donc } \text{non } r\).

The structure \(A \text{ POURTANT } C\) is then described as:
- The speaker accepts \([\alpha P, -\gamma R]\), TF of \(A \text{ donc } \text{non } C\)
- The speaker uses \([\gamma R, \gamma R]\), TF of \(C \text{ donc } C\).

This analysis of \(A \text{ POURTANT } C\) is a particular case of the analysis of \(A \text{ mais } C\) for \(r\) is identified with \(\text{non } C\).

But this approach is unsatisfactory. The role of the sequence \(C \text{ donc } C\) was to account for the contribution of \(C\) to the meaning of \(A \text{ POURTANT } C\). But if \(C\) is described by a sequence which has \(C\) for both argument and conclusion, it is difficult to maintain that \(C\) has been interpreted within a \(\text{donc}\) sequence. The contribution of \(C\) would simply be one of self-justification. Further, all utterances could then be analysed in the same way, and utterances like \(\text{It is raining,}\) or \(\text{I liked that book,}\) could be said to be only self-justifying.

In order to avoid this, whilst still claiming that \(\text{pourtant}\) is a special case of \(\text{mais}\), there is another possible solution, which has occasionally been considered by Anscombe and Ducrot. It may be claimed not that \(C\) is an argument for \(C\), but that the utterance of \(C\) is an argument for \(C\). Thus \(\text{pourtant}\) would be used for the same kind of arguments as \(\text{puisque je te le dis!}\) (because I am telling you so). However, this approach would still lead to difficulties, as the introduction of the utterance-act into the linguistic description of \(\text{pourtant}\) would be no more than a stratagem that allows for saving a theoretical a priori.

That is why this first standard approach of \(\text{pourtant}\) will be abandoned.

2.2. Standard approach 2

It is now assumed that the \(C\) segment introduces an \(r \text{ donc } C\) sequence. Just as in the description of \(\text{mais}\), there are now two sequences with contrary conclusions; but as there is no contradiction in the \(\text{pourtant}\) sequence, it is again assumed that the speaker does not have the same attitude towards the two sequences. As with \(\text{mais}\), the speaker will accept \(A \text{ donc } \text{non } C\), but will use the \(r \text{ donc } C\). A \(A \text{ POURTANT } C\) will thus be described as:
- The speaker accepts \([\alpha P, -\gamma R]\), TF of \(A \text{ donc } \text{non } C\)
- The speaker uses \([\delta T, \gamma R]\), TF of a sequence like \(r \text{ donc } C\)

As segment \(C\) is no longer interpreted as an argument but as a conclusion of the second \(\text{donc}\) sequence, \(\text{pourtant}\) can no longer be seen as a special case of \(\text{mais}\). But the descriptions of the two connectives still have the same structure:
- The speaker accepts \([\alpha P, \beta Q]\)
- The speaker uses \([\delta T, -\beta Q]\)

\(\text{Pourant}\) is now distinguished from \(\text{mais}\) by the fact that:
- with \(\text{mais}\), the \([\beta Q]\) scale must be contextually determined
- whereas with \(\text{pourtant}\), it is \([\delta T]\) that is unknown.

The idea will now be developed that:
- This corresponds to a particular usage of \(\text{MAIS}\), that of ‘direct opposition’.
- This use of \(\text{MAIS}\) must be distinguished from that of \(\text{pourtant}\).
2.3. Description of the ‘direct opposition’ use of MAIS

It is assumed, following Anscombre and Ducrot, that the mais of:

(5) Il fait beau mais Jean n’est pas content.
‘The weather is fine but J is not happy.’

is a realisation of the same connective MAIS as in:

(6) Il fait beau mais je suis fatigué.
‘The weather is fine but I am tired.’ (uttered as a refusal to go for a walk)

It is also supposed, however, that it is not used in the same way in (5) and (6). In (5), MAIS is used to set up ‘direct opposition’ between the segments; whereas in (6), there is ‘indirect opposition’. (These terms are not used here in exactly the same way as by Anscombre and Ducrot, as their notion of ‘direct opposition’ corresponds to what has been presented here as the ‘first standard’ approach to pourtant.)

I will first assume the following description of the mais of direct opposition:
- The speaker of A mais C accepts [αP,—γR], TF of A donc non C.
- The speaker of A mais C uses [δT,γR], TF of a sequence like r donc C.

This means that what follows the mais of direct opposition is not a new argument, but rather the conclusion of an implicit argument. The argumentative value of C is not a sequence it introduces, but a sequence of which it is the conclusion. Here the segments of discourse are no longer described as introducing donc sequences, which is already an extension of Anscombre and Ducrot’s theory.

This description accounts for the fact that it is possible to insert in a direct opposition as (5) a justification for the second segment. For example:

(5') Il fait beau mais, comme il déteste se promener, Jean n’est pas content.
‘The weather is fine but, as he doesn’t like walking, J is unhappy.’

Of course, the same kind of comment can be inserted in an indirect opposition, as in the following dialogue:

A: Et si on allait se promener
‘What about going for a walk?’

B: Il fait beau, mais comme j’ai été malade, je suis fatigué.
‘The weather is fine, but as I have been ill, I feel tired.’

However here the commentary, somehow implicit in (5), seems external to (6).

Finally, the present approach also accounts for the fact that the ‘direct opposition’ mais is more polemic than the indirect use of MAIS. Of course the indirect use of A mais B is a kind of ‘coup de force’, insofar as it eliminates the argument A for r without justification, in favour of the argument B for non r. But the direct opposition
usage, is a greater 'coup de force': here the argument A for r is not only abandoned, but the contrary conclusion non r is then asserted, both without justification.

More generally, I will then assume the following general description of A mais A':
- The speaker accepts \([\alpha P, -\beta Q]\), the TF of A donc r.
- The speaker uses \([\delta T, \beta Q]\), the TF of either A' donc non r or B donc A'.

MAIS is used indirectly when \([\delta T, \beta Q]\) justifies the sequence A' donc non r, and r must be contextually determined. But it is used directly when \([\delta T, \beta Q]\), justifies B donc A'. Here the conclusion r is assimilated to non A', and the argument B must be contextually determined. In both cases the speakers appeal to two TFs between which there is the same relation of opposition: in both cases, the second parts of these TFs are respectively \((\beta Q)\) and \((-\beta Q)\). That is the reason why it can be referred to two uses of one and only one morpheme MAIS.

2.4. Pourtant and the direct opposition mais

The above description of the direct opposition mais is identical to the second approach suggested for pourtant. The point here is that in fact pourtant and the direct opposition mais must be distinguished. In A mais C, C is presented as being justified, but in A pourtant C, C is rejected as abnormal. The speaker is surprised that C. Thus, although (5) can be changed to (5') as above, it is impossible to change (3) to:

(3') Il fait beau et pourtant, comme il deteste se promener, Jean n'est pas content.
'The weather is fine and yet, as he doesn't like walking, J is not happy.'

Note that it is not claimed that (3') can never be uttered, nor even that it is more problematic than (5'). It is claimed rather that the commentary in (3') is not understood as called by the meaning of pourtant. To interpret (3'), it is necessary to ignore either the pourtant or the commentary. They are not complementary, and cannot be understood together. In the same way, the interpretative processing is different in (7) and (7'):

(7) Il est riche mais, comme il le cache à tout le monde, sa banque lui refuse des crédits.
'He is rich but as he hides it from everybody, his bank refuses him credit.'

(7') Il est riche et pourtant, vu qu'il le cache à tout le monde, sa banque lui refuse des crédits.
'He is rich, however as he hides it from everybody, his bank refuses him credit.'

Thus A pourtant C cannot be thought of as an incomplete form of A pourtant, comme B, C (A however, as B, C). And this is why the instructions proposed for A mais C:
- The speaker accepts \([\alpha P, -\gamma R]\]
- The speaker uses \([\delta T, \gamma R]\]
cannot be accepted as a description of A pourtant C.
2.5. Third standard approach

The third standard approach assumes that the speaker of A POURTANT C evokes the TFs of the two sequences A donc non C, and C donc r, and the question is now that of defining the speaker’s attitude to the second TF.

Compare this approach to the one adopted for the indirect use of A mais C:
- The speaker accepts [αP,−βQ], TF of a sequence like A donc r.
- The speaker uses [γR,βQ], TF of C donc non r.

This description was based on two ideas:
- The use of mais leads to the interpretation of the joined segments as a sequence of arguments with contrary conclusions. Thus the TFs evoked must be related in a certain way.
- The speaker of A mais C concedes A donc r but uses C donc non r.

But on the third approach, A POURTANT C cannot be interpreted in the same way. With MAIS the sequences introduced are part of a single argumentative structure; but this cannot be the case with POURTANT, because this word does not link C donc r to A donc non C. The speaker draws the conclusion r independently of A donc non C. The conclusion r is derived from the complete structure A POURTANT C.

The instruction ‘the speaker evokes C donc r’ will therefore be interpreted as follows:

- The speaker of A POURTANT C presents an argument for the conclusion r for which C is an argument.

Thus, the external conclusion r of A POURTANT C is written into the description of A POURTANT C.

More precisely, I will show the difference between mais and pourtant by distinguishing between the different attitudes of the speakers of A mais C and A pourtant C to the arguments C donc non r and C donc r. Thus:
- The speaker of the indirect mais does not just accept but uses1 the TF of C donc non r. This means that he takes responsibility for this internal argumentative structure.
- The speaker of A POURTANT C uses2 the TF of C donc r. This means that the discursive conclusions of A POURTANT C derive from C, and that the speaker takes responsibility for this external argumentative structure.

However, if the role of A POURTANT C as a new argument is written into the description of that discourse segment, then for the sake of consistency, all semantic descriptions should make it clear on which constituent the sequences may be based. For both the direct and indirect uses of MAIS, for example, it should be shown that the sequences (5) and (6) are argumentatively co-oriented with je ne suis pas content and je suis fatigué, which means that they can only be linked to the same set of expressions.

As a theoretical consequence of this third approach to A POURTANT C, therefore, it is necessary to introduce a third instruction into the descriptions of both uses of mais:
- The speaker uses$_2$ $[\gamma R, \delta S]$, TF of a sequence like $C$ donc s.

Thus, for the direct use of $A$ mais $C$:
- The speaker accepts the TF $[\alpha P, \gamma R]$ of $A$ donc non $C$.
- The speaker uses$_1$ the TF $[\delta T, \gamma R]$ of $r$ donc $C$.
- The speaker uses$_2$ $[\gamma R, \varepsilon S]$, TF of $C$ donc s.

And for the indirect use of $A$ mais $C$:
- The speaker accepts $[\alpha P, \beta Q]$, TF of $A$ donc $r$.
- The speaker uses$_1$, $[\gamma R, \beta Q]$, TF of $C$ donc non $r$.
- The speaker uses$_2$ $[\gamma R, \varepsilon S]$, TF of $C$ donc s.

However, this leads to a problem. With the indirect use of mais (as opposed to the direct use), there is no need to differentiate between the conclusions of the two sequences introduced by $C$: the speaker uses$_1$ the TF he uses$_2$. So as there would be no point in simply enumerating the different possibilities, the direct and indirect uses of mais can no longer be said to be different uses of the same connective.

This difficulty is a consequence of the standard form of AL. The distinction made between acceptance and use$_1$ seems to account for the complex argumentative structure introduced by mais, but it is not appropriate for the description of pourtant, which does not present the same argumentative structure. In the standard form of AL, what links $A$ POURTANT $C$ and $A$ donc non $C$ is apprehended through the instruction:

The speaker accepts $[\alpha P, \gamma R]$.

This means presenting the anomaly signaled by POURTANT as a concession. Hence the necessity for a further TF to describe the role of $C$. But, just as with $A$ donc $C$ there is no need for any other TF than $[\alpha P, \gamma R]$, in the same way with $A$ POURTANT $C$ there is no need to add any other instruction apart from the one describing the relation between $A$ and $C$. The idea developed here is that pourtant sets up a direct relation between $A$ and $C$. Just as the speaker of $A$ donc $C$ relies on what links $A$ and $C$, the speaker of $A$ POURTANT $C$ will also rely on the relation between $A$ and $C$. Rather than simply accepting the anomaly, the speaker will assume it, and will rely on it for his utterance of $C$.

3. Regular and exceptive TFs: First definition

It has been shown above that it is not possible to associate the $C$ segment of $A$ POURTANT $C$ to a donc sequence. But Anscombe and Ducrot's general framework leads to assume that the underlying linguistic structure of segment $C$ in $A$ POURTANT $C$ has no single semantic value, describing what $C$ refers to. That is why I will add to their theory a new, primary notion of pourtant, explaining how this connective can set up a direct relation between its arguments. Thus, it is still assumed that segment $C$ in $A$ POURTANT $C$ only has meaning relative to this structure, associated to the $A$ segment. But the TF used by the speaker of $A$ donc non $C$ no longer appears in the description of $A$ POURTANT $C$. The link between the two sequences must be
defined, and this is a constraint on the definition proposed of the relation between the arguments of *pourtant*. The problem is as follows:

- The sequences *A donc non C* and *A POURTANT C* must be characterized with two distinct objects *F* and *G* (otherwise the analysis will coincide with that of Anscombre and Ducrot).
- The objects *F* and *G* must have certain similarities.

The idea is that *F* and *G* are constructed from a single object *R*. Thus *A POURTANT C* will implicate *A donc non C*, in such a way that the two sequences both depend on the third object *R*. *R* must now be defined.

The notion of warrant used by Anscombre and Ducrot will be used in this section for it leads to an unsatisfactory but convenient exposition of our solution. But it will be seen that our hypotheses make it necessary to revise the very notion of topos as used by Anscombre and Ducrot. The notion of warrant (convenient but unsatisfactory) will therefore be rejected, and the topoi will be seen as expressing the idea that to attribute a semantic value to a discourse segment is to associate it either to *donc* sequences or to *pourtant* sequences. This is an extension of Anscombre and Ducrot's hypothesis according to which *donc* sequences are not complex but primary structures. It will be seen that my point of view is compatible with the general framework provided by Anscombre and Ducrot to the extent that their global semantic project is retained, rather than the theoretical tools adopted.

Underlying Anscombre and Ducrot's approach is the idea that the justification of both:

(8) *Il fait beau: Jean doit être content.*

‘The weather is fine: J must be pleased’.

and:

(3) *Il fait beau et pourtant Jean n'est pas content.*

is the belief that good weather is agreeable. *R* represents this belief, and will be called a rule. However, in (8), it is necessary in order to avoid the difficulties encountered by Anscombre and Ducrot, to distinguish this rule from the classical warrant of (8). It is assumed that every rule has exceptions as well as cases of regular application and that it can therefore be considered either from the point of view of its regularities, or from that of its exceptions. The idea is that *donc* sequences are based on the rule from the point of view of its regularities; the classical notion of warrant is now represented not by the rule itself, but rather by the regular form of the rule.

More precisely, each of the two ways of apprehending the rule will be referred to as TFs, which will be said to be either regular or exceptive. These two types of TF characterize the *donc* sequences and the *pourtant* sequences respectively. The object *F* which is characteristic of *A donc non C* is a regular TF, while the object *G*, characterizing *A POURTANT C* is exceptive. Thus it will be claimed that the speaker of (8) uses the regular form of the rule according to which fine weather is agreeable, while the speaker of (3) uses the exceptive form.
This new notion of exception does not refer to the speaker’s intentional attitudes. It is not claimed that given a rule (for example ‘the better the weather, the more agreeable it is’), the speaker could either ‘use it’ (as in 8), or ‘make an exception to it’ (as in 3). It is simply considered that the rule can be apprehended in either way, and that, linguistically, it can only be apprehended in one of these two ways. To see the rule from the regular point of view is to apprehend it in a certain way, and the speaker of a *donc* sequence uses the rule in that form, just as the speaker of a *pourtant* sequence uses it in its exceptive form.

Thus the speaker of either a *donc* sequence or a *pourtant* sequence has a certain belief and has the same attitude regarding the form of the rule he is using; he intends to draw a conclusion in the same way. Just as the speaker of A *donc non C* intends to communicate non C, the speaker of A *pourtant C* intends to communicate C. They are both argumentative sequences, constructed in fundamentally the same way: in both cases the characteristics F and G are used as warrants. Thus the segment C in A *pourtant C* can be said neither to be added to A, nor part of an implied *donc* sequence, but rather to be directly justified by the warrant.

As opposed to the treatment by Anscombe and Ducrot, the warrants of *donc* sequences are distinguished from the rules they are derived from. [αP,βQ] is now used to designate the rules, rather than the regular TFs. Furthermore, as all rules have exceptions, it is now possible to construct two TFs: a regular one, R(αP,βQ), justifying *donc* sequences, and an exceptive one, E(αP,βQ) justifying *pourtant* sequences. A *pourtant C* now implies A *donc non C* only in the sense that the two sequences are based on different forms of the same rule. Their argumentative structures are thus related without being identified.

However, this approach raises new questions, in particular concerning the hypothesis that all rules have exceptions, which does not correspond to modern notions of Laws and Rules. It should be pointed out that the rules involved here are those used in natural language, and are not descriptions of the external world. It is not claimed that the rules of physics or chemistry must necessarily have exceptions, but only that through the use of *pourtant* (however), natural language presents the world through rules which have systematic exceptions. The notions of TF and rule must now be defined more precisely.

4. Topoi, rules and topical forms

4.1. Refutation by exception

On my approach, A *pourtant C* implies A *donc non C* in the sense that it is derived from a rule from which it would have been possible to construct the warrant of A *donc non C*. In the same way it could be said that A *donc non C* implies A *pourtant C*. In other words, just as the classic notion of exception involves the acceptance of a rule, it is claimed here that the notion of regular case involves the acceptance of a rule with exceptions. One problem with this approach is that it seems possible to refute *donc* sequences precisely by pointing out the existence of exceptions. In the following dialogue, for example:
B is presenting an argument against A’s sequence. But does he question the rule that A was using in its regular form? This would contradict the hypothesis according to which exceptions are constitutive of linguistic rules, because it would then be necessary to admit that the existence of exceptions weakens a rule. To preserve this hypothesis, it is therefore necessary to demonstrate that B’s reply is not opposed to the rule underlying A’s argument, but to the use made of its regular form. It will then be seen how this kind of refutation brings out one of the parameters in the description of rules.

B’s reply is parallel to:

(11) Tous les gens qui travaillent ne réussissent pas.
    ‘Not everyone who works, passes.’

interpreted as ‘It is not the case that everyone who works, passes’. Thus B’s reply can be paraphrased as:

(12) Il est faux que quand on travaille, on réussisse toujours.
    ‘It is not the case that when you work, you always pass.’

Note that when a complete structure of the form ‘All Xs are Y’ is negated, the underlying belief expressed by that structure is preserved. So a speaker of a discourse like I don’t like all kinds of wine presents himself as liking wine. And in the same way, the speaker of (12) can thus be said to accept the rule according to which work leads to success. The expression ‘It is not the case that’ must therefore be said to apply not to the rule itself, but to the regular use of the rule.

Thus, compare the utterances:

(13) Tous les gens qui travaillent réussissent.
    ‘All those who work pass.’
(14) Les gens qui travaillent réussissent
    ‘Those who work pass.’

Here (14) only expresses the rule according to which work leads to success. Its negation:

Les gens qui travaillent ne réussissent pas.
‘Those who work do not succeed.’

is the negation of that rule, and is co-oriented with utterances based on the opposite rule according to which work leads to failure. On the other hand, (13) refers not to
the rule itself but to its regular form. This does not mean that (13) claims that there are no exceptions to this rule. Of course, (13) could justify A’s argument, but so could an utterance like:

(15) La plupart des gens qui travaillent réussissent.

‘Most of those who work pass.’

And the use of the word la plupart (most) cannot be taken as implying the absence of exceptions. What tous and la plupart have in common, and what allows them both to justify A’s argument cannot therefore be the absence of exceptions to the rule. More positively, my claim is that in (13) the speaker is only concerned with the regular cases; he will be said to recognise the regular form of the rule [+T,+R]. tous is only distinguished from la plupart in that it can be used to construct stronger arguments.

The utterance (11) above is now seen as the negation of precisely that recognition of the regular form of the rule. It is assumed that to use a TF it is first necessary to recognise it. So not to recognise a TF is a form of opposition to its use. Thus, while accepting the underlying rule, the speaker of (11) is opposed to the use of its regular form. So, whereas either (13) or (14) can justify donc sequences like A’s argument, utterances like (11) as interpreted here, will justify pourtant sequences like Pierre a travaillé et pourtant il échouera (P has worked, however he will fail). In refusing to use the regular form of the rule he recognises, the speaker of (12) (or 10) accepts the exceptive form of the rule.

As he recognises the exceptive form of [+T,+R], B points out that the underlying rule has exceptions. But it is not for this reason that his reply is opposed to A’s argument. B is opposed to the use of the regular form, that is to the way A is using the underlying rule. Thus, this kind of argumentative refutation cannot be seen as an objection to the idea of a constitutive link between rules and exceptions.

4.2. Rules and topoi

The preceding discussion was not concerned with the idea of the rule as a warrant, but it nevertheless brings it into question. Take for example this second dialogue:

(9') A': Pierre n’a pas travaillé: il va rater son examen.

‘P has not worked: he will fail his exam.’

(10) B: Quand on travaille, on ne réussit pas toujours.

‘When you work, you don’t always succeed.’

Here B’s reply can no longer be interpreted as a refutation of A’. Since in the earlier dialogue B was said to be opposed to A’s use of the regular form of [+T,+R], it is now necessary to say that the speaker A’ of the second dialogue is not using the regular form of [+T,+R]. Although they have certain points in common, it is necessary for linguistic reasons to distinguish between the rules underlying A donc C and non A donc non C.
More precisely, it is necessary to define the distinctive parameter of these rules and associate it with a property of the related discourse sequences. This property will be referred to as 'the argumentative orientation of a discourse sequence'. It should be noted here that this orientation is not reducible to the positive or negative characteristics of the constitutive segments. In particular, it will be seen that two sequences whose second segments have different positivity may nevertheless have the same orientation. Thus, as they express the same rule, the sequences \textit{A donc C} and \textit{A pourtant non C} have the same argumentative orientation, although the second segment is positive in the one case and negative in the other.

However, if the rules are to have attributed to them a parameter which is associated with the related discourse sequences, rather than to their constitutive segments, then they can no longer be considered as warrants; they can no longer reflect the move from the first to the second segment of a sequence.

The general hypothesis according to which every rule has exceptions, leads therefore (indirectly) to reject the idea that rules are warrants. But there is also a direct reason for rejecting the notion of warrant.

According to the general hypothesis, the same rule underlies both \textit{A donc C} and \textit{A pourtant non C}; but so far, for purposes of exposition, the classical rhetorical description of \textit{donc} had been assumed, and the notion of a rule identified with that of a warrant, that is a principle which justifies the acceptance of the second segment of a sequence once the first segment has been accepted. Thus from an argument \textit{A} the regular TF with \textit{donc} was said to justify the conclusion \textit{C}, while the exceptive TF of the same rule this time with \textit{pourtant} was said to be a justification of the conclusion \textit{non C}.

However, even though the two sequences are based on different forms of the rule, this would mean that the same argument and the same rule can allow contrary conclusions. And so this notion of rule as warrant appears meaningless. It is therefore necessary to admit that rules as defined here do not serve as warrants and the question is raised as to what exactly is expressed by a rule. What does \textit{la richesse rend heucreux} (to be rich is to be happy) mean if it expresses a belief underlying both \textit{Pierre est riche: il doit être heureux} (P is rich: he must be happy) and \textit{Pierre est riche et pourtant il est malheureux} (P is rich, yet he is unhappy). What is meant when these sequences are said to be argumentative?

In order to present an adequate definition of a rule it is useful to consider the following examples (used by Ducrot in his seminars 1990-91):

(16) *\textit{Il est tard pourtant le train est déjà là.}  
‘It is late, yet the train is already here.’

(17) \textit{Il est tard donc le train est déjà là.}  
‘It is late, so the train is already here.’

(18) \textit{Il est tôt pourtant le train est déjà là.}  
‘It is early yet the train is already here.’

(19) *\textit{Il est tôt donc le train est déjà là.}  
‘It is early so the train is already here.’

(16') \textit{Il est tard pourtant le train est encore là.}  
‘It is late yet the train is still here.’
(17') *Il est tard donc le train est encore là.
'lt is late so the train is still here.'

(18') *Il est tôt pourtant le train est encore là.
'It is early yet the train is still here.'

(19') Il est tôt donc le train est encore là.
'It is early so the train is still here.'

Take first the words déjà (already) and encore (still). They seem to be both associated with the unexpected; in using either of these words the speaker would present the presence of the train as being in some sense surprising. As the presence of the train cannot simultaneously be justified (by the fact that it is early) and presented as surprising this would explain the impossibility of (*19). But then for the same reasons (17) should also be unacceptable, which is not the case. So the description of déjà must take account of whatever distinguishes (17) from (*19). Now these two sequences are distinguished by their arguments: while in (17), time has passed, in (*19) little time has passed. The description of le train est déjà là must therefore include a point of view on the passage of time, compatible with the segment il est tard in (17) and incompatible with that expressed by il est tôt in (*19).

It is proposed here to paraphrase le train est déjà là with il est tôt pourtant le train est là (it is early yet the train is here), and le train est encore là with il est tard pourtant le train est là (it is late yet the train is here). Neither paraphrase makes a reference to surprise or psychological states, but it is apparent in both cases, the train should not in fact be there. This means, given the present description of pourtant, not that the presence of the train is surprising or unexpected, but that there is an exception to a rule concerning the passage of time.

More precisely, it is supposed that each of the eight examples refers to two distinct sequences. Thus (*16) will not be analysed as derived from the complex form [il est tard pourtant (il est tôt pourtant le train est là)]. The TF of (*16) is not supposed to be a function of the TF (or the rule) introduced by déjà in the conclusion. Instead (*16) is analysed as expressing two different points of view. The first is expressed by the sequence:

(16a) Il est tard pourtant le train est là.
'lt is late yet the train is here.'

And the second, introduced by déjà, is expressed by:

(16b) Il est tôt pourtant le train est là.
'lt is early yet the train is here.'

(*16) would only be acceptable if the two different points of view could be accepted simultaneously.

It may be thought that the two points of view, which may or may not be compatible, reflect only the descriptive aspect of the first segments of (16a) and (16b). In this case (*16) would be unacceptable because the speaker would be required to
accept both that it was late and that it was early. He would be unable to accept simultaneously that a long time and only a short time has passed. But if that were the case, then (17) would also be unacceptable, because it refers to the sequences (17a) *il est tard donc le train est là* (it is late so the train is here) and (17b) *il est tôt pourtant le train est là* (it is early yet the train is here). A purely descriptive approach to the first segments of (16a) and (16b) cannot therefore account for the unacceptability of (16). The points of view proposed must express the fact that the structure underlying (16a) links the segments *il est tard* and *le train est là* with *pourtant*, whereas the structure underlying (17a) links the same segments with *donc*. In other words, it is necessary to take account of the rules underlying the sequences.

In order to do this, each of the eight sequences (X) will be described by two TFs:

- The TF underlying the sequence (Xa), without *déjà* or *encore*.
- The TF representing the point of view introduced by *déjà* or *encore*, and underlying the proposed paraphrases (Xb).

A complete description would involve specifying the speakers’ attitudes to each of these TFs. It is sufficient for present purposes to suppose that the speakers’ attitudes are such that they accept the rules represented. This will make it possible to account for the impossibility of (*16), (*19), (*17’) and (*18’). Note that the intention is not to give a complete description of the eight sequences, but to explain what is meant by the expression ‘simultaneously acceptable rules’. In order to do this, it is now necessary to define some of the properties of a ‘rule’.

### 4.2.1. Various incompatibilities: Notion of semantic block

Take example (*19) above. Here the sequence (19a): *Il est tôt donc le train est là* (It is early, so the train is here), is associated with R(−T,+S), regular form of the rule according to which the less time has passed, the more states exist; while (19b): *Il est tôt pourtant le train est là* (It is early, yet the train is here) is associated with E(−T,−S), exceptive form of the rule according to which the less time has passed, the less states exist. It is necessary to explain why [−T,+S] and [−T,−S] cannot both be accepted simultaneously.

It may be thought that these rules are incompatible because, given a single state of affairs (the non passing of time), they lead to two contradictory states of affairs: here the presence and absence of the train. However, this reasoning is excluded because on my approach, the speaker of an argumentative sequence uses, not the rules but the associated TFs. Seen from the regular point of view rule [−T,+S] is oriented towards *le train est là*, but from the exceptive point of view it is oriented towards *le train n’est pas là*. Equally for [−T,−S]. So the incompatibility of these rules cannot be explained by the different states of affairs they would be said to justify. Again, the notion of rule presented here does not correspond to the classical notion of warrant.

As in Ducrot’s recent expositions regarding *donc*, it is claimed here that [−T,−S] and [−T,+S] are primarily opposed in that they do not present the same understanding of time. Whereas with [−T,+S] the non passing of time is seen as positive, preventing, for example, the destruction of states of affairs, with [−T,−S], the non passage of time is seen as negative, preventing, for example, the construction of states of affairs. Just as:
(20) Il fait chaud dehors: allons nous promener.
   'It is warm outside, let’s go for a walk.'

and:

(21) Il fait chaud dehors, restons à la maison.
   'It is warm outside, let’s stay at home.'

refer to two distinct kinds of heat, one agreeable and the other disagreeable, sequences (19a) and (19b) are concerned with two different notions of Time. What is more, (19a) specifies, not only the kind of time, but also the kind of presence of the train. Clearly, the segment le train est là (the train is here) could be interpreted in two different ways, conveying either that the train has arrived or that the train has not left. In (19a), this ambiguity disappears: the train is seen as not having left.

So rule [-T+S] expresses two ideas:
- The non passage of time is positive
- The existence of a state of affairs excludes its end (the presence of the train being seen as a non departure)

In the same way for [-T,-S]:
- The non passage of time is negative
- The existence of a state of affairs is linked to its beginning (the presence of the train being seen as an indication of its arrival)

Within each rule these points of view are of course related. When non passage of time is positive, as in (19a), and so when Time is seen as negative, the presence of the train is seen as a non departure; and conversely when Time is positive and its non passage is negative as in (19b). So the two rules do not make reference to a same objective description of Time, which would secondly be related to the presence or absence of things. Instead the presence or absence of things is seen from the point of view of the passage of time, and it is inaccurate to make use of that same parameter T in the description of the two rules. In the same way, there can be no objective concept corresponding to presence or absence, involving a single parameter S. They both express a particular way of representing at the same time the existence of states of affairs and the passage of time. Even though these representations can be paraphrased by using the linguistic expressions ‘time’ and ‘existence’, they are in fact semantic blocks which are not susceptible of further analysis. If these rules are incompatible, it is because they express different points of view regarding Time as related to States of affairs, and these two points of view cannot be applied simultaneously in the same situation. It is in this sense that (*19) is impossible.

4.2.2. Various compatibilities: Topoi and rules

These compatibilities are examined in order to derive a property of rules which makes it possible to give a more precise definition of the preceding concept of semantic block. Take this time sequence (17). This involves (17a) il est tard donc le train est là (it is late so the train is here), and (17b) il est tôt pourtant le train est là (it is early yet the train is here) and refers to the TFs R(+T,+S) and E(−T,−S). As
(*19) was considered to be unacceptable because of the semantic incompatibility between the rules, the acceptability of (17) must imply that the rules involved here are compatible.

More generally, this result concerning the semantic compatibility of \([\alpha P, \beta Q]\) and \([-\alpha P, -\beta Q]\) preserves Anscombe and Ducrot's hypothesis according to which there is a relationship between, for example *il est tard donc le train est là* (it is late so the train is here) and *il est tôt donc le train n’est pas là* (it is early so the train is not here). But here this relationship does not depend on graduality. Instead it is proposed that in both cases Time is positive and the presence of the train depends on its arrival. That is the semantic block referred to here as the topos and which appears as such in the description of the rules. \([+T,+S]\) and \([-T,-S]\) are compatible because they are different ways of perceiving the same block (TS). They will be noted \((+T,S)\) and \((-T,S)\). The parameter corresponding to the values noted \(+\) or \(-\) is now used in order to describe the rule, and represents the property introduced in 4.2 and distinguishing *A donc C* from *non A donc non C*.

Thus, not only are the rules seen from the regular and exceptive points of view, they are also characterized by two parameters:

- A semantic block, or topos, common to the rules underlying *A donc C* and *non A donc non C*, representing the semantic interdependence of the arguments and conclusions of the sequences expressing the rule.
- Another parameter distinguishing the rules underlying *A donc C* and *non A donc non C* and reflecting, not properties of the arguments and conclusions, but a property of the complete sequences.

According to the thesis presented here, *A donc non C* and *A pourtant C* are expressing the same rule. More precisely, they can now be said to make reference to the same block. Thus (22) *il est tôt donc le train est là* (it is early so the train is here) and (23) *il est tôt pourtant le train n’est pas là* (it is early yet the train is not here) both present the presence of the train as a non departure. In this sense, *A pourtant C* implicates *A donc non C*. In the same way, the sequences (24) *il fait chaud dehors: Pierre a dû aller se promener* (it is warm outside, P must have gone for a walk) and (25) *il fait chaud dehors et pourtant Pierre n’est pas allé se promener* (it is warm outside, yet P has not gone for a walk) both present the heat as agreeable. That is why they are opposed to (26) *il fait chaud dehors: Pierre a dû rester à la maison* (it is warm outside, P must have stayed at home).

Anscombe and Ducrot's standard argumentative approach could not express this. Their claim that the speaker of (23) accepts the justification of (22) corresponds to the idea that the segment A of (23) presents Time as positive. But they still had to interpret the second segment "... the train is not here" in (23) as the negation of "... the train is here" in (22). To account for this, they were obliged to place the conclusion of the *pourtant* sequence in a *donc* sequence with an implicit argument. From their point of view, therefore, it seems that they would have had to claim that (23) expresses the *donc* sequences:

(23a) *Il est tôt donc le train est là.*

'It is early so the train is here.'
(23b) Il est tard donc le train n’est pas là.
‘It is late so the train is not here.’

This would imply that the speaker of a pourtant sequence (in the standard theory) is switching between the two TFs of a single topos. But, this does not appear to be the case, because the speaker of (23) continues to believe that it is early, and does not end up with the idea that it is late. That is why it is thought preferable to express these interpretative constraints by allowing the arguments to be directly articulated by pourtant.

5. Conclusion

The framework presented here has certain consequences for the theory of argumentation. The claim that A donc C and A pourtant non C are based on the same rule has led to the further fundamental claim that in neither case was there a move from argument to conclusion. The speaker of (1) Pierre est riche: il doit être heureux (P is rich, he must be happy) does not present himself as reaching a conclusion (P is happy). He does not establish a hypothesis (P’s richness) which would then lead him to that conclusion. He does not justify one fact by another. He does not do any reasoning at all, not even any vague or incomplete reasoning. Instead he just describes a single situation, that of Pierre, and this description consists in applying the regular form of a rule. This rule can be evoked by la richesse rend heureux (richness makes you happy). But this is the expression of a single idea, underlying both the word ‘richness’ and the word ‘happy’, and which is selected by combining these words in single sequence.

It may be objected that to make this claim is to ignore ‘linguistic intuition’. It may seem obvious to some that the speakers of such sequences are reasoning inferentially. However, this kind of intuition seems much less clear for other uses of donc, as in:

(27) S’il fait beau, et si donc je suis allé me promener, tu ne pourras me joindre que ce soir.
‘If it’s fine, and so if I go out for a walk, you won’t be able to reach me until this evening.’

Here it is by no means obvious that the speaker has concluded inferentially that he may go for a walk. Admittedly, there are uses of donc which do reflect what is usually referred to as inferential reasoning, but there is no reason to consider these uses as prototypical. Further, a donc sequence can only be meaningfully described as an inference if the word ‘inference’ is considered as part of the descriptive meta-language. But the concept of ‘inference’ has no objective reality in itself, which all linguistic models would have to account for. On the contrary, to consider that donc sequences are used for inferential reasoning, is to select a particular semantic model. Thus (1) can only be hypothetically described as an inference. The main purpose of
This paper was to demonstrate that this hypothesis is not compatible with Anscombe and Ducrot's general argumentative framework. The fact that it is generally accepted at the present time is not an argument for its truth, but shows only the strength of the theoretical consensus.

References