What if there's no Brexit deal?

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Summary

How no deal might happen
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union provides for an EU Member State to leave the EU with or without a withdrawal agreement or ‘deal’.

The UK White Paper on future UK-EU relations sets out a model for future relations in which the UK follows a ‘common rulebook’ and maintains selected access rights to EU policies, bodies and programmes. The EU insists it will not allow the UK to ‘cherry-pick’ in order to be in a better position outside the EU than in it. These two positions, if they are resistant to compromise and flexibility, could result in no agreement being in place by 29 March 2019 and no agreement to carry on negotiating.

The EU and UK aim to reach agreement by October 2018 on the UK’s terms of withdrawal and on the framework for future relations, although this deadline is now likely to slip to November. A way of avoiding a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland is proving particularly difficult for the negotiators.

If there is no withdrawal agreement, and no UK request or no EU agreement to extend the negotiations, or if either the UK Parliament or the European Parliament or the other 27 EU Member States do not endorse a withdrawal agreement, there will be no deal and the EU Treaties will no longer apply to the UK from 29 March 2019.

Another point at which ‘no deal’ could occur is at the end of the proposed 21-month transition (implementation) period if there is no detailed agreement on the future EU-UK relationship or if such an agreement is not in force.

Both sides in the negotiations agree that ‘no deal’ is not what they want, but some Brexit supporters would prefer it to a ‘soft’ Brexit which does not end free movement, payments to the EU, membership of the Single Market and customs union, continued adherence to EU rules and the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU.

EU preparations for no deal
In the absence of what the European Commission describes as “functional solutions” to the Irish border issue, the EU has stepped up preparations for a no-deal scenario in March 2019. The Commission has been drafting amendments to EU legislation to take account of the UK’s exit in areas such as shipping, tariff obligations, energy, customs, aviation, health and safety, transport and citizenship. The Commission is identifying the legal acts that will have to be adapted in the context of Brexit by “preparedness acts” that will fill legislative gaps and “contingency measures to remedy negative impacts in the cliff-edge situation”, which would take effect in the event of a no-deal scenario.

UK preparations for no deal
Chequers statement
The UK Government insists that preparations for no deal are part of its overall Brexit preparation strategy. The Prime Minister’s Statement on the Cabinet away day at Chequers in July included a pledge to step up preparedness for all possible outcomes to the negotiations, including no deal, and the Prime Minister has assured Parliament that it is preparing for ‘no deal’ as well as other scenarios.
European Union (Withdrawal) Act

Secondary legislation is being laid under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 that will preserve EU law in domestic law or convert it into UK law on exit day. If the UK leaves the EU without a deal, most EU law will still apply in the UK but as domestic law (‘retained EU law’ or EU-based UK law). But there will be no reciprocity with EU Member States.

Government guidance on preparing for no deal

The Government believes a no-deal scenario could be managed in an “orderly” fashion (although this view is not necessarily shared by other stakeholders). On 23 August the Department for Exiting the EU published 25 ‘technical notices’, the first of three sets of guidance on how to prepare for Brexit if there’s no deal.

Some contributions to this paper were written before the publication of the Government’s no-deal planning guidance. Sections in which the technical notices have not been taken into account will be updated in due course.

No deal in practice

What would no deal look like in practice? No deal on a withdrawal agreement would mean no transition (implementation) period and no framework for future relations – let alone a full future relations agreement. The impact is still unknown overall, but in some areas it is easier to estimate the practical consequences and costs than in others.

The economy

It is difficult to pinpoint the economic impact of ‘no deal’ with certainty. Many economists expect the pound to fall in value in the event of ‘no deal’. This would mean the price of imports would rise, pushing up inflation. However, UK exports would become cheaper internationally, potentially mitigating some of the disruptive effects on trading with the EU. There might also be an opportunity for improved UK growth prospects from trade deals with other non-EU countries.

But most economic modelling in this area shows that the potential benefits of leaving the EU with no deal over the longer term do not make up for the higher trade barriers with the EU, given its importance to the UK.

Trade and customs

With no withdrawal agreement or framework for future relations, trade between the two economies would be conducted under the terms of the World Trade Organisation. Tariffs on UK exports to the EU and vice versa are expected (assuming the UK would not change its Most Favoured Nation tariffs under WTO rules). Tariffs would be low, averaging around 3%, but for some goods they would be higher. Potentially more disruptive would be non-tariff barriers, where additional paperwork, customs checks, technical requirements and regulatory standards could slow things down.

At the moment of leaving the EU customs union without a deal, the border between the UK and the EU would become a customs border. This is likely to mean more customs controls and probably increased costs and delays for business. It is estimated, for example, that delays caused by customs checks of trucks from the EU could cause a 17-mile queue at the port of Dover.
A hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland
The EU and the UK Government share a commitment to avoiding a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland, but they have yet to reach an agreement on how best to avoid checks and infrastructure at the border. Technology, a degree of ongoing regulatory alignment and some sort of customs agreement have all been suggested as possible solutions, but it is unlikely that any of these would be in place in a no-deal scenario.

One proposed solution to avoid disruption at the border is for the UK to waive checks and tariffs on EU goods as they enter NI. However, many trade experts believe this would trigger the Most Favoured Nation principle that applies to all WTO agreements, which would require the UK to waive its tariffs and checks on goods coming in from all other countries. The EU has said they would impose checks on goods entering Ireland regardless. This would cause delays and probably reduce trade, particularly in agri-foods, which make up a large proportion of cross-border trade.

There are concerns, shared by the UK government, that if there is infrastructure on the border to enable checks on goods, it would become a target for dissident republicans. However, some commentators believe that border checks would not inspire a new wave of dissident activity, and that any infrastructure and checks can be done away from the border, which would lessen their impact. The majority of people in Northern Ireland are opposed to any form of North-South border checks.

Free movement
Free movement of people rights, whereby any EU national can work in, live in or provide services in any EU Member State providing they meet certain conditions, is a key citizens’ right that will be affected by a no-deal Brexit.

The Government wants to implement a ‘settled status’ regime for EU nationals in the UK, whether there is a withdrawal agreement or not. Those with settled status should have full access to UK social security benefits. The position of those who on exit day have not yet been resident in the UK for five years – those with ‘pre-settled status’ – is less clear. For UK nationals in the EU it is unclear whether they could continue to access UK social security benefits in the EU27 Member State they reside in at the time. The existing reciprocal healthcare arrangements for UK citizens in the EU and EU citizens in the UK would probably end.

Food supply
Half of the UK’s food and drink supply comes from within the UK, with 30% from the EU and 20% from the rest of the world. Potential disruption to food supplies immediately after a no-deal Brexit has been given regular media coverage. Exiting the EU Secretary Dominic Raab told the Exiting the EU Committee that the Government would “look at this issue in the round and make sure that there is adequate food supply...”. The retail sector is concerned about the practicalities of stockpiling food.

Agriculture and fisheries
Trading arrangements - tariffs and standards – would be the main issue. With no alternative arrangement, the UK as a third country would be subject to tariffs, checks, registrations, certifications etc for commodities, food and feed, plant and animal-based products. Agriculture could also impacted by the ‘no deal’ effects of other policies such as immigration (for seasonal, agri-food workers and vets).
Brexit means the UK will become an independent coastal state with responsibility for managing fisheries in the UK’s Exclusive Economic Zone of 200 miles. It will not be bound by the Common Fisheries Policy and could deny access to EU Member States’ vessels (and vice versa). But under international law States are required to minimise economic dislocation to other States whose nationals have habitually fished in a zone.

Energy
The UK and EU energy sectors are integrated through trade, legislation and inter-connection of energy supply, although EU Member States are ultimately responsible for their domestic energy supply to citizens. Aspects of the UK energy sector, such as Euratom and the Internal Energy Market (IEM), will probably be affected similarly by a deal or no-deal Brexit. The UK will leave Euratom along with the EU; the Government is open to leaving the IEM and has begun preparations for leaving, but the future relations White Paper suggests a preference for future energy integration. ‘No deal’ could mean a less integrated relationship than the UK would like and not enough time to prepare for alternatives.

Internal security
The UK currently participates in around 40 EU measures that support and enhance internal security and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. According to police organisations, leaving the EU without a deal could result in a loss of operational capacity and strategic influence and an increased demand on resources because of the need to compensate for these losses. They say this could have a significant impact on public safety. Both the UK and the EU have emphasised the importance of maintaining cooperation in the field of security, law enforcement and criminal justice, but the Home Secretary has said security should not be linked to the other aspects of the negotiations, and that the UK’s proposals are unconditional.

Transport
For the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the aviation deadline is earlier than the Brexit deadline of 29 March 2019. But would planes actually stop flying between the UK and the EU27 in the event of no deal? The Government believes it might be possible to agree a ‘bare bones’ aviation agreement in the event of a no-deal scenario.

Research and higher education
The UK currently does disproportionately well in securing EU research funding and UK Universities are the top performers in receiving EU funds based on scientific excellence. The higher education sector and research bodies are concerned about the impact of a no-deal Brexit on access to EU research funding and collaboration in EU projects, recruitment and retention of EU staff, access to the Erasmus+ programme and the possible consequences for EU students coming to study in the UK.
1. How could no deal happen?

Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides for an EU Member State to leave the EU with or without a withdrawal agreement - or ‘deal’ - within a two-year timeframe starting from the formal notification of withdrawal by the leaving State.

1.1 Timing is crucial

The UK Government delivered a letter notifying the European Council of its intention to leave the EU on 29 March 2017, which started the clock ticking under the Article 50 process. The EU and the UK aim to complete negotiations on the UK’s ‘orderly’ withdrawal from the EU by October 2018. Theresa May told the Liaison Committee on 18 July that the aim was still to have “sufficient detail of this agreed by October”. Dominic Raab told the Lords EU Committee on 29 August he was “confident” a deal was “within our sights”, that he was still aiming for the October deadline but there was a measure of leeway. He confirmed that the 20% of matters not agreed included data transfers, police and judicial cooperation and collaboration and governance issues; the contours and principles were agreed but not the technical details. A solution to the Irish border was the main outstanding issue.

If October proves impossible, as many believe it will be, November or even December is more likely. This would allow only just enough time for the UK and European Parliaments (the EP has said it needs three months) to consider and vote on a withdrawal agreement, and for the 27 other EU Member States to ‘ratify’ it in the Council of the European Union in time for exit day on 29 March 2019 (11 pm UK time).

The UK and EU have agreed to “continuous” negotiations on Brexit “to energise the final phase of the diplomacy and to reach a deal that is in both sides’ interests”.

1.2 Scenarios for a no-deal Brexit

Leaving the EU without a withdrawal agreement – no deal - cannot be ruled out. Terms used to describe a ‘no deal’ outcome to the negotiations include ‘cliff edge’ Brexit, ‘hard Brexit’ and the UK ‘crashing out’ of the EU.

No deal could be the result of various scenarios:

- The EU and UK do not agree on the terms of a withdrawal agreement and/or a framework for future relations because of

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1 Bloomberg, U.K. and EU Drop October Deadline for Brexit Deal, 29 August 2018
2 Dominic Raab, speech, 23 August 2018
3 Described in the Lords EU Committee report Brexit: deal or no deal, 7 December 2017, “as overnight between 29 and 30 March 2019 they would have to adjust to radically different terms of trade, while citizens would face profound uncertainty over issues such as residence, property and other rights, child custody decisions, or health insurance”.
4 Although ‘hard Brexit’ now seems to mean something short of no deal.
lack of time and/or because there are intractable disagreements and no willingness to compromise – the talks break down;

- There is agreement in principle on the substance of a withdrawal agreement but more time is needed and the other EU Member States refuse to extend negotiations;⁵

- There is agreement in principle on the substance of a withdrawal agreement but more time is needed; the EU27 are willing to extend negotiations under Article 50 TEU but the UK refuses to ask for an extension;⁶

- The UK Parliament rejects the negotiated withdrawal agreement and framework for future relations;

- The European Parliament rejects the negotiated withdrawal agreement and framework for future relations;

- The Council does not endorse the withdrawal agreement by an enhanced qualified majority (20 of the 27 Member States, representing 65% of the EU population);

- A withdrawal agreement is concluded and enters into force, but at the end of the implementation/transition period there is no agreement on future EU-UK relations; or there is an agreement, but it has not been implemented in the UK or ratified in the EU Member States and has not entered into force provisionally.

### 1.3 Are any scenarios more or less likely than others?

It would appear less likely that the EU27 Member State governments or the European Parliament (EP) would unexpectedly vote against an agreement drawn up by the EU and UK negotiators. The EP, which has a power of veto over the final deal, has been kept fully informed of developments in the negotiations and its resolutions on Brexit have been taken into account so as not to jeopardise final agreement. The EU27 governments have (so far) maintained solidarity in their position on the negotiations, so surprises, either in the adoption of a final text or in allowing an extension of negotiations, are unlikely. Earlier reports that Spain could veto a withdrawal agreement because of its sovereignty claim on Gibraltar are unfounded, since no EU Member State has a veto.

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⁵ The Select Committee on Exiting the EU recommended in its Third Report of March 2018 that the Government should be prepared to seek a limited extension to the two-year article 50 period if substantive aspects of the future relationship are not agreed, or if Parliament votes against the withdrawal agreement, or if there is no deal, but acknowledged that the EU might not grant such a request.

⁶ Trade Secretary Liam Fox has said asking for an extension would be a “complete betrayal” of Brexit voters (Politico, 27 July 2018).
power, although Spain could, of course, contribute to a blocking minority against an agreement.

Some scenarios might provide a more or a less favourable environment for a no-deal departure than others (i.e. a ‘smooth’ no deal scenario or a ‘disruptive’ no deal), depending on the good will of the parties and the political mood. But the consensus among the negotiators and most stake-holders is that any no-deal outcome should be avoided.

In early August the Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, described the possibility of no deal as “uncomfortably high”. The Government insists no deal is “unlikely” but also believes it is taking a “responsible” approach and making “sensible preparations”, so that even a no-deal scenario could be managed in an “orderly” fashion.

1.4 A ‘bare bones’ deal?

‘No deal’ would mean no withdrawal agreement, and this would mean no transition (implementation) period in which to adapt to being outside the EU and to finalise and ratify a future relationship agreement.

Professor Derek Wyatt and Hugo Leith of Brick Court Chambers told the Foreign Affairs Committee in March 2017 that a ‘no deal’ outcome next March did not necessarily mean the end of negotiations, suggesting that a negotiation outside the Article 50 process could take place:

The economic and political shock for the UK and the EU could lead to renewed attempts to deal with outstanding issues. The position might be recovered, and a belated withdrawal agreement which included transitional arrangements might be put in place.

It might be possible to agree a “bare-bones” deal covering key issues of mutual concern, as David Davis suggested to the Lords EU Committee in October 2017: “in the event that we did not get a full deal, the interest of both sides on, say, counterterrorism co-operation, justice co-operation or data exchange co-operation is so great that I find it hard to believe that we will not get some fundamental deal there”.

Or there might be an assortment of last-minute unilateral (EU) and/or bilateral (UK-EU27) ‘parachute’ agreements to minimise disruption in certain areas. Philip Rycroft (DExEU) suggested the European Commission would want to avoid “unnecessary disruption” to business

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7 The EU27 ‘ratification’ of the withdrawal agreement and declaration on a framework for future relations will be by an enhanced qualified majority vote: 20 of the EU27 States representing 65% of the EU27 population.
8 BBC Today Programme, 3 August 2018.
9 See Theresa May, the Chequers statement, 6 July 2018, and Dominic Raab, UK government’s preparations for a ‘no deal’ scenario, updated 24 August 2018
10 Ibid
11 See, e.g. BBC News, No 10 deny plan for Army role in ‘no deal’ Brexit, 30 July 2018.
between the EU and UK and would therefore want to be pragmatic even in the event of ‘no deal’. This assumption was part of the Government’s thinking but could not be guaranteed. Dominic Raab told the Exiting the EU Committee on 5 September that there could be “no deal deals” in some areas if negotiations break down: the UK and EU could coordinate what they do without a legally binding agreement; sign Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs); or there could be more formal agreements.14

But there could still be a period of undeterminable length in which the UK and the EU are without any agreements on withdrawal or post-Brexit relations, and possibly little good will among the EU27 towards the UK. Anand Menon of ‘UK in a Changing Europe’ is pessimistic about all such no-deal mitigation scenarios:

Given the political capital expended by both the UK and the EU on reaching an agreement within the Article 50 timeframe, a no deal outcome of any kind is likely to generate considerable acrimony. In particular, there will be a lot of finger-pointing about who is to blame.

This matters on a number of levels. Most immediately, it will complicate any moves to secure emergency deals on critical systems such as air travel, medicines or fissile materials, especially if politicians on either side seek to use such issues to teach the other a lesson or force compromises elsewhere. Mitigations in the form of agreements with the EU would be particular to each sector, meaning the impact of no deal could vary considerably, with certain sectors more vulnerable than others. The difficulty is that we cannot know at this point just how many of these emergency agreements it would be possible to reach in a relatively short period of time and in a confrontational political atmosphere.

Moreover, a breakdown of the negotiations would colour the pursuit of any wider efforts to restart the UK-EU relationship, in terms of the attitudes of both sides and the lack of a clear basis upon which to work. No withdrawal agreement means no political declaration on the future relationship, and it would be wise to assume that the general level of trust and willingness to compromise would be small.15

Furthermore, Michel Barnier said on 3 September that the EU would not engage in any kind of “managed no-deal Brexit” if negotiations break down. He told the Exiting the EU Committee there would be no further discussions or negotiations, no “side-deals”, no “mini-deals”, the discussions would stop.16

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15 UK in a changing Europe, Cost of no deal revisited, 3 September 2018.
16 House of Commons Exiting the EU Committee, Oral evidence, 4 September 2018.
2. Preparations for no deal

2.1 UK Government preparations

The return of “no deal is better than a bad deal”

In her Lancaster House speech in January 2017 the Prime Minister, Theresa May, was “clear that no deal for Britain is better than a bad deal for Britain”. By the time of her Florence speech in September 2017, she firmly supported a negotiated withdrawal and the option of walking away from a bad deal was not mentioned. Both sides in the negotiations agreed that an orderly, negotiated withdrawal was preferable and in both their interests.

Agreement on phase one of the negotiations in December 2017 appeared to enhance prospects for a mutually acceptable negotiated withdrawal. The mutual benefits of a good Brexit deal were reiterated in the Prime Minister’s Chequers Statement in July 2018 and the ensuing White Paper on future relations.

But the prospect of a no-deal outcome to the negotiations has returned to the Brexit rhetoric in the UK as well as the EU (see section 2.2 below), with each side accusing the other of being inflexible and contributing to the possibility of a breakdown in the negotiations and a no-deal scenario. Theresa May said in her statement on the Chequers agreement on 9 July that unless the EU changes its negotiating position, “there is serious risk it could lead to no deal” and this would be a “disorderly no deal”. Michael Gove said on the Andrew Marr Show on 8 July that the UK was being “generous”, and that if the EU did not reciprocate, “we may have to come to the conclusion that we need to walk away without a deal” and “be in a position to walk away in March 2019”. The new Foreign Secretary, Jeremy Hunt, warned that without a “change in approach from the EU negotiators”, there is now a “very real risk of a Brexit no deal by accident”.

The Prime Minister stands by her Lancaster House evaluation; she told the Liaison Committee on 18 July:

"You ask me about the fact that I have said that no deal is better than a bad deal. I stand by that. I think that that is right. I think a bad deal—for example, some have suggested that we would be prepared to pay “any price” for something—would not be a good deal for the United Kingdom."

Michel Barnier insists the EU is prepared to be flexible if the UK Government gives way on its ‘red lines’.

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17 For information on the Government’s Brexit future relations White Paper, see Commons Briefing Paper 8387, The Brexit White Paper on future relations and alternative proposals, 28 August 2018.

18 BBC News, Brexit: Jeremy Hunt warns EU of ‘no deal by accident’, 23 July 2018

19 Michel Barnier: speech 23 April 2018; speech, Institute of International and European Affairs, 6 July 2018
The new Brexit Secretary Dominic Raab is reported to be “insouciant” about a no-deal Brexit. He maintained there would be “opportunities” from a no-deal outcome (including immediate regulatory freedom, independent trade and immigration policies, and “a swifter end” to payments into the EU budget). Brexit supporter Jacob Rees-Mogg MP is reported to have said that no deal would be preferable to the Government’s Chequers proposal. But Business Secretary Greg Clark told the French newspaper Le Figaro on 24 July that no deal “would be bad for all countries and all citizens of the European Union. And that would impoverish everyone”.

Opposition leader Jeremy Corbyn has said that “No deal is a bad deal and would represent a historic failure”. The Liberal Democrat leader Vince Cable has said a no-deal Brexit could be “potentially catastrophic”.

**Departmental preparations**

In its report published on 12 March 2017 on Article 50 negotiations: Implications of ‘no deal’ the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee recommended:

> The Government should require each Department to produce a ‘no deal’ plan, outlining the likely consequences in their areas of remit and setting out proposals to mitigate potential risks. Such preparation would strengthen the Government’s negotiating hand by providing credibility to its position that it would be prepared to walk away from a bad deal.

In June 2018 an Institute for Government (IfG) report summarised what preparations the Government would need to make for different Brexit scenarios:

> Some areas are not dependent on future negotiations, such as the settlement scheme to provide status to EU nationals after Brexit, meaning officials do not have to cope with multiple scenarios. But these are the exception. For others the uncertainty means that departments have to work on multiple plans in parallel. HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), for example, needs to be ready for post-Brexit customs if there’s no deal in March 2019 or if talks end in failure come December 2020, as well as having plans for the Government’s two options for a possible future relationship. Each of the four plans, with their different constraints and requirements, would be, at best, extremely ambitious if they were the only scenario the department was working to.

Has the Government implemented “multiple plans in parallel” to prepare for all kinds of Brexit? Philip Rycroft, DExEU Permanent Secretary, told the Exiting the EU Committee on 4 September that Brexit

> “If you are asking me whether we are going to say to people here and now, “If there is no deal, you will not be able to do A, B and C,” I would say that preparedness for no deal is about making sure that Government, business and those who have to take actions to prepare for no deal are able to do that and to do so in a timely way, because some of these actions may take time to put in place”. Prime Minister to Liaison Committee, 18 July 2018

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20 Politico, UK Cabinet chaos triggers countdown to Brexit explosion, 9 July 2018
21 Dominic Raab, speech on Brexit no deal planning, 23 August 2018
22 See The Times, Jacob Rees-Mogg says Chequers Brexit deal may be worse than no deal, 7 July 2018.
23 Politico, 5 July 2018
24 The Guardian, ‘Catastrophic’ no-deal Brexit a real possibility, says Vince Cable, 11 June 2018
25 Ninth Report of Session 2016-17
26 IfG, Preparing Brexit. How ready is Whitehall? Summary. Joe Owen, Lewis Lloyd and Jill Rutter, 10 June 2018
planning, including for no deal, had been taking place across Departments for two years.

**New Cabinet sub-committee**

Damian Green, then First Secretary of State and Minister for the Cabinet Office, announced in October 2017 the creation of a new Brexit-focused Cabinet sub-Committee - the European Union Exit and Trade sub-Committee (Domestic Preparedness, Legislation and Devolution) to oversee domestic policy preparations and implementation of Brexit; and changes to the existing EU Exit and Trade (Strategy and Negotiations) sub-Committee (an extension of the EU Exit and Trade (Negotiations) sub-Committee), to oversee the Brexit and future relations negotiations. The new sub-committees would “sit alongside” the EU Exit and Trade Committee and the EU Exit and Trade (International Trade) sub-Committee which would continue as before.

**Brexit workstreams**

On 30 April 2018 in a letter to Meg Hillier, Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, DExEU published *Departmental summaries of EU Exit workstreams*, setting out the areas of work being undertaken (“policy areas requiring particular focus, the current number of workstreams for which each department is responsible, and some specific examples”).

The National Audit Office, which has been reporting on the Government’s Brexit delivery, noted that DExEU’s “delivery plan guidance required departments to formulate delivery plans to support a preferred negotiation (or ‘day one deal’) or a ‘no deal’ outcome for each EU Exit work stream”. The DExEU summaries do not specifically indicate any no-deal planning, but this could be read into the “contingency outcomes” referred to in five instances.

Philip Rycroft assured the Exiting the EU Committee on 4 September that political divisions in the Government were not holding up any Brexit planning workstreams.

**Machinery of government changes**

On 24 July the Prime Minister announced changes to the machinery of Government in the light of Brexit. DExEU would continue to lead on domestic preparations “in both a deal and a no deal scenario, all of the necessary legislation, and preparations for the negotiations to implement the detail of the Future Framework”. DExEU would recruit new staff and Cabinet Office officials coordinating work on preparedness would move to DExEU, “while maintaining close ties with both departments”. Theresa May herself would lead the negotiations with the EU, with Dominic Raab deputising and supported by the Cabinet Office, whose Europe Unit, headed by Oliver Robbins, would “have overall responsibility for the preparation and conduct of the negotiations”. Philip Rycroft told the Exiting the EU Committee on 4 September that the changes would enable DExEU to focus on what comes after Brexit.

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More staff
Dominic Raab said in his speech on 23 August 2018 that the Government was increasing staffing inside and outside Whitehall: “The UK government now has 7,000 people working on Brexit preparations and funding is in place for another 9,000”, and “in relation to frontline services, such as the UK’s Border Force, we are currently recruiting an extra 300 staff in time for our exit, with plans in the pipeline to recruit 1,000 more staff, so they are ready to deal with any increase in work”.

Philip Rycroft said DExEU was under no budget restraints with regard to staffing and resources for Brexit planning.28

‘No deal’ funding
Chancellor Phillip Hammond set out the Government’s ‘no deal’ funding strategy in evidence to the Treasury Committee on 11 October 2017:

[...] we do have planning for all scenarios, including a no-deal scenario. I am committed to funding Departments for the work they need to do in preparation, and we have already allocated £250 million to Departments from the reserve. But there will be points of decision where it will be necessary to make go or no go decisions around future programme spending to be ready on day one. I am clear that we have to be prepared for a no-deal scenario, unless and until we have clear evidence that that is not where we will end up. At the moment, although we of course hope for a different outcome, we cannot be certain of it.

I am not proposing to allocate funds to Departments in advance of the need to spend. We should look in each area at the last point at which spending can begin to ensure that we are ready for day one of a no-deal scenario. That is when we should start spending hard-earned taxpayers’ money. Every pound we spend on contingent preparations for a hard customs border is a pound that we can’t spend on the NHS, social care, education or deficit reduction. I don’t believe that we should be in the business of making potentially nugatory expenditure until the very last moment, when we need to do so. We will be ready—we will spend the money in a timely fashion to ensure that we are ready—but we will not spend it earlier than necessary just to make some demonstration point.

Asked whether the Treasury had “done a broader assessment of how much it would have to spend in the event of a no-deal scenario, and how much money could not be spent on other things”, and whether the Treasury was “expecting to have to reopen the 2015 Departmental spending reviews”, Mr Hammond replied:

On the last point, no, because the money that is required to be expended against the contingency of a no-deal scenario will come from the reserve, so we will not reopen departmental spending settlements. In terms of quantum, it is a moveable feast. Obviously, one can plan for the most extreme scenario. Let me give you an example: it is theoretically conceivable that, in a no-deal scenario, no air traffic will move between the UK and the European Union on 29 March 2019. However, I don’t think anybody seriously believes that that is where we will get to.

28 Commons Exiting the EU Committee, Oral evidence, 4 September 2018
There are a range of outcomes, and at a point in time we will need to determine what a realistic worst-case scenario that we need to plan and invest for is. On that specific point, it is very clear that mutual self-interest means that, even if talks break down and there is no deal, there will be a strong compulsion on both sides to reach agreement on an air traffic services arrangement.

In the November 2017 budget the Chancellor also made an additional £3 billion of funding available for departments and the devolved administrations over the next two years to implement plans for various exit scenarios, including ‘no deal’.

The Prime Minister summarised funding for a deal or no deal Brexit in evidence to the Liaison Committee on 18 July:

The Treasury set aside, over a period of two years, the sum of £3 billion for preparatory work. That was allocated at the spring statement. My right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer explained the allocation for 2018-19 among Departments. As you might imagine, DEFRA is the Department that has £310 million allocated to it for that year. HM Revenue and Customs has £260 million, the Home Office has £395 million. The other big amounts include £185 to BEIS, and then, obviously, other Departments have some allocated. Those sums are for work they are doing in preparing for the outcomes, and of course those outcomes are a deal or no deal.

IT systems

New IT systems will be needed to replace databases currently shared with the EU. Many of them are in the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), HM Revenues and Customs (HMRC), the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), Department for International Trade (DIT) and the Home Office. The UK will also be disconnected from various IT systems that cannot be replicated domestically because of their inherent cross-border basis, such as the VAT Information Exchange System (VIES), which is a core component of the system that allows goods to move within the EU without VAT liability being checked at the border.

Developing new databases can be a lengthy process; an internal Cabinet Office report in 2015 leaked to Computer Weekly found that “the average time for a new digital service to reach public use – either fully live or in beta – was two years. The completed exemplars ranged from 1.2 years to three years in duration”.

The technical publication The Register commented on DEFRA systems that could be at risk:

Key programmes at risk of delays or failure were the department’s import controls systems, the database replacement for the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals, the export health certificates, catch certificate for

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29 ComputerWeekly.com, So you want new IT systems for Brexit? Leaked GDS report shows it’s already too late, 15 August 2017
marine caught fish for human consumption, and the system for veterinary medicines.30

The Government is also relying on future technology-based solutions to the Irish border customs issues, despite these having been declared a partial solution at best by the EU.

In a report published in April 201831 the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) was critical of the Brexit preparations of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and was particularly concerned about the lack of IT procurement that would be necessary in the event of no deal:

*We doubt the realism of the Department’s plans to deliver the numerous IT systems required to support the implementation of its Brexit work streams, especially when it has yet to start procurement.* The Department needs to build upwards of 12 new digital systems, such as a database to register trademarks. We took evidence in January 2018, before publication of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement proposing a transition period to December 2020. Extraordinarily, the Department had not yet started to procure any of these systems despite them being required by March 2019 in the event of a no deal scenario. They may still be required if negotiations should break down. The Department said it hoped to begin procurement in the next few months and that it was confident that it could acquire and test the systems by March 2019. Given the government’s generally poor track record in delivering IT projects, we are extremely sceptical that the Department will be able to deliver these systems in time.

In its response in May 2018 to the Foreign Affairs Committee report on the implications of no deal, the Government said it was continuing “to implement plans to ensure that we are ready for the UK’s exit from the EU, including procuring new systems, recruiting new staff and committing financial resources where necessary”.32

But some reports suggest civil servants are preparing ‘manual workarounds’ in case the technology fails or is not available. The Commons Science and Technology Committee has launched an inquiry into the state of the digital government strategy, which will include consideration of the post-Brexit digital skills that will be needed. The Committee is asking for written evidence to be submitted by 28 September 2018.

**The Government steps up ‘no deal’ preparations**

Boris Johnson, in his resignation letter on 9 July, said the Government had “postponed crucial decisions – including the preparations for no deal” in favour of pursuing what he called a “semi-Brexit”. Others in

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30 The Register, *Defra to MPs: There’s no way Brexit IT can be as crap as rural payments*, 8 March 2018
What if there’s no Brexit deal?

the EU, the UK Government, opposition politicians and industry thought more preparations were necessary. The Financial Times (20 July) reported on no-deal preparations by businesses across the UK, stating that “as part of the preparations, some 250,000 small businesses will be asked to start making customs declarations, in a dry run for a hard Brexit”, and:

UK businesses are already spending heavily on their preparations. Adam Marshall, head of the British Chambers of Commerce, said companies have been thinking through the potential impact of changes to cross-border trade, staffing, contracts, VAT and intellectual property.

Overall, the Government believes it is being “responsible” about contingency planning. For example, in his response to the European Scrutiny Committee special report (14 June) David Davis said the Government was “on course to deliver a functioning border in a ‘no deal’ scenario that enables trade to flow, the Government to collect revenues, and the UK to have a secure border”. DExEU Minister Lord Callanan insisted (23 July) the Government was preparing for a range of Brexit scenarios, from ‘orderly’ withdrawal to ‘no deal’ - but not by recommending the stockpiling of processed food, as reported in The Sun on 10 July and several other newspapers. DExEU Minister Chris Heaton-Harris told the Commons on 19 July:

Departments’ plans are well developed and designed to respond to all scenarios, including the unlikely possibility that we leave the EU without a deal. Some contingency plans have already become evident and more will become public over the coming weeks.

He also said 300 extra staff had already been recruited to police UK borders and that there was “an ongoing programme to recruit a whole load more”.

Dominic Raab said after his first meeting with the EU negotiator Michel Barnier on 26 July that the UK Government, like any “responsible government”, was planning for no-deal, but conceded it needed to step up its plans. He also told the Committee on Exiting the EU on 24 July (Q2472) that in the event of no deal, although there would be “uncertainty” in the short term, the UK would “still be able to thrive” in the long term.

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34 The statement on the Chequers agreement on 6 July said: “It remains our firm view that it is in the best interests of both sides to reach agreement on a good and sustainable future relationship. But we also concluded that it was responsible to continue preparations for a range of potential outcomes, including the possibility of ‘no deal’. Given the short period remaining before the necessary conclusion of negotiations this autumn, we agreed preparations should be stepped up”.
36 See, for example, CBI, CBI survey: How businesses are preparing for Brexit, 2018.
38 See also Financial Times, British food stores ridicule Brexit stockpiling plans, 26 July 2018.
39 EUObserver, UK Brexit minister warns of ‘no-deal’ preparations, 23 July 2018
Philip Rycroft outlined staff numbers to the Exiting the EU Committee on 4 September, saying DExEU had high quality staff with a “diverse range of experience and talent”.

In a speech on 23 August on planning for the “unlikely event” of no agreement, Mr Raab said he would seek discussions with the EU over coordinated action to mitigate the effects of a no-deal Brexit (the Bank of England and European Central Bank are currently in talks). He also sought to dispel media rumours of stockpiling, shortages and a vindictive EU:

- So let me reassure you all that, contrary to one of the wilder claims, you will still be able to enjoy a BLT after Brexit.
- And there are no plans to deploy the army to maintain food supplies.
- I think it’s also worth saying that most of the worst case scenarios, being bandied around, imply that the EU would resist all and any mutual cooperation with the UK.
- In reality, I find it difficult to imagine that our EU partners would not want to cooperate with us even in that scenario in key areas like this, given the obvious mutual benefits involved.

Dominic Raab updates the Commons on negotiations and no-deal preparations

Agreement has been reached in most areas
On 4 September Mr Raab updated the Commons on the progress of Brexit negotiations and the Government’s ‘no deal’ contingency planning. He said the negotiators had “injected some additional pace and intensity into the negotiations, as we reach the final phases” and that the “vast majority of the Withdrawal Agreement” had been agreed. Progress had been made on the outstanding issues to do with the protection of data and information, the treatment of ongoing police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, and ongoing EU judicial and administrative procedures after exit.

Northern Ireland issues still unresolved
Northern Ireland was still a major sticking point. They had continued to “work to complete a backstop” but he reiterated that the EU proposals were “unacceptable, because they would create a customs border down the Irish Sea”. He was determined to avoid a hard border but would “not permit a customs border down the Irish Sea, which would put at risk the constitutional and economic integrity of the United Kingdom, and of course, this can be done without compromising the EU’s core principles”.

Bilateral meetings
He outlined the 60 or more bilateral meetings ministers had had with their EU counterparts since the publication of the Brexit future relations White Paper on 12 July, saying the proposals had “received a wide range of positive and constructive feedback” and:
Equally, just as we have presented our proposals in a spirit of compromise, so too they have proved challenging in some respects for some in the EU.

But, our friends across Europe are engaging seriously with our proposals on the substance.

He acknowledged that there were “some risks to a ‘no deal’ scenario”, but said the Government’s approach demonstrated that it was “taking the action to avoid, to minimise and to mitigate these potential risks so we are equipped to manage any short-term disruption”.

‘Opportunities’ provided by a no-deal Brexit

He again pointed to “some countervailing opportunities” that a no deal scenario would bring”.

- The UK could lower tariffs and negotiate and bring into effect new free trade deals straight away;
- The “immediate recovery of full legislative and regulatory control, including over immigration policy”;  
- A “swifter end to our financial contributions to the EU”, while being “mindful” of legal obligations.

‘Technical notices’ on no deal preparations

On 18 July the Prime Minister told the Liaison Committee that over the course of the summer the Government would be releasing around 70 ‘technical notices’ for British businesses and citizens - “those that need to know that information” - setting out how the public and business could prepare for the consequences of a no-deal Brexit.

The Committee Chair, Dr Sarah Wollaston, tried to press the Prime Minister on the extent of advanced preparations for these possible consequences:

Q93 Chair: [...] there is still that growing possibility, I feel, that we could end up with a no-deal scenario; and my question was will you be laying out for the public what the consequences of that will be, very clearly?

The Prime Minister: If we are in a no-deal scenario then we will lay out the consequences for the public.

Q94 Chair: You won’t do it in advance.

The Prime Minister: What we are doing at the moment is working for a deal, and that is the basis on which the Chequers agreement was made; it is the basis on which the White Paper is made; it is the basis on which we started discussions with the European Union. At this point what we are doing is saying we will ensure, as we step up our no-deal preparations, that those technical notices are issued over August and September so that those who need to have that information have that information.

Chair: You have made that clear.

The Prime Minister: With due respect, I think what you are asking me to do is to do something else, which is to set out the argument for no deal versus the argument for a deal, rather than actually saying we are working for a deal, and we will make sure that those who know—

“While it is sensible for them to undertake contingency planning for ‘no deal’, both the UK and the EU must ensure that the very act of such preparations does not increase the likelihood of this outcome”.

Lords EU Committee, Conclusions para 58, Brexit: deal or no deal, 7 December 2017
Q95 Chair: Prime Minister, with respect, I am asking you to set out for the public—because I think sometimes the public don’t realise the scale of the issues that we would be facing, and the costs and the absolute necessity that we start planning now, because time is getting so short. So I guess my request to you is will you agree to publish this so that the public can see what the consequences are, and what you are planning for?

The Prime Minister: What we will be doing is ensuring that more information is available on the preparations the Government are making for no deal, that we publish the technical notices so that those who need to make the preparations for no deal are able to do so.

Q96 Chair: You have made that clear, Prime Minister. My concern was for the wider public understanding of what the consequences are.

The first public information alerts - or ‘technical notices’ or ‘guidance’ - were published on 23 August on the DExEU website. Their publication was interpreted by many as a sign that the Government was taking no-deal preparation more seriously, by others as an indication that the Government was panicking as the deadline for agreeing a deal approached. DExEU Permanent Secretary Philip Rycroft told the Exiting the EU Committee on 4 September that the Notices were drawn up by individual departments but managed by DExEU, and that there had been close consultation with the devolved administrations. He would not answer a question from Hilary Benn about when the Government would notify businesses about the likelihood of a deal not being reached or whether DExEU had given any consideration to possible litigation or judicial review concerning the impact on commercial operations of not knowing about ‘no deal’ in advance of it actually happening.

The Exiting the European Union Committee’s Chair, Hilary Benn MP, commented on the Government’s no deal plans on the Committee website:

Ministers have left their No Deal planning very late in the day. A lot of questions remain to be answered, and they seem to be relying on continued co-operation with the EU without any indication of what would happen if this was not forthcoming.

A failure to reach agreement with the EU will also mean no transition period so all this uncertainty could be just seven months away.

These papers tell us three things. First, they confirm that No Deal - far from being better than a bad deal - would be very damaging economically. Businesses that export to the EU would face the cost and bureaucracy of customs, safety and security and rules of origin declarations for the first time, and in certain sectors, tariffs.

Secondly, there is no guarantee for British citizens living in other EU countries about the future of their pension payments.

Thirdly, there is still no clarity on how the return of a hard border in Northern Ireland will be avoided, and ministers have simply told businesses to seek advice from the Irish Government. This is an extraordinary abdication of responsibility.
Having wasted two years, these papers show exactly why No Deal is unacceptable and why ministers must now ensure that an agreement is reached with the EU which provides a transition period and protects jobs, trade and investment.

Brexit legislation is passed

The Government’s reply to the Foreign Affairs Committee report referred to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill then going through Parliament and to other Brexit-related legislation “to prepare for all exit scenarios” (the Nuclear Safeguards Act, Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act, Haulage Permits and Trailer Registration Act, and forthcoming bills on immigration, agriculture and fisheries).

The European Union (Withdrawal) Act (EUWA) received Royal Assent on 26 June 2018. Around 800 SIs will be made under the EUWA by February 2019 to provide for a temporary continuation of EU provisions in the UK, with or without a withdrawal agreement. The aim is to ensure there are no (or few) sudden shocks or holes in the statute book on Brexit day.

Under the Act a European Statutory Instruments Committee (ESIC) has been set up in the Commons to check whether the choice of procedure to adopt certain Brexit-related SIs is appropriate. The degree of Parliament’s involvement depends on the type of procedure used. The proposed negative instruments can be found on the Government’s EU Withdrawal Act 2018 statutory instruments website, together with Explanatory Notes on each draft SI.

The constitutional implications of a no-deal Brexit are discussed in detail in section 3 below.

2.2 European Union preparations

According to Michel Barnier there is currently agreement on 80% of the UK’s withdrawal terms. Matters still to be agreed include the protection of ‘geographical indications’, solutions for UK territories (e.g. the UK’s Sovereign Bases in Cyprus, and Gibraltar, on which bilateral negotiations between the UK and Spain are ongoing) and the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. According to one estimate, only 5-6% more text has been agreed since March, when 80% agreement was first announced. In the absence of what the European Commission describes as “functional solutions” to the Irish border issue in particular, the EU has stepped up emergency “parachute” planning for the UK leaving the EU without a withdrawal agreement on 29 March 2019. The Commission, the EU Presidency (Austria) and other Member States are also reported to be considering how the UK exit date could be extended if more time is needed to prepare.

“...is not our objective. By the way, you do not need a negotiator for no deal. We are negotiating to avoid the ‘no deal’, but it still cannot be excluded”.

Michel Barnier, speech at European American Chamber of Commerce, 10 July 2018

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40 For information on the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, see Parliament’s Brexit: research and analysis website, Brexit: legislation.

41 Philip Rycroft, oral evidence to Exiting the EU Committee, 4 September 2018

42 On 10 July and on 2 August

43 EUObserver, ‘Dealbreaker’ issues multiply in Brexit talks, 30 August 2018

44 See Independent, Brexit talks should be extended if no deal agreed, EU Council chair says, 5 July 2018.
Financial Times commented that any EU unilateral contingency provisions “would be tailored to the bloc’s interests and would remain in force only until the EU develops the infrastructure to enforce rules for a no-deal Brexit that could last for years”.  

European Parliament report

In May 2018 the EP’s Constitutional Affairs Committee published an in-depth analysis of the institutional, budgetary and policy implications of a ‘hard Brexit’ for the EU (The Institutional Consequences of a ‘Hard Brexit’). The study looked at how UK withdrawal without a withdrawal agreement, transition arrangements or framework for future relations would affect each EU institution, the EU budget for the current Multiannual Financial Framework and EU policies in the areas of trade, security and justice. It provided “guidelines for the EU to be prepared in case such scenario were to materialise”.

Commission Brexit Preparedness Group

At the end of 2017 the Commission established a Brexit Preparedness Group composed of around a dozen civil servants and headed by Pascal Leardini. On the Brexit Preparedness website the Group posts ‘preparedness notices’, legislative initiatives and other relevant activities. The notices “aim at preparing citizens and stakeholders for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom” and “set out the consequences in a range of policy areas”. The website provides further information on EU preparedness for no deal:

In addition, EU decentralised agencies have published information in relation to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, for example the Community Plant Variety Office, the European Chemicals Agency, the European Medicines Agency and the European Union Intellectual Property Office. Furthermore, the three European Supervisory Authorities (the European Banking Authority, the European Securities and Markets Authority and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) and the Single Supervisory Mechanism have issued opinions and guidance.

Amending EU legislation to take account of Brexit

The Commission has been drafting amendments to EU legislation to take account of the UK’s exit in areas such as shipping, tariff obligations, energy, customs, aviation, health and safety, transport, citizenship and the “adaptation of hundreds of databases and IT systems managed by the Commission and national capitals”.  

On 12 June Commission Secretary-General Martin Selmayr presented the European Parliament’s Brexit Steering Group with a list of amendments to laws and regulations in a document entitled Pending and planned legislative proposals for the purposes of Brexit preparedness (as of 12 June 2018).

Commission official Pascal Leardini told the EP Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) on 2 July that the Commission would soon

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45 Financial Times, Brussels steps up emergency planning for no-deal Brexit, 28 June 2018
46 MLex, 2 July 2018
47 Politico, 3 July 2018
complete its identification of the legal acts needing adaptation. The acts would be “either preparedness acts, that serve to fill gaps in the legislation, or contingency measures to remedy negative impacts in the cliff-edge situation”. They would take effect in the event of a no-deal scenario, “including the unwanted but still possible cliff edge”. Politico reported:

In addition to the practical contingency planning, Leardini said that officials are racing to develop legislation to close potential legal gaps. Some matters, he said, will require legislative acts and others like customs changes can be achieved via so-called delegated acts (legally binding acts that enable the Commission to supplement or amend nonessential parts of EU legislative acts).

Leardini said his group has also issued 66 preparatory notes to private stakeholders, urging them to be ready for a potentially disorderly Brexit. These, he argued, are “purely informative and not speculative.”

But Leardini said the Commission had “not done an overall impact assessment of what happens if there's no deal because there are too many variables”.

Brexit impact assessment

On 19 July the Commission published a Communication (COM(2018) 556 final), Preparing for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union on 30 March 2019, in which it set out the main consequences of a no-deal outcome:

Box 1: Commission position on main consequences of UK withdrawal on 30 March 2019 without a withdrawal agreement

- The United Kingdom will be a third country and Union law ceases to apply to and in the United Kingdom.
- Citizens: There would be no specific arrangement in place for EU citizens in the United Kingdom, or for UK citizens in the European Union.
- Border issues: The European Union must apply its regulation and tariffs at borders with the United Kingdom as a third country, including checks and controls for customs, sanitary and phytosanitary standards and verification of compliance with EU norms. Transport between the United Kingdom and the European Union would be severely impacted. Customs, sanitary and phytosanitary controls at borders could cause significant delays, e.g. in road transport, and difficulties for ports.
- Trade and regulatory issues: The United Kingdom becomes a third country whose relations with the European Union would be governed by general international public law, including rules of the World Trade Organisation. In particular, in heavily regulated sectors, this would represent a significant drawback compared to the current level of market integration.
- Negotiations with the United Kingdom: Depending on the circumstances leading to the withdrawal without an agreement, the EU may wish to enter into negotiations with the United Kingdom as a third country.
- EU funding: UK entities would cease to be eligible as Union entities for the purpose of receiving EU grants and participating in EU procurement procedures. Unless otherwise provided for by the legal provisions in force, candidates or tenderers from the United Kingdom could be rejected.

48 Adam Fleming Tweet, 2 July 2018
The Financial Times reported on 1 August that the EU was willing to “offer Britain a vague blueprint for future ties with the bloc — if it helps Theresa May avoid a “no deal” outcome and win parliamentary backing for a withdrawal treaty”. On 29 August Michel Barnier said the EU was “prepared to offer Britain a partnership such as there never has been with any other third country”.  

The Commission has asked the other 27 EU Member States (the EU27) to accelerate their contingency planning for a no-deal Brexit, “warning of queues of freight at ports as well as implications for the pharmaceutical, financial services and aviation sectors”.  

Several other EU States have been preparing contingency measures. A summary of EU27 planning is outlined in the Appendix to this paper.

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49 Politico, Michel Barnier: EU will offer UK unprecedented deal, 29 August 2018
50 The Times (Ireland), 14 July 2018
3. Constitutional implications in the UK

3.1 Parliament’s role in the absence of a deal

The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (EUWA) sets out a process by which Parliament could give Parliament a say in the event that no withdrawal agreement is reached and/or ratified. Section 13 of the Act makes provision for three no deal scenarios:

- if Parliament is taken to have rejected *either or both* the withdrawal agreement and the framework for the future relationship between the UK and EU;
- if the Prime Minister makes a statement before 21 January 2019 that “no agreement in principle can be reached” on the “substance” of *either or both* of those two agreements; and
- if “no agreement in principle” has in fact been reached on the “substance” of *either or both* of those two agreements.

In each of these three scenarios, a Minister of the Crown will be required, within 21, 14 and 5 days respectively, to make a statement “setting out how Her Majesty’s Government proposes to proceed”. In each of these three scenarios, the House of Commons must then be given an opportunity to vote on “a motion in neutral terms, to the effect that the House of Commons has considered the matter of the statement”.

The House of Lords in each case must also be given an opportunity within a specified period to consider a motion “taking note” of the statement.

Can a motion in neutral terms be amended?

A “motion in neutral terms” normally cannot be amended in the House of Commons. This is because Standing Order No. 24B provides that:

> Where, in the opinion of the Speaker or the Chair, a motion, That this House, or, as the case may be, the committee has considered the matter, is expressed in neutral terms, no amendments to it may be tabled.

However, the House is free to agree to disapply Standing Orders. A statutory provision cannot be used to force a specific Standing Order to be used in relation to a particular motion. In a Written Statement on 21 June (HCWS781), David Davis clarified:

> Under the Standing Orders of the House of Commons it will be for the Speaker to determine whether a motion when it is introduced by the Government under the European Union...
Legal effect of a motion

As a matter of law, there are no consequences if one of the motions provided for in the three ‘no deal’ scenarios is rejected. The Act only requires that it shall be moved by a Minister of the Crown; not that it must be agreed to for the Government to proceed with its intended course of action.

A matter of confidence in the Government?

Depending upon the political circumstances, either Parliament’s motion (a) to approve a deal, or (b) in relation to a Government statement following a “rejected deal” or “no-deal”, could be taken to be a matter of “confidence” in the Government.

Historically, a Government that lost a vote of confidence was expected to resign, or else its Prime Minister was expected to request that the monarch dissolved Parliament for a General Election. Since the passage of the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011, however, the calling of an early General Election has been a matter for Parliament to decide, rather than something the Head of Government can request of the Head of State.

Box 2: Authorisation of early general elections and the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011

A General Election can now only be called “early” in two circumstances, either:

- if a motion for an early general election is agreed either by at least two-thirds of the whole House (including vacant seats), i.e. 434 Members out of 650, or without division; or
- if a motion of no confidence is passed and no alternative government is confirmed by the Commons within 14 days by means of a confidence motion.

The first scenario happened on 19 April 2017, giving rise to the 2017 General Election. The second scenario has not happened since the FTPA was enacted. For further information on the Act, see Commons Briefing Paper 6111, Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, 27 April 2017.

If the Government states that such a motion is a matter of confidence, this would not necessarily require a General Election under the FTPA. A confidence motion as required under the Act or a vote for an early General Election would still be required.

3.2 Operation of the EU (Withdrawal) Act if there is no transition period

The UK has already legislated to seek to provide “legal continuity” as and when it leaves the EU. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018

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52 James Callaghan requested, and was granted, a dissolution of Parliament after an explicit motion of no-confidence in his Government was passed on 28 March 1979.

53 For further information, see Commons Briefing Paper 2873, Confidence motions, 13 May 2013, and Dr Catherine Haddon, Institute for Government, The (Not So) Fixed-Term Parliaments Act, 14 April 2015.
both repeals the *European Communities Act 1972* and makes arrangements to “transpose” much, but not all, of EU law as it exists on exit day, into domestic law. The Act also makes arrangements to allow the UK’s governments (plural) to make “corrections” to domestic law (including retained EU law) to make sure that it functions properly in light of the UK no longer being an EU Member State.

The *EUW Act* operates ‘agnostically’ as to the existence or otherwise of a deal. It is intended to provide legal continuity regardless of the outcome of the Brexit negotiations. In practice, however, the manner in which legal continuity is achieved, and on what timescale, will depend on whether (and what type of) agreement is reached. The draft Withdrawal Agreement expects that a transition (or implementation) period will be part of any final agreement and that it will operate until the end of December 2020. During that transition period, EU law (including the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU - CJEU) will continue to have full force and effect. The UK will therefore be expected to provide domestic means of implementing EU law that comes into effect between exit day and the end of transition in its *Withdrawal Agreement and Implementation Bill*.54

The key difference in a ‘no deal’ scenario is that no transition period would apply and the ‘default’ provisions of the *EUW Act* would come into effect from 29 March 2019. This would mean there would be no obligation, either in international law or domestic law, to ‘track’ or ‘shadow’ changes in EU law from that point onwards.

3.3 Devolution

**Temporary restrictions on devolved competence**

After exit day the devolved institutions will no longer be required to legislate compatibly with EU law. Section 12 of the EUW Act removes this requirement from the *Scotland Act 1998*, *Government of Wales Act 2006* and *Northern Ireland Act 1998*.

However, in its place, the Act allows the UK Government to make regulations to restrict, on a temporary basis, the legislative and executive competence of the devolved institutions. These regulations can be used to prevent the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly and Northern Ireland Assembly from “modifying” retained EU law in areas UK Ministers specify. The regulations cannot be made more than two years after exit day and no set of regulations can have effect for longer than five years.

Changes to competence would take place on (or in the case of regulations, potentially some point after) exit day, regardless of whether there was a deal. However, if there is a deal, further arrangements for compliance with EU law by devolved institutions would be expected to be made in the *Withdrawal Agreement and Implementation Bill*. In the

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54 The Government White Paper, *Legislating for the Withdrawal Agreement between the United Kingdom and the European Union*, Cm 9674, 24 July 2018, explains that a transition agreement will be delivered by legislating to delay the repeal of (parts of) the *European Communities Act* to a point after exit day.
absence of separate arrangements for a transition period, the UK Government would more likely seek to bring section 12 regulations into force from 29 March 2019 rather than from a later date.

Common Frameworks

The UK Government intends to bring forward legislation creating UK-wide “common frameworks”. These aim to replace, in devolved policy areas, some of the restrictions imposed by EU law that harmonise practices and standards in all Member states. The Government wants to create these frameworks to safeguard the UK’s internal market, to protect common resource and security interests, and to prevent internal regulatory divergence from undermining its capacity to enter into comprehensive trade agreements with third countries.

This legislation would be introduced regardless of whether the UK left with or without a deal, but there may be a greater urgency to legislate for these in the event of ‘no deal’. A transition period (and any further implementation periods in relevant policy areas) may reduce the urgency for these arrangements in the event of an agreement being reached.

The Scottish ‘Continuity Bill’

The Scottish Parliament approved its own legislation for legal continuity in devolved areas in March 2018. The UK Withdrawal from the European Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill was prevented from gaining Royal Assent in April 2018 because the UK Government exercised a power in the devolution statutes to refer the Bill to the Supreme Court. It contends that the Bill is outside the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament and should therefore be declared void: “not law”. The UK Supreme Court considered the legal arguments over two days (24-25 July) before deciding in the autumn whether the “Continuity Bill” can go forward for Royal Assent.

If the Continuity Bill is cleared for Royal Assent, this will have implications for legal continuity regardless of whether the UK reaches a deal with the EU. Among the arrangements in the Continuity Bill, for example, is a power for Scottish Ministers to “keep pace with” developments in EU law after exit day. No such power exists in the EUW Act for either UK or devolved ministers.

In the event of a no-deal Brexit such a power could prove particularly important, since there will be no arrangements for a transition period. It will also have implications for the UK’s internal market, as some parts of the UK might continue to follow the substance of EU law more closely than others.

55 Under the devolution statutes the UK Government can refer a devolved Bill within four weeks of it completing its legislative stages but before it gains Royal Assent. Such a reference allows the UK Supreme Court to determine whether the Bill is within legislative competence. See s. 33 Scotland Act 1998.
4. Governance

The European Union involves complex governance processes, as set out below. In the event of no deal, the UK will be outside those processes and there will be no agreement on how future relations between the UK and the EU should be managed, including how disputes should be resolved.

In order to appreciate the implications of a governance vacuum, it is necessary to understand the current arrangements.

4.1 Current governance of the UK-EU relationship

In discussing the governance of both the current UK-EU relationship and the future UK-EU relationship, a clear definition of the concept is helpful. While there are various ways to explain ‘governance’, the Commission’s definition (echoing the terminology of the Council’s negotiating guidelines) is a useful starting point. It suggests that governance of any international agreement is made up of three components:

1. Ongoing Management/Supervision
2. Dispute Settlement
3. Enforcement after dispute settlement

As an EU Member State, all three components of governance of the UK-EU relationship are currently dealt with via EU mechanisms.

Ongoing management and supervision of the EU Treaties, or the Member States’ compliance with those, is carried out by several different institutions. There are various ‘managerial’ bodies in the EU, with tasks ranging from ‘big picture’ management to ‘day to day’ management.

The European Council, formally given legal personality in the Treaty of Lisbon, is the ‘big picture’ management institution. As the body where the EU Heads of State or Government meet at least bi-annually, it sets the direction of travel that it wishes other EU institutions to pursue. It is also the body that can formally re-open Treaty negotiations.

However, day to day ‘management’ as well as supervision of EU law falls to the European Commission. Unlike most other international organisations, which do not have powers to produce ‘secondary’ legislation, the EU has legislative abilities that are either initiated or (in the case of tertiary legislation) exercised by the Commission. It behaves like an executive in charge of ‘management’ in this sense, though its activities are steered by the political sign-posting of the European Council. Its supervision powers are more specific and can give rise to the ‘infringement proceedings’ set out in Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). Under this procedure, the Commission
can take action against any Member State it believes is not complying with EU law.

Supervision of compliance with the EU Treaties works in other directions, however. The Member States can also take action against each other (Article 259 TFEU) and the EU institutions (Article 263 TFEU), and the EU institutions can also accuse each other of *ultra vires* action (Article 263 TFEU). Consequently, rather than speaking of a single ‘supervisor’, the EU has a complex and multi-structural system of ‘observing’ compliance with, and the functioning of, the Treaties, which is led (but not exclusively) by the Commission.

**Dispute settlement** in the EU is first of all dealt with via the aforementioned infringement proceedings. If Member States are unresponsive to a Commission administrative action that sets out how they are perceived as not complying with their EU obligations, the Commission can take its case to the CJEU, which then issues a binding judgment either in favour of the Commission or the Member State.

However, early in the EU’s existence, it was realised that the EU legal system would not only give rise to disputes between Member States and the EU, but also to disputes originating with individuals and companies who were either benefitting from or suffering from their Member States not having complied with EU law. Such complaints may arise between such private parties and their Member State, or even between two private parties affected by an EU law provision. The Treaties have to date remained silent on the dispute settlement mechanism applicable to private parties with complaints rooted in the EU Treaties; it is clear only that they do not (generally) have standing before the CJEU. Questions of dispute settlement stemming from EU law arose in national courts, however, and when the CJEU was asked how to address these disputes, the CJEU filled this gap in the Treaties with several seminal judgments.

First, it established in *Van Gend en Loos* that private parties could rely directly on EU law provisions before domestic courts where those EU provisions met certain criteria: they were clear, precise and unconditional.\(^{56}\) Second, it established in *Costa* that EU law was ‘supreme’ over domestic law, and so where a national court observed a clash between domestic and EU law, EU law took precedence.\(^{57}\) Third, it eventually found in *Von Colson* that even if EU law is not clear, precise and unconditional, domestic courts (under the duty of ‘sincere cooperation’ as set out in Article 4(3)TEU) must do everything within their power to interpret a national law *in light of* any EU law that a Member State was meant to comply with.\(^{58}\)

The consequence of this case law is that since 1963 there have been two concurrent streams of ‘dispute resolution’ within the EU. The first is at the ‘macro’ level and involves disputes between the Member States and the EU institutions; these are resolved by the Commission through administrative processes or by the CJEU if those administrative processes

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\(^{56}\) Case 26/62 *Van Gen den Loos* ECLI:EU:C:1963:1

\(^{57}\) Case 6/64 *Costa v ENEL* ECLI:EU:C:1964:66

\(^{58}\) Case 14/83 *von Colson and Kamann* ECLI:EU:C:1984:153
fail. The second is at the ‘micro’ level and involves private parties making a claim in a domestic court, which applies CJEU-developed principles to ensure that they attain their EU law rights.

**Enforcement following dispute settlement** is not EU-level enforcement; the judgment issued in private party complaints about a failure to comply with EU law is a purely domestic judgment and is enforced via whatever enforcement systems the Member States themselves have in place. The EU has no competence to dictate what those are.

The EU (like most international organisations) has very limited enforcement powers with regard to failures to comply with CJEU judgments. If Member States are persistently unwilling to comply with a CJEU judgment, under Article 260(2) TFEU the Commission can bring a further case to the CJEU regarding non-compliance, and the CJEU can impose a ‘lump sum’ or ‘penalty payment’ if it finds for the Commission, with the CJEU itself determining the amount of penalty payment or lump sum (or both) that is appropriate in a given case (albeit with Commission input, as set out in its applications under Article 260 TFEU).

Many other international agreements have enforcement mechanisms, such as an ability to suspend rights or ‘concessions’ gained under a treaty in response to persistent harmful non-compliance with treaty obligations. The EU model does not, however; the consequences of this appear to be that there is no EU-level enforcement option that ‘excludes’ a Member State from aspects of EU law as a punishment and source of pressure for its own non-compliance. This has been considered in the past; the 1984 Spinelli Draft Treaty endorsed by the European Parliament included a sanctions mechanism that included the suspension of rights for “serious and persistent violations of treaty provisions”. The proposal was not adopted, however, and has not since been revisited.

Does this mean that a Member State cannot be ‘excluded’ from EU law against its wishes, even if it continuously fails to comply with its Treaty obligations? The argument has been made that public international law permits ‘sanctions’ options beyond those set out in Article 258-260 TFEU – suspension of rights on a temporary basis seems impossible, but expelling a Member State is accounted for in a general principle of international law, namely *pacta sunt servanda*. Article 60 of the *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties* (VCLT) permits the parties of a treaty to terminate the operation of a treaty vis-à-vis another signatory that has committed a ‘material breach’ of treaty provisions. A ‘material breach’ is defined as covering a “violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty”, which appears to be a similar trigger condition as that applicable to the infringement proceedings under EU law. Logically, therefore, a first ‘material breach’

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59 Case C-304/02 Commission v France
of the EU treaties should be dealt with under the infringement proceedings.\textsuperscript{60}

However, various international lawyers have argued persuasively that where the EU’s own enforcement mechanisms do not work (and so there is consistent breaching of obligations), Article 60 of the VCLT covers a scenario that is not set out in the Treaties, and thus should apply. The alternative would be the Member States effectively being forced to tolerate a regime that consistently fails to comply with promises it has made under the Treaty, and still being obliged to extend the benefits of EU law to that regime.\textsuperscript{61} As a final resort, Article 60 of the VCLT appears to permit ‘expulsion’ of sorts from the EU – but not before any complaining Member State or EU institution has taken recourse to Article 258-260 TFEU.

4.2 Governance if there is no Withdrawal Agreement

Withdrawal from the EU will mean the end of most of the architecture described above. The relevant institutions will no longer have the jurisdiction to provide oversight/management, dispute settlement or enforcement functions unless the UK and the EU specifically agree this in any agreement on a future relationship.

Without such an agreement, and without an agreed Withdrawal Agreement that sets out its own governance structure (as discussed in this Commons Briefing Paper), there would be very little structure to the governance of the relationship between the EU and the UK. The framework of interactions would resemble that of the UK and any other third country: it would require diplomatic presence not only in the EU27, but presumably also in the EU seat, Brussels. Management and supervision of the overall relationship would need to take place via a newly established UK ‘mission’ to the EU – but it is inconceivable that diplomacy alone would govern the relationship for any length of time, given the significant connections between the UK and the EU in economic, political and social terms.

There are of course aspects of a no-deal EU-UK relationship that will be governed by existing international organisations and treaties that both the EU and the UK have ratified, each accompanied by their own dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms. EU-UK trade, for instance, would fall under the WTO’s remit, and disputes would be settled under the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding, which has

exclusive jurisdiction over WTO-related disputes (implications for trade are discussed in section 6 below).

Where the UK and the EU have ongoing ‘relationships’ in areas not explicitly covered by existing treaties, in the absence of an overarching deal with the EU, the parties would have to establish treaty infrastructure underpinning those relationships themselves. This would inevitably involve establishing governance mechanisms for the relationship as set out in these new treaties. These may take the standard form set out by the Commission in its slides on governance, of having a joint committee, with representatives from both the EU and the UK, having supervision/management functions and ‘first stage’ dispute settlement functions, with second-level dispute settlement functions falling to binding arbitration.

Alternatively, any new treaty may include a jurisdictional clause that allows any disputes about its interpretation or application to be referred to the International Court of Justice at request of either party. A new court could also be established by any UK-EU treaties.

Raphael Hogarth of the Institute for Government suggests that in the future relationship, the UK and the EU may pursue novel or hybrid dispute settlement and enforcement setups. This is equally true for a no-deal relationship, but the key difference is that extensive governance structures tend to accompany international agreements that encourage or maintain close cooperation between countries. Agreements surrounding a no-deal Brexit may not necessarily be characterised as such. Any suggestion that a particular governance model or hybrid is likely to appear post-Brexit in the event of no deal would be purely speculative; the most that can be noted is that new governance structures would have to be adopted post-haste to take the place of the elaborate framework set up by the EU, and to manage the intertwined nature of UK-EU relations that on exit day will need careful unravelling, even without a deal.
5. Economic impact

The economic impact of the UK leaving the EU with no deal – without a withdrawal agreement, transition period, framework for a future trade deal or ‘mini-deals’ in certain areas – is difficult to pinpoint with certainty, not least because there is no relevant precedent for a major developed economy leaving a large trading bloc, especially one as integrated as the EU’s Single Market and Customs Union. That being said, economic analysis and estimates can broadly highlight some of the likely consequences for the economy both in the near and long term.

5.1 No deal WTO scenario over long term

‘No deal’ would mean trade between the UK and EU economies being conducted under the terms of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). See section 6 for further information on trade.

Generally speaking, economic modelling from the Government and others shows that as the cost of trading with the EU increases (via tariffs and non-tariff barriers), the greater the negative impact on the UK economy would be. In other words, a scenario where the UK trades with the EU on WTO rules is likely to result in UK GDP being lower in the long term than a scenario where the UK has a European Economic Area (EEA)-type arrangement or a free trade agreement (FTA).

These ‘losses’ could be mitigated by improved UK growth prospects from trade deals with other non-EU countries and from other policy areas (such as growth-enhancing changes to UK regulation). However, the vast majority of economic modelling in this area shows that these potential benefits of leaving the EU with no deal over the longer term do not make up for the higher trade barriers with the EU (given its importance to the UK).

For example, the Government’s “Cross Whitehall” analysis of leaving the EU, dated January 2018 and published by the Commons Committee on Exiting the EU, provides a summary of the analytical issues that go into modelling different Brexit trade scenarios. It also gives ‘illustrative profiles’ of the long-term impact on the level of GDP compared with staying in the EU. These show that the UK:

- could see its GDP around 1.6% lower in 15 years under an EEA-type scenario (staying in the Single Market) compared with what GDP would have been if the UK remained in the EU;
- could see its GDP around 4.8% lower in 15 years under a Free Trade Agreement-type scenario compared with what GDP would have been if the UK remained in the EU;
- could see its GDP around 7.7% lower in 15 years under a ‘WTO mitigated’-type scenario compared with what GDP would have been if the UK remained in the EU. Note this is a ‘smooth’ no deal scenario and not a ‘disruptive’ no deal.

The analysis shows that the economy will grow in all scenarios, but that growth would be slower compared with staying in the EU. For instance,
instead of GDP going up by 25% in total over 15 years, the WTO scenario has it going up by around 17%. These figures are broadly in line with most of the analysis conducted by others, both before and after the referendum.

The analysis states that it is not a forecast as such (there are many other factors that will affect the economy over this time) but a comparison of these different scenarios on a consistent basis. The analysis came with heavy caveats; it was marked as “Draft Analytical Thinking with Preliminary Results”, for example.

The analysis also suggested that borrowing could be around £80bn a year higher by 2023-34 if the UK leaves the EU with no deal.

In summary, a ‘no deal’ scenario with no transition or future trade framework would, in the view of a large majority of economists, result in the UK economy growing more slowly than with other scenarios over the longer term.

5.2 Short-term impact of ‘no deal’

This section highlights some of the possible short-term economic consequences of ‘no deal’ and looks at the factors that may play a role in determining their impact.

As with the long-term impact discussed above, the immediate economic effects of a no-deal scenario are uncertain. For example, we do not know the precise circumstances that would lead to no deal and how financial markets, businesses and consumers, among others, would react.

If the UK leaves the EU without any transitional arrangements or a framework for a trade agreement, the way trade between the UK and EU is conducted would change overnight. The UK would become a third country with regards to the EU. This is expected to result in the imposition of tariffs on UK exports to the EU and on EU imports to the UK. On average these tariffs are low, averaging around 3%, but for some goods, such as many agricultural products, they are higher.

A potentially more disruptive consequence would be non-tariff barriers. These include additional administrative paperwork, customs procedures and checks (for example, relating to rules of origin), technical requirements and regulatory standards. For example, EU food safety law requires all meat products imported from countries outside the Single Market to be traceable to businesses that have been individually

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62 EU Exit Analysis: Cross Whitehall Briefing (January 2018) published by DEXEU Commons Select Committee, 8 March 2018, page 16
63 For example see: Angus Armstrong, Comparing Brexit forecasts: who should we believe on the economy?, UK in a Changing Europe, 16 June 2016; National Institute of Economic and Social Research, Deal, or no deal? The £2,000 question, 16 February 2018
64 On the assumption that the UK would not change its Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs under WTO rules.
65 WTO, European Union tariff profile [accessed 17 August 2018]
approved by the European Commission’s Food and Veterinary Office. In a no deal scenario, those approvals would not exist and therefore - barring any unilateral, and most likely temporary, derogation from that legislation for British products - UK lamb, beef and poultry exports could be refused entry into the EU from March 2019 onwards. The UK would also no longer be party to the trade agreements the EU has negotiated (see section 6.3 for information on trade with non-EU countries).

The impact of a no-deal scenario stretches beyond those who import and export goods and services. From the transportation to the financial services sectors, ‘no deal’ would have implications for businesses.

Many economists expect the pound to fall in value in the event of ‘no deal’. If this did happen, the price of imports would rise, pushing up inflation (as it did following the EU referendum). In turn, the purchasing power of businesses and consumers would be squeezed. UK exports would become cheaper internationally, potentially moderating some of the effects of disruption to trading with the EU (depending on the extent to which they rely on imported goods and services, as these would have become more expensive). In this scenario there is a risk that confidence could fall with investments being deferred or scrapped and consumers cutting back on their spending.

An analysis of the possible effects of ‘no deal’ on the UK economy by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research think tank determined that it would be the disruption to trade with the EU that would have the biggest negative impact on GDP in the months following a no-deal Brexit. It states that GDP would “stall due to an immediate reduction in services exports to the EU”, mitigated somewhat by the expected fall in the value of the pound (supporting exports).

5.3 Factors that could influence the magnitude of the economic impact

Certain issues may influence the degree to which the economy is affected by a no-deal departure from the EU. A few are summarised in this section.

Preparedness

The more prepared the Government, businesses and the wider public are for no deal, the greater opportunity there will be for steps to be taken to limit the economic disruption caused. The Government, like the EU, has now published around a third of its guidance to businesses and consumers on how to deal with a no-deal Brexit. Further guidance is

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66 See article 12 of the Official Controls Regulation (Regulation 854/2004). The legislation allows this requirement to be waived for a specific country, but this requires a proposal by the European Commission and the approval of a qualified majority of Member States. That derogation can also be limited in time.

67 UK in a Changing Europe, Cost of No Deal, July 2017

68 NIESR, National Institute Economic Review No 245, August 2018, Box A, F12-13 and NIESR blog post, “How much would a ‘White Paper Brexit’ cost the UK economy?”, 1 August 2018

69 NIESR, National Institute Economic Review No 245, August 2018, Box A, F12-13
expected in September. However, due to the inherent bilateral nature of trade, the extent to which the UK can unilaterally prepare for disruption is limited. It has, for example, no control over how customs officials in France, the Netherlands and Belgium would treat UK imports in a no deal scenario, and any delays in clearing freight moving from the UK to the EU27 could also disrupt traffic in the other direction. The Government’s no-deal planning also relies to some extent on the EU acting unilaterally to avoid disruption, but this cannot be guaranteed.

Timing

How long before Brexit day will it be known that ‘no deal’ will happen? At least in principle, the longer there is to prepare for it, the more that can be done to plan for and adjust to such an outcome.

In December 2017, the House of Lords EU Committee stated that the later a no-deal outcome is known, the more damaging it is likely to be:

> It is clear that the later ‘no deal’ emerges as the outcome of the negotiations, the more damaging its effects will be. To hold out the prospect of a ‘no deal’ outcome until the eleventh hour, and even to suggest that the clock could be ‘stopped’ to allow negotiations to continue beyond that point, even when there is no obvious legal mechanism to do so, would be irresponsible. For one thing, it guarantees that uncertainty for business and citizens will continue, and even increase, as ‘Brexit day’ approaches.⁷⁰

How long ‘no deal’ lasts

Even in the event of a no-deal outcome, some form of deal may be agreed subsequently, even if it takes the form of a basic functional ‘bare bones’ deal. The Government also appears to envisage that, even in absence of a Withdrawal Agreement, there may be some ‘mini deals’ ahead of the UK’s exit from the EU – for example in relation to air traffic rights – to avoid some of the most immediate disruption to transport and trade links.

There may be economic pressures for talks following no deal. Possible economic effects in the UK have been described above, but EU Member States could also be impacted to a lesser degree, particularly in Ireland.⁷¹

5.4 The financial settlement

The March 2018 draft Withdrawal Agreement sets out how the UK and EU will settle their outstanding financial obligations to each other. The matter was discussed during the first phase of exit negotiations under the heading of the ‘financial settlement’. The political agreement reached on the settlement was set out in the Joint Report between the UK and the European Commission.

The financial settlement was labelled in the media as the UK’s ‘exit bill’ or ‘divorce bill’. The Library briefing Brexit: the exit bill provides further

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⁷⁰ House of Lords EU Committee, Brexit: deal or no deal, 7 December 2017, para 59
details about what has been agreed and how the negotiations proceeded.

What has been agreed?

The agreement reached on the financial settlement stipulated that the UK would participate in the EU Budget as if it were still a Member State from March 2019 until 31 December 2020, and contribute afterwards towards existing financial commitments that remain outstanding on that day, including the pension liabilities of EU staff. The settlement also provides that:

- the UK will, over time, wind up its financial involvement with the European Investment Bank (EIB) but remain liable for a share of any contingent liabilities that crystallise in relation to EIB lending that took place before 30 March 2019;72
- the UK will continue to participate in the European Development Fund, which is legally separate from the EU budget, until the current round ends at the end of 2020.73

All the text in the draft Withdrawal Agreement covering the financial settlement is coloured green, meaning it has been agreed by the negotiators and will only be subject to technical legal revisions.

What is the legal status of the financial settlement?

The terms of the settlement will only become legally binding once the Withdrawal Agreement is ratified by the EU (by votes in the EP and Council) and the UK. If there is no Withdrawal Agreement the political agreement reached on the financial settlement will not be legally binding.

Financial obligations if there is no deal?

There is a great deal of uncertainty about what happens to the outstanding UK-EU financial obligations if there is no deal. It is likely that politics and the appetite for an ongoing EU-UK relationship will largely dictate the extent to which the two parties honour the agreement reached over the financial settlement. The relevance of the financial settlement to the future UK-EU relationship is considered in section 5.4.

In evidence to the House of Lords EU Committee on 29 August, Dominic Raab said there was still a “question around quite what the shape of those financial obligations were” if the UK left with no deal, and that the UK “always pays its dues”. He did not say the UK would pay nothing, which some thought he implied when he said no deal would bring a “swifter end” to UK payments to the EU Budget.

The financial settlement brings together a range of financial items, not just those that arise from the UK’s participation in the EU Budget. For instance, it sets out how the UK’s financial relationship with the European Investment Bank (EIB) will be wound up and how the UK will

72 National Audit Office, Exiting the EU: The financial settlement, 20 April 2018, para 2.28
73 See also the European Scrutiny Committee’s Report of 25 April 2017.
continue to contribute to the European Development Fund. Below we consider what ‘no deal’ may mean for some of the significant individual items included in the financial settlement, in the absence of any further political agreement.

**UK participation in the EU Budget**

Items in the financial settlement that arise from spending and liabilities agreed while the UK was an EU Member State include spending under the current long-term EU budget (the 2014 – 2020 ‘Multiannual Financial Framework’ or MFF), outstanding liabilities (largely those related to pensions) and contingent (as yet uncertain) liabilities, for example relating to the EU’s macro-financial loans to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.

The Lords EU Financial Affairs Sub-Committee considered the UK’s legal liability for these items if there is no Withdrawal Agreement in early 2017. Legal expert witnesses to the Committee had different opinions on the legal status of these items. However, the Committee concluded that without a Withdrawal Agreement Article 50 TEU allows the UK to leave without being liable for outstanding financial obligations. The Committee also concluded that individual EU Member States may seek to bring a case against the UK for outstanding payments under public international law, but also that “international law is slow to litigate and hard to enforce. In addition, it is questionable whether an international court or tribunal could have jurisdiction”. 

As discussed in section 5.4, the Lords Committee said that the political and economic consequences of the UK leaving without making any payment “are likely to be profound”.

The Institute for Government has also suggested that if the UK refused to make any payments to the EU, then redress may be sought through the International Court of Justice or the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

Under the financial settlement, the UK would continue to be eligible to receive EU funding from the 2019 and 2020 EU Budgets as if it were still a Member State, while for CAP payments it would continue as normal, for discretionary grants such as like research funding the UK might receive less, even if it remains legally eligible for them. Section 5.6 on EU funding discusses the impact of ‘no deal’ on this funding.

**European Investment Bank**

Under the European Investment Bank (EIB) Statute, the shareholders are the EU Member States, so it is likely that the UK will cease to be a member of the EIB, whether there is a ratified Withdrawal Agreement.
or not. The financial settlement explains how the UK’s financial involvement in the EIB will be wound up. It sets out:

- the schedule for the gradual return of €3.5 billion of paid in capital to the UK;
- that UK will provide a guarantee to the EIB equal to its callable capital (up to €39 billion) – an amount the UK currently agrees to provide if required. The guarantee will decrease as EIB loans associated with it mature.

The UK has paid in €3.5 billion to the EIB, which the Bank leverages for its operations. It has also agreed that it will pay in up to a total of €39.2 billion if necessary (all Member States have made similar guarantees of varying sizes, in line with the size of their economies). If the UK ceased to be a shareholder, it would probably want to receive its €3.5 billion back immediately and stop bearing its share of the liabilities of the Bank’s outstanding loans, which would have a severe impact on the Bank’s operations. For its part, the EIB would probably want to keep this money, at least in the short term. Given that there is no clear process in the Bank’s Statute to deal with this situation, further negotiation and possibly legal action would be the likely result.

In July 2017, the UK’s position paper on the privileges and immunities enjoyed by EU institutions highlighted that the EIB uses its position as an EU agency to operate in the UK (and has lent considerable amounts to UK-based operations, such as the Northern Powerhouse Investment Fund). Without a deal, its ability to do so would cease, which calls into question whether these operations could continue to receive funding. It seems likely that a subsequent negotiation would have to take place between the UK and EIB to settle the matter.

More discussion of this issue can be found in section 5.4 above on the financial settlement.

**UK participation in the European Development Fund**

The European Development Fund (EDF) is the EU’s main instrument for providing overseas development assistance to countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. For historical reasons, it is separate from the general EU Budget in a legal and accounting sense. The EDF is broken down over time into ‘EDF funds’. The UK’s spending through the EDF contributes towards its commitment to spend 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) on overseas aid.80

The financial settlement says that the UK will remain part of, and will contribute to, the EDF until the close of the 11th EDF fund in December 2020. The UK also has a share of the EDF’s Investment Facility. This funding will be returned to the UK as the investments end.

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80 For information on the UK’s aid target, see Commons Briefing Paper 3714, The 0.7% aid target: June 2016 update, 20 June 2016.
Each EDF fund is set out in a separate treaty – called an ‘internal agreement’ – outside the EU Treaties.\(^{81}\) Strictly speaking, the EDF internal agreements are not subject to the Article 50 process. Article 50 relates to the EU Treaties and provides that if there is no deal the EU Treaties will cease to apply in the UK after 29 March 2019, but the EDF internal agreements will not cease. This suggests that in the event of no deal the UK’s legal obligation to make contributions to the EDF would persist in a legal sense, unless the UK can end its involvement in the internal agreements some other way.

Whatever happens, it is unlikely that the UK’s total spending on overseas aid will decrease. In 2016, £1.5 billion of the £13.4 billion spent by the UK on overseas aid went through the EDF.\(^{82}\) Continuing to meet the statutory target for UK overseas aid of 0.7% of GNI would necessitate channelling any spending no longer going through the EDF to other overseas aid programmes. It is reasonable to anticipate that about 10% of the UK’s 2019-20 aid budget will potentially be available for reallocation in the event if a no-deal Brexit. The UK is also considering seeking participation in the EU’s development programme from 2021 onwards – the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – although the legal parameters for any such involvement are yet to be decided by the EU institutions.\(^{83}\)

**Politics and future EU-UK relations**

In reality, politics and the appetite for an ongoing EU-UK relationship are likely to dictate the extent to which financial commitments are settled if there is no deal.

For example, the UK Government has said that after Brexit it would like to participate as a third country in some EU programmes and agencies, such as the next research and innovation programme (Horizon 2020 is the current programme) and the European Defence Fund.\(^{84}\) If there is no deal it seems unlikely that the EU would allow the UK to participate in any of its programmes unless a financial settlement outside the Withdrawal Agreement can be agreed.

There are other areas where the UK would favour an ongoing relationship with EU, and in the event of ‘no deal’, coming to an agreement on the financial settlement could help to facilitate such cooperation.

\(^{81}\) European Scrutiny Committee, Documents considered by the Committee on 25 April 2017, 28 European Development Funds

\(^{82}\) House of Lords Library Briefing, Brexit: Overseas Development Assistance, 6 February 2018

\(^{83}\) The European Scrutiny Committee is expected to publish a report on the UK’s post-Brexit involvement in EU development programmes on 18 September 2018.

\(^{84}\) The Government White Paper on the future relationship between the UK and the EU proposes continued UK participation in several EU programmes and agencies.
The Lords Committee concluded that “the political and economic consequences of the UK leaving the EU without responding to claims under the EU budget are likely to be profound”. 85

EU and UK views on the financial obligations

The EU and UK set out their views on the financial obligations before and during negotiations on the financial settlement. Their opinions may offer some insight into how each might respond if there is no Withdrawal Agreement.

Broadly speaking, for the European Commission the financial settlement is about ‘settling the accounts’ 86 – without a deal it would presumably consider them ‘unsettled’. The Commission published a position paper on the principles of the financial settlement in June 2017 which went into some detail about individual obligations.

Since the referendum, the UK Government has stated its intention to negotiate a settlement “in accordance with the law and in the spirit of the United Kingdom’s continuing partnership with the EU”. 87 The UK has also recognised that financial obligations between the two parties exist. In July 2017 former Secretary of State David Davis acknowledged that “the UK has obligations to the EU, and the EU obligations to the UK, that will survive the UK’s withdrawal”. 88 The Prime Minister has said that “the UK will honour commitments we have made during the period of our membership”. 89

During the first phase of withdrawal negotiations it was clear that the UK and EU had different views on the legal position of the financial obligations being discussed. David Davis said the Government was convinced there was no legal obligation for most of it and viewed it as a political rather than legal obligation. 90

5.5 UK participation in EU Agencies

If the UK does stay involved in some EU agencies and programmes such as Horizon 2020 and the European Defence Fund, it would be as a ‘third country’ and with a financial contribution.

Negotiations over the future EU-UK relationship will determine which EU programmes and agencies the UK will participate in and how it will contribute financially to them. Some programmes are already open to ‘third countries’ – often these are programmes with cross-border or collaborative elements. The European Scrutiny Committee believed that negotiating participation in any of the regulator agencies integral to the

85 House of Lords EU Committee, Brexit and the EU Budget, HL Paper 125, 4 March 2017, paras 135-137
86 Speech by Michel Barnier at the press conference on the adoption of the Commission’s recommendation on draft negotiating directives, 3 May 2017
87 Prime Minister’s letter to Donald Tusk triggering Article 50, 29 March 2017, page 4
88 HC Deb 13 July 2017, c15-16WS
89 PM’s Florence speech: a new era of cooperation and partnership between the UK and the EU, 22 September 2017
90 Lords EU Committee, Uncorrected oral evidence Scrutiny of Brexit negotiations, 31 October 2017
architecture of the Single Market would be “especially difficult”. Discussions about UK participation in EU programmes are complicated by the fact that these follow the EU’s seven-year budgetary cycle, of which the current one ends in December 2020. The legal – and financial – frameworks for the programmes from 2021 onwards are still subject to negotiations in the European Parliament and the Council as part of the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework. The outcome of those EU-level negotiations will determine the broad parameters for UK participation as a third country in specific programmes.

There is a precedent for determining the size of third countries’ contributions to EU programmes. Broadly speaking, third countries make contributions based on the EU’s budget for the programme and the size of the third country’s economy relative to the size of the EU economy plus the third country’s economy. Negotiations will determine whether the UK contributes according to this precedent.

Clearly there is uncertainty about which EU programmes the UK may participate in and how the associated costs will be calculated. For illustrative purposes the European Scrutiny Committee has estimated the potential gross cost of the UK participating in six EU programmes, all of which the Government has shown some interest in participating in.

The estimates – which the Committee say are “necessarily extremely provisional” – are based on the precedent for third countries’ contributions described above. The estimates should be treated with some caution, as:

- the UK has not yet negotiated third party participation in any of the programmes;
- they are based on provisional EU budgets for the programmes during 2021 – 2027 that may change;
- the UK and EU may agree alternative approaches for calculating the UK’s contribution;
- the estimates are gross contributions – they don’t account for funding the UK might receive from the programmes, which would mean a lower net contribution. For instance, the UK has a strong record in securing funding from the EU’s research and innovation programmes, which if continued would mean a significantly smaller net contribution.

91 European Scrutiny Committee, 34th Report of Session 2017-19, 10 July 2018, para 6.8
92 ibid
93 Commons Library briefing, Brexit: UK Funding from the EU, has data on the funding received by the UK from EU programmes.
94 The European Commission has proposed a mechanism for the 2021-2027 framework programme for research that would ensure that the UK does not become a net recipient from the programme if it participates as a third country.
In the event of ‘no deal’, it is highly unlikely that the EU27 would countenance UK participation in a new round of EU programmes as a third country until – at the very least - the financial settlement in the draft Withdrawal Agreement had been revived. Otherwise, they would effectively be allowing the UK to forego paying what they see as its financial commitments accrued during its EU membership.

Close integration with the Single Market

If the UK-EU future relationship results in the UK remaining closely integrated with all or part of the Single Market, then it is likely that the EU will request a financial contribution to the economic development of the poorer EU Member States. Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, which are in the EEA but not the EU, contribute funding to the EEA grants as a condition of their participation in the Single Market. Norway also provides Norway grants. Switzerland, which is not part of the EEA, but has bilateral trade agreements with the EU, makes enlargement contributions.

The size of any contribution would depend on the extent to which the UK remains integrated with the Single Market. The Government has stated on many occasions that the UK will leave the Single Market. If the UK were required to make payments, it is unlikely these would go to the EU Budget – the EEA, Norwegian and Swiss programmes are managed by their governments.95

5.6 Funding from the EU

The situation regarding EU funding in the event of ‘no deal’ is uncertain, largely because the EU Treaties governing the administration of this funding were not written to take account of the possibility of an EU Member State leaving the Union. The consequences of the UK leaving

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95 Op cit, page 71
without a deal are therefore unclear, and will likely only be resolved by further negotiation or possibly legal action.

The House of Lords EU Committee examined this issue in their report on Brexit and the EU Budget. They concluded that there may be different legal situations as regards ongoing funding from the different EU schemes, but that in general:

> The legal rights of UK-based persons to continue to receive EU funding post-Brexit are uncertain, and the Government, in undertaking to meet outstanding obligations (such as CAP payments) from domestic funds, implies that it does not expect the EU to meet them.\(^{96}\)

It appears, then, that the most likely outcome is that funding from the EU would stop at the point when the UK leaves, particularly if the UK made no further financial contributions to the EU. The UK Government has made some commitments around replacing this funding domestically.

**Structural Funds**

The main Structural Funds providing money to the UK are the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF). Along with some smaller funds, these are set to provide a total of €17.2 billion to the UK over the period from 2014 to 2020; much of this has already been paid out, but there will still be some that will not have been paid if the UK leaves the EU in March 2019.

The ERDF and ESF operate by providing money to Managing Authorities (MAs) within EU Member States, which then distribute it according to operational programmes agreed with the European Commission. In England, Government departments act as the MAs,\(^{97}\) while the Scottish and Welsh Governments and the Northern Ireland Executive perform this role in their respective countries.

If there were no deal, it is very likely that the EU would stop paying out money to the MAs. The UK Government has guaranteed all funding to organisations that secure funding from the EU up to the end of 2020, so even in the event of ‘no deal’ they would continue to receive this money.\(^{98}\)

**Direct funding from the European Commission**

Some EU funding comes directly to the UK from the European Commission, generally for specific projects – research funding under the *Horizon 2020* programme is one such example. In the event of ‘no deal’, this funding would be terminated – the EU made this clear in an announcement on its Research & Innovation Participant Portal website (emphasis added):

> For British applicants: Please note that until the UK leaves the EU, EU law continues to apply to and within the UK, when it comes to

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96 House of Lords European Union Committee, *Brexit and the EU budget*, 4 March 2017, HL Paper 125 2016-17, paragraph 149

97 The departments in question are MHCLG (for the ERDF), DWP (for the ESF), and Defra and its subsidiaries for the EAFRD and EMFF.

98 HM Treasury, *Funding from EU programmes guaranteed until the end of 2020*, 24 July 2018
rights and obligations; this includes the eligibility of UK legal entities to fully participate and receive funding in Horizon 2020 actions. Please be aware however that the eligibility criteria must be complied with for the entire duration of the grant. If the United Kingdom withdraws from the EU during the grant period without concluding an agreement with the EU ensuring in particular that British applicants continue to be eligible, you will cease to be eligible to receive EU funding (while continuing, where possible, to participate) or be required to leave the project on the basis of Article 50 of the grant agreement.

The UK Government has promised to underwrite the payment of all Horizon 2020 awards to UK entities, even if such projects continue after the UK has left the EU; this will still be the case if there is no deal, and this guarantee also applies to all other directly-funded programmes up to the end of 2020. This does not, however, help researchers based in other EU countries who have partnered with organisations in the UK, and who might have to break that partnership.

Agricultural funding
The UK receives a large amount of support for its agricultural sector under the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This is mainly delivered through the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (part of the Structural Funds mentioned above) and the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), which is set to provide a total of €22.5 billion to the UK between 2014 and 2020. Defra reports that £3.4 billion in CAP payments was paid out to farmers in the UK in 2017 alone.

If the UK leaves the EU without a deal, this funding will stop. In their 2017 manifesto, the Conservative Party pledged to maintain CAP funding at the same level in cash terms until the end of the parliament (expected to be in 2022); later Government announcements have confirmed this pledge. Farmers would therefore continue to receive funding up to this point; it is less clear how much funding (and in what form) would be available afterwards.

For more detail, see section 10 on food and farming.

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99 European Commission, Research & Innovation Participant Portal, 6 October 2017
100 The Article 50 referred to here is not the same one that the UK invoked to leave the EU; it is the article in the Grant Agreement signed by beneficiaries that allows either party to the agreement to terminate it.
101 BEIS, UK Participation in Horizon 2020, March 2018
102 HM Treasury, Funding from EU programmes guaranteed until the end of 2020, 24 July 2018
103 Defra, UK CAP Payments, retrieved 28 June 2018
104 Conservative Party manifesto, page 26, 18 May 2017
6. Trade

The UK is currently party to over a thousand international agreements with third countries as a member of the EU. These cover trade, regulatory and policy co-operation in a range of areas, including fisheries, agriculture, the nuclear sector and transport (including aviation agreements). How many of these are pertinent to the UK is as yet unclear. There is little information available on what the Government’s intentions are regarding continuity of arrangements covered by the EU’s non-trade agreements.\textsuperscript{105} But leaving the EU without a deal would mean a radical change in UK trade relationships with the EU and the rest of the world.\textsuperscript{106}

6.1 Trading under WTO rules

Trading under the WTO rules is the ‘default’ option, which would mean that the tariffs on trade in goods apply to trade between the UK and the EU and between the UK and the rest of the world (see also section 5.1). The UK is a founding member of the WTO in its own right, but as an EU Member State it is in practice represented in the WTO by the European Commission. After Brexit the UK will no longer be represented by the EU and will be a fully independent member of the WTO. The UK will need to update the terms of its WTO membership, for example by establishing its own ‘schedule’ of trade commitments at the WTO.\textsuperscript{107} This process is not expected to be straightforward.\textsuperscript{108}

The WTO represents a rules-based trading system, based on multiple multilateral agreements between member states. Its General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) governs how tariffs are applied and addresses non-tariff barriers (quotas, rules of origin and various other legal or bureaucratic trade restrictions). The leading principle of non-discrimination requires WTO members not to treat any member less advantageously than any other: grant one country preferential treatment, and the same must be done for everyone else. There are exceptions for free trade areas and customs unions like the EU, and a preference schemes for developing countries, and anti-dumping duties (which are not determined on a non-discrimination basis). Beyond these, the tariff and treatment that applies to the ‘most-favoured nation’ (MFN) must similarly apply to all.

Based on the application of the MFN principle of the WTO, the EU would have to apply the same tariff to imports from the UK as to imports from any other nation that has no preferential trade agreement

\textsuperscript{105} For further information on the EU’s trade and other agreements, see House of Commons Briefing Paper 8370, \textit{UK adoption of EU external agreements after Brexit}, 24 July 2018, and House of Commons International Trade Select Committee report on \textit{Continuing Application of EU trade agreements after Brexit}, 28 February 2018.

\textsuperscript{106} The UK in a Changing Europe, \textit{Cost of No Deal}, 20 July 2017

\textsuperscript{107} The UK will almost certainly have to establish its independent position at the WTO, irrespective of whether there is a deal with the EU.

\textsuperscript{108} P. Ungphakorn, \textit{Nothing simple about UK regaining WTO status post-Brexit}, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 27 June 2016
with the EU in the event of no-deal. The same would apply to all other countries importing goods from the UK.

Without a deal the UK’s trade in services with the rest of the world would be governed by the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The MFN principle applies to trade in services in the same way it applies to trade in goods, albeit with more options for exceptional treatment. Members can tailor their commitments under GATS in line with their national policy and schedule their commitments to a handful of sectors or choose to provide market access in a wide range of services.

Leaving the EU, and the customs union in particular, would allow the UK to pursue its own trade interests and forge its own free trade agreements. What will trade look like after a no-deal Brexit? The next section looks at the UK in relation to the EU and the rest of the world.

### 6.2 UK trade with the EU

As an EU Member State, the UK is part of the EU Single Market and customs union. The EU, taken as a whole, is the UK’s largest trading partner. In 2017 UK exports to the EU were £274 billion (44% of all UK exports). UK imports from the EU were £341 billion (53% of all UK imports).\(^{109}\) Services accounted for 40% of the UK’s exports to the EU in 2017.

All the trade within the Single Market takes place (up to the point of exit) without paying tariffs or facing quota restrictions on goods. The Single Market also aims to eliminate non-tariff barriers such as differing technical specifications and labelling requirements.

With regard to trade in services, the Single Market provides the freedom to establish and run a company in any Member State. This is facilitated by mutual recognition of professional qualifications, freedom of movement of people and capital, and harmonisation of various rules.

No deal in March 2019 means the UK will be a third country to the EU for the purposes of trade. From exit day onwards, its relations with the EU will be governed by general public international law and both the UK and EU will start trading on the basis of WTO rules. The EU will be obliged to treat the UK no more favourably than any other country that has no preferential trade agreement with the block.\(^{110}\)

Under the WTO the UK would no longer be obliged to follow the rules applied by the EU. There would be no requirement to implement EU legislation, although UK businesses would still have to comply with EU rules in order to export to the Single Market.

### Trade in goods

The EU customs union sets the Common Customs Tariff (CCT): all members of the customs union apply the same set of tariffs on goods imported from outside the EU. UK exports to the EU would face the

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\(^{109}\) Statistics on UK-EU trade, Commons Library Briefing Paper 7851, 31 July 2018

\(^{110}\) Joe Owen, Alex Stojanovic, Jill Rutter, *Trade after Brexit*, Institute for Government, December 2017, p46
EU’s CCT and imports into the UK from the EU would face whatever tariffs the UK decided to impose. All exports from outside the EU are subject to the Rules of Origin (RoO) checks, even if they come from a country which has a trade agreement with the EU. This ensures that a correct tariff is applied and goods do not enter the EU customs union illegally via a low tariff country. As exporters from a third country, UK companies will immediately face such checks on all goods exported to the EU.

Trading under WTO rules means that the maximum tariff that can be applied to goods coming from the UK is the MFN rate. The EU’s MFN tariffs have generally fallen over time. In 2015 the EU’s average tariff was 2.6% for non-agricultural products.\textsuperscript{111} This is an average figure; tariffs on some individual products are higher. The EU tariff on cars, for example, is 10%. While the EU tariffs are low on average, they are still substantial for some sectors, particularly agriculture. The average EU tariff on sugar and confectionery, beverages and tobacco, is around 20%.\textsuperscript{112} This could be potentially economically disruptive, as it would increase the cost of the UK products in the EU. However, the MFN principle would prevent the EU from levying discriminatory or punitive tariffs on goods from the UK, or vice versa.

**Non-tariff barriers**

As a third country the UK could face various non-tariff barriers to trade, including administrative and bureaucratic delays at customs, technical barriers to trade, import licensing, standards and rules of origin.

A Commission Brexit ‘preparedness notice’ for a no-deal scenario indicates, for example, that imports from the UK entering its territory may be subject to customs controls. Businesses will have to submit customs declarations and may be required to provide guarantees to cover potential customs debts.\textsuperscript{113}

Manufacturers or importers established in the UK will no longer be considered as EU economic operators. A former EU distributor will become an exporter and will have to comply with a new set of conformity assessments.\textsuperscript{114}

UK industrial products are currently subject to the standards and requirements of EU product legislation on general product safety, public health, environmental safety or energy efficiency requirements, for example. However, a no-deal Brexit may introduce new bureaucratic requirements to prove compliance.

The import of certain goods from the UK and the export of such goods to the UK will become subject to import/export licensing. The EU imposes such restrictions on goods going to and coming from third

\textsuperscript{111} World Trade Organization, \textit{WTO Tariff Profiles 2017}, p 82. Trade-weighted average
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid
\textsuperscript{113} European Commission, Notice to Stakeholders, \textit{Withdrawal of the United Kingdom and EU Rules in the Field of Customs and Direct Taxation}, 30 January 2018
\textsuperscript{114} European Commission, Notice to Stakeholders, \textit{Withdrawal of the United Kingdom and EU Rules in the Field of Industrial products}, 22 January 2018
countries to protect health and safety and the environment. This affects
goods such as waste, hazardous chemicals, genetically-modified
organisms, live animals, products of animal origin, and some plants and
plant products, such as wood packaging. The existing licences issued by
the UK authorities will cease to be valid.\footnote{European Commission, Notice to Stakeholders, \textit{Withdrawal of the UK and EU Rules in the Field of Import/Export Licences for Certain Goods}, 25 January 2018}

The licensing requirements will also apply to controlled goods, such as
firearms and dual-use items that can be used for both civil and military
purposes.\footnote{Such items range from raw materials like chemicals to components and complete systems like lasers, as well as software and technology. Government Guidance, \textit{Exporting controlled goods if there’s no Brexit deal}, 23 August 2018.}

The Government’s ‘technical notice’ \textit{Trading with the EU if there’s no Brexit deal} and \textit{VAT for businesses if there’s no Brexit deal} clarify that the
obligations for businesses that trade with the EU would be broadly the same as those that apply to companies currently trading with
countries outside the EU. Businesses would have to register as UK
economic operators, submit customs declarations on imports and
exports, and might have to pay tariffs or fulfil other administrative
requirements.\footnote{Government Guidance, \textit{Trading with the EU if there’s no Brexit deal} and \textit{VAT for businesses if there’s no Brexit deal}, 23 August 2018.}

Importers of goods from the EU would have to
correctly classify these goods in order to apply the right UK import
tariff.\footnote{Government Guidance, \textit{Classifying your goods in the UK Trade Tariff if there’s no Brexit deal}, 23 August 2018.}

\section*{Rules of origin}

The EU has preferential trade arrangements with a range of other
countries. UK inputs (materials or processing operations) currently count
as ‘EU content’ for the purpose of determining if imports benefit from
preferential tariffs the EU has agreed with those countries. As of the
withdrawal date, in the absence of any other arrangement, goods
originating in the UK that are incorporated in EU goods exported to
third countries will no longer qualify as ‘EU content’. EU exporters will
no longer be able to cumulate the UK share in the product and may
thus miss out on the benefits of preferential tariffs.\footnote{European Commission, Notice to Stakeholders, \textit{Withdrawal of the United Kingdom and EU Rules in the Field of Customs and External Trade, Preferential Origin of Goods}, 4 June 2018}

\section*{Trade in services}

Without an agreement, the UK’s trade in services with the EU will be
governed by the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).

Within the EU Single Market, economic operators are free to establish
and run a business in any Member State and can also provide services
from their ‘home’ Member State in any other Member State.
Professional qualifications acquired in one Member State are recognised
across the Single Market. Freedom of movement of people and capital, harmonised rules on VAT, intellectual property rights and data
What if there’s no Brexit deal?

Many Single Market for Services measures are facilitated by the so-called Services Directive. This Directive aims to remove the legal and administrative barriers to cross-border service provision. It does this using various mechanisms, including:

- abolishing “discriminatory requirements” placed on people establishing businesses in other countries, including residency requirements or nationality requirements;
- removing other “burdensome requirements”, such as complex authorisation schemes, economic needs tests, or business size and health checks;
- requiring Member States to establish a Single Point of Contact so businesses can access all relevant information easily.120

The Directive also removes a range of barriers to consumers accessing services in other EU countries or accessing services provided by non-UK EU companies in the UK.121 Under a no-deal scenario, these provisions would cease to apply to UK operators in EU Member States.

There is a view among researchers that the WTO has made less progress in service liberalisation than the EU’s single market for services has to offer. GATS constitutes a broad framework for the liberalisation of trade in services rather than setting compulsory rules.122 According to researchers at the London School of Economics (LSE), “since the WTO has made far less progress than the EU in liberalising trade in services, [no deal] would mean reduced access to EU markets for UK service producers”.123 Emerging work at the OECD suggests that, on average, EU barriers to services sector trade with third countries are four times greater than those which apply inside the Single Market.124

The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) has noted that if no deal is agreed, the WTO rules would not guarantee the same level of access to the EU market for services industries as there is now. The single market for services provides for “positive integration” measures (e.g. mutual standards), which GATS is lacking. This concerns harmonisation of rules or the mutual recognition of rules by default. A CBI report said:

The barriers services businesses could potentially face include nationality requirements for service providers, requirements for businesses to have a minimum number of locally-resident staff for different roles, restrictions on the number of establishments and foreign ownership, and authorisation requirements that are subject to economic needs assessments.

120 European Commission, Services Directive: quick guide
121 European Commission, Services Directive in practice
122 Prof. Dr. Friedemann Kainer, The consequences of Brexit on Services and establishment: Different Scenarios for Exit and Future Cooperation, Analysis for the European Parliament Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee, June 2017
123 S. Dhingra and T. Sampson, Brexit and the UK economy, LSE Centre for Economic Performance, May 2017, p4
124 A goods-only Brexit deal puts UK services sector jobs at risk, Financial Times, 5 July 2018, UK Trade Policy Observatory Analytical Studies of Brexit Conference Brochure, 3 July 2018
Companies in some of our most successful exporting sectors would be unable to export specific types of services to the EU at all. Those industries include airlines, broadcasters, and a range of financial, professional and business service providers.\(^{125}\)

According to a study by UK in a Changing Europe, in a no-deal scenario UK service exporters would also suffer from the loss of passporting rights for financial services, as well as access for other service providers (legal and accountancy services, etc).\(^{126}\)

Financial Services

**UK dominance in Europe**

The UK’s financial services sector is the dominant financial centre in Europe and arguably the world. As such, the links between it and firms in the EU run deep and broad with all the main European banks and insurance companies operating in London. They operate here, as UK companies do in Europe, under a system of ‘passports’. Any company authorised in any EU Member State can operate in any other EU Member State under its ‘passport’. It is the potential immediate and sudden loss of this ‘passport’ that is the biggest potential problem arising out of ‘no deal’.

**Temporary permissions regime**

In December 2017 the Government announced its intention to introduce a temporary permissions regime, if necessary, which would allow EEA firms to continue operating in the UK for a time-limited period after the UK has left the EU without a deal. This temporary regime would be introduced later and would be bolstered by the main regulators (the Financial Conduct Authority and Bank of England) being given the power to implement changes to their rulebooks to permit it to become effective in support of whatever legislation is passed.

The main Treasury document is: [HM Treasury’s approach to financial services legislation under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hm-treasurys-approach-to-financial-services-legislation-under-the-european-union-withdrawal-act) (published 9 August 2018). Extracts from this are shown below:

- The UK will continue to implement new EU law that comes into effect and the UK will continue to be treated as part of the EU’s single market in financial services. This will mean that access to each other’s markets will continue on current terms and businesses, including financial services firms, will be able to trade on the same terms as now until 31 December 2020.

- Given the highly regulated nature of financial services, the volume of trade between our markets, and our shared desire to manage financial stability risks, we would need a stable process for maintaining equivalent regulatory outcomes as legislation evolves – including a system to resolve disagreements at regulatory and supervisory levels – alongside an open, collaborative relationship between supervisors that protects our respective financial systems and our taxpayers from financial stability risks.

\(^{125}\) CBI *5 Steps To Protect Services Post-Brexit*, 8 March 2018, p14, 18

\(^{126}\) The UK in a Changing Europe, *Cost of No Deal*, 20 July 2017
As well as the issuance of SI’s to translate current EU law into UK law – an issue common to all areas of legislative activity – the Treasury has set out other steps to be taken:

- HM Treasury also plans to delegate powers to the UK’s financial services regulators to address deficiencies in the regulators’ rulebooks arising as a result of exit, and to the EU Binding Technical Standards (BTS) that will become part of UK law. Such sub-delegated powers will be subject to broadly the same constraints as HM Treasury’s use of the Act’s powers, as well as additional mechanisms to ensure robust HM Treasury oversight. An SI to achieve this will be laid before Parliament now that the EUWA has received Royal Assent. Further information on regulatory changes to BTS and regulators’ rules for EU exit will be provided by the financial services regulators in due course.

- The government is continuing this work to ensure that the UK will have a functioning legislative and regulatory framework in all scenarios. As part of this, HM Treasury intends to legislate to provide the financial services regulators with powers to introduce transitional measures that they could use to phase in any onshoring changes.

- This means that firms do not need to prepare now to implement onshoring changes in the event no deal is reached with the EU.

- Firms should continue to plan on the assumption that an implementation period will be in place from 29 March 2019 – and, therefore, that they will be able to trade on the same terms that they do now until December 2020. They will need to comply with any new EU legislation that becomes applicable during this period.

**Treasury approach to ‘no deal’**

The document addresses the point about what happens if there is no ‘deal’ (paras 1.17 – 1.20):

- In the unlikely scenario that the UK leaves the EU without a deal, the UK would be outside the EU’s framework for financial services. The UK’s position in relation to the EU would be determined by the default Member State and EU rules that apply to third countries at the relevant time. The European Commission has confirmed that this would be the case.

- In light of this, our approach in this scenario cannot and does not rely on any new, specific arrangements being in place between the UK and the EU. As a general principle, the UK would also need to default to treating EU Member States largely as it does other third countries, although there are instances where we would need to diverge from this approach, including to provide for a smooth transition to the new circumstances. The principles that would lead to deviations from this approach are set out below.

- In some areas, correcting deficiencies to reflect this environment would be relatively straightforward. The UK’s world-leading financial sector is overseen by HM Treasury and underpinned by a strong legislative framework with world-class regulators (the Bank of England/Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority). This
means that the responsibilities of EU bodies could be re-assigned efficiently and effectively, providing firms, funds and their customers with confidence after exit.

- In this scenario, EU financial services firms operating in the UK would broadly become subject to the same supervisory regime that the UK already applies to other third countries – a regime that is shaped by the highly global, cross-border nature of financial services and the UK’s robust regulatory framework as set out in legislation, including in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA), the Banking Act 2009 and the Bank of England Act 1998. This existing UK financial services legislative framework provides powers for extensive cooperation with global regulatory bodies. When the UK is no longer an EU Member State, and so the EU obligation of reciprocal cooperation no longer applies, this existing framework could be relied upon to ensure this important cooperation continues in this scenario.

On 5 September the Treasury published the Draft Payments and electronic money (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations and The Credit Transfers and Direct Debits in Euro (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018. The Explanatory Notes set out how the SI would create a temporary permission regime in a no-deal scenario:

The passporting system relies upon domestically implemented EU legislation – in the UK, the PSRs. If the UK leaves the EU without a deal, there will be no agreed legal framework upon which the passporting system can continue to function. As a result, without a deal, any references in UK legislation to the EEA passporting system will become deficient at the point of exit. To correct this deficiency, this SI seeks to create a Temporary Permissions Regime (TPR) akin to that contained within the EEA Passport Rights (Amendment, etc., and Transitional Provisions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018 for FSMA regulated firms.

There is a general webpage dedicated to further Government announcements and another on financial services legislation under the EUWA Act which will be amended as further decisions are made.

**Bank of England comments on ‘no deal’**

The Bank of England commented on the Government’s approach to responding to the no deal possibility:

We do not expect firms providing services within the UK’s regulatory remit to have to prepare now to implement these changes. HMT has set out that it intends to provide regulators with powers to grant transitional relief, where appropriate, to ensure that, in a scenario in which an implementation period is not in place, firms and FMs have sufficient time to comply with the changes.

Against the possibility that the implementation period does not take effect on the 29 March 2019, HMT today confirmed that it will bring forward legislation under the EUWA shortly to create temporary permissions and recognition regimes. This will allow firms, including non-UK central counterparties, to continue their activities in the UK for a time-limited period after the UK has left the EU even if there is no implementation period. Those firms that wish to continue carrying out business in the UK in the longer term will also be able to use this time limited period to seek to
obtain full authorisation (or recognition) from UK regulators without disruption to their business.

**Derivatives and ‘no passports’ issues**

The derivatives market has been identified by the Governor of the Bank of England as the ‘big issue’ for the UK and EU to solve post Brexit day. Speaking to the Treasury Committee in July 2018 the Governor outlined the problem, saying that as it stands, contracts left to maturity and unaffected by life time events would still be valid, but:

The crucial point here is that on the day of leaving, the contract can still be serviced; however, life-cycle events will start to accumulate and, arguably, they will accumulate quite rapidly in the event of a cliff-edge Brexit because one would reasonably expect the volatility in markets to go up. How big is that potential risk? We have done the due diligence on that. For a mid-size firm there are about 1,000 life-cycle events a month. For a large derivative counterparty, there are up to 250,000 a week. If you think about it in the world of derivatives hedging underlying positions, with the inability to conduct these life-cycle events and an environment where there is volatility, the risk—the inability to dynamically hedge—increases with time, and you see a financial stability risk developing fairly quickly, in our opinion. We shared that opinion publicly through the FSR and directly with our counterparts in the EU.

He also drew attention to the ‘no passport’ problem applying to cross-border clearing houses, where the EU has not come up with an equivalent temporary permissions regime:

... as it stands at present, the large, UK-based clearing houses would no longer be authorised clearing houses by the EU following the Brexit date. Therefore, the actions of European counterparties that had cleared in those clearing houses would be ultra vires; they would not be authorised to use those clearing houses. Those clearing houses would know that in advance and so the European counterparties would have to close out those positions in advance. The question is how rapidly that could be done. The orders of magnitude are much higher—it is a notional £60 trillion-plus of exposure—than they are in the uncleared space. That process, which the Bank of England oversees as the regulator of these clearing houses, would have to begin prior to the Brexit date.

I want to make two final points. First, the UK Government have signalled their intention and developed statutory instruments, which they will lay before Parliament as soon as is practical. Given the timing of the summer recess, that is likely to be in the fall, but it will be done in a timely way. Those statutory instruments will solve the UK side of this issue—both authorisation of EU CCPs and authorisation of the EU counterparties. The European Union has not yet indicated a solution to this.

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127 For a more thorough examination of the derivatives market post Brexit see ISDA; *Contractual Continuity in OTC Derivatives Challenges with Transfers*, July 2018.

The combination of the ‘no passport’ issue and the derivatives issue is particularly troublesome for the insurance industry. This briefing from the Association of British Insurers sets out the problem:

1. When the UK leaves the Single Market, UK-based providers will no longer be able to rely on ‘passports’ and the right of establishment to service existing cross-border financial contracts throughout the European Economic Area (EEA). There will also be an identical impact on EEA providers who will be unable to service existing financial contracts with UK-based parties. This issue is often referred to as the contract continuity problem.

2. This will, for example, impact general insurance, long-term life insurance, pension schemes, medium and long-dated derivatives contracts, revolving credit facilities, and may also affect general customer terms of business, prime brokerage and custody arrangements.

3. The extent of this issue is significant and will affect both UK and EEA consumers. According to the Bank of England, approximately six million UK insurance policyholders, 30 million EEA insurance policyholders, and around £26trn of outstanding uncleared derivatives contracts could potentially be affected. The issue will also affect contracts relating to segregated mandate business under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) II. In particular, failure to find a solution to derivatives contracts could potentially lead to significant financial stability risks.

4. Honouring existing obligations to customers is a key priority for the industry in the UK and the EU, and it is continuing to do all it can to address the issue. However, while service providers are preparing to take steps to mitigate the impact of the loss of passporting rights, it is highly unlikely that this will be adequate to fully address the contract continuity issue by March 2019.

5. As a result, it is imperative that action by service providers is coupled with action from policymakers and regulators in the UK and EU to mitigate this ‘cliff edge risk’. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) flagged in its Article IV statement that a resolution would be “most efficiently achieved through coordinated EU and UK legislation. 

- It is critical that the UK and EU implement the transitional period that was agreed at a political level at the European Council meeting in March 2018. Furthermore, it is also important for UK and EU regulators to issue commitments about the future treatment of these contracts to act as a regulatory ‘back stop’ in the event that the transitional period fails to materialise.

- Any UK/EU solution should also be underpinned by ongoing supervisory cooperation between UK and EU regulators. The new European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England (BoE) technical working group on risk management, announced on 27 April 2018, would be an ideal forum to discuss solutions to this issue.

- The early announcement of grandfathering arrangements, either for a time-limited period or potentially until maturity, would allow for contract continuity which will deliver the
best results for UK and EEA customers, as well as European competitiveness more broadly.\textsuperscript{129}

**Public procurement**

Becoming a third country could mean no mutual rights of access to public procurement markets in the UK and the EU – although many contracts may in practice still be open. In such a scenario the EU rules on public procurement would no longer apply and EU Member States’ authorities would have to apply the same rules to a potential UK supplier as to any other business based in a third country with which the EU did not have an agreement on procurement.\textsuperscript{130}

This ‘cliff-edge’ and possible exclusion of UK bidders from procurement procedures in the EU can be largely avoided by joining the General Procurement Agreement of the WTO (GPA). The UK is currently a party to the GPA by virtue of its EU membership, but the Government has submitted an application to re-join as an independent party.\textsuperscript{131} This would ensure continued UK access to the EU27 procurement market for most tenders above certain thresholds. The GPA would not give the UK the same full access to EU procurement markets that it currently enjoys, however.\textsuperscript{132}

Commenting on the differences in scope between the EU Procurement directives and the GPA, Professor Sue Arrowsmith of the University of Nottingham states that some of them are of limited importance for the UK:

> The scope of procurement covered for the EU/UK under the GPA is narrower than the scope of covered procurement under the EU procurement directives in relation to a few utility sectors, coverage of private utilities, the defence sector, some services, (possibly) concessions, and certain private contracts subsidised by government. The GPA also does not include below-threshold procurement. However, some of these differences are of limited importance in the UK context. Further, the procurement that does fall into the gaps between the directives and GPA, at least above the directives’ thresholds, could easily be added to the GPA UK if desired.\textsuperscript{133}


\textsuperscript{129} TheCityUK/ABI briefing, June 2018
\textsuperscript{130} European Commission, [Notice to Stakeholders: Withdrawal of the United Kingdom and EU Rules in the Field of Public Procurement](https://ec.europa.eu/competition/grade/docs/2018/2018-00000001-138320180118EN.pdf), 18 January 2018
\textsuperscript{131} International Centre for Trade and Development, [EU, UK Debate Next Steps as Key October Summit Approaches](https://www.ictad.org/article-hours/eu-uk-debate-next-steps-key-october-summit-approaches), 26 July 2018
\textsuperscript{132} Institute for Government Explainers, [Public procurement](https://instituteforengovernment.org/explainers/public-procurement)
\textsuperscript{133} Prof Sue Arrowsmith, [Consequences of Brexit in the area of public procurement](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/internet/es?lang=en&contentId=ACT& structuredId=270602&lang=en&appId=396), a study for the European Parliament Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection, April 2017
Consumer protection
BEIS has contingency plans if the UK loses access to EU-wide market surveillance and enforcement systems, but it will have a considerable task to implement them in the event of a no-deal scenario.

- To support its market surveillance capability, the UK currently relies on an EU-wide rapid alert system to identify unsafe products. BEIS sought a ministerial direction in March 2018 to spend £2.4 million on a replacement system. This was behind schedule but, following the direction, BEIS reports being on track to deliver a minimum capability by March 2019 in a no-deal scenario (paragraphs 2.19 to 2.21).

- National Trading Standards has identified product safety checks on imported goods as an issue that may be affected by EU Exit if provision is not made for the free movement of goods in a future UK–EU economic relationship. The borders in Kent could be some of the most affected by Brexit because the vast majority of goods imported through there are from the EU and not currently subject to product safety checks. Kent Trading Standards has estimated the impact on its workforce of different scenarios, including no deal, and has escalated this to their funding providers. There is no requirement in law that product safety checks must be carried out at the border and, to date, no changes have been made to the infrastructure at Dover to expand capacity for product safety checks (paragraph 2.24).

- Trading Standards services and the CMA are planning to work bilaterally with EU Member States on enforcement, as they currently do with non-EU countries, if there is no deal. Appropriate protocols already exist, but outside EU structures the authorities expect cross-border enforcement to take longer and be more expensive, and the UK authorities cannot mandate another country to cooperate (paragraphs 2.22 to 2.23).

6.3 Pursuing an independent trade policy
As an EU Member State the UK cannot operate its own independent trade policy. Through its membership of the EU, the UK is currently a party to around 60 EU trade agreements with other countries. In the event of a no-deal Brexit, the UK will no longer be party to these agreements. At the same time, the UK will immediately be able to pursue its own trade policy and sign new agreements.

The Government has taken various steps to prepare for an independent UK international trade policy. These are designed to cover a range of possible outcomes, including no-deal.

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134 This figure varies, partly depending on whether trade-only agreements or all agreements with a trade element are included.
New UK legislation

The Government has introduced the *Trade Bill* and the *Customs Bill* which both aim to prevent disruption in trading arrangements and allow the UK to continue its existing trade policy as far as possible immediately after Brexit. The Trade Bill has provisions for the transitioning of EU trade agreements. The customs legislation under the Customs Bill will mostly follow the EU Customs Code. Neither of the Bills are intended to deal with future trade agreements with the EU or other countries.

In a no-deal scenario, there would be significant time constraints in an otherwise ongoing process in which the UK is developing the principles of its trade policy.

Trading with third countries

The UK is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in its own right. However, as noted above, on leaving the EU it will need to update the terms of its WTO membership.

WTO schedules

In order to re-establish its autonomy from the EU in the WTO, the UK must take several procedural steps. In particular, it must agree ‘schedules’ for goods and services. These country-specific commitments refer to maximum tariff levels and tariff rate quotas (TRQs - quantitative restrictions on imports) on goods and levels of agricultural subsidies.

The Department for International Trade has stated that the Government plans to replicate as far as possible its current commitments after Brexit. The Commission and the UK have mutually agreed to apportion the UK’s TRQs based on recent years’ trade flows. On 24 July 2018, the UK notified its draft schedule for goods commitments to the WTO and within three months it should be clear if any WTO member has an objection. However, formal objections can be expected as several major agricultural exporters, including the US,

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135 The Trade Bill passed its third reading in the House of Commons in July 2018 and will receive its second reading in the House of Lords in September.
136 The Customs Bill will receive its second reading in the Lords on 4 September 2018.
138 WTO, ‘Members’ commitments’
140 European Commission Proposal on the apportionment between the United Kingdom and the EU27 of tariff rate quotas included in the World Trade Organisation schedule of the Union, COM(2018)321 final, 22 May 2018
141 WTO, United Kingdom submits draft schedule to the WTO outlining post-Brexit goods commitments, 24 July 2018
142 EU, UK Debate Next Steps as Key October Summit Approaches, International Centre for Trade and Development, 26 July 2018
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada and Thailand, have expressed disagreement with the proposed quotas between the EU and the UK.143

The Government believes a failure to certify the schedules before March 2019 would not be a problem:

\[
\text{Should the goods and services schedules be uncertified as we leave the EU, we do not anticipate there to be any problems – it is not uncommon for WTO members to operate on uncertified schedules for periods of time.144}
\]

For services schedules the UK has to comply with the GATS obligations and specify its commitments for each particular service sector, detailing the levels of market access and treatment under national laws.145 The UK is preparing a list of UK-specific exemptions from the MFN Treatment under the GATS.146 These unamendable lists of exemptions – a part of the services schedule - allow the extension of more favourable treatment to particular countries in particular service sectors for a limited period of time.147

**Public procurement and third countries**

The UK is currently party to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) through its EU membership. Under the GPA, many large public sector procurement opportunities must be opened up to suppliers in countries which are the parties to the agreement. The Government has already formally requested to re-join the GPA after Brexit and has submitted a market access offer similar to the EU’s terms.148 Re-joining the GPA would ensure that the UK maintains a similar level of access to the government procurement markets of (non-EU) third countries. The GPA does not, however, cover the enhanced terms of access which the EU has negotiated for operators of its Member States under its free trade agreements with third countries like Canada and Japan.149 This would be a matter for the UK’s future bilateral trade treaties with these countries.

**‘Rollover’ of existing EU trade agreements**

As part of an orderly withdrawal, the Government would like the transitional adoption or ‘rollover’ of all the EU’s trade agreements and other preferential trade arrangements with third countries. The Government published a [Technical Note](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/rollover-of-existing-eu-trade-agreements) of February 2018 on continued

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143 MLex, ‘Comment: UK trade can survive on ‘uncertified’ schedules after Brexit’, 2 August 2018


145 House of Lords EU Committee, [Brexit: the options for trade](https://www.parliament.uk/business/lords-committees/foreign-affairs-committee/-/publication/1365169), 13 December 2016, HL 72, chapter 6


147 WTO, [Services: rules for growth and investment](https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/serv.pdf)

148 EU, [UK Debate Next Steps as Key October Summit Approaches](https://www.bbc.com/news/uk/12797563), International Centre for Trade and Development, 26 July 2018

149 The EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement is expected to enter into force in 2019, after its ratification by the European Parliament and Japan’s National Diet.
application of EU international trade and other agreements during the envisaged transition/implementation phase by agreement of all the parties concerned. This would enable trade arrangements with third countries that the UK is currently party to as an EU Member State to be replicated in UK-third country agreements when the UK leaves. This would not preclude a fuller revision of these agreements in the longer term to create a more bespoke trading arrangement.

The EU agrees to rollover in principle
At the March 2018 European Council, the EU agreed to notify other parties to international agreements that the UK is to be treated as a Member State during the transition period for the purposes of these agreements. However, this remains a request and it is possible that the third countries concerned may not agree.

The Government’s bilateral engagement
The Government said in January 2018 that it had engaged with 70 countries covered by over 40 EU international trade agreements and had received a positive reaction to its objective of ensuring continuity in these trading relationships.

An International Trade Committee (ITC) report on Continuing Application of EU trade agreements after Brexit published in February 2018 warned of trade with 70 nations “falling off a cliff edge” if the Government did not act quickly to roll over the EU’s trade deals. It said there was an urgent need for clarity “over the number, type, scope, extent and importance of the EU’s trade-related agreements” and warned that substantive amendments to the rolled-over agreements were almost certain to be required. The Government told the ITC in May that it was working bilaterally with partner countries to “to ensure continuity of effect for our international agreements beyond the Implementation Period”. Commons Briefing Paper 8370, The UK adoption of the EU’s external agreements after Brexit, 24 July 2018, provides a more in-depth account of the issues.

Liam Fox told the ITC on 11 July 2018 that agreements in principle had been reached with third countries about continuing trading arrangements, but that many countries were waiting to see if there would be a transition (implementation) period first, with a view to using the extra time to negotiate a more bespoke agreement (rather than simply rolling over the existing arrangements). It was the Government’s intention to have those agreements in place before Brexit. But Trade minister George Hollingbery told the ITC on 4 September that it is “not an absolute given” that all the EU trade agreements would be “transitioned” before exit day (MLex, 4/9)

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150 International Trade Committee, Continuing application of EU trade agreements after Brexit: Government Response, 15 May 2018, p 4
151 Commons Briefing Paper 8370, The UK adoption of the EU’s external agreements after Brexit, 24 July 2018
152 International Trade Committee, The work of the Department for International Trade, 11 July 2018, Q 332-337
Government guidance

The Government’s ‘no deal’ guidance published on 23 August included technical notices on “Classifying your goods in the UK Trade Tariff if there’s no Brexit deal” and “Trading with the EU if there’s a no Brexit deal”. Both refer to separate technical notice on “Trade Agreement Continuity”. However, “Trade Agreement Continuity” has not been published at the time of writing.

Classifying your goods in the UK Trade Tariff if there’s no Brexit deal” states that “the UK intends to continue offering unilateral preferences to developing countries, and to seek to transition all EU Free Trade Agreements for day 1 in order to ensure continuity for both goods imported to the UK, and for UK exports” and that further information on preferential trade under the UK’s existing trade agreements will be captured in the Trade Agreement Continuity technical notice.

Proposed UK-SADC agreement

On 28 August 2018, coinciding with a visit to South Africa, the Prime Minister announced that a new UK-Southern African Economic Partnership would be ready as soon as the current EU-Southern African Development economic partnership (covering the same six countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Eswatini/Swaziland and Mozambique)153 ceases to apply to the UK.

UK Trade Minister George Hollingbery and Botswanan trade minister (representing the five Southern African Customs Union countries and Mozambique) issued a joint statement on 29 August, which referred to the importance of a UK-EU agreement on a post-Brexit transition period and continued cumulation between the UK, EU and all parties to the agreement in ensuring continuity to trade. It stated:

We take note of the progress achieved regarding the UK and EU’s agreement on a time-limited implementation period between the EU and UK following the UK’s departure from the EU, and in particular the intention for the UK to be treated, for the purposes of EU international agreements, as an EU Member State for the duration of the implementation period between the EU and UK. The SACU (Southern African Customs Union) and Mozambique Trade Ministers indicated that they look forward to receiving formal confirmation of the same via the proposed notification, and to continuing to receive regular updates on progress from the UK on the EU-UK negotiations under Article 50 of the Treaty of the European Union on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. SACU and Mozambique emphasise the importance of continued cumulation between all the parties in promoting continuity and to avoid disruption in trade, and urge both the UK and the EU to recognise the importance of cumulation in the discussions on a post-Brexit EU-UK arrangement.

Tariff rate quotas, rules of origin and cumulation

As highlighted in the ITC report, it will not be possible to simply replicate the terms of some of the EU’s trade agreements, as they include arrangements for tariff rate quotas (TRQs) and rules of origins requirements which would need amending to make them more specific.

153 The first five countries making up the Southern African Customs Union.
to the UK. TRQs involve allowing imports of a fixed quantity of certain goods at a lower tariff rate, with a higher tariff applied to anything above this. A UK-specific free trade agreement may require a new TRQ calculation, although the UK’s exit would also create problems for the EU, as it would most likely want to recalculate its TRQs with third countries to take into account the UK no longer being part of the calculations. TRQs are also an issue in establishing separate UK and EU27 schedules at the WTO post-Brexit, with a number of third countries objecting to the proposals made by the UK and the EU.  

Trade agreements also involve rules of origin (RoO), whereby the origin of goods must be proven for them to qualify for preferential treatment in respect of customs duties. The application of origination status can be widened by means of provisions for ‘cumulation’, whereby components or inputs from outside a country can be treated as originating from there for the purpose of RoO.

The ITC report cited evidence from Mike Hawes of the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, who explained that “most free trade agreements tend to have a minimum [domestic content] threshold of 55% to 60%” for automotive goods. Therefore, he said, merely copying and pasting the EU-South Korea free trade agreement, for example, would not benefit the UK “because we would not qualify for the preferential trading arrangements … unless you could agree cumulation with the European context, which is what we currently enjoy”.

The ITC report refers to the suggestion made by several witnesses and submissions to its inquiry that “diagonal” cumulation arrangements should be established allowing inputs from any of the three parties concerned (the UK, the EU and the third country in a trade agreement) to count as originating content.

One route to this would be for the UK separately to join the Regional Convention on Pan-Euro-Mediterranean Rules of Origin (the PEM Convention), to which it is currently party as a member of the EU. This allows for diagonal cumulation between all signatories, provided there are trade agreements in place between all the contracting parties concerned. However, as the UK Trade Policy Observatory pointed out in its evidence to the inquiry, “the EU can be quite difficult in agreeing to diagonal cumulation” and typically only does so if all countries involved have free trade agreements among themselves”.

**UK trade arrangements with EFTA and Turkey**

Arrangements with the EFTA countries and Turkey would require a more substantial renegotiation. EFTA Members Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway participate in the Single Market through the EEA Agreement and Switzerland participates in aspects of the Single Market

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154 The UK and EU sent a joint letter to the WTO in October 2017 informing it of their agreed plans to apportion existing agricultural quotas, as well maintain existing levels of farm subsidies. However, it was reported in April 2018 that following opposition to these plans from Australia, New Zealand, the USA and others the EU was now proposing a full renegotiation of WTO schedules, but this was being opposed by the UK Government.
through a series of bilateral agreements. Turkey is in a partial customs union with the EU. These agreements are based on extensive acceptance of the EU’s regulatory and customs regimes. Trade with these five countries constitutes 6.2% of the UK’s external trade. The Government has established a ‘trade policy dialogue’ with Norway and a Trade Working Group with Turkey.\(^{155}\)

**Impact of ‘no deal’ on rollover**

As of November 2017, EU bilateral and multilateral trade agreements covered 88 countries and accounted for 13% of UK trade.\(^ {156}\) The UK will no longer be part of those arrangements in the case of no deal.

A transition period would give the Government time to work on bespoke agreements, but ‘no deal’ would mean no transition period. The threat of ‘no deal’ presents the Government with considerable time pressure and it is uncertain if countries would agree to a temporary bilateral rollover of the agreements, as they would be cautious of missing out on an opportunity to renegotiate preferred terms in case the no deal scenario becomes a reality. Asked on the Andrew Marr programme on 2 September 2018 whether the new trade deals replicating the trading arrangements with third countries would be in place for Brexit day, Liam Fox said:

> That remains our aim. Of course a lot of countries are waiting to see exactly what [the UK] relationship will be with the European Union. But not one of those countries have said to us that they don’t want to get a trade agreement with the UK.

Responding to Andrew Marr’s follow up question as to whether it would still be possible to get all these deals ready for the minute after the UK leaves the EU, Fox said: “It’s possible but it’s ultimately dependent on both parties agreeing”.

The Institute for Government has suggested the Government prioritise agreements which should be in place before leaving the EU as part of its no-deal planning:

> ‘No deal’ planning has to assume that those arrangements will not be in place. That means the UK needs to prepare a priority list of countries and agreements, renegotiated and re-ratified by 29 March 2019 – and it needs to warn business of the consequences if those agreements are not in place. The Government claims it is making good progress on third country agreements, but it needs to be much more transparent to give business confidence this is really happening.\(^ {157}\)

If the Government is successful in agreeing new rolled-over treaties with third countries to replace EU agreements, then it may be able to implement these irrespective of whether it reaches a deal with the EU on withdrawal and future relations. But a failure to agree on the future

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\(^{155}\) International Trade Committee, Continuing application of EU trade agreements after Brexit, 7 March 2018, HC 520 (see Annex 2)

\(^{156}\) This figure did not take into account newly signed agreements such as EU-Japan partnership. The Government’s Impact Assessment for the Trade Bill, November 2017.

\(^{157}\) Institute for Government, How the Government plans to roll over third country agreements, 19 July 2018
relationship is likely to complicate matters where third countries are awaiting confirmation of the UK’s future relationship with the EU before concluding new agreements with the UK.

**Rules of Origin**

It would also not be possible to apply diagonal cumulation arrangements in relation to rules of origin (RoO), creating difficulties for the UK in meeting the current RoO requirements in EU trade agreements with third countries if it attempted to replicate these in UK-specific trade agreements. Given the complex supply chains with components coming from across the EU in sectors such as the car industry, this might require the threshold for domestic content in RoO to be revised significantly downwards.

In addition, concluding agreements with countries that have a particularly close relationship with the EU, such as the EFTA countries and Turkey, would be difficult in the absence of clarity over the future UK-EU relationship. In evidence in January 2018 to the ITC, Dr Holger Hestermeyer (Shell Reader in International Dispute Resolution at King’s College London) said the UK would need to negotiate new agreements with these countries which would “differ substantially from the current arrangements”.

**Possible continuity of aspects of Mixed Agreements**

Around a quarter of the EU’s international agreements have been classified as mixed agreements because they cover competences shared by the EU and Member States. This means that they have been ratified separately by individual EU Member States as well as approved at EU level. It is possible that some aspects of these agreements could continue to apply in the event of the UK leaving the EU without a deal, but there is some debate about this. While EU-exclusive competence agreements will cease to apply to the UK once it leaves the EU, some legal experts have suggested that aspects of mixed agreements could continue to apply. However, the EU has stated that all agreements will cease to apply.158

In the absence of definitive information about the state of play of negotiations with third countries on the rollover of existing trade and other co-operation arrangements, the areas of co-operation covered and the Government’s assessment of which of the EU’s international treaties require replacement in order to avoid disruption of relations, it is difficult assess whether the necessary arrangements will be in place by March 2019.

**New trade deals**

In addition to its work on existing EU trade agreements, the Government is exploring options for new free trade agreements (FTAs) after leaving the EU:

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We have established working groups and high level dialogues with a range of key trade partners, including the United States, Australia, China, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), India, Japan and New Zealand.\footnote{Department for International Trade, \textit{Trade White Paper: Preparing for our future UK trade policy – Government Response}, January 2018, Chapter 2.1}

In July 2018 the Department for International Trade announced consultations on the UK’s first bilateral trade agreements with Australia, New Zealand and the USA, as well as potentially joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

But trade negotiations are time-consuming and complex, and while it is an EU Member State the UK cannot officially negotiate and sign future trade deals. Even the legality of holding preliminary consultations on future deals has been debated, although the Government has been conducting bilateral discussion, as outlined above.\footnote{The Trade Bill, Commons Library Briefing Paper, chapter 2.2} The draft withdrawal agreement allows the UK to negotiate and sign new trade agreements during the transition period, but not to implement then until after transition. But with no deal and no transition period, formal negotiations and/or the conclusion of new agreements could not happen until after March 2019, meaning new trade agreements with third countries would not be in place.
7. Customs

The effects of ‘no deal’ are expected to be most tangible at the UK border. At the moment of leaving the EU customs union without a deal, the border between the UK and the EU would become a customs border. This is likely to mean more customs controls, potentially involving increased costs and delays for business.

The port of Dover processes up to 10,000 incoming and outgoing freight vehicles a day. Currently, 99% of those originate in the EU and are processed in around two minutes. Customs checks on non-EU trucks take on average 20 minutes. An additional two-minute delay per freight vehicle in the ferry terminal would cause a 17-mile queue at Dover. The ports lack the physical space to accommodate the goods waiting to be processed. This written evidence from the Port of Dover to the Commons Public Accounts Committee illustrates the urgent need for contingency measures for no deal.161 Also, manufacturers who make use of complex cross-border supply chains and “just-in-time” delivery of parts might be forced to make adjustments.162

Disruption to trade because of uncertainty around customs procedures in the case of no deal is possible. But having contingency plans ready is essential on both the UK and the EU side of the border. These concern investment in infrastructure, IT systems and manpower.

The Government’s no deal guidance to businesses that trade with the EU aims to “minimise delays and additional burdens for legitimate trade”.163

The Customs Bill

The Taxation (Cross-Border Trade) Bill (the Customs Bill) provides for a range of negotiation outcomes, including a contingency scenario for a no-deal outcome. The Bill covers the implementation of customs, VAT and excise regimes, and sets out the steps the Government would take to minimise disruption for businesses and travellers. The operational arrangements for future international agreements on trade and provision for customs import and export duties would have a significant operational impact on the work of HMRC.164

Concerns about management of borders

The main issues and challenges for the management of the border after Brexit were highlighted in a report by the National Audit Office in October 2017, which noted that “the number of decisions that have to be made over whether to permit people and goods to cross the border could increase significantly (potentially 230% and 360%
The Public Accounts Committee (PAC), which is monitoring HMRC’s operational preparedness for a no deal scenario, expressed concerns at the end of 2017 about the Government’s earlier assessment that risks to border activity would remain unchanged immediately post-Brexit:

Government departments are assuming that the risks to managing the border will not change immediately when the UK leaves the EU, and that border checks will therefore be the same after March 2019 as they were before.[..]

Particularly in the event of a no-deal scenario, the border could be exposed to risks on day 1 of the UK’s departure. Officials are relying too much on there being a transitional period in order to have the time to develop the new systems and infrastructure that may be required.[..]

HM Revenue and Customs preparedness
A cross-government Border Planning Group (BPG) led by HMRC’s Chief Executive, Jon Thompson, was established in early 2017 and tasked with the co-ordination of Brexit-related border challenges. In October 2017, the Treasury confirmed that this group had been allocated a budget of £2.5 million for the year 2017-18. According to the Treasury:

The Border Planning Group has reviewed all border locations (ports, airports and the Channel Tunnel) to understand the implications at these locations of controls and checks; and concluded that there are a number of locations, especially ‘Roll On - Roll Off’ ports (for example, Dover), where significant extra controls and checks would be difficult to accommodate without affecting the flow of traffic and people.

The BPG also co-ordinates work with organisations such as local authorities and non-governmental organisations responsible for managing or enabling the border (port and airport operators, carriers, agents and others). Plans are being developed on a location by location, port by port basis.

As for ‘no deal’ planning, Jon Thompson recently explained to the PAC:

If, when we get to October, we will exit the European Union in March 2019 and go on to WTO rules, the Government will have to make some choices about what objectives take primacy at the border. A choice will need to be made between the free flow of trade, the security of the United Kingdom and the raising of revenue. I think it is fair to say that you will not get an optimal system in April 2019 across those three objectives. You will have to prioritise…

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166 Public Accounts Committee, *Brexit and the UK border*, 8 December 2017, HC 558, paras 1-3
167 WPQ 107596 12 October 2017
168 HM Treasury, *Government response to the Committee of Public Accounts on the Fourth to the Eleventh reports from Session 2017-19*, Cm 9575, March 2018, paras 1.2-1.3 and 3.2-3.3
169 Ibid
170 PAC, *HMRC’s performance: progress review*, 30 April 2018, HC 972, Q55
In response, the PAC wrote to HMRC stating:

> We have previously reported that the Border Planning Group’s assumption that the risks to border activity remained unchanged immediately post-Brexit is a risky approach, and this remains a concern. We are also not convinced that HMRC is sufficiently prepared for the different possible Brexit outcomes, for example, in terms of the potential new infrastructure that might be needed at ports. 171

The PAC had previously noted that the new Customs Declaration Service, which the HMRC started planning and implementing before the EU Referendum, was at risk of not being fully operational by the planned date of January 2019. 172 In July 2018 the BPG told the PAC that work had been done on risk mitigation and that an upgrade of the current customs declaration system was being tested. By the end of September it should be clear whether the system would be cope with a no deal scenario. 173

Regarding recruitment of new personnel at HMRC and Border Force, Jon Thompson recently reported:

> I have been reasonably clear that, in these various scenarios, we will need somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000 additional staff. We recruited 1,113 by the end of May. [...] We will continue to recruit en route to the 4,000 to 5,000. Of those the estimation is that 3,000 people need to be trained—2,500 HMRC colleagues and 500 Border Force. [...]  

Asked if an optimal staffing solution would be found by April 2019, Jon Thompson said:

> The answer is, it is not. It will not be optimal, but from 2019, in the scenario that you are exploring of day one, no deal, we would continue to mature the system through 2019 and 2020—get more people and so on and so forth. We believe you would have a functioning border, but it would not be an optimal situation. 174

The Treasury has acknowledged “the practical difficulties to accommodate significant extra controls and checks without affecting the flow of traffic and people”, and said that therefore:

> … the Government is taking a pragmatic approach to border controls to ensure the flow of traffic at the border, and to implement controls and checks as they can be accommodated. 175

To minimise disruption in transit procedures, the parties to the Common Transit Convention (CTC) are preparing to invite the UK to re-join the Convention soon after leaving the EU. This would enable the UK to remain in the EU’s common transit procedures with EFTA Members as

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171 Letter from Meg Hillier, Chair of the Public Accounts Committee to Jon Thompson, HMRC Chief Executive, 6 June 2018  
172 PAC, Brexit and the future of Customs, 14 November 2017, HC 401, para 4  
173 PAC, Customs Declaration Service: Progress Review, 11 July 2018, HC 1398, Q 25-26  
174 PAC, Customs Declaration Service: Progress Review, 11 July 2018, HC 1398, Q79, 82, 84  
175 HM Treasury, Government response to the Committee of Public Accounts on the Fourth to the Eleventh reports from Session 2017-19, Cm 9575, March 2018, paras 1.2-1.3 and 3.2-3.3
well as Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey. The CTC allows exporters to avoid customs checks until goods reach their destination country, so goods travelling to and from the UK and passing through the EU and into third countries would avoid paying EU duties. \(^{176}\)

**Case study 1: impact on the automotive sector**

**Profile of the sector**
Automotive production in the UK is a high profile and successful industry typical of many ‘just in time’ manufacturing sectors. It is part of an international supply chain and its manufacturing plants operate a low-stock, high-volume model that requires constant component delivery. The sector has relatively high levels of productivity, high investment and many high-skilled workers.

The sector in the UK is dominated by foreign-owned manufacturers based at large, high value plants mostly in the Midlands and the North East. \(^{177}\)

The sector: \(^{178}\)

- employed 162,000 people, 1% of total employment in Great Britain in 2016; \(^{179}\)
- generated economic output (in terms of Gross Value Added) of £16.6 billion, 0.8% of the UK’s economic output in 2017; \(^{180}\)
- is 20% more productive than the overall manufacturing industry and 35% more productive than the average for the UK economy; \(^{181}\)
- exported vehicles worth £44 billion in 2017; this was 13% of UK goods exports and 54% of vehicle exports were to the EU. \(^{182}\)

The sector is highly integrated with complex supply chains involved in the production of almost all the components of motor vehicles. The Automotive Council (a high-level forum composed of industry leaders and Ministers) estimates that “44% of parts used to make UK cars come from UK suppliers”. \(^{183}\) The Financial Times suggests that even this figure may overestimate the proportion of UK-made components:

Of [the] 30,000 components in modern vehicles, each one may contain 30 sub-components and have passed through 15 countries during the course of its production... With many of the parts going into Tier One components coming from overseas, it is

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\(^{176}\) MLex, ‘UK could remain in EU’s customs convention with its neighbours’, 9 August 2018


\(^{178}\) The industry is defined as Standard Industrial Classification code 29.

\(^{179}\) ONS, Business register and employment survey, 2017, via NOMIS database

\(^{180}\) ONS, Quarterly National Accounts Q1 2018, Low Level Aggregates Table, June 2018

\(^{181}\) ONS, Labour productivity Q1 2018, Data: Breakdown of contributions, whole economy and sectors. Data are current price, output per hour, automotive sector = Transport and equipment manufacturing

\(^{182}\) Society of Motor Manufacturers and Technicians (SMMT), *Motor industry facts 2018*, pp7,9,10

\(^{183}\) Automotive Council, *Rise in amount of British parts used in British car production*, 20 June 2017
therefore highly likely that the true UK make-up of vehicle components is far lower than 44%...\textsuperscript{184}

The importance of supply chains to this industry means that the impact of a no-deal Brexit could be significant. The main possible impacts can be divided into (i) the impact of tariffs, (ii) the impact of non-tariff barriers to trade, and (iii) the changing regulatory regime.

**Tariffs**

While the UK is in the EU’s customs union, no tariffs are charged on cars and automotive components (or any manufactured goods) that are imported from or exported to the EU. In a no deal scenario, it is assumed that EU-UK trade would be arranged under WTO rules governing trade between trade partners with no FTA.

This would mean the imposition of tariffs on trade in goods between the UK and the EU. UK exports to the EU would face the EU’s tariffs and imports into the UK from the EU would face whatever tariffs the UK decided to impose.\textsuperscript{185} The average tariffs imposed by the EU on the import of cars is 9.8%, and the average tariff for motor vehicle parts is 3.8%.\textsuperscript{186}

If tariffs are imposed on car exports to the EU or component imports from the EU, then the cost of manufacturing cars in the UK would increase. Honda, a major car manufacturer with plants in the UK, commented to the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) Select Committee that the imposition of tariffs “would make UK manufactured vehicles ‘uncompetitive’”.\textsuperscript{187} The BEIS Select Committee concluded that:

\textit{...it is difficult to see how it would make economic sense for multinational volume manufacturers – the bulk of the UK automotive sector – to base production in the UK in a no deal or WTO tariff scenario.}\textsuperscript{188}

Section 6.2 above provides further information on tariff issues in a no-deal scenario.

**Non-tariff barriers**

Non-tariff barriers are practical, administrative or physical obstacles that make trade more difficult. The automotive sector in the UK could experience non-tariff barriers in the form of “delays at the new UK-EU border and...additional administrative requirements” in the event of a no deal Brexit.\textsuperscript{189}

The ‘just in time’ model that the automotive industry operates means that stock is delivered to the assembly line as it is needed. Only a very

\textsuperscript{184} Financial Times, \textit{Brexit triggers a great car parts race for the UK auto industry}, 30 July 2017

\textsuperscript{185} The Government has said that it intends to replicate the EU’s tariff structure as far as possible, at least in the short term (HCWS316 Written Statement 5 December 2016).

\textsuperscript{186} WTO, \textit{Tariff Download Facility} (WTO Most Favoured Nation average applied tariffs)


\textsuperscript{188} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{189} BEIS Committee ibid. Section 3
limited number of spare parts are stockpiled – manufacturers tend not keep more parts than are needed for the immediate future. Delays in the delivery of stock could prevent cars from being manufactured at the pace required to maximise efficiency and retain competitiveness.

Honda commented to the BEIS Select Committee that “a 15-minute delay could add around £850,000 per year in costs” to annual production at their Swindon factory.\(^{190}\)

**Regulatory standards**

Differing regulations that determine how a manufactured good is produced or tested are a type of non-tariff barrier. All cars sold or registered in the EU are subject to strict safety and other regulations. New cars must be issued with a Certificate of Conformity to prove that they meet EU regulations. Certificates of Conformity can only be provided by a ‘type-approval authority’ in an EU Member State. In the UK the type-approval authority is the Vehicle Certification Agency (VCA).\(^{191}\)

If there is no deal and the UK immediately assumes third country status in relation to the EU, the European Commission has said the VCA will lose its status as a type-approval authority.\(^{192}\) Manufacturers would have to seek approval from a type-approval authority in another EU country, which could be costly and may add to the time taken to gain approval. The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Technicians commented to the BEIS Select Committee that the type-approval authorities in other EU Member States might lack the capacity to provide certification for UK manufactured vehicles in addition those manufactured in their own country.\(^{193}\)

**Case study 2: professional and business services sector**

**Profile of the sector**

The professional and business services sector includes industries that provide specialist, knowledge-intensive services to businesses. It includes legal services, accountancy, advertising, architectural services, engineering and management consultancy. It is a large sector and one in which the UK has a high international reputation.

The professional and business services sector: \(^{194}\)

- includes 645,000 businesses, 24% of all businesses in the UK in 2017.\(^{195}\)

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\(^{190}\) Ibid.  
\(^{192}\) European Commission, *Brexit preparedness notices: Type Approvals (automotive vehicles)*, February 2018, p2  
\(^{194}\) The Industry is defined as the following Standard Industrial Classification codes: 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, 82.  
\(^{195}\) ONS, ‘Business activity, size and location’, 2017, via Nomis Database
• employed 4.1 million people, 14% of employment in Great Britain in 2016.\textsuperscript{196}

• generated economic output (in terms of Gross Value Added) of £198 billion, 11% of the UK’s economic output in 2017.\textsuperscript{197}

The professional and business services industry provides essential services to all parts of the economy. Employees are typically highly skilled professionals. Businesses in this sector range from very large firms operating throughout the world and providing a range of services (such as the ‘Big Four’ accountancy firms or the ‘magic circle’ law firms), to small and medium sized enterprises that support a specific kind of business in one region of the UK.\textsuperscript{198}

**Service industries in the EU**

Professional and business services businesses are subject to the EU’s Single Market for Services, which is not as far reaching as the Single Market for Goods. The core principles of the Single Market for Services are:\textsuperscript{199}

• the freedom to establish and run a company in any Member State;
• the freedom to provide services across Member State borders;
• mutual recognition of professional qualifications (qualified service professionals are recognised as such throughout the EU without having to re-qualify).

The Single Market for Services also allows freedom of movement of people and capital, and harmonises rules in VAT, intellectual property and data protection, all of which reduce the barriers to providing professional and businesses services in other EU Member States.\textsuperscript{200}

Section 6.2 above provides further information on the Single Market for Services.

**Impact of no deal: regulatory frameworks**

In the event of a no-deal Brexit, UK professional and business services companies operating only in the UK are unlikely to see any major direct impact. These services are largely regulated on a domestic basis, so EU-wide rules have only a limited impact.\textsuperscript{201}

In areas where the regulatory framework is harmonised by EU Directives, a no-deal Brexit is also unlikely to have any immediate impact. For example, statutory audit is specified under the Audit Directive [2006/43/EC] and UK regulations will probably remain

\textsuperscript{196} ONS, ‘Business register and employment survey’, 2017, via NOMIS database
\textsuperscript{197} ONS, Quarterly National Accounts Q1 2018, Low Level Aggregates Table, June 2018
\textsuperscript{198} Department for Exiting the EU Select Committee, HM Government Sectoral Brexit Impact Assessments: Professional and business services, December 2017, p3
\textsuperscript{199} European Commission, Single Market for Services, webpage accessed 30 July 2018
\textsuperscript{200} European Commission, Slides on Internal EU27 preparatory discussions on the framework for the future relationship: Services, 6 February 2018
\textsuperscript{201} Exiting the EU Committee, HM Government Sectoral Brexit Impact Assessments: Professional and business services, December 2017, p9
unchanged for some time after withdrawal, whether or not a deal is reached. Any divergence would probably happen over several years.\textsuperscript{202}

However, a no deal scenario could have an immediate impact on UK companies operating or seeking to operate in the EU, and on EU companies operating or seeking to operate in the UK. Without a deal, these businesses would be viewed as third-country businesses, which means that EU Directives would not automatically apply to them. What rules do apply would depend on the company law in each Member State, so it is possible that some Member States would allow UK businesses to provide services as now, but this is not guaranteed.\textsuperscript{203}

**Mutual recognition of qualifications**

Another important area for the professional and business services sector in which ‘no deal’ could have a major impact is the mutual recognition of professional qualifications in the EU and the UK. It is possible that UK professionals working in the EU would no longer be recognised as having valid professional qualifications; this would depend on the Member States’ existing rules on the recognition of qualifications awarded by third countries.

The European Commission has said that with no deal the UK’s third country status would mean:\textsuperscript{204}

\[\text{the recognition of professional qualifications of United Kingdom nationals in an EU-27 Member State will be governed by the national policies and rules of that Member State, irrespective of whether the qualifications of the United Kingdom national were obtained in the United Kingdom, in another third country or in an EU-27 Member State.}\]

The Commission also notes that this would apply to non-UK EU citizens in the UK (whose status would depend on the sector-by-sector rules in the UK regarding third country qualifications), and those EU citizens holding professional qualifications awarded in the UK but working in other EU countries.\textsuperscript{205}

See section 9.2 below for more information on free movement and recognition of qualifications.

\textsuperscript{202} Ibid, p11

\textsuperscript{203} European Company Law Experts, *The consequences of Brexit for companies and company law*, Section 5: Third Country firms: the post-Brexit regime, May 2017

\textsuperscript{204} European Commission, *Notice to stakeholders - Withdrawal of the United Kingdom and EU rules in the field of regulated professions and the recognition of professional qualifications*, June 2018, p3

\textsuperscript{205} Ibid, p4
8. Northern Ireland and the Irish border

Many of the possible effects of ‘no deal’ on the Irish border and trade with Ireland are the same as those that would arise from UK - EU trade in general and at other ports/entry points for goods traffic.

But there are two unique characteristics that make the Irish border more complex. The first is the nature of that border - it is the only land border the UK shares with the EU. The border is currently “invisible and seamless across its 310 mile/500 km length”. The second is the history of violence and conflict in the region, which was largely brought to an end with the signing of the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. This means there are particular sensitivities about the erecting of border infrastructure and implementing checks on goods crossing the border. This is why the UK government has committed to “no new physical infrastructure at the border and no new checks or controls at the border”.

The EU and the UK Government share a commitment to avoiding a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. Although the two-sides have yet to reach an agreement on how best to avoid checks and infrastructure at the border, the types of solutions suggested, which include the use of technology, some degree of regulatory alignment and some sort of customs agreement, are likely to be absent in a no-deal scenario.

8.1 Customs checks

If the UK implements a new customs regime under WTO rules, what checks at the Northern-Irish border would it be required to conduct and could it waive some or all of them? The EU has consistently said that checks would be required on the Irish border if the UK leaves the Single Market and customs union. Michel Barnier said in February 2018, that such checks would be “unavoidable”.

It has been reported that the Irish Prime Minister, Leo Varadkar, suggested in July 2018 that even with ‘no deal’, checks and infrastructure at the border would not be required. The Irish Times reported:

Mr Varadkar said that such a “doomsday scenario” would mean that the “commitments of others” would be relied upon to prevent a hard border. […] “Also, president Juncker and my EU

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206 Gibraltar shares a land border with Spain but is a British Overseas Territory, and the UK’s Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus have no customs posts or frontier barriers, the UK government has committed to maintaining this status and the EU has largely agreed to ensuring this happens. See CBP 8269 pp 81-5 for more detail.

207 HM Government Northern Ireland and Ireland- Position Paper, 16 August 2017

208 See, for example, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Karen Bradley’s evidence to the European Scrutiny Committee, EU Withdrawal, 16 May 2018, HC 763, Q326.

colleagues have on many occasions said that they wouldn’t require us to put in place a physical infrastructure and customs checks on the Border between Northern Ireland and Ireland,” he said.210

However, the Irish Revenue Commissioners subsequently confirmed that they were making preparations for “full customs checks” on UK-Irish trade “in case no deal is reached on Brexit.”211

The Prime Minister’s EU Advisor Oliver Robbins, in oral evidence to the Exiting the EU Select Committee on 24 July, acknowledged the European Commission’s position that checks and controls would be necessary (Q2451) and said that if it came to that situation, there would be a “strong debate between the two sides as to what was necessary there”, that both sides would “have to reflect on their responsibilities and make the appropriate measures and preparations”.

Seamus Leheny, Northern Ireland Policy Manager at the Freight Transport Association, has written about the possible effects of customs checks on goods traffic crossing the Northern Irish border:

Commercial goods vehicle traffic across the Irish border was estimated at 4,677,772 vehicle movements for the year 2016, according to analysis of TII data by Irish Revenue & Customs. This works out at a staggering 12,788 commercial vehicle movements daily across the border.

It’s also worth highlighting that compared to 2014, commercial vehicle traffic across the Irish Border has increased by 21.4%. This clearly demonstrates that both economies, north and south, continue to become more reliant on one another as our supply chains become more entwined.

Even if customs checks were to be imposed on cross border traffic at the minimum 1% level, then, we would see around 128 physical inspections of goods vehicles daily. The impact of such checks would be additional costs for transport operators, delays and missed schedules.212

He also describes how the logistics of goods transport adds further complexities:

Many cross-border freight movements are consolidated loads: for example you could have one lorry carrying forty different consignments, each one unique with different points of origin and destination. This could mean a check on one pallet of goods on a truck could have consequences for dozens of other businesses.213

The reason most trade experts believe the UK will need to impose customs checks on goods coming into Northern Ireland is because of the MFN principle, which applies to all WTO agreements (see section 6.1 above).214 Countries can side-step this principle if they sign free trade

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210 Irish Times, EU calms Varadkar’s fears of physical Border checks after Brexit, 19 July 2018.
211 Irish Times, Revenue preparing for full customs checks post-Brexit, 6 September 2018
212 UK in a Changing Europe, Making Northern Ireland a bridge between the UK and the EU, Seamus Leheny (Freight Transport Association), 18 June 2018
213 UK in a Changing Europe, ibid
214 See WTO, Principles of the trading system
agreements with each other or form customs unions, as the WTO permits those as ‘exceptions’ to the MFN rule.

One proposal to avoid infrastructure and checks on the Irish border in a no-deal scenario is for the UK to waive checks on goods as they enter Northern Ireland. However, if there is no deal, there is also no UK trade agreement with the EU, so many trade experts have argued that if the UK applied no customs tariffs or checks to EU goods coming across the Irish border, MFN requirements mean it would have to do the same for all goods coming in from other nations. Aoife O’Donoghue, Professor of International Law at the University of Durham, told Channel 4 News:

> If the UK chooses not to impose any tariffs on goods coming across the [Irish] border… that would mean that the UK is giving the EU (because Ireland is the EU in this context) complete open access. So its most favoured nation tariff is zero. That means it would have to give a zero tariff access to every single country in the WTO.215

Dr Lorand Bartels, an international trade academic, gave evidence to the European Scrutiny Committee (ESC), and was asked what would happen if the UK did waive all customs and regulatory checks at the Northern Irish border. He suggested that while this would be a problem legally, the UK might receive a waiver from the WTO:

> I can only speak about what that would mean legally. It would be something of a problem, essentially. The reason is that it would be granting the EU preferences that would not be shared with other WTO members. I do not think, I should say, that the WTO should in reality present this as a major problem. First of all, I have to insist as a WTO lawyer that WTO rules are binding and are law. However, the reality is that it takes a long time to enforce them. It requires countries to complain. They might not see any value in complaining. More importantly, though, it would be appropriate to ask for a waiver of the WTO to cover this sort of situation, and there is a very good chance, given the circumstances of the Northern Irish border, that that waiver would be forthcoming. It is a technical problem but one that is relatively easily solved. Again, I do not know what this actually means on the ground.216

Federico Fabbrini, Professor of European law at Dublin City University, has suggested that the EU could use a previously unused provision in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to remove the need for customs checks (but not regulatory checks) in Northern Ireland:

> In the event of a hard Brexit, therefore, contingency plans would need to be put in place from the EU side to deal with the sudden emergence of a customs border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. […] [A]n option that the EU could consider … would be to trigger Article XXIV(3) GATT, which introduces the so-called “frontier traffic exception” from the MFN principle. Under this never-used clause of the GATT, ordinary WTO customs rules “shall not be construed to prevent: a) advantages accorded by any contracting party to adjacent countries in order to facilitate frontier traffic”. Pursuant to this reading, the EU could declare the

215 Channel 4 News, Fact check: What are the options for the Irish border after Brexit? 29 November 2017
216 European Scrutiny Committee Oral evidence: EU Withdrawal, HC 763, 27 June 2018, Q539
The entire territory of Northern Ireland to be a frontier zone to the EU customs union; thereby removing the need for customs controls (at least on the EU side) but not the need to SPS checks. Clearly this solution would not be problem-free, as it would create a loophole in the impermeability of the EU external customs border, which could be exploited for illegal purposes. Nevertheless, it should remain in the armory of the EU to deal with a thorny issue.\footnote{European Parliament Constitutional Affairs Committee, The Institutional Consequences of a Hard Brexit, Professor Federico Fabbrini, May 2018.}

The ESC also asked Dr Bartels about this exception. He thought it could not be extended to the whole of Northern Ireland, as that was not its original intention:

The frontier travel exception is another one [exception] but it does not take you very far. The discussions on the frontier traffic exception at the time that the rule was drafted made it fairly clear that, where we were talking about situations where you had had a border running through a city, the traffic that counts as frontier traffic is about goods that are produced and consumed within a small distance of that border. The figure that was given by the United States, which drafted this provision, was 15km either side of the border. Essentially what we are talking about is market traffic.

[…] It is not designed to cover whole territories. It is really just for market traffic on the border in those sorts of special circumstances. It is not really anything more than that. With all due respect to my colleague, what he has said has been somewhat misunderstood and too much reliance has been placed on it.

[…] Quite clearly, the frontier traffic exception is of no particular use here except, if you really wanted to push it, to actual frontier traffic that extends in a very, very small zone either side of that frontier.\footnote{European Scrutiny Committee Oral evidence: EU Withdrawal, HC 763, 27 June 2018, Q532}

David Collins, Professor of International Economic Law at City University, London, also told the ESC that this exemption could not cover the whole territory of Northern Ireland, but he did say it could help alleviate some issues for local goods traffic, explaining: “this is the basis for the discussion in some circles about having a two-tier checking system, one for local traffic and then another for larger traffic that might have an international destination”.\footnote{Ibid}

Sabine Weyand, the EU Commission’s Deputy Chief Negotiator, told the Exiting the EU Committee in September, that such a border zone would not satisfy EU concerns about the integrity of the single market:

You referred to the exemption from MFN provisions in the WTO. Now this refers to tariff issues. Indeed you can create an economic zone 20 km around the border or wherever, but that does not address the issue we face on the island of Ireland.

Here we are talking very practically about—imagine—an import of shrimps from an Asian country where they treat shrimps with antibiotics, which are prohibited in the EU because they can lead to blindness. Now this shipment arrives in Liverpool and is
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destined for the market in Northern Ireland and also the EU27. At what moment and how do we check that there are no residues of prohibited antibiotics? A 20 km zone does not address this issue. That is one example.

The second example is bicycles imported from China on which the EU levies anti-dumping duties. Maybe the UK in the future decides not to have such anti-dumping duties because you want to have your own system on this, so how can we ensure that bicycles, arriving in Liverpool again or somewhere else, do not end up undermining the anti-dumping duties that the EU is levying? How can we avoid that this becomes an entry point into the single market? Again, WTO rules on exemptions, of 20 km, do not address this issue.

The third issue—and a very important one—is VAT. How can we ensure that VAT is levied correctly? That is a major source of revenue for all our member states and is also a major source of fraud in the EU but also in the UK. Therefore, we will need to have a system where we can protect the integrity of the single market and the customs union, in a situation where we do not have a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland.

It is on these very precise and concrete issues that we need to find a solution. In the same evidence session, Michel Barnier said that not only were checks unavoidable, but there was no neat distinction between customs and regulatory checks:

In the light of your Government’s decision to leave both the single market and the customs union, it is obvious that we need to find ways and means to set in place a number of checks on goods entering Ireland. Without any checks, that would be a breach in the single market and customs union. Without checks, we cannot guarantee the safety of goods entering into the European Union and circulating in it, and vice versa obviously for the British market, as far as you are concerned, because the external border of your market would be there now.

In the joint report of December and then in a letter from Theresa May in March, the British Government committed itself to respecting the integrity of the single market and the customs union and the place occupied therein by Ireland. On the ground, ladies and gentlemen, it is impossible—this is nothing new—to distinguish between customs checks and other regulatory checks. The two kinds of checks are intrinsically linked in the technical physical organisation of what happens when things are checked on that border for the single market.

The Prime Minister, in her evidence to the Liaison Committee in July 2018, suggested that the Government would not automatically impose border controls and checks if there were no deal:

Q4 Hilary Benn: Can you confirm that no deal would mean a hard border in Northern Ireland? It’s a very simple question. If there is no deal, there will be a hard border.

The Prime Minister: There isn’t the sort of simple answer to that that you are looking for, if I may say so.

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221 Ibid Q2537.
Q5 Hilary Benn: Really?

The Prime Minister: Obviously, if we were looking at the question of no deal, the United Kingdom would need to consider what action we would take in those circumstances, and the Irish Government and the European Commission would need to consider what action they would take in those circumstances.

Q6 Hilary Benn: But you have put a huge amount of effort, including in your White Paper, into coming up with a proposal to avoid a hard border—presumably because, as you said to the House of Commons on 9 July, “The friction-free movement of goods is the only way to avoid a hard border between Northern Ireland and Ireland”. Therefore, if there is no deal, there can’t be friction-free movement of goods, and therefore there would be a hard border, wouldn’t there?

The Prime Minister: If there is no deal, there will be decisions for the United Kingdom Government to take about the action that it takes at its borders. The European Commission is very clear that if there is no agreement in relation to customs arrangements, there will have to be checks at the border, but, as I say, when you come to a circumstance—whatever the circumstances were—we would obviously need to look at the situation in which that deal was being put in place, the arrangements in which that lack of a deal was being put into place, and so forth.

Q7 Hilary Benn: But we are talking about no deal. You have just acknowledged that the Commission has said that checks would have to be put in place on the European side. Therefore there would be a hard border, and that would be the consequence of no deal. I suppose the question is, why would that be worth it? You have often said, “We’re prepared to contemplate no deal,” although you do not want that outcome. Why would that be a price worth paying for Northern Ireland?

The Prime Minister: If I can just recap on what I said, in my first answer in relation to this, I said that if we were in a no-deal situation we would obviously have to consider what action we were taking, not just in relation to the Northern Ireland border but more generally; the European Commission would have to consider what action it was taking with its responsibilities for customs, and indeed individual Governments would have to consider the action that they were taking in those circumstances.

As you know, the proposals that the European Commission have put forward so far have been based on the assumption that, if you do not have that frictionless trade, there is that border in place. What I am saying is if we were in the circumstances of no deal, all the parties concerned would have to consider what action they would take.

8.2 Regulatory checks

With or without a deal, the Government intends to leave the Single Market. The Single Market, as well as removing tariffs and quotas on goods trade between Member States, also removes non-tariff barriers to trade, such as differing technical specifications and labelling requirements (see section 6.2 above).

The Northern Ireland Affairs Committee report on the land border between Northern Ireland and Ireland describes how this regime allows
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goods to pass across the border currently and the possible effects of the UK leaving the Single Market:

To facilitate the free movement of goods, the Single Market operates under the principle of “mutual recognition”. This means that any good lawfully produced in one member state can be sold in any other. To make this work, the EU has adopted harmonised regulatory standards which ensure that all member states observe, at a minimum, the same product standards. We heard that mutual recognition is “more than just having similar rules”, it relies on judicial enforcement and keeping national legislation in each member state constantly in alignment. When the UK leaves the Single Market, it will no longer be bound by the Single Market’s regulatory standards for goods or accept the powers of the EU institutions, which means UK and EU goods could cease to benefit from mutual recognition in each other’s markets. Regulatory differences can create barriers to trade because the greater the variance in regulations the more checks are required on goods traded between countries. For example, if the UK were to diverge from EU prohibitions on genetically modified food or chlorine-washed chicken it would become necessary to ensure that these goods do not cross the border into the EU via Ireland.

The debate over what would happen to goods traffic crossing the border in a no-deal scenario centres on whether the UK would be treated as a third country by the EU or not. While the UK would not be part of the Single Market, it would have in place all the EU regulatory requirements. But because it would not be legally obliged to maintain those requirements, the EU is likely to insist on checks to ensure compliance. The EU’s preparedness notices assume that the UK will be treated as a third country. The new requirements for businesses seeking to export to the EU, particularly on health and food safety, are extensive.

According to the Institute for Government (IfG), “[c]ustoms checks account for less than half of the border formalities” and regulatory checks are more “onerous” than customs checks. The European Commission has produced a slide showing that most checks and controls on goods entering and exiting the EU are not related to customs duties.

Live animals, food and other agricultural products, are amongst the most regulated goods and therefore have the most rigorous regime of checks and controls. Regulatory checks would have a heavy impact on Irish border traffic because of the large volume of trade in these products across the border.

The Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee, in their report Brexit: Trade in food, looked at the volume of trade in these goods across the Irish border and the potential impact of a harder border:

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222 Northern Irish Affairs Select Committee, 2nd Report - The land border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, HC 329, 16 March 2018, para 43

223 Institute for Government, The Irish border after Brexit, Tim Durrant & Alex Stojanovic, June 2018
111. The trade in live cattle and sheep, and beef and lamb across the Northern Ireland/Republic of Ireland border takes place on a daily basis, with approximately 390,000 live lambs crossing the border annually. The Livestock and Meat Commission for Northern Ireland told us that the Northern Ireland sheep industry was particularly exposed to the effects of more complicated border arrangements, with approximately 45% of all lambs born in Northern Ireland exported to the Republic of Ireland each year. In 2016, the value of this live trade was approximately £31.5 million.

112. The dairy industries in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland act as one through the supply chain, and dairy products cross the border several times between the farm gate and the consumer. Republic of Ireland dairy co-operatives own approximately 60% of the processing capacity in Northern Ireland. Exports to the Republic of Ireland were approximately 15% of total sales of the Northern Ireland dairy industry in 2015.

113. Witnesses told us that it was essential that two-way access between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland remained “without tariffs and free from burdensome non-tariff administrative measures”. Dairy UK said that a hard border would be the least desirable option for the dairy industry.\footnote{224}

The report also describes the regime for third countries to export live animals and animal products to the EU:

104. Any consignment of animals or animal products from third countries to the EU, may only enter the EU at a designated border inspection post (BIP). All such consignments of imported animal food products are subject to a documentary, identity and possibly physical examination at the first point of entry into the EU, and all consignments must pay a hygiene inspection charge depending upon the type and amount of the commodity being examined. These charges are harmonised, laid down in EU legislation and quite independent of any customs dues payable.

[...] There are no control points at the land border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.\footnote{225}

In the event of no deal, if the EU insists on such checks, and in the absence of border inspection posts, it is unclear how such products could enter Ireland from Northern Ireland.

Seamus Leheny explains in more detail the checks on animal products, and the requirements if there were no special agreement between the UK and the EU to bypass them:

- Customs checks on things like tariffs is only the tip of the iceberg in terms of checks, and there is potentially an even bigger problem facing supply chain logistics on the Island of Ireland. Council Directive 97/78/EC of 18 December 1997 states that food products of animal origin, including meat, entering the EU shall be subjected to veterinary checks. There are three elements to these checks:
  - Documentary Checks: Verifying the veterinary certificates and documents accompanying the consignment.

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\footnote{224}{Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee, \textit{3rd Report - Brexit: Trade in Food}, HC 348, 18 February 2018}
\footnote{225}{Ibid}
2 – Identity Checks: Check to ensure products in vehicle match those described in documents. This will mean physical inspection of vehicle to check seal numbers.

3 – Physical Check: Here the consignment is physically inspected, and this can include examining the packaging, checking temperatures, sending samples for to a lab analysis, or even smelling or tasting a product.

The EU stipulates the frequency of checks as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-EU Import Checks</th>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Official that undertakes inspection</th>
<th>Frequency of Checks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Documentary Checks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ID Checks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Physical Checks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beef, Lamb, Pork</td>
<td>Official Veterinarian</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry</td>
<td>Official Veterinarian</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Veterinary checks must take place at the physical point where goods enter the EU so without some special agreement, veterinary checks and the associated infrastructure would have to be put into place at the Irish Border in order to protect the integrity of the European food supply chain. This would result in every such load having to stop to lodge documents, ID checks and potentially a physical inspection.

The UK may also have to reciprocate such checks for goods entering Northern Ireland and Great Britain as potential future trade partners will want to limit the UK market from the supply of similar EU products that they wish to sell us instead.226

Professor David Collins, however, believes that WTO agreements to which the EU are a party would prevent such a regime of checks being imposed on UK exports. He wrote in *The Spectator* in August 2018:

> While EU leaders like to threaten us with hints that our exports would be unsellable in the EU, the fact is that non-tariff barriers such as arbitrary health and safety inspections and borders would be prohibited under the WTO’s Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreements. The UK intends to retain conformity with EU regulations following Brexit, at least for the time being, meaning that the existing low levels of health and safety risks to the public in UK products will not change in the days after Brexit. There would, as a result, be no grounds for the EU to exclude our goods from its markets.

> The WTO’s new Trade Facilitation Agreement obliges the EU to maintain borders which are as frictionless as possible, using modern technologies such as pre-arrival processing of documents and electronic payments. Discrimination against foreign products through all sorts of internal regulations is forbidden. These rules are enforced by a well-respected international tribunal which has a high rate of compliance and cannot be overruled by the European Court of Justice.227

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227 The Spectator, *Why a no-deal Brexit is nothing to fear*, 4 August 2018.
Professor Collins' view is not shared by the majority of trade experts. Financial journalist Therese Raphael disagrees that regulatory goods checks are prohibited by WTO agreements: “Prohibited is a strong word. In fact, the WTO tells members to enter into consultations, but it doesn't force them to recognize another's standards”. 228 She also disputes Collins' representation of what the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement requires:

Similarly, the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement aims at frictionless borders, but the idea that it could be used to prevent border infrastructure in Ireland after a no-deal Brexit is fanciful. Every developed country has signed up to it, including some famously non-porous borders, which tells you something about its teeth.

While EU members may individually want to recognize British goods as compliant, the EU’s Customs Code imposes more onerous procedures and checks on third-party goods than those member states are subjected to. For example, U.K. exporters would have to complete, among other forms, a Single Administrative Document, with 54 parts, for each declaration. They would lose access to the New Computerized Transit System, the IT system that facilitates trade.

This isn’t the EU deciding to be obstreperous or imposing new barriers; it's a legal thing -- or, as Stojanovic put it in a conversation, it's literally a case of "computer says no." The U.K. will be treated like any other outside country.

The U.K. government could take the EU to a dispute resolution body to complain that its standards haven’t been automatically recognized. But good luck with that; the EU would fight any attack on its single market rights vigorously and it would all take a very long time to resolve. 229

Dmitry Grozoubinski, a former WTO negotiator for Australia, supports this view and has said:

The SPS and TBT agreements call for technical regulations to be evidence based, to serve a policy objective and to minimally distort trade. They do NOT prevent, for example, the EU from requiring certification by an EU authority (which, absent an agreement, UKs won’t be).

Peter Ungphakorn, a former senior information officer with the WTO Secretariat, looked specifically at what the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement says about checks on goods:

Basically, the Trade Facilitation Agreement is irrelevant to the question of whether the UK and EU can check each other’s goods. […]

The agreement is important. The main purpose is to slash the costs of trading by cutting red tape when goods cross borders. So it calls for streamlined procedures, paperwork handled electronically and as simply as possible, and so on. It also breaks new ground by allowing developing countries to promise to reform their procedures on condition they receive aid to implement it.

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228  Bloomberg, [Computer Says No’ to Jacob Rees-Mogg on Brexit](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-09/computer-says-no-to-jacob-rees-mogg-on-brexit), 9 August 2018

Because customs and other procedures in developing countries tend to be slow and cumbersome, it’s these countries that stand to gain the most from implementing the agreement.

But it would be wrong to say the agreement is targeted at only or even mainly developing countries. Far from it. There are important provisions that developed countries like the EU and UK have to respect or face legal challenges.

It’s just that the provisions dealing with electronic paperwork and streamlined procedures don’t fall into that category. They are written in a way that only requires countries to do their best to comply. And what “doing their best” means is left up to them.230

But Dr Bartels’ view (which he acknowledges is not shared by all his colleagues or the EU) is that the UK’s current alignment with the EU’s regulations on goods could mean checks are not technically required straight away post-Brexit:

If on Brexit day the regulations that the UK has are considered by law and in fact the EU to be no more burdensome than necessary to achieve the EU’s objectives, and that is because they are the same as the EU’s regulations, I cannot see how that changes on Brexit day plus one. Down the track, things change, of course, and there are other aspects to this. One has to also look at the rules on checking for regulatory compliance and that depends on trust and there are slightly different rules that apply to that.

Just in terms of the underlying standards, yes, that is my view. I should say that it is an unpopular view, in Brussels and elsewhere and among my colleagues, but that is my view.231

However, he also thought the EU would still probably impose regulatory checks on goods coming into the EU in the event of no deal, saying “you cannot stop that. It is the EU’s border. It is going to protect it”.232

There is no clarity at present as to exactly how goods traffic across the border will be managed in the event of no deal. The UK Government’s own guidance on what would happen has little or no detail at present on regulatory/ sanitary and phytosanitary checks, although it is expected to publish more information in the coming weeks. Currently, there is one section on trading across the Irish border in the technical note on ‘Trading with the EU if there’s no Brexit deal’, which reads:

The Irish government have indicated they would need to discuss arrangements in the event of no deal with the European Commission and EU member states. We would recommend that, if you trade across the land border, you should consider whether you will need advice from the Irish government about preparations you need to make.233

VAT would also need to be collected on goods travelling from Northern Ireland to the Republic Ireland, and vice-versa, in the event of a no deal scenario. There is already a VAT border between Ireland and Northern

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230 How does the Trade Facilitation Agreement really affect Brexit? Peter Ungphakorn, 16 August 2018.
231 European Scrutiny Committee Oral evidence: EU Withdrawal, HC 763, 27 June 2018, Q544.
232 Ibid, Q540
233 HMRC, Guidance: Trading with the EU if there’s no Brexit deal, published 23 August 2018.
Ireland, as VAT and excise are not fully harmonised across the EU, meaning that both territories apply different levels of VAT to different goods. However, the need for infrastructure at the border has been abolished, by the introduction of an EU common regulatory framework under which businesses can sell goods with 0% VAT on the understanding that it will be paid by the recipient business. This arrangement relies on the VAT Information Exchange System (VIES) via which information on cross-border movements of goods is transmitted between the EU’s national tax authorities. In contrast, customs officials at the EU’s external border have a duty to ensure that the correct Value Added Tax (VAT) is paid on imports.234 The Government also accepted, in its technical note on the “temporary customs arrangement”, that “to avoid a hard border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, the application of common cross-border processes and procedures for VAT and excise would be necessary”.235

8.3 Impact on trade and the economy

The latest HMRC regional trade statistics show that Northern Ireland exported £2.8 billion worth of goods and services to Ireland - around 33% of the region's exports - and imported £2.1 billion of goods and services from Ireland - 28% of its imports.236 According to the IfG, agri-food accounts for close to 40% of Northern Irish exports to Ireland.237

The organisation InterTradeIreland238 commissioned the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), an Irish think tank, to conduct analysis of the impact of Brexit on the Irish border. ESRI looked at several different scenarios, including one where trade between Ireland and the UK would be based on WTO rules. The resulting imposition of tariffs and non-tariff barriers in this scenario could result in Irish trade to Great Britain falling by 12%, British trade to Ireland falling by 6%, Irish trade to Northern Ireland falling by 14%, and Northern Irish trade to Ireland falling by 19% - resulting in a total reduction in cross-border trade of 16%.239

However, they also modelled a scenario where, as well as these trade barriers being imposed, there was a 10% fall in the value of the pound sterling (this is similar to the fall in the pound immediately after the EU referendum). Most economists believe there will be a significant drop in the value of the pound if the UK leaves the EU with no deal. The fall in sterling in ESRI’s analysis would, for British and Northern Irish trade, partly mitigate the effects of the trade barriers being imposed, but it

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234 See European Scrutiny Committee report on reform of EU VAT legislation, 28 March 2018, which also covers the implications of the reintroduction of VAT as an import tax on UK-EU trade in goods for Northern Ireland in particular.
236 HMRC, Regional Trade Statistics, Q1 2018, released 7 June 2018 [accessed 29 August 2018]
237 IfG, The Irish border after Brexit, Tim Durrant & Alex Stojanovic, June 2018.
238 InterTradeIreland are a cross-border trade and business development body funded by both the Irish and Northern-Irish governments. For more information see their website.
239 InterTradeIreland, Potential Impact of WTO Tariffs on Cross-Border Trade, 23 March 2018, Table 4, p 13.
would worsen the outcome for Irish exports to Britain and Northern Ireland.

In this scenario Irish trade to Great Britain would fall by 20%, British trade to Ireland would remain broadly similar (at +0.3%), Irish trade to Northern Ireland would fall 21%, and Northern Irish trade to Ireland would fall 11% - so there would be a total fall in cross-border trade of 17%.\textsuperscript{240}

The study also looked at trade of different categories of goods. It predicts that the volume of trade in agri-foods in particular would see large falls. In a no-deal scenario\textsuperscript{241} they foresee that trade in meat and fish from Ireland to Northern Ireland could fall by 65%, while from Northern Ireland to Ireland it could fall 26%. Figures for dairy products were a fall of 66% and 52% respectively. A few categories of goods could see some increases in trade volumes from Northern Ireland to Ireland; for example, machinery and electrical goods might rise 6%.\textsuperscript{242}

If the Government were to unilaterally waive customs and regulatory controls for goods entering the UK via the land border with Ireland, there would be a potential loss of revenue from the non-collection of import duties, VAT and excise. Jon Thompson, Chief Executive of HMRC, discussed this issue with the House of Lords EU External Affairs Sub-Committee. He talked of the ‘trilemma’ that faced the government for all of the UK’s external borders:

\begin{quote}
Ministers would need to make a decision about the free flow of trade, the security of the United Kingdom and the raising of revenue, because those are the current three objectives at the border. In the scenario you are setting out [no deal], some choice may have to be made between those three objectives in the run-up to April 2019.\textsuperscript{243}
\end{quote}

Mel Stride, financial secretary to the Treasury, acknowledged this trade off to the same Committee.\textsuperscript{244} Mr Stride emphasised to the Sub-Committee that there were already checks in place at the moment in Northern Ireland away from the border to prevent excise fraud, and this capacity could be used in the event of no deal:

\begin{quote}
People assume that in Ireland there are no checks or interventions going on with goods going across, but of course there are. There is a substantial amount of trafficking, fuel laundering and tobacco smuggling. There are interceptions inland in Northern Ireland, so it is not the case that we would not have the ability to function in that particular environment, but there would clearly be some very significant restrictions.\textsuperscript{245}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{240} InterTradeIreland, ibid.
\textsuperscript{241} The scenario with WTO rules trade and a pound sterling depreciation of 10%.
\textsuperscript{242} InterTradeIreland, ‘Potential Impact of WTO Tariffs on Cross-Border Trade’, 23 March 2018, Table 7,p18
\textsuperscript{243} House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, Sub-Committee on External Affairs, ‘Brexit: Customs Arrangements’, oral evidence, 19 July 2018, Q87.
\textsuperscript{244} Ibid, Q114.
\textsuperscript{245} Ibid
The Financial Times reporting on the Committee’s evidence session said, “the revenue losses have the potential to be large if the UK does not collect taxes at the border”.246

8.4 Movement of people
The movement of people across the Irish border has remained a relatively uncontentious part of the negotiations and poses fewer issues compared to the movement of goods. This is largely because of the Common Travel Area (CTA) between Ireland and the UK. The CTA allows British and Irish nationals to travel freely within the CTA without being subject to passport controls. The CTA is based on bilateral agreements and domestic legislation in the UK and Ireland that should be largely unaffected by Brexit. Both sides in the negotiations have agreed articles relating to the CTA in the draft Withdrawal Agreement. Another factor that makes the movement of people simpler in any Brexit scenario is that both Ireland and the UK are outside the Schengen Area.247

Bernard Ryan, Professor of immigration law at the University of Leicester, told the Lords EU Committee that the continuation of CTA arrangements post-Brexit would be compatible with EU law:

> There is no apparent legal reason why the Republic of Ireland should not retain the benefit of Protocols 19 and 20 [Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union] after Brexit, so as to permit bilateral co-operation with the United Kingdom outside the Schengen Zone.248

In theory, a no-deal Brexit should not imperil such co-operation. For more information on the CTA see Library Briefing Paper: The Common Travel Area, and the special status of Irish nationals in UK law. However, the CTA only applies to Irish and UK citizens. Arrangements for non-CTA nationals are more complex. Although there are minimal immigration checks for journeys started within the CTA, non-CTA nationals must have the relevant immigration permission for the country they are seeking to enter.

There is also the issue of frontier workers - EU citizens who live in one Member State and work in another. The Irish journalist Tony Connelly, in his book on Brexit and Ireland, explains how Brexit could affect their status:

> For those who are neither Irish nor British citizens, and who live and work on different sides of the Irish border, the prospects are particularly uncertain. Unlike citizens of Ireland and the UK, they are not protected by the provisions of the Common Travel Area. Under EU rules, such people are regarded as ‘frontier workers’. That means they enjoy certain rights, such as access to medical services-including the right to a medical card-on the side of the

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247 The Schengen Area eliminates internal border checks on the movement of people between the 26 countries that have joined the zone.
248 Lords EU Committee, Brexit: UK-Irish relations, 12 December 2016, HL Paper 76 2016-17, written evidence of Professor Bernard Ryan (BUI0008)
94 What if there’s no Brexit deal?

border where they work. There are similar rights regarding social-
welfare and pension payments.

When Britain leaves the EU, those rights will fall. That would mean, for example, Lithuanian lorry drivers or mushroom harvesters who live in the North and work in the South (or vice versa) will no longer be regarded as frontier workers protected by EU rights. It is understood, however, that their particular situation will be looked at during the two-year withdrawal negotiations.\(^{249}\)

The draft Withdrawal Agreement protects the rights of frontier workers, allowing EU and UK citizens to exercise their rights up to the end of the transition period (see Articles 9, and 22-24). It also allows frontier workers to exit and enter the UK and Ireland for work without requiring a visa,\(^{250}\) although it does require workers to have either a passport or official identification card to cross borders. But if there is no deal, none of these provisions will be in force, meaning that frontier workers could find themselves in a legal limbo.

8.5 Security concerns

The UK Government’s position paper on the Irish border states that “the invisible and open border between Northern Ireland and Ireland is, as the Irish Government has said, arguably ‘the most tangible symbol of the peace process’”. The paper also notes that the Belfast (‘Good Friday’) Agreement included a specific commitment to “the removal of security installations”.\(^{251}\)

George Hamilton, Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), said in an interview with the Guardian in February that any infrastructure on the border would become a target for dissident republicans:

“Our assessment is that they would be a target because it would be representative of the state and in their minds fair game for attack. I would assume that that assessment is shared by senior politicians and officials who are negotiating Brexit.

“While I am chief constable I do not want to enter the political debate over Brexit but I still think it’s fair to comment on some of its implications and scenarios. And a hard border from a policing perspective would not be a good outcome because it would a create a focus and a target.”

He said fixed frontier customs and security posts would expose PSNI officers to greater danger than they already face from anti-peace process republican paramilitaries.

“Anything that makes the police presence predictable in places where terrorists are active of course raises the threat and increases the harm to my officers. We deal with risk every day and we are good at it but unfortunately the terrorists only have to be lucky once and get a result with catastrophic consequences. I think it

\(^{249}\) T Connelly, ‘Brexit and Ireland: The Dangers, the Opportunities, and the Inside Story of the Irish response’, 2017, p 260

\(^{250}\) They may be required to apply for a document proving their frontier worker status (see Article 24 of the Agreement).

\(^{251}\) DExEU, position paper: Northern Ireland and Ireland, 16 August 2017
would be a poor use of police resources if we are going to have to protect physical infrastructures at the border.”

Mr Hamilton thought hard border installations “could have a negative political impact” in Ireland and Northern Ireland, “re-emphasising the context and the causes of the conflict” and so creating tensions and challenges that the Good Friday Agreement had helped to dispel. Determined dissident republicans, he said, might regard such infrastructure on the northern side of the border “as a representation of the UK state”. He thought he might need more policing resources:

Asked if his force’s strength of 6,700 officers could properly police the 300-mile Irish border, Hamilton said that unless there were extra numbers recruited resources would have to taken away from other areas of policing.

“There would be an increased demand due to a hard border and a pull of resources towards that which means either an uplift in police funding or else we would have to have reduced levels of service in other areas.”

In a May 2018 paper on the Irish border, the think-tank Policy Exchange argued that concerns about Brexit affecting peace in Northern Ireland were overblown:

The weak arguments that Brexit somehow endangers peace or undermines the Good Friday agreement have been allowed to take hold. Neither argument bears much examination, but importantly they have received minimal examination – and have been repeated unthinkingly in the British media. Sinn Fein’s Gerry Adams and Colm Eastwood, leader of the nationalist SDLP, have both stated that no general breakdown in peace is likely. Adams instead stresses the dangers to human rights from Brexit although few lawyers appear to agree with him.

The real danger is not any general return to the Troubles but rather that border infrastructure can be attacked, and officials attempting to protect or replace it may be put at risk. It is this risk which motivates the UK Government to promise a border with no infrastructure at all. Of course, the huge attention drawn to the border issue in the media makes it almost inevitable that dissident republicans would attempt some attack. This may however be a short-term danger. Once Brexit is complete, with no-one stopped at the border and with no visible infrastructure, any danger is likely to subside.252

Suzanne Breen, a Northern Irish journalist, argues in the Belfast Telegraph that even if infrastructure were put in place, while it might serve as a reminder of previous partition, the security threat is much reduced from the past:

There are many legitimate concerns around Brexit and its effects on both sides of the border. But claiming it’s a ticking time bomb for the peace process is quite simply scaremongering.

The customs checkpoints which existed along the border for almost half a decade after partition played no part in violence erupting here in 1969.

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252  Policy Exchange, Getting Over the Line: Solutions to the Irish border: Why the UK (including Northern Ireland) can leave the Customs Union, avoid a hard border – and preserve the Good Friday agreement, Graham Gudgin and Ray Basset, 9 May 2018.
That IRA campaign was firmly rooted in the denial of civil rights - jobs, housing and political equality. A return to the border as we knew it from the 1970s onwards - with British soldiers in watchtowers on the hillsides above checkpoints - is not on the cards.

Of course, the introduction of any infrastructure will serve as a reminder - and perhaps an uncomfortable one for some - that partition and the border still do exist. But the youth of Ballymurphy or the Bogside will not go out to kill or be killed because of customs controls.

And who exactly are expected to wage any new armed campaign anyway? The Provisionals' war is over. Dissident republicans are having some success in recruiting young people in working-class nationalist areas, but I guarantee that none of those joining up are citing Brexit and the possibility of customs posts as their reasons.²⁵³

The IfG summarised the findings of a May 2018 study from Queen's University Belfast on Northern Irish attitudes to border checks:

‘There is substantial and intense opposition to possible North-South border checks [of the kind that would be required if the UK were to become a third country with no special arrangements] between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland and to East-West border checks between Northern Ireland and Great Britain.’

The report found that around 60% of people surveyed would support peaceful protests against checks on the border. It also noted that there is little support for violence against border infrastructure, with ‘only 5% of the population as a whole… fairly or very supportive of vandalising border technology’. But the authors found that in focus group discussions, ‘there are strong expectations that protests against either North-South or East-West border checks would quickly deteriorate into violence.’²⁵⁴

8.6 Energy

There has been an all-island electricity market on the island of Ireland since 2007. Although Northern Ireland is a net exporter of electricity (i.e. it exports more than it imports), it still relies on electricity imports from Ireland when there is insufficient local electricity generation capacity.

The Financial Times reported in July that ‘no deal’ could have a significant impact on the energy market in Northern Ireland, and the Government had drawn up emergency plans that could mean electricity generators being requisitioned to provide power for the region:

Thousands of electricity generators would have to be requisitioned at short notice and put on barges in the Irish Sea to help keep the lights on in Northern Ireland in the event of the hardest no-deal Brexit, according to one paper drawn up by Whitehall officials.

²⁵³ Belfast Telegraph, ‘Suzanne Breen: Brexit scaremongering chorus grows’, 27 April 2018
²⁵⁴ IfG, ‘The Irish border after Brexit’, Tim Durrant & Alex Stojanovic, June 2018
That could involve bringing back equipment from far-flung countries such as Afghanistan – where the UK is still part of Nato-led operations – said people familiar with the paper’s contents. 255

However, the Single Electricity Market (SEM) is based on bilateral agreement between the UK and Ireland, so according to ESRI, “should the UK leave the EU, the previous bilateral agreements would remain in force”. 256 But some experts say the SEM is, in turn, reliant on the EU’s own Internal Energy Market (IEM – see section 12.1 below), so there could be consequences for the UK. Robert McCormick, general manager of the System Operator for Northern Ireland (SONI) which operates the electricity system in Northern Ireland, told the House of Lords EU Committee that “If GB is not part of the IEM, onward trading [from Northern Ireland] with Europe will be extremely difficult (if not impossible)”. 257

Other experts giving evidence to the Committee thought the SEM should be able to function even if the UK was no longer in the IEM. 258

If a no-deal scenario did result in disruption of energy supplies across the border, there would be significant impacts on both Ireland and Northern Ireland. A European Parliament report in November 2017 described Ireland’s dependency on UK gas supplies:

> Gas supplies are of crucial importance to Ireland because gas plays a central role in electricity generation. Because of this, any interruption to supply could have very serious consequences. Nearly all of the gas used in Ireland comes through the interconnectors with the UK. 259

The Government’s position paper on Northern Ireland and Ireland states “the continued ability to trade gas between Great Britain and the island of Ireland is also critical for security of supply and efficient market operation”. 260

The UK is a net importer of gas from Europe, so it in turn relies on gas imports from mainland Europe, which could also be threatened by a no-deal scenario.

If there is no deal, tariffs on energy supplies would probably not be imposed by either side. The EP report (see above) stated that “for WTO members the EU has no tariff on electricity or gas imports”, 261 but also warned:

> Gas and electricity markets are complex service markets, not simple commodities markets, and the EU is in the process of

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255 Financial Times, Hard Brexit: the eye-catching contingency plans to stop NI power blackouts, 11 July 2018
256 Economic and Social Research Institute, Scoping the Possible Economic Implications of Brexit on Ireland, November 2015
257 Lords EU Committee, Brexit: energy security, HL Paper 63, 29 January 2018, para 142
258 Ibid, see paras 141-147
259 European Parliament, Policy Dept A: Economic and Scientific Policy, The impact of Brexit on the EU energy system, November 2017
260 DExEU, position paper: Northern Ireland and Ireland, 16 August 2017
261 EP report, November 2017
streamlining the interface between national market designs to create a single energy market.262

8.7 Other areas

There are other areas of cross-border cooperation that would be affected by ‘no deal’. The UK and EU Brexit negotiators have conducted a joint ‘mapping exercise’ to identify cross-border policy areas that could be affected by Brexit and have reportedly found 142 of them. These 142 areas are all a subset of the six areas of North-South economic cooperation identified in the Good Friday Agreement: transport, agriculture, education, health, environment and tourism.

The December 2017 Joint Report says the mapping exercise:

[s]how that North-South cooperation relies to a significant extent on a common European Union legal and policy framework. Therefore, the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union gives rise to substantial challenges to the maintenance and development of North-South cooperation.263

In evidence to the Lords EU Committee, Dominic Raab was asked if he would share the conclusions of the exercise. He replied that the “exercise has been going well”, but that he would “need to get a final readout of the timeframes”. This suggests it is still work in progress.264

There is more detail on the effect of no deal on transport across the Irish border in section 12.5.

262 EP report, ibid
262 European Commission, Joint Report, 8 December 2017, para 44
264 Lords EU Committee, Scrutiny of Brexit negotiations, Dominic Raab oral evidence, 29 August 2018, Q5
9. Free movement of people, healthcare, social security and pensions

9.1 Free movement of people

A significant number of so-called ‘citizens’ rights’ will be affected by Brexit. The primary one is the free movement of persons’ rights, whereby currently any EU national can work in, live in or provide services in any EU Member State, providing they meet the conditions set out in the EU Treaties and Directive 2004/38/EC (the ‘Citizenship Directive’). These primary ‘residency’ rights are complemented by a variety of further rights, co-ordinating social security coverage for mobile EU nationals and enabling them to access healthcare, education and so on.

This section will address the primary ‘residency’ rights and how they would be affected by a ‘no deal’ Brexit; secondary rights stemming from the primary free movement of persons rights are discussed in the subsequent sections. In particular, it is unclear whether UK nationals would continue to be covered by the EU legislation that helps coordinate social security in the EU27 – nor is it clear whether they would be able to continue to access UK social security benefits in the EU27 Member State they currently reside in.

The following sections look both at EU nationals living in the UK and UK nationals living in the EU27.

EU nationals living in the UK

EU nationals resident in the UK at the moment of ‘withdrawal’ will be covered by one of two legal regimes in the absence of a concluded Withdrawal Agreement. This is dependent on the speed with which the UK Parliament legislates to bring the negotiated ‘citizens’ rights’ chapter of the Withdrawal Agreement into force in the UK – which it can do entirely separately from actually concluding that agreement with the EU.

Settled Status

If the ‘citizens’ rights’ legislation is domestically implemented by 29 March 2019, this would mean the rights of EU nationals in the UK, from 30 March 2019 onwards, would actually be those rights agreed with the EU in the draft Withdrawal Agreement. All EU nationals resident in the UK at the date of withdrawal would be eligible for either ‘settled status’ itself – a new ‘permanent residency’, and a purely UK domestic status – or for the pathway to ‘settled status’, called ‘pre-settled status’, whereby they can qualify for ‘settled status’ by exercising relevant EU Treaty Rights for a period of five years.

The EU Treaties themselves will no longer be binding on the UK at this time, but domestic legislation that refers to these Treaties will nonetheless be legally valid. Consequently, as set out in the Home Office’s [statement of intent on ‘settled status’], EU nationals exercising
Treaty rights will be entitled to a temporary or permanent status document and will continue to qualify for those documents providing they meet the three conditions necessary under the proposed ‘settled status’ legislation:

- **identity**: they hold an EU nationality (or are a qualifying family member of an EU national);
- **eligibility**: they are resident in the UK as ‘eligible’ (meaning Treaty-rights exercising) EU nationals;
- **suitability**: they pass a criminality check.

The ‘settled status’ statement of intent makes clear that the status entitles qualifying EU nationals and their family members to “the same access as they currently do to healthcare, pensions and other benefits in the UK”. This means in practice that access to all domestic public services that EU nationals can currently access if resident in the UK will continue.

Recent UK Government statements have suggested that it is the UK’s intention to implement the ‘settled status’ regime regardless of whether a deal is successfully concluded with the EU.

On 11 July 2018, Minister of State for Immigration Caroline Nokes gave evidence to the Exiting the EU Committee on the ‘settled status’ regime in the event of no deal:

**Chair**: [...] What happens to people who have been given settled status—because you have rolled it out and they have made an early application—if we end up with no deal?

**Caroline Nokes**: I keep our commitments in this offer to EU citizens very seriously indeed. The Prime Minister has been very clear that we want EU citizens who are here to be able to stay here, and we recognise the very significant contribution they make to our communities and, indeed, to our economy. This is an international obligation that I take very seriously. We do not anticipate that there will be no deal, and in the event of no deal I personally hope that we will uphold everything that we have said and make sure that we deliver on our commitment to EU citizens.

**Chair**: That is very helpful. The Government are spending quite a lot of money preparing, just in case there is no deal; but leave that on one side. I take it from what you said that Government are saying to anyone listening who is an EU citizen, “Look, whether there is a deal or not we are going to do right by you and you will be able to stay”. I think that clarity will be quite helpful, because if there is not clarity and people say, “We are preparing for no deal. No deal is a possibility”, it could create anxiety, as I am sure you would accept, on the part of the 3 million European citizens currently in the UK if they felt there was any doubt about their continuing right to reside in the UK.

**Caroline Nokes**: Once we have opened the scheme and someone has achieved settled status, it is the equivalent of indefinite leave to remain. We would not be able to take that away from them. If they have it they will be able to keep it.

This echoes the statement made by Home Secretary Sajid Javid before the Lords EU Select Committee on 21 June 2018.
**Lord Judd:** Can you guarantee to us that the agreement on EU citizens’ rights that has been reached with the EU will be honoured, even if the UK is unable to reach an acceptable deal with the EU 27 under Article 50?

**Sajid Javid MP:** The Prime Minister has been clear on this issue from day one, and I shall repeat her words. She said that EU citizens living lawfully in the UK will be able to stay. No matter what happens, if you are living lawfully in the UK you will be able to stay. Our focus has been, understandably, that we will get a deal—I am confident about that—and we are working on that basis. We have already reached agreement with the EU on citizens’ rights, in both the December and March agreements. That is what we are working on in honouring through this scheme and that is where our focus has been.

**If there is no ‘settled status’**

Should Parliament for any reason not legislate to bring the proposed ‘settled status’ regime into effect before 29 March 2019, the status of EU nationals resident in the UK on exit day will continue to be determined by the current legislation applicable to EU and EEA nationals. The [Immigration (EEA) Regulations 2016](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukreg/2016规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制/规制) will, under the EU Withdrawal Act 2018, be ‘retained’ and so remain in force unless repealed by either the ‘settled status’ legislation or any other future legislation.

Again, it is irrelevant that the EEA Regulations refer to Treaties that the UK is no longer bound by upon withdrawal from the EU: they confer rights within the UK to nationals of Member States, defined as the Member States of the EU, and consequently will continue to cover all EU nationals resident in the UK in the same way they do now. The related ‘primary’ rights that EU nationals hold, such as the ability to access healthcare services, are rooted purely in domestic law that references the concepts in the Immigration (EEA) Regulations 2016. So, for example, EU nationals exercising Treaty rights are generally considered to be ‘ordinarily resident’ in the UK and can on that basis access the NHS without payment under the NHS Act 2006.

This legislation is likely to be replaced with alternative immigration rules for EU nationals, either if a deal is concluded or in the absence of a deal. The ‘settled status’ regime is only intended to cover those EU nationals who were resident in the UK before its formal withdrawal (transition/implementation period included) from the EU. Any EU national moving to the UK outside that time period will need to be covered by a to-be-proposed domestic immigration regime. The Home Affairs Committee’s [interim report](https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-summary-syllabus.aspx?c=188) on future migration from the EEA published on 31 July 2018 stresses that in the absence of a government White Paper on immigration or an Immigration Bill, there is “little indication” of what this future immigration regime will look like. In the event of a deal, the future immigration regime may be the product of negotiations between the EU and the UK; in the absence of a deal, it is likely to be a purely domestic policy consideration.

However, the comments made by Sajid Javid (as cited above) make clear that it is not the Government’s intention to remove existing statuses from any EU nationals currently resident under EU law, and it can be
assumed this will apply even if the ‘settled status’ legislation is not implemented. While it is therefore likely that the Immigration (EEA) Regulations will be repealed and replaced with domestic legislation that does not cross-reference the EU Treaties, the Government’s position is that resident EU nationals should be granted a temporary or indefinite leave to remain in the UK under UK law.

Dominic Raab emphasised on 21 August that the rights of EU nationals to at least “stay” in the UK would be protected in the event of ‘no deal’:

> We hugely value the contribution of EU citizens here in the UK and I am confident that in the unlikely eventuality that we don’t have a deal, we will move swiftly to secure their position. It is inconceivable we would do anything other than make sure that they are legally in a position where they’re secure to stay. … we are talking about real people… and we have got a moral obligation. There’s no question that we’re going to see EU citizens turfed out. We’ve made that clear in the past. I’ve made that clear in the past, I’m happy to give that reassurance today.

This reassurance, however, does not address what rights EU nationals will hold in the UK if no deal be reached and if there is no legislation in place for ‘settled status’.

**Other rights and unknowns**

Unless the Government’s position changes significantly, all rights described as ‘primary’ – e.g. the ability to live in, work in, study in and access public services in the UK – will be retained, at least in the short run, by EU nationals living in the UK, even in the event of ‘no deal’. However, the situation with respect to secondary rights – particularly those relating to rights that are dependent on not only UK public services, but also public services in the EU27 – is significantly different. This is discussed in the sections below.

The position for EU nationals who are ‘visiting’ rather than ‘resident’ will also change as a result of Brexit. Regarding access to healthcare, for example, at the moment EU national visitors to the UK are not charged for using the NHS under an exemption in the NHS (Charges to Overseas Visitors) Regulations 2015. But this exemption applies to those present in the UK and having rights stemming from secondary EU law, such as the social security coordinating Regulation 883/2004/EC. It is not clear if the concepts contained in that Regulation (such as a ‘home Member State’ or a ‘host Member State’) will continue to operate logically in the UK, even if the Regulation itself is ‘retained’. The UK would have to identify itself (presumably in domestic legislation) as a ‘host Member State’ in order for that regulation to continue to operate with respect to the UK post-Brexit. Other rights mutually agreed for ‘short-term’ EU national visitors (as opposed to EU nationals exercising free movement rights for longer than three months) are likely to experience similar problems without domestic amending legislation.

A further question that remains unanswered by the current legislative proposals relates to the future of non-EU EEA and Swiss nationals in the

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265 BBC News, [EU residents will be secure if no Brexit deal says Raab](https://www.bbc.com/news/uk/2018-08-21-eu-residents-will-be-secure-if-no-brexit-deal-says-raab), 21 August 2018
UK. As the current withdrawal negotiations are taking place with the EU27 alone, while the EU free movement of persons rights are also applicable to the non-EU EEA states under the EEA Agreement and to Switzerland by means of bilateral agreements, the rights of non-EU EEA and Swiss nationals are not addressed by the draft Withdrawal Agreement. On this point, the Home Office’s statement of intent on ‘settled status’ gives the following insight:

Whilst the agreement with the EU does not cover the citizens of the non-EU European Economic Area states (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) and Switzerland, we have been clear that we want to secure a similar deal for citizens of these states living in the UK and for UK nationals living there. Talks with all four states are progressing well and pending final agreement being reached with each on the detail of the arrangements, the Government intends that the scheme described in this Statement of Intent will be open to other EEA citizens and Swiss citizens (and their family members) on a similar basis as for EU citizens.

UK nationals in the EU

The legal situation of UK nationals resident in one of the EU27 Member States at the time of UK withdrawal is much less certain. While they are intended to be covered by the Withdrawal Agreement, and this will preserve a significant number of their rights, their status in the absence of a Withdrawal Agreement is dependent on domestic law in each of the EU Member States. The Withdrawal Agreement, if concluded, will produce a single regime that all Member States will apply to EU nationals – but reports to date (from, among others, the European Parliament) suggest that the Member States are not making significant strides in preparing to implement that legislation or produce any other legislation in the event of a no-deal Brexit.

This is problematic for UK nationals resident in the EU27. The legislation in each of the EU27 currently gives UK nationals rights to reside purely on the basis that they are ‘EU nationals’. They do not have specific rights to reside as UK nationals, much as (for instance) German nationals do not have specific rights to reside in the UK under the Immigration (EEA) Regulations 2017. However, while EU27 nationals will still be ‘Member State nationals’ for the purposes of UK domestic laws following Brexit, UK nationals will no longer be ‘Member State nationals’ for the EU27.

In the absence of a Withdrawal Agreement, the basis on which UK nationals would have a right to reside in the EU27 State they currently live in would abruptly change on 30 March 2019. The Commons Exiting the EU Committee published a report on the rights of UK and EU nationals on 23 July 2018, which commented on this specifically:

If there is no agreement on ongoing free movement after the transition period ends, then the rights of UK citizens currently resident in the EU may be determined by EU rules on third country nationals (rules that apply to nationals of non-EU member states). Jane Golding, British in Europe, said there are different pieces of legislation that apply to third country nationals:

‘The conditions are far more stringent and in no way compare with being an EU citizen, and there is no right of free movement.'
There is a limited form of mobility. Then there are very big holes in this third-country national regime as far as self-employed people are concerned. There are a number of pieces of legislation that cover employees, but far fewer for self-employed people who are providing cross-border services. There are very big holes there.'

The Committee called on the EU27 to make a similar guarantee to that made by the UK Prime Minister, even in the event of no deal.

Steve Peers, Professor at the University of Essex, has argued that ‘citizens’ rights’ should be ring-fenced from the rest of the negotiations so as to ensure continuity of rights for eligible UK and EU nationals. However, in the absence of any ringfencing, he has made a separate argument for a unilateral EU-wide regulation that echoes what the ‘settled status’ legislation does. He argues that the EU has the power to legislate on this issue and should do so for the sake of legal certainty. To date, however, no such legislation has been proposed (let alone adopted) at EU level.

9.2 Mutual recognition of professional qualifications

Automatic recognition in UK but not necessarily reciprocated

As just one example of the influence of EU law on domestic work entitlements, under EU Directive 2005/36/EC on the mutual recognition of professional qualifications, EEA healthcare professionals with a qualification from an EEA country have their qualification automatically recognised when applying to be registered with a relevant professional regulator. Regulators include the General Medical Council (GMC), Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) and General Dental Council (GDC).

Mutual recognition of qualifications is written into UK legislation and regulations governing doctors, nurses and other healthcare professionals, as well as a variety of other regulated professions set out in the EU Directive. This would probably be retained in UK law in the case of a no-deal Brexit, allowing UK regulators to automatically recognise EEA nationals’ qualifications; however, as discussed below, the conditions under which recognition of EEA qualifications operates can be amended by Parliament at will in the event of ‘no deal’.

‘No deal’ would mean that the qualifications of UK-trained medical professionals would no longer be automatically recognised when registering to practise in the EU27, unless equivalent provisions were swiftly introduced into national legislation by other EU countries.

The BMA has argued that continued mutual recognition of professional qualifications is crucial for hiring EU nationals to work in the health service, with any changes to this being particularly felt in Northern Ireland, whose health service employs a large number of healthcare professionals from Ireland.

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266 BMA, The impact of leaving the EU on patients, February 2018
It is important to note as well that, although UK regulators may continue to be allowed to unilaterally recognise EEA nationals’ qualifications, the UK would lose access to the current EU-wide alert system. This notifies UK regulators at the pre-registration stage of EU health professionals where concerns have been raised about their fitness to practise.

**English language testing**

The Government has commented to the Health Select Committee that after leaving the EU it would consider introducing more stringent pre-registration English language testing for healthcare professionals, which they are not currently allowed to do under the EU Directive on mutual recognition. Therefore, the Government may choose to amend the law on recognition of EU healthcare qualifications, rather than retain it in its current form. In its response to the Committee’s report on Brexit and health and social care, the Government set out its view on the need for a balance between language stringency and avoiding bureaucracy:

> The primary purpose of regulating healthcare professionals is to ensure public safety. Some regulatory bodies have concerns that MRPQ (Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications Directive) limits the action they can take when registering EEA professionals, particularly by restricting tests of language competence. The Department agrees that a balance needs to be struck between managing this risk in a proportionate way and ensuring that the flow of skilled and valuable healthcare professionals into the NHS is not impeded by unnecessary levels of bureaucracy.  

More information can be found in the Commons Briefing Paper, [Language testing for healthcare professionals](https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmhealth/9465/9465.htm), 7 March 2018.

**9.3 Reciprocal healthcare**

**Current reciprocal healthcare arrangements**

The EEA Member States and Switzerland co-ordinate the provision of social security including healthcare under [Regulation 883/004](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32004R0883). The Regulation includes rules on the reimbursement of healthcare costs between Member States in the following main circumstances:

- for visitors using the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) for all necessary care during temporary stays in another Member State;
- for state pensioners and their dependants who have moved abroad, the state that pays their state pension is responsible for paying the costs of their healthcare – known as the S1 route;
- for a person who has been authorised to undergo a planned medical treatment in another Member State, costs are paid by the Member State that has referred them – known as the S2 scheme;

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What if there’s no Brexit deal?

• for a dependant (usually a spouse or child) of someone who lives in another EEA Member State or someone from another EEA Member State working in the UK.

What the draft Withdrawal Agreement provides

The (draft) Withdrawal Agreement aims to protect reciprocal healthcare arrangements for UK nationals resident in the EU before the end of the transition period (and vice-versa), so long as they continue to live or work in the country where they lived or worked at the end of the transition. This includes UK state pensioners who have retired to the EU27, as well as people who have started a course of pre-planned health treatment abroad.

The Government will continue to seek agreement with the EU that protects the reciprocal healthcare entitlements of state pensioners, including those not covered by the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement, and seek to fully protect rights under the EHIC S1 and S2 schemes, including:

• the rights of UK state pensioners who retire to the EU (and vice versa) after the end of the implementation period to benefit from a reciprocal healthcare scheme;
• the rights of UK residents to continue to receive needs-arising treatment in the EU under the EHIC scheme (and vice versa); and
• the rights of UK residents to be able to receive planned treatment in an EU Member State when this is pre-authorised by the UK (and vice versa).

Possible impact of no deal

In the event of a no-deal Brexit, the existing reciprocal healthcare arrangements for UK citizens in the EU and EU citizens in the UK would probably end. The Government has said it is developing contingency plans for this eventuality:

We are confident of securing a comprehensive deal but, to fully prepare for the unlikely event the UK and the EU do not agree the Withdrawal Agreement and implementation period, or secure a deal on future reciprocal healthcare rights, we are further developing contingency plans to minimise disruption for patients after the UK exits the EU. This includes building our understanding of the systems, processes and infrastructure needed in Member States to prioritise the safety of both UK and EU patients in all scenarios.

But the Department added that it was not at this stage “in a position to reveal further details of our contingency planning” as it was focussing on “securing a reciprocal deal with the EU”.

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269 Ibid, p 8
270 Ibid, p 10
271 Ibid
The British Medical Association (BMA) provided the following summary of what a no deal could mean:

Should there be a failure to agree a withdrawal agreement by March 2019, access to reciprocal healthcare arrangements for UK citizens and residents within the EU, and EU citizens and residents within the UK, would end. This would lead to significant disruption to those individuals’ healthcare arrangements, an increase in costs of insurance, and uncertainty regarding accessing healthcare abroad. Moreover, the NHS would face a drastic increase in demand for services, which could dramatically increase its costs and place greater pressure on doctors and clinical staff. […]

The impact of the loss of reciprocal care on patients would be significant, especially given the number of beneficiaries that are pensioners living abroad. Evidence given to the House of Commons Health Select Committee has suggested that many of them will be unable to fund private healthcare and so will be forced to return to the UK.12 UK citizens travelling within the EEA, and EEA citizens visiting the UK, will also need to purchase their own travel or health insurance should access to reciprocal arrangements be lost. This is a particular concern for those with disabilities or long-term conditions, as the cost of health and travel insurance for those with pre-existing conditions could be prohibitively high.272

The UK currently has bilateral reciprocal healthcare arrangements with 16 non-EEA countries.273 In the event of no deal, the UK could negotiate similar arrangements with the EU as a whole or with individual EEA Member States. However, bilateral agreements cannot be negotiated while the UK remains in the EU,274 which means that in the event of no deal, and before bilateral agreements have been agreed, there could be a sustained period where UK citizens do not have any access to reciprocal healthcare arrangements.

The UK has some reciprocal healthcare arrangements which pre-date EU membership (see below), but the status of these agreements if no deal is agreed remains unclear. Evidence given to the Health Select Committee noted that such agreements would not be comprehensive if relied upon as a contingency:

Of course, we have a number of agreements that predate the European Union that we could fall back on, but each of those has different terms and conditions, different eligibilities, different limits and different numbers of people who can be covered.275

Access to the NHS of EU nationals resident in UK

While visitors from the EU to the UK have access to the NHS governed by reciprocal healthcare arrangements, EU nationals who are ‘ordinarily
resident’ in the UK access free NHS treatment through a different legal mechanism.

Under the National Health Service (Charges to Overseas Visitors) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/238, providers of NHS healthcare in England are required to charge overseas visitors (people not classed as ‘ordinarily resident’ in the UK) for use of the NHS, unless they have one of the exemptions set out in the regulations.

As set out in the Government’s Guidance on implementing the overseas visitor charging regulations, there is a three-fold test of ordinary residence for EEA nationals:

- Is the individual lawfully in the UK?
- Is the individual here voluntarily?
- Is the individual properly settled here for the time being?

There are similar ordinary residence requirements in the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish equivalent regulations.

As set out above, in the event of a no-deal Brexit, the Government has stated its intention for EU nationals living in the UK to be able to apply for settled status, giving them the same access to the NHS as they have currently:

Wera Hobhouse (Bath) (LD)

…I have a very simple question. Do settled status and pre-settled status give EU citizens the same right to use the national health service as UK nationals?

The Minister for Immigration (Caroline Nokes)

Yes.

Medicines supply and availability

Concerns about the potential impacts of a no-deal Brexit on medicines supply in the UK relate to how medicines (and medical devices) will be regulated and monitored for safety in future, and the impacts on medicines supply and future pharmaceutical trade.

UK imports of medicine and pharmaceutical products were worth £24.8 billion in 2016, and mostly came from the EU. UK exports of these products were worth £24.9 billion – around half of these went to EU countries. The Association for the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) has said that this reflects:

45 million packs of medicines that leave the UK every month and go to Europe, and 37 million packs of medicines that leave the continent and come to the UK.

Currently, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) provides and coordinates licensing, expertise and support for medicines and medical devices throughout the EU. Marketing authorisations (medicines

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276 Access to the NHS is based on the concept of ‘ordinary residence’, rather than nationality or citizenship.

277 HC Deb 21 June 2018, c519

licences) may be granted centrally or through a mutual recognition process and apply across the EU or may be granted by the Member State regulator to apply in one country. The **Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency** (MHRA) is the UK medicines regulator. It currently works with the EMA as part of a regulatory network and contributes to its work.

The Government has said that it wants to seek an ‘associate’ membership of the EMA. The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care has said this means “as close as possible participation with the European Medicines Agency with observer rights”. However, in the event of a no-deal Brexit, and without other arrangements in place, the UK could not continue to participate in the shared regulatory framework with the EMA. The Government has confirmed that the MHRA would take on responsibility for functions currently undertaken by the EMA and that this would require changes to the **Human Medicines Regulations 2012**.  

**Delays in licence applications**

However, concerns have been expressed that a separate regulatory system could mean delays in applications for licences because the UK would represent a much smaller market than the EEA, and this could impact on how quickly medicines would be available.

For those medicines that are to be licensed and supplied in the EU, the EMA has set out that, in the event of a no-deal Brexit, there will be requirements for marketing authorisation holders and batch testing of medicines to be based in the EU from 30 March 2018.

**Medicines supply**

Beyond the regulation of medicines, there are concerns about potential trade barriers and resulting delays in medicines supply that may occur in the event of no deal. Pharmaceutical companies in the UK and EU say they are stockpiling medicines in preparation for this scenario.

In the absence of a trade agreement with the EU, under the WTO Pharmaceutical Tariff Elimination Agreement, tariffs on medicines are unlikely to increase significantly, compared with other products. However, not all medical products are included in this Agreement; pharmaceutical companies have reported that relying on WTO rules could disrupt supply chains and lead to higher costs of medicines.

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279 Department of Health and Social Care, *Guidance: How medicines, medical devices and clinical trials would be regulated if there's no Brexit deal*, 23 August 2018

280 House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, *Corrected oral evidence: Brexit: regulation and standards*, January 2017 (Q7)

281 BMA, *Brexit Briefing: Medicines and medical devices regulation*, October 2017

282 EMA, *Questions and Answers related to the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union with regard to the medicinal products for human and veterinary use within the framework of the Centralised Procedure*, 19 June 2018

283 David Crow and Adam Samson, *Drugmakers prepare to stockpile drugs in UK before Brexit*, Financial Times, 1 August 2018


There are also concerns about an increase in non-tariff barriers in the event of no deal, and the potential delays this could mean for medicines supply, especially for those medicines with a short shelf life, such as medical radioisotopes.286

**Box 3: Medical radioisotopes:** Radioisotopes are used in the diagnosis and treatment of a range of conditions287 and are imported to the UK from (mainly EU) research reactors.288 Although radioisotopes can be sourced from beyond the EU, the materials often have short half-lives, meaning they can decay rapidly and cannot be stored for very long. In the UK around 700,000 nuclear medicine procedures using radioisotopes are carried out each year.289

Concerns have been raised that Brexit could affect the supply of radioisotopes290 by causing import delays291 and causing the UK to leave the Euratom Observatory which manages supply chains in times of shortages.292 A no-deal Brexit could mean that any potential customs agreement and cooperation with the Observatory which might be sought as part of a deal would not be realised. The Government has said that the availability of radioisotopes should not be impacted by Brexit.293

For further information on the supply of nuclear material, see section 12.2.

**Government preparedness**

In July 2018 Secretary of State for Health and Social care Matt Hancock said the Department was preparing for range of outcomes, including a no deal scenario.294 Furthermore, he said that:

We are focusing on the importance of a continuous supply of medicines that have a short shelf life; some of the medicines that would be most difficult to provide in a no-deal scenario where there was difficult access through ports would need to be flown in, for instance. I hope that, even under a no-deal scenario, there will still be smooth movement in through ports, because it is not our intention to provide barriers to that, and the work will take that into account. But you can imagine that it is incredibly important for me, as Secretary of State, to ensure that people will have access to the medicines they need.295

He said the Department was working with industry on the stockpiling of medicines and that he was “confident that with the right amount of work we can mitigate the worst of the circumstances”.

On 23 August the Government published ‘technical notices’ relating to medicines regulation in the event of no deal:

- **How medicines, medical devices and clinical trials would be regulated if there’s no Brexit deal**

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286 Dayan M, *Over the edge: a no deal Brexit and the NHS*, Nuffield Trust comment, August 2018
287 European Commission, *Supply of medical radioisotopes*, Accessed 13 August 2018
289 *Supply of Medical Radioisotopes*, POSTnote 558, July 2017
290 Dr Nicola Strickland, ‘RCR statement on the potential impact of leaving the Euratom treaty’, Royal College of Radiologists, 10 July 2017
291 Lords Select Committee on the EU, Home Affairs Sub-Committee, *Brexit: the health implications of leaving Euratom*, Oral Evidence, 22 November 2017, Q3
292 Ibid Q4
293 HC Deb 27 June 2017 Vol 626
294 Health and Social Care Committee, *Oral evidence: Work of the Secretary of State*, HC 523 (Q209), 24 July 2018
295 Ibid, Q308
Batch testing medicines if there’s no Brexit deal

Submitting regulatory information on medical products if there’s no Brexit deal

The technical notices state that in the event of no deal:

- existing EU law on medicines would be converted into UK law under the EUW Act;
- the UK will recognise medical devices that are CE marked and approved for the EU market and will comply with new EU medical devices regulations due to come into force in 2020 and 2022;
- current marketing authorisations granted through the centrally authorised product route will be converted to UK marketing authorisations, but after 29 March 2019, all new applications for a marketing authorisation in the UK would have to be made to the MHRA;
- batch testing of imported medicines from the EEA and named third countries will continue to be recognised in the UK;
- marketing authorisation holders and those responsible for pharmacovigilance (Qualified Persons) should be established in the UK by the end of 2020; and
- new systems for the submission and processing of regulatory information are being developed for March 2019.

The Government said that the MHRA would:

…take a streamlined approach to approving UKMA applications that places no greater burden on industry and ensures that patients can access new and innovative medicines at the same time as EU patients.296

On 23 August 2018, alongside the publication of the technical notices, Mr Hancock wrote to hospitals, GPs, pharmacies and pharmaceutical companies, setting out what action would need to be taken to ensure medicines supply to patients continues in the event of a no-deal Brexit. The letter requested that pharmaceutical companies ensure that by 29 March 2019 they have an additional six weeks’ supply of medicines on top of the normal buffer stock held and that for products with short shelf lives, suppliers should make plans to air freight these to avoid border delays.297

The letter informs pharmacists and hospitals that they should not stockpile medicines and asks clinicians to advise patients about Government plans to maintain medicines supply - and that they too should not stockpile medicines.298

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296 DHSC, Guidance: How medicines, medical devices and clinical trials would be regulated if there’s no Brexit deal, 23 August 2018
297 DHSC, Letter from Secretary of State for Health and Social Care to pharmaceutical companies, 23 August 2018
298 DHSC, Letter to the health and care sector: preparations for a potential no-deal Brexit, 23 August 2018
The Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) has launched the Medicines Supply Contingency Planning Programme through which it will require pharmaceutical companies to provide information about its contingency planning for medicines supply in the event of no deal. More information on the scheme is provided on the DHSC website.

The Government guidance on preparing for no deal has been welcomed by healthcare organisations but there have been calls for more detailed information to be made available. The Brexit Health Alliance (formed of NHS providers, medical royal colleges and other health organisations) has said the Government guidance is a first step and the NHS will want to see more detailed operational advice. It said its members would work with the Government to ensure “these issues are addressed in future guidance and that patients will continue to receive the treatment they need whatever the outcome of the negotiations”.

9.4 Social security

In the event of ‘no deal’, the provisions in EU law on the co-ordination of social security schemes for people between Member States – in Regulation 883/2004 – would cease to apply. The co-ordination rules do not harmonise social security systems across the EU, but instead support freedom of movement by, for example, providing for equal treatment in access to benefits with nationals of the host state, clarifying which state is responsible for paying benefits, allowing aggregation of insurance periods across countries, and enabling certain benefits to be ‘exported.’ A well-established system of administrative co-operation between Member States ensures the effective operation of the co-ordination rules, dispute resolution and secure data sharing.

For some of the states covered by the co-ordination rules, the UK has bilateral, reciprocal social security agreements pre-dating the UK’s EEC entry. These agreements were superseded by the EU co-ordination rules, but remain in force for limited purposes. Should the co-ordination rules cease to apply it is possible that these bilateral agreements would become applicable again, although this is by no means certain. These bilateral agreements are, however, far more limited in scope than the

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299 NHS Providers, On the day briefing: UK government’s preparations for a ‘no deal’ scenario, 23 August 2018
300 ABPI, ABPI responds to Brexit ‘no deal’ planning guidance, 23 August 2018
301 NHS Confederation, Time for planning not panic, says Brexit Health Alliance after government publishes no-deal guidance, 23 August 2018
302 The co-ordination rules apply to countries in the European Economic Area (EEA), and to Switzerland
303 For further information on social security co-ordination see section 13 of Commons Library briefing CBP-7213, Brexit: impact across policy areas, 26 August 2016
304 EEA states with which the UK has historic bilateral social security agreements include Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. The UK also has a social security agreement with Switzerland.
305 Article 8 of EC Regulation 883/2004 provides that the co-ordination rules “shall replace” any pre-existing social security convention entered into by a Member State. It is not clear whether this means these conventions effectively cease to exist or merely remain ‘dormant’.
EU co-ordination rules; they vary widely in terms of the persons and benefits covered and they may refer to benefits which no longer exist. Administrative mechanisms would also need to be established in tandem with each of the other countries for any reciprocal arrangements to work.

The implications of having no comprehensive post-Brexit agreement to co-ordinate social security for people moving, or who have moved, between the UK and the EU27 have not as yet received much attention. Situations that could occur include, for example:

- individuals being unable to aggregate contributions paid or periods of residence in the UK and the EU27 States to satisfy the conditions for benefits;
- no clear rules about which country, if any, is responsible for paying a person’s benefits where they have lived in more than one country, and no mechanism for resolving disputes; and
- posted workers – i.e. employees working in another country temporarily – finding themselves liable to pay social security contributions in both countries, instead of remaining insured only under the scheme of their home country.

In a recent report the House of Lords European Union Committee noted concerns voiced by, among others, the Association of British Orchestras, that requiring its members to pay social security contributions when working in EU27 counties could make touring too expensive. This potential problem would affect all posted workers, not just those working in the cultural sector. The Committee warns: “Failure to secure a reciprocal commitment on social security would undermine any broader agreement on migration between the UK and EU”.  

EU nationals in the UK

As noted in section 9.1 above on primary free movement of people rights, the Government has signalled that it intends to implement the proposed ‘settled status’ regime for EU nationals in the UK, regardless of whether a deal is successfully concluded with the EU. Those with settled status should have full access to UK social security benefits. The position of those who, on 29 March 2019, have not been resident in the UK for five years – those with ‘pre-settled status’ – is less clear.

The expectation is that by exit day the UK will have incorporated into domestic legislation existing EU laws, including those relating to the co-ordination of social security. However, for social security co-ordination to operate in any meaningful sense post-exit, the EU27 would have to reciprocate by continuing to apply the EU rules and allowing the UK full access to existing administrative mechanisms.

In the absence of any agreement with the EU27 on social security co-ordination, the pre-existing (and limited) bilateral social security

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306 Lords EU Committee, Brexit: movement of people in the cultural sector, HL 182 2017-19, 26 July 2018, para 58
agreements the UK has with some states – if they remain viable and operable – would be the only fall-back.

The position on access to benefits for EU nationals coming to the UK after exit day will depend on the yet-to-be-specified future immigration regime. The Government’s future relations White Paper said the UK would “seek reciprocal arrangements on the future rules around some defined elements of social security coordination”. Should this not be achieved, the existing bilateral agreements – if they still apply – would provide the only continuing framework. The UK could attempt to negotiate new reciprocal social security agreements with individual states, but such negotiations could prove difficult and protracted. Until any new arrangements were in place, there would remain significant gaps in social security coverage for people moving between the EU and the UK.

**UK nationals in the EU**

The position on access to benefits for UK nationals in the EU27 in the event of ‘no deal’ is even less clear. EU States would not be obliged to enact measures to protect citizens’ rights – including to social security – for UK nationals in their jurisdictions. The EU could, as Professor Steve Peers has suggested, enact a unilateral EU-wide regulation to ‘ring-fence’ citizens’ rights, mirroring the UK’s ‘settled status’ legislation. Failing that, individual EU27 States could amend their domestic laws to provide guarantees for UK nationals, or agree bilateral social security agreements with the UK (although it seems highly unlikely that separate agreements could be negotiated and put in place before exit day).

If no such alternative arrangements are in place, by default UK nationals in EU27 countries would become third-country nationals for the purposes of the EU social security co-ordination rules. Existing bilateral social security agreements might provide some measure of protection for UK nationals in some Member States, but for those in others the loss of social security rights would be sudden and could have serious consequences.

For UK nationals moving to EU27 States after exit day, in the absence of an EU-wide agreement the position on access to benefits would depend on the host country’s immigration policy and the terms of any bilateral social security agreement it has with the UK (if these still apply).

**Migrants in the UK**

The NRPF Network – a “network of local authorities and partner organisations focusing on the statutory response to migrants with care needs who have no recourse to public funds (NRPF)” – notes on its [webpage about EEA Nationals](https://nrpfnetwork.org.uk/Resources/EEA/Nationality) that at present “EEA nationals and family members of EEA nationals, who are not eligible for welfare benefits social housing, may be able to receive housing and financial assistance from social services” only “if this is necessary to prevent a breach of

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308 Cm 9593, July 2018, para 89
their human rights or their European Treaty rights” and that any such assistance is limited to:

- Families where there is a child in need (if the family are destitute then the child will be in need) [for a definition of “children in need”, see the Library briefing paper on this issue]
- A young person who was formerly looked after by a local authority
- An adult requiring care and support due to a disability, illness or mental health condition

In a no-deal scenario, the NPRF Network states that “the Government and EU have yet to reach a final agreement on the full terms that will apply to the UK when it leaves, and it is unclear how a ‘no deal’ situation will impact on these proposals. Arrangements have not yet been confirmed for non-EU EEA (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) or Swiss nationals, but the Government has indicated it intends for them to be subject to the same process”, adding that:

The Government is currently proposing that after the UK has left the EU on 29 March 2019, there will be a transition period that ends on 31 December 2020. EU nationals and their family members living in the UK by the end of the transition period will need to take action before 30 June 2021 and apply for either settled or pre-settled (temporary) status under the EU Settlement Scheme if they wish to stay here. EU nationals and family members who arrive after 29 March 2019 and people who have already obtained a permanent residence document will also need to apply. The Government has indicated that a person who fails to apply by the end of June 2021 may have no lawful basis to remain in the UK, but it is unclear what the consequences of this will be. The EU Settlement Scheme is being piloted at the end of August and is due to be implemented by the end of the year.

9.5 Pensions
State Pensions

The social security co-ordination rules allow periods of insurance for State Pensions purposes to be aggregated, so an individual who has worked in more than one Member States can on reaching pension age make one application to the relevant agency in the country of residence – in the UK, the International Pension Centre. This agency then notifies details of the claim to all countries in which the person has been insured. Each Member State in which the person was insured then calculates its pro-rata contribution and puts that amount into payment. There is information about these rules on the Europa.EU website – see State Pensions abroad.

Future arrangements will depend on the Brexit negotiations. In phase 1, subject to the caveat that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, both sides to the negotiations committed to:

310 PQ 60094, 20 January 2017
What if there’s no Brexit deal?

- lifetime export of uprated pension;
- recognising contributions both before and after exit in the EU27 and the UK, for those covered by the Withdrawal Agreement; and
- equal treatment under the conditions set out in EU law.\(^{311}\)

If there is no deal, these social security co-ordination provisions would cease to apply. In their absence, individuals in a cross-border situation could potentially be covered by:

- any bilateral social security treaties already in place between the UK and the relevant Member State (if these became operable again and depending on the extent of their scope and current relevance (as discussed in section X above);
- the legislation of the relevant Member State;
- EU directives on the status of third-country nationals finding themselves in a cross-border situation, to which EU Member States would be bound.\(^{312}\)

DEXEU Permanent Secretary Philip Rycroft told the Exiting the EU Committee on 4 September that Ministers would decide when and what to advise UK citizens living in an EU27 State about the pensions situation.

**Pension uprating**

For people in receipt of the UK State Pension overseas, a major concern is whether it will be uprated annually.

The UK State Pension is payable overseas. However, the policy adopted by successive governments is that it is only uprated in EEA countries or where there is a reciprocal agreement requiring this.\(^{313}\)

In the event of ‘no deal’, residents of some EU Member States may be covered by more limited existing reciprocal agreements, as discussed above. Beyond this, a decision whether to uprate the UK State Pension overseas is a matter for the UK Government. It could, presumably, seek to negotiate new bilateral agreements with individual Member States.

For more detail, see Library Briefing Paper SN-01457 [Frozen Overseas Pensions](#) (August 2018).

**Aggregation**

The UK is expected to incorporate into domestic legislation existing EU laws, including those relating to the co-ordination of social security. As noted above, however, for social security co-ordination to operate fully, the EU27 would have to reciprocate.\(^{314}\) It is possible that any existing reciprocal agreements would become applicable again on account of

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\(^{311}\) Joint technical note on the comparison of EU/UK positions on citizen’s rights – 28 September 2017, p13-14; EU-UK Joint report on the negotiations December 2017, para 4-5


\(^{313}\) HC Deb 2 December 2010 c953W; HC Deb, 7 July 2011 c132W

bilateral agreements. Beyond that, it will presumably depend on the legislation of the country in question.

The same might be relevant to a further aspect of the current arrangements – whereby years of insurance or residence in another Member State or EEA country can count towards satisfying conditions of entitlement (for example, the minimum qualifying period for the new State Pension). While the UK could unilaterally offer to treat those years of ‘residence’ as contributing to entitlement conditions, it is not clear that it would do so unless UK nationals in the EU27 are likely to benefit from similar provisions.

**Private pensions**

UK workplace pensions operate on a national basis subject to UK legislation. However, they invest internationally and a solution to the financial services passporting and derivatives issues discussed in section 6.2 is therefore important.

Another issue that will need to be addressed is ensuring that the small number of schemes operating across borders (in particular, between the UK and Ireland) are able to continue to do so.

These issues are discussed in more detail in Library Briefing Paper CBP-07629 Brexit – implications for private pensions (August 2018).

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315 Pensions Act 2014, s2; State Pension Regulations 2015 (SI 2015/173), reg 13 (Explanatory Notes, para 7.23): DMG para 74162

10. Food and Farming

The National Farming Union (NFU) has said that a no-deal outcome is the worst possible one for the farming industry. The Food and Drink Federation has called ‘no-deal’ a ‘grisly prospect’.

In a ‘no deal’ scenario for agriculture, trading arrangements - i.e. tariffs and standards - are the main issue. Without an alternative arrangement, the EU will treat the UK as a third country and a range of tariffs, checks, registrations, certifications etc will start to apply for the first time for a range of commodities, food and feed, and plant and animal-based products. Agriculture is also impacted by the ‘no deal’ effects of other policies such as immigration (for seasonal, agri-food workers and vets).

The UK will leave the farm support and rural development funding systems of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in any Brexit scenario, so preparations for alternative domestic arrangements are already underway. This is because the CAP is enshrined in EU Treaty arrangements for Member States. Consultations on new domestic agriculture policy are either in train or complete across the UK legislatures and the UK Government has guaranteed current funding levels until 2022.

The UK Government issued the following no-deal technical notices on 23 August 2018:

- Farm payments if there’s no Brexit deal
- Receiving rural development funding if there’s no Brexit deal
- Producing and processing organic food if there’s no Brexit deal
- Developing Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) if there’s no Brexit deal

In view of the current regulatory regimes, which are largely EU based, it is likely that future technical notices will also need to cover areas such as food safety and food labelling, imports of food and feed, plants and seeds, veterinary medicines, fertilisers and pesticides.

For example, the Food Standards Agency (FSA) has highlighted that Brexit will create gaps in the food safety regime for the UK. Some of the institutions which currently carry out regulatory activities Europe-wide will no longer carry out those activities on behalf of the UK and some systems used for administering the regulatory regime will not be available.

317 NFU Online, Technical notice serves warning over continuity of British food exports, 23 August 2018
318 FDF, FDF response to Government’s no deal technical notices, 23 August 2018
319 Food Standards Agency, An update on the FSA’s preparations for the UK’s Exit from the EU, FSA Board Meeting, 20 June 2018
10.1 Tariffs and standards

‘No deal’ could mean applying WTO tariffs where there currently are none for EU trade, as well as WTO rules for plant and animal health checks (in trade terms these are known as sanitary and phytosanitary measures). This could have a significant impact on the farming industry and consumers in terms of changing the balance of import and export markets and consumer choice, the speed of supply chains and prices.

Tariffs are usually higher for agricultural products than for other goods and services. Perishable goods such as milk are also more sensitive to delays at borders, as are live animals. With no withdrawal agreement in place, there could be different regulatory regimes for the UK as a third country relating to pesticide regulation, GM food and plant controls (such as seed certification requirements).

However, the UK Government has said it will be establishing its own Geographical Indication (GI) scheme to protect regionally protected goods such as Scotch Whisky, Welsh Lamb etc. This will be consistent with the WTO Agreement of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs).

This new UK framework will go beyond the requirements of TRIPs, and will provide a clear and simple set of rules on GIs, and continuous protection for UK GIs in the UK. The scheme will be open to new applications, from both UK and non-UK applicants, from the day it enters into force.

10.2 Food supply

Introducing the technical notices, Dominic Raab said that for food, the Government had set out “practical measures to mitigate any risks of disruption to supply”. He said this would be achieved through “the recognition of EU food standards, our pursuit of equivalency arrangements on food regulation with the EU and indeed with non-EU countries, and through our support for UK farmers in terms of financial funding schemes”.

He emphasised that the UK’s food and drink supply is diverse, with the UK supplying half of the food that we consume, with 30% imported from the EU and 20% from the rest of the world. He confirmed (contrary to media reports) that there were no plans to deploy the army to maintain food supplies and played down the likelihood of the EU not offering some kind of mutual recognition in this area in a no-deal scenario: “Who is credibly suggesting, in a no deal scenario, that the EU would not want to continue to sell food to UK consumers?”

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320 The WTO’s Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS measures) sets out the basic rules for food safety and animal and plant health standards.

321 See e.g. Seed breeders warn of major Brexit impact, Fresh Produce Journal, 9 June 2018.

322 Cm 9593, The Future relationship between the UK and the EU, July 2018.

323 GOV.UK, Secretary of State Dominic Raab’s speech on no deal planning, 23 August 2018.
Potential short-term disruption to food supplies immediately after a no-deal Brexit has been given regular media coverage and Dominic Raab was asked by the Exiting the EU Committee (July 2018) whether the Government was considering stockpiling food in preparation for this. He responded:

Again, we will set this out in the technical notices, but it would be wrong to describe it as the Government doing the stockpiling. Of course, the idea that we only get food imports into this country from one continent is not appropriate, but we will look at this issue in the round and make sure that there is adequate food supply as well as all these other things.324

The retail sector has expressed concerns about the practicalities of stockpiling food. The British Retail Consortium said:

Stockpiling of food is not a practical response to a no-deal on Brexit and industry has not been approached by Government to begin planning for this. Retailers do not have the facilities to house stockpiled goods and in the case of fresh produce, it is simply not possible to do so. Our food supply chains are extremely fragile and this is yet further demonstration of the need for an agreement on the backstop to ensure frictionless trade is maintained after the 29 March 2019.325

The Food and Drink Federation (FDF) has said that the technical notices published so far confirming anticipated burdens on importers and exporters would “frighten many SME food businesses”. The FDF also pointed out that there was “no substantive information” on mitigating the effect of no-deal on the island of Ireland, where the effects would be most significant.326

10.3 Organic Food

The technical notice on organic food maintains that UK businesses could experience delays of up to nine months after a no-deal Brexit because UK organic control bodies offering the necessary certification would need to be approved for operation in the UK by the EU. The UK is hoping to find ways to speed up this process.327

The NFU claims this would in effect be a trade embargo on UK organic products and could have wider, disruptive implications for the future trade of all agri-food products if all of them were subjected to the same problems with approvals and certification. The FDF has pointed out that similar issues would apply for other food currently displaying EU marks or logos.328

324 Exiting the EU Committee, Oral evidence: The progress of the UK’s negotiations on EU withdrawal, HC 372, 24 July 2018, Q2406
325 British Retail Consortium media statement, Stockpiling of food is not a practical response to a no-deal on Brexit, 26 July 2018
326 FDF, FDF response to Government’s no deal technical notices, 23 August 2018
327 Defra, Producing and processing organic food if there’s no Brexit deal, 23 August 2018
328 Ibid
Farmers Weekly reports that although no official data is available, it is estimated that about 10% of the UK’s organic output (worth some 2.2bn in 2017) is exported, predominantly to EU countries.\textsuperscript{329}

The Government has said it anticipates “continuing to accept EU organic products in a ‘no deal’ scenario, but this will be at the UK’s discretion” and it expects to negotiate an equivalence arrangement because the UK will be retaining existing EU requirements for organic food.

The technical notice also states that the UK will continue to require certification and traceability of organic food and feed products, but a new UK-owned imports traceability system would replace the current \textit{EU Trade Control and Expert System} (TRACES) system to ensure the traceability of organic food and feed. TRACES tracks the entire trade and certification process for animals, food, feed and plants. The FDF doubts the UK Government can replace it with a new, comprehensive, functional UK alternative IT system in time for exit day.\textsuperscript{330}

\section*{10.4 Genetically Modified Organisms}

Applications for new Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) are managed at EU level and include an assessment of the application by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) as well as by the national authorities in the EU Member States. The Commission can propose a GMO be authorised only when there is a favourable risk assessment by EFSA. Member States vote in a regulatory committee on the authorisation decision proposed by the Commission.

The Government’s technical notice for ‘no deal’ on GMOs states that there will be “no significant implications for UK stakeholders”.

Regulatory decisions on proposed GM trials would continue as usual on a devolved basis and the UK would apply the same risk assessment process for regulatory decisions on marketing GMOs as currently takes place at EU level (although it has not yet been decided whether this would be on a joint-UK basis or separately across the devolved legislatures).

As the UK would be treated as a third country, UK businesses would only be able to export GMO products to the EU if the GMO had EU marketing approval. This would be the same for the EU with UK marketing approval.

\section*{10.5 Farm support}

CAP support is made up of direct payments under the \textbf{Basic Payment Scheme} (Pillar I) and payments for agri-environment measures, and grants for rural development projects which contribute to wider rural development objectives (Pillar II) under the Rural Development Programmes for each part of the UK.

\textsuperscript{329} No deal Brexit could wipe out British Organic Farming, \textit{Farmers Weekly}, 23 August 2018

\textsuperscript{330} Ibid
Currently CAP support makes up around 50-60% of farm incomes in England. In other parts of the UK it is a larger proportion, mainly because there is more land which has more difficult farming conditions, e.g. hill farming.  

In terms of overall agricultural policy and future farm support, the UK is already preparing farm support payment systems outside the CAP, whatever the Brexit scenario. This is because only EU Member States can participate in the CAP and its payment schemes.

The technical notices on farm payments and rural development funding confirm previous statements.

Defra’s Agriculture Command Paper, *Health and Harmony* (the precursor to an Agriculture Bill), sets out proposals for managing a transition period from 2019 to 2022 and a new scheme of farm support beyond. The devolved legislatures have also set out their proposals.

The UK Government has pledged to maintain the same cash funds as currently for farm support under the CAP until the end of the Parliament (assumed to be 2022). This is for all of the UK and across all aspects of current CAP funding, i.e. Pillars I and II. Further details about current CAP funding are provided in Commons Library briefing *Brexit: Future Agriculture Policy* (January 2018), which is being updated.

Farmers that graze livestock are known to be the most dependent on farm subsidies and vulnerable to changes in the farm support system – in particular those grazing sheep in remote parts of the UK. The UK pig and poultry sectors have the least support but have some of the highest farm incomes.

### 10.6 Pesticides

The UK currently works within an EU regulatory system of pesticide approval. Active ingredients are authorised at EU level for use across the EU but Member States authorise the specific products that make use of these ingredients and set conditions for their use. The competent authority for doing this in the UK is the Chemicals Regulation Directorate (CRD) in the Health and Safety Executive.

The Government is already planning for the regulatory capacity needed to implement the regulation of plant protection products in the UK “building on the existing capacity in the Health and Safety Executive”. The Government has also said it is “considering future arrangements for the regulation of pesticides” as part of the preparation for EU exit and “remains of the view that decision on the use of pesticides should be based on careful scientific assessment of the risks”.  

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331 [Northern Irish agriculture subsidies to fall after Brexit report warns](https://www.irishnews.com/ni-latest/news/northern-ireland/2018/01/16/n13302801054766/), *The Irish News*, 16 January 2018
333 [See data such as Defra, *Farm Business Income*, February 2018](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/another-bad-year-for-farm-businesses)
335 [PQ 1510 4 July 2017](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/another-bad-year-for-farm-businesses)
10.7 Potential sector impacts of no-deal

A 2016 analysis commissioned by the NFU looking at a range of potential Brexit trade scenarios (including trading on WTO rules) and farm support levels found that for most sectors the biggest driver of UK farm income changes was the level of public support payments available. The loss of these support payments offset positive price impacts in all of the potential Brexit trading scenarios examined. Various more recent sector reports are available at https://ahdb.org.uk/brexit/.

**Food and drink**

The potential impacts of a no-deal scenario vary widely by commodity and sector of the food chain. The Federation of Wholesale Distributors has cautioned that without a trade agreement, the food and drink wholesale distribution sector will face upward pressure on their suppliers’ prices.336

**Dairy**

Dairy UK has said the worst Brexit outcome would be for trade with the EU to be based on WTO rules alone; this is because the tariffs for dairy products in the EU’s WTO MFN tariff schedule are “prohibitively high”, in order to prevent the import of dairy products into the EU. Working to the WTO schedule in the absence of an agreement would make EU dairy imports into the UK much more expensive, which would impact on UK wholesale prices.337

**Lamb and beef**

Scenario modelling by the Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board (AHDB),338 and the NFU,339 have shown the lamb and beef sectors to be potentially two of the most vulnerable UK sectors post-Brexit overall. In particular, the sectors’ prospects suffer if there is no comprehensive trade deal with the EU that maintains similar tariffs to now, and if subsidies are reduced or removed.

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336  FWD, *Brexit: Current issues* [as viewed on 26 July 2018]
338  NFU online, *NFU and AHDB team up for Brexit Roadshows*, 25 October 2017
339  NFU Online, *British Agriculture: The implications of a UK Exit from the EU – Summary of a study by the LEI Wageningen UR for the NFU of England and Wales*, April 2016
11. Fisheries

After Brexit the UK will no longer be part of the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). It will become an independent coastal state and be fully responsible for managing fisheries in the UK’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 miles. This will include setting total allowable catches (TACs), distributing quotas and determining who has access to fisheries. Access for EU vessels to UK waters and vice versa is likely to be part of any agreement reached with the EU, as part of a future relationship.

The UK will continue to be bound by the requirements of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and how they relate to the management of fisheries in any Brexit outcome. UNCLOS requires coastal States to give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch in its EEZ and emphasises the need to minimise economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone. It also provides an obligation to co-operate with other coastal states on the management of shared stocks or stocks of associated species.

The Government’s Fisheries White Paper Sustainable fisheries for future generations, published in July 2018, set out the Government’s intention to continue to co-operate closely with the EU and other coastal states on the sustainable management of fish stocks that cross borders, and states that “any decisions about giving access to our waters for vessels from the EU, or any other coastal states including Norway, will then be a matter for negotiation”.

Setting the system for quota distribution to individual fishing vessels is already the responsibility of Member States and therefore largely unaffected by any Brexit agreement. However, the White Paper makes clear that the Government is considering some changes to how fishing effort is set post-Brexit, particularly for smaller and inshore fishing vessels.

For further information of the UK’s current approach to fisheries management within the context of the Common Fisheries Policy please see the POST note on UK Fisheries Management.

11.1 Priorities for fisheries

The fisheries sector is very diverse in the UK, with both a significant inshore and offshore fleet. There are also differences in the size and type fishing vessels across the devolved administrations. Both EU quota species and non-quota species are important for different parts of

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340 Article 61(1) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) states that “[t]he coastal State shall determine the allowable catch of the living resources in its exclusive economic zone”.

341 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

342 Defra, Fisheries White Paper Sustainable fisheries for future generations, published July 2018

343 Defra, Fisheries White Paper, 4 July 2018

344 MMO, UK Sea Fisheries Statistics 2016, 28 September 2017
the sector.\textsuperscript{345} Non-quota species do not fall under the CFP and include most shellfish, which is often high value and exported from the UK. The UK also has significant processing and aquaculture industries. This results in a diversity of views on priorities for the sector, as was noted in the White Paper:

> A full range of views have been expressed across a very wide range of issues and there is no consensus. Different sectors within the fishing industry (catching, processing, and trading) have different priorities. Within each of those sectors, there is a range of views.\textsuperscript{346}

The House of Lords Committee on the European Union 2016 report, Brexit: Fisheries, set out some of the potential concerns and priorities for fisheries going into the Brexit negotiation. The report recognised that whilst the fishing industry represents “a very small part of the UK’s GDP” it is of great importance to many coastal communities and that opportunities exist for the UK in leaving the CFP. It also noted that the majority of fish caught in the UK are exported to the EU and that the UK currently imports most of the fish it consumes.

The report highlighted concerns about the potential impact on the fisheries industry of a lack of agreement during the Brexit negotiations on access, quotas and trade. The conclusions on access and quota included the following:

20. Unilateral restriction on access to fishing in the UK EEZ would almost certainly lead to reciprocal restrictions being placed on UK vessels fishing in the EU EEZ. This would also have a profound effect both on the fishing industry in the EU and on the UK fleet that relies on fishing outside the UK EEZ. Some form of mutual access arrangements must therefore be negotiated.

21. The historic reluctance of Member States to renegotiate the relative stability key suggests that negotiating new quota allocations after Brexit will be difficult. Such difficulty will be accentuated if these negotiations overlap with the wider negotiations on EU withdrawal. The Government could use access to fishing within the UK EEZ as a lever for achieving a better allocation of quotas but must also bear in mind that co-operation will be crucial for the long-term sustainability of stocks.

22. As an independent coastal state the UK will in principle be able to ‘walk away’ from negotiations with other coastal states if the compromises reached on TACs or quota shares are not aligned to UK interests. Walking away would, by leading to unilateral management of shared stocks, risk undermining the sustainability of fish stocks. It would also invite retaliation in other areas, including trade. Consequently, walking away should be a last resort.\textsuperscript{347}

And on fisheries and trade:

23. Trade in fish and seafood is essential to the wider seafood industry, which relies heavily on importing raw goods at reduced or zero tariffs for domestic consumption, and on exporting domestic catches and production. Any disruptions to the current

\textsuperscript{345} MMO, UK Sea Fisheries Statistics 2016, 28 September 2017

\textsuperscript{346} Defra, Fisheries White Paper, Sustainable fisheries for future generations, July 2018

\textsuperscript{347} Lords EU Committee, Brexit: Fisheries, December 2016
trading patterns could have profound effects on both the catching and processing sectors.

24. Trade with the EU in fish products will be a key factor to the future success of the UK fishing industry and fish processors. We therefore urge that the fish sector should be included in the Government’s consideration of priorities for a future trading relationship with the EU.348

Fisheries Minister George Eustice emphasised to the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (EFRA) Committee on 5 September that the Government’s position on fisheries and trade should be dealt with as separate issues with annual quota negotiations:

> Our [position] is crystal clear [...]. There is a negotiation to be had on fisheries but it is entirely separate to the negotiations on trade. Fisheries is a dynamic environment. You need to have annual discussions and negotiations on the state of stocks, state of science and where those stocks are so it will always be a separate negotiation in our view.349

### 11.2 ‘No deal’ scenarios

A no-deal Brexit, in which there was no transitional agreement on fisheries up to the end of 2020, would mean that the UK would become an independent coastal state from 30 March 2019, taking over responsibility for its EEZ. The UK would no longer be bound by the Common Fisheries Policy and could deny access to EU Member States’ vessels. Likewise, UK vessels which currently fish in other Member States’ waters could be denied access by the EU, although under international legislation (UNCLOS) there is an emphasis on the need for States to minimise economic dislocation to other States whose nationals have habitually fished in a zone.

In the event of no deal, the Government would have to legislate to replace a number of EU regulations on fisheries under the **EU Withdrawal Act 2018** by March 2019. In addition, the Government is also planning to introduce a wider Fisheries Bill, by the end of 2018, which will provide powers to amend any regulations.350

### Quotas and access to fishing grounds

In the event of a no deal, should the Government decide to introduce any immediate changes to access to fisheries, the impacts for the different parts of the fishing industry would depend what changes are made. As yet, there has been no indication from the Government if any changes would be made immediately, or rather whether the current quota allocations and access arrangements would be maintained in the first instance. The position may be clarified when the Government publishes the technical notice on fisheries. However, **UK in a Changing Europe** noted in its briefing **Cost of a No Deal Revisited** that, unlike in other areas, maintaining the current approach could be difficult for the Government:

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348 Lords EU Committee, Brexit: Fisheries, December 2016
349 Oral evidence at: https://parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/6aa99bfb-d1aa-4dd3-808d-317c863683b9
350 EFRA Select Committee Evidence Session, 17 July 2018, Fisheries, Q385
The government’s mitigation strategy in key policy areas has been to manage disruption through unilaterally retaining the status quo. However, this approach seems unsustainable in the case of fish. Maintaining current levels of EU access to UK waters would be politically problematic in the event of no deal; the pressure on the government to reclaim control of UK waters would be substantial.\footnote{UK in a Changing Europe, \textit{Cost of a No Deal Revisited}, 3 September}

After Brexit the UK Government will have to reach agreement on a common framework for fisheries with the devolved administrations. In the case of a no deal scenario UK in Changing Europe notes that this will have to be “resolved as a matter of urgency”.\footnote{Ibid} In the longer term, as set out in the \textit{White Paper}, the Government plans to maintain the system for the existing quota while exploring new ways to allocate any additional fishing opportunities that arise as a result of leaving the CFP.

TACs are agreed on a yearly basis at the EU \textit{Agriculture and Fisheries Council} meeting every December for the following calendar year, starting in January. The implications of the UK leaving the CFP part way through the year on the 2019 TACs agreements are unclear, as is how agreements with non-EU countries on shared stocks would be managed by all parties for the remainder of 2019.

In 2017, UK exports in fish and related products to the EU were worth £1.3 billion and comprised 70\% of all UK fish exports from the UK by value. Fish imports from the EU were worth £1.1 billion (34\% of all fish imports to the UK by value).\footnote{UK Trade Info database, downloaded in April 2018, using product code SITC 03 – ‘Fish, crustaceans, molluscs & aq. invert & preps thereof’}

The impact of a no deal Brexit on the fisheries industry’s ability to export and trade are likely to be felt across the sector. With no agreement, as in other areas, trade in fisheries products would default to WTO tariffs. Generally, tariffs are higher on the most processed fish products. Defra set out, in evidence to the House of Lords EU Select Committee in 2016, examples of the level of tariffs that the EU currently applies to Most Favoured Nations under WTO rules:

The EU’s MFN tariffs on fisheries products range from 0\% (e.g. on imports of fresh eels) to up to 25\% (e.g. on fillets on processed mackerel). Generally, tariffs are higher on highly processed products compared to lightly or unprocessed products – for example, the EU’s MFN tariff on unprocessed salmon is 2\%, while the tariff on prepared salmon is 5.5\%. The EU’s MFN tariff for the UK’s five products lines with the largest exports to the EU are shown below, with their HS product code:

- Fresh, whole Atlantic Salmon, exports to the EU worth £168m in 2014 (HS 03021400): 2\%
- Live, fresh or chilled scallops, exports worth £62m in 2014 (HS 03072100): 8\%
- Frozen unsmoked Norway Lobsters (Nephrops), exports worth £56m in 2014 (HS 03061590): 12\%
What if there’s no Brexit deal?

- Not frozen and unsmoked Norway Lobsters (Nephrops), exports worth £45m in 2014 (HS 03061590): 12%
- Frozen whole mackerel, exports worth £44m worth £44m in 2014 (HS 03035410): 20%.\(^\text{354}\)

In its evidence, Defra also highlighted the EU would also face tariffs on fish exports to the UK and that “such an arrangement is unlikely to be attractive to the EU”.\(^\text{355}\)

In addition to tariffs, fisheries products, as all perishable products, could be impacted by any increased delays at borders resulting from greater custom controls. Box 1 below sets out concerns expressed by the UK shellfish sector on the impacts of a no deal scenario.

**Box 4: Shellfish Sector**

The shellfish sector does not fall under the CFP quota system, other than for Norway lobster and northern prawn in certain areas, and therefore fishing opportunities would be unlikely to change significantly as a result of the UK being outside the CFP.

However, a report commissioned by Shellfish Association, NFFO and SFF, published in July 2018 and reported by Fishing News, highlighted the impact of a no-deal on an industry that relies on “smooth unimpeded trade”:

Businesses throughout the shellfish supply chain in the UK and in the EU are reliant on smooth, unimpeded trade. We are dependent on the European market, but likewise there is heavy dependence on our products on the continent. We have undertaken this study to identify the issues to ensure that, as far as possible, no part of our industry will be disadvantaged. The study makes clear that both in terms of the tariff regime but also non-tariff barriers, there is a great deal at stake.\(^\text{356}\)

The article goes on to highlight the conclusion that “the possibility of replacing EU markets with alternative high-value markets is challenged not only by the difficulty of reproducing such traditions through marketing, but also by the global production and trade of most shellfish types” The article refers to an estimated cost of EU tariffs to the sector of £41m per year, in the event of no deal.

**EU Regulations**

The EU Commission published a preparedness notice to stakeholders on Fisheries and Aquaculture in April 2018, setting out how UK withdrawal would impact both the UK and EU sectors in the absence of any kind of withdrawal agreement. It sets out that under Regulation (EU) 2017/2403 on the sustainable management of external fishing fleets, EU flagged vessels would need to obtain authorisation from both the UK and EU to fish in UK waters, and that UK vessels would have to obtain EU authorisation to fish in EU waters.

With regards to landings, as the third country the UK would only be able to land or transfer fish at designated EU ports as set out in Regulation 1005/2008. The Regulation also requires third country vessels arriving at EU ports are inspected to ensure they comply with requirements on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU). In

\(^\text{354}\) Lords EU Committee, Brexit: Fisheries, December 2016, Defra written evidence

\(^\text{355}\) Ibid

\(^\text{356}\) Fishing News, Brexit shellfish threat: No deal Brexit shellfish warning, 30 July 2018
addition, under the Regulations the UK would be required to send a flag notification to the EU to be able to export fish products to the EU:

In order to export fishery products caught by third country flagged fishing vessels to the EU, the Commission has to have received a notification from the flag State. As of the withdrawal date, this applies to the United Kingdom.357

UK exports to the EU, together with EU exports to the UK, would also require to be accompanied by a catch certification under the regulations from the relevant competent authority:

The catch certificate to be validated by the United Kingdom must certify that the catches concerned have been made in accordance with applicable laws, regulations and international conservation and management measures. The catch certificate must have been validated by the United Kingdom competent authority. 358

Certification of organic aquaculture products

As set out in the Commission’s notice, EU regulations require organic aquaculture products sold in its markets to be certified as such and that “a no-deal scenario would make UK issued certificates invalid”.

As set out by the Government in its preparedness note Producing and processing organic food if there’s no Brexit deal, businesses could experience delays of up to 9 months after a no deal Brexit because UK organic control bodies offering the necessary certification for export to the EU would need to seek approval by the EU. The Government has stated it is hoping to find ways to speed this process up. 359

Funding for fishing communities

The EU provides funding for fishing communities through the European Marine and Fisheries Fund, which is part of the CFP, and runs to 2020. The UK has an allocation of €243m for the period 2014-2020. The EMFF falls under the 2014-20 Multiannual Financial Framework allocation for structural and investment funds and as the Government made clear in the notice on The government’s guarantee for EU-funded programmes if there’s no Brexit deal, it has guaranteed its funding until 2020.

Longer term impacts

The New Economics Foundation published a report on the impact of various Brexit scenarios on fisheries, Not in the same Boat in November 2017. In a modelled no deal scenario, where there was agreement with the EU on shared fish stocks which increased UK share of stock, WTO tariffs were applied on trade and EU vessels were excluded from UK waters, there was an overall increase in catch and profitability for the sector. However, this was not evenly distributed, with the benefit mainly accruing to UK flagged vessels, fishing offshore, that fish quota species that currently fall under the CFP:

357 EU Commission, Preparedness notice to stakeholders on Fisheries and Aquaculture, 9 April 2018
358 EU Commission, ibid
359 Defra, Producing and processing organic food if there’s no Brexit deal, 23 August 2018
This divide in quota ownership is one of the contributing factors to a sharp divide in current economic performance, with the large-scale fleet recording profit margins of 19% and the small-scale fleet operating at a profit margin of 0%. As the gains from quota increases accrue to those who hold the quota rights, these gains further entrench the ‘haves and have nots’ of UK fisheries. Small-scale vessels also see little benefit from exclusive access out to 200 nautical miles, as they fish exclusively in inshore waters.\(^{360}\)

It should be noted that the study did not include in its no deal model any new obstacles to trade with the EU, although it did highlight the potential negative of impact of these for fisheries trade:

New obstacles to selling to the EU market – such as product standards and port inspections – are also a significant concern for the future economic performance of the UK fishing fleet. Fortunately, the UK is starting from a good position: current product standards are harmonised. However, to avoid border delays and inspections, there will need to be a continued close relationship between the EU and the UK on fisheries and the avoidance of an adversarial relationship that could ultimately force the EU to retaliate with a strong and obstructive hand.\(^{361}\)

A study, *Impact of hard Brexit on European fisheries*, published by the Wageningen University and Research in April 2018, modelled the impact for the EU as a whole of loss of a mutual access to waters, together with the application of non-tariff measures (NTM) and the cost of measures required to facilitate trade. The study covered fisheries, aquaculture and fish processing. The authors concluded that a hard Brexit would lead to reduced fish prices in the UK and noted that the fish processing and aquaculture sectors could decline due to the impact of trade measures:

If the United Kingdom (UK) would completely close its marine areas, the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium would be affected the most. For the UK aquaculture and fish processing production will decline due to trade measures. For the other three countries production of all fish producing sectors will decline. Also, because of a higher production volume of wild fisheries in the UK, the price of fish in this country will go down, resulting in lower production value and thus income of the sector. In the whole of Europe fish prices will rise. Especially Irish consumers will have to dig deep into their pockets: fish prices can increase up to 8%.\(^{362}\)

*Fishing for Leave* criticised the study, particularly the conclusion that a no deal would lead to an increased UK fish production of only 15%.\(^{363}\) It responded by highlighting the large potential increase in available catches to UK flagged vessels that could follow if other vessels were excluded from UK waters:

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\(^{360}\) NEF, *Not in the same Boat*, November 2017, p4

\(^{361}\) NEF, *Not in the same Boat*, November 2017, p73

\(^{362}\) Wageningen University and Research, *European consumers pay the price for fish when hard Brexit occurs*, 24 April 2018

\(^{363}\) Wageningen University and Research *Impact of hard Brexit on European fisheries*, April 2018, p11
Currently the EU catches 675,000 tons in UK waters – 60% of the fish caught in the UK sector – whilst the UK only catches 88,000 tons or 16% of the fish taken in EU waters.\textsuperscript{364}

The \textit{Wageningen report} does refer to an increase in fisheries access having the potential to increasing fisheries landings in the UK by up to 60%.\textsuperscript{365} However, it concluded that for this to be realised would require no trade measures being put in place by the EU, and that this would be unlikely:

Gains of $400m could be expected if UK gains back its fishing territories and there are no trade protectionism measures. However, under NTMs and MFN [most favoured nation] tariffs, which is the more likely scenario, most of these gains are faded away and there is a zero sum.\textsuperscript{366}

George Eustice \textit{told} the EFRA Committee on 5 September that UK fishermen would benefit from Brexit even if there is no deal: “Fisheries is one of the key areas where we would gain by having more rapid control”.

\textsuperscript{364} Fishing for Leave, \textit{Flawed Fisheries Report Brings Serious Questions Over Economists Analyses}, 27 April 2019

\textsuperscript{365} Wageningen University and Research \textit{Impact of hard Brexit on European fisheries}, April 2018, p5

\textsuperscript{366} Ibid, p11
12. Energy and the environment

Although Member States remain ultimately responsible for the energy supply to their citizens and for deciding on the most appropriate energy mix, the UK and EU energy sectors are integrated through trade, EU legislation, the interconnection of energy supply and nuclear cooperation under the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Since the mid-1990s, the EU has been implementing an internal energy market (IEM) to build a more efficient energy market.367

Given the existing energy integration between the UK and the EU - notably through Euratom and the IEM - the UK energy sector would probably be affected by Brexit. However, the UK Government is committed to leaving Euratom and is open to leaving the IEM, and has begun preparations for leaving. As such, although the Brexit White Paper contains preferences on energy integration in future, the impact of a sudden no-deal Brexit on energy could be much the same as a Brexit deal.

Potential impacts of ‘no deal’ could be a less integrated relationship than the UK’s position in the White Paper, and that UK preparations to leave are not ready in time for a no-deal Brexit. These are in addition to the potential impacts of Brexit in any scenario.

12.1 Internal Energy Market

In 2017 the UK imported 4.2% of its electricity demand through interconnectors to Europe and the island of Ireland, and 36.8% of its gas.368 The UK also imports Liquified Natural Gas, though not through interconnectors and predominantly not from EU countries.

The IEM facilitates harmonised, tariff-free trade across these interconnectors. The Government’s Brexit White Paper said the UK wanted to “explore” options for the UK’s future relationship with the IEM and contains options to either leave or remain in the market.369 Therefore, it is possible that ‘no deal’ could be much the same as a deal, as the UK could stay in or leave the IEM in the event of a deal or leave in the event of no deal.

Leaving the IEM (as a result or a negotiated deal or a no-deal scenario) could have an impact on the trade of energy through interconnectors. However, it is also important to note that several countries outside the EU currently trade energy through interconnectors with the EU, and the EU does not generally apply tariffs to these imports.370

368 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Digest of UK Energy Statistics 2018, Tables 5.5 and G.5
369 HM Government, The Future Relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union, 12 July 2018, para 144
National Grid told the BEIS Committee that ‘no deal’ posed no immediate risk to the UK’s security of electricity supply, which could be supported through greater domestic generation.  

There may be other, longer term costs of leaving the IEM (with or without a deal) without any other sort of agreement to cooperate on energy matters, such as less efficient trading, which could increase the cost of energy, 372 exclusion from EU solidarity principles for gas supply crises, 373 more difficulty securing future interconnector projects 374 which can help increase flexibility and resilience of grids, especially with increasing intermittent renewables, and less influence on future IEM rules. 375 These costs would impact EU Member States that export or import energy to and from the UK, as well as the UK itself.

Ireland

Ireland’s Single Electricity Market (SEM) allows free trade of power across the island, with all generators and suppliers trading through a central mandatory wholesale market. 376 The SEM is undergoing significant change; the Integrated Single Electricity Market (I-SEM) is designed closely around the rules of the IEM. 377 Although in the short term, a no-deal Brexit is unlikely to affect the transport of electricity, in the longer term regulatory divergence could be problematic for the continued functioning of this Irish market (including in relation to the EU ETS - see below for details). There could also be potential impacts on Ireland’s gas supply as a result of Brexit, as Ireland imports much of its gas from the UK (see above for ‘no deal’ issues). 378

12.2 Euratom

The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) provides the basis for regulation of civil nuclear activity in its Member States. The Euratom Treaty shares the EU’s institutional framework but is a distinct legal entity from the EU. 379 The Government announced in the March 2017 Article 50 letter that the UK would leave Euratom as well as the EU. 380 The legal basis for leaving Euratom as part of the UK’s exit from the EU has been a subject of ongoing debate. 381

The UK began preparations for leaving Euratom by passing the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 and negotiating replacement Nuclear Cooperation Agreements for trade. But if there is no deal and no transition period

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372 BEIS Committee, Ibid
373 BEIS Committee, ibid, p. 13
374 Andrew Ward, *Our friends electric: interconnection and Brexit*, Financial Times, 15 January 2018
375 BEIS Committee, ibid, para. 39
376 CER Factsheet on the Single Electricity Market, April 2011
377 Information note, Proposed Amendment to the Electricity Regulation (Amendment) (Single Market) Act 2007
379 Euratom Treaty, 1957
380 HC Deb 1 February 2017, Vol 620
there is a risk that these alternative domestic arrangements are not completed in time.

For other aspects of Euratom such as nuclear research, a no-deal Brexit could have a clearer impact, with funding arrangements affecting the continuation of existing projects (radioisotopes are discussed in section 9.3).

As to its future relationship with Euratom, the UK Government’s White Paper says (para 144):

The UK will seek a close association with Euratom: a new relationship that is more comprehensive and broad than any existing agreement between Euratom and a third country.

A no-deal Brexit could mean this relationship with Euratom is not realised. It is also possible that even without a deal, the UK could still secure a separate deal with Euratom. For more general information, see the Library’s briefing paper on Euratom.

- **Nuclear Safeguards**: these are measures to verify that countries comply with international obligations not to use civil nuclear materials for weapons.\(^{382}\) The *Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018* makes provision for a new domestic safeguard regime after the UK leaves Euratom. In May 2018 concern was raised in the press that the new regime would not be ready by exit day.\(^ {383}\) However, in an appearance before the House of Lords Energy and Environment Sub-Committee in July 2018, the Office for Nuclear Regulation (who are responsible for implementing the new regime) said they were “confident” that timeframes would be met.\(^ {384}\) ‘No deal’ should therefore have little impact on Nuclear Safeguards, if domestic provisions are in place in time. The Library Briefing on the *Nuclear Safeguard’s Bill* has further detail.

- **Nuclear Cooperation Agreements**: the UK Government is in the process of negotiating new Nuclear Cooperation Agreements (NCAs) with relevant nuclear states to replace existing Euratom agreements. These agreements facilitate trade such as in nuclear materials including fuel. An NCA is not a legal requirement for trade in many countries (where export licences can be used), but is a requirement in Australia, Canada, Japan and the US. The UK agreed an NCA with the USA in May 2018, which will need to be approved by both countries’ parliaments.\(^ {385}\) The *Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018* included an amendment to provide that if the NCAs are not ready in time, the UK must make a request to the EU that existing Euratom NCAs be extended. In the event of a no-deal Brexit, if replacement NCAs have not been agreed and approved in time and existing arrangements with Euratom are not extended, it is possible that trade will cease with the countries.

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383 Red warnings for UK’s post-Brexit nuclear safeguards, *Sky News*, 16 May 2018
384 Lords EU Committee, Energy and Environment Sub-Committee, *The Office for Nuclear Regulation’s Brexit preparedness*, 11 July 2018, Q1
concerned, and the UK may have to transfer its trading needs to a country where an NCA is not required.

- **Research:** the UK collaborates with the EU on a number of nuclear research projects, including Joint European Torus (JET), a fusion power project at Culham. The Brexit White Paper stated that the Government wanted a deal to “provide for UK association with the Euratom Research and Training Programme”. Euratom provides 87.5% of the funding for the Culham JET project and the UK Government provides the rest. The funding is secure until the end of 2018 and the Government has committed to paying its “fair share” of the funding until 2020. However, it is possible that Euratom will not renew its funding as a result of Brexit, either later this year or in the event of no deal. It is also possible that in the event of ‘no deal’ for Euratom cooperation in general, the UK and Euratom do agree to collaborate specifically on Culham, or on research more generally. Further information on research collaboration and no deal Brexit is provided in section 13.

### 12.3 Chemicals (REACH)

The main EU legislation for the regulation of chemicals in the EU is called REACH (formally the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals Regulation (No 1907/2006)). REACH requires substances that are manufactured or imported into the EU (in quantities of more than 1 tonne) to be registered with the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) and provides a framework by which the use of hazardous substances can be restricted. There is also specific EU legislation, for example, for certain types of chemicals; this section only covers REACH.

The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is the competent authority for REACH in the UK and plays a role in enforcement and in assessing substances prior to the ECHA. The Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) is the lead Government department with overall policy responsibility across the UK.

The Government’s preferred approach is to seek an agreement on a form of “associate membership” of the ECHA such that substance registrations remain valid in both the EU and UK markets. If there is no deal reached with the EU on some form of associate membership of the ECHA the UK would become a third party to

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387 BEIS, *Euratom Exit Factsheet, Research and Development*, June 2018
388 Gov.uk, *Government commits to continue funding its share of Europe’s flagship UK-based nuclear fusion research facility*, 27 June 2017
389 Background information can be found in the Library briefing paper on *Chemicals Regulation* (CBP7681, 11 August 2016).
390 Health and Safety Executive, *Other REACH Processes*, [accessed 22 August 2018].
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REACH. This means that UK REACH registrations would no longer be valid (in the absence of an agreement otherwise). 392

Two broad issues arise for a no deal scenario:

1. Exporting chemicals to the EU market:
   Broadly speaking, to preserve EEA market access UK companies would need to transfer their registrations to an EEA-based entity, or alternatively the obligation for compliance falls to the importer. 393 Industry stakeholders warn of significant disruptions to supply chains in manufacturing sectors in the absence of a deal. 394

2. Regulating chemicals in the UK:
   The Government has said that it would develop its own version of REACH, referred to as “UK REACH”. 395 The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) would be the lead regulatory authority and the Government is working on an IT database for a UK registration system. Registrations are expected to be “grandfathered” from the EU to UK system, with companies given 2 years to provide a full data package. For more detail, see the Government’s technical notice: Regulating chemicals (REACH) if there’s no Brexit deal.

   The House of Lords EU Energy and Environment Sub-Committee and chemical industry stakeholders have expressed concerns that some companies may have difficulty providing a full data package within the 2 year period due to intellectual property rights. 396 397

For more information, see the Library briefing paper on Brexit and Chemicals Regulation (REACH) (CBP 8403).

12.4 The environment

Government funding and preparations

The Liaison Committee questioned the Prime Minister about ‘no deal’ on 18 July 2018. She confirmed that of the £3 billion that the Treasury has set aside over two years for no deal preparations, Defra was allocated £310 million for 2018-19. 398 The Prime Minister assured the Committee that the UK would not reduce its environmental standards in the event of ‘no deal’. 399

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392 European Chemicals Agency, UKs withdrawal from the EU, [accessed 22 August 2018].
393 European Chemicals Agency, UKs withdrawal from the EU, [accessed 22 August 2018].
395 Defra, Regulating chemicals (REACH) if there’s no Brexit deal, 24 September 2018.
396 House of Lords EU Energy and Environment Sub-Committee, Serious concerns raised over Defra’s ‘no deal’ preparations, 24 October 2018.
397 Alliance of Chemical Associations, Letter to Therese Coffey MP dated 31 October 2018 [accessed 5 November 2018].
398 Commons Liaison Committee, Oral evidence: the Prime Minister, HC 1393, 18 July 2018, Q3
399 Ibid, Q116
Defra Secretary of State Michael Gove confirmed to the Commons European Scrutiny Committee in July 2018 that “although no one wants it”, Defra was stepping up its preparation for the possibility that the UK would have to trade on WTO terms from March 2019.

‘No deal’ scenarios

A March 2018 risk analysis report commissioned by Friends of the Earth, UK environmental policy post-Brexit by the Tyndall Centre, University of East Anglia examined a number of scenarios, including a “chaotic” no deal (‘cliff-edge’ Brexit) and a “planned” no deal (the WTO option) and the impact each could have on specific environmental policy areas. Waste, chemicals, habitats and birds and climate change were all identified as policy areas at moderate to very high risk under a no-deal scenario. Waste is discussed further below.

Greener UK (a coalition of environmental bodies) published a report What would a no deal Brexit mean for the environment? (July 2018) highlighting a number of ‘no deal’ concerns, including losing mechanisms for co-operating with the EU on transboundary environmental issues (of particular importance for Ireland), and a potential gap in governance between exit day and the date that any new UK environmental watchdog is established. During a Commons Environmental Audit Committee evidence session, similar ‘no deal’ concerns were raised by MPs, including Green Party MP Caroline Lucas who stated:

It is massively urgent. An air gap sounds like quite a benign thing, but if we fall off a cliff after March 2019 and we do not have all of the infrastructure of environment protection and the enforcement mechanisms and all of that, that can have serious implications in terms of the state of our environment in this country.

The Secretary of State confirmed in reply that the Government was “stepping up preparations in the event of there not being that [withdrawal] agreement”. He confirmed:

[…] work that is going on at the moment with my team looking at all of the statutory, legislative and other underpinnings that require to be put in place.

Further discussion of environmental issues in the context of Brexit is provided in the Library Briefing Paper on Brexit and the environment, 8 August 2018.

Waste

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400 Commons European Scrutiny Committee, Oral evidence: EU Withdrawal, HC 763, 18 July 2018, Q718
402 Greener UK, What would a no deal Brexit mean for the environment? July 2018 [accessed 20 July 2018]
403 Environmental Audit Committee, Oral evidence: Environmental principles and governance consultation, HC 1062, 11 July 2018, Q164
404 Ibid
There is concern about the implications for the movement of waste in both deal and no-deal Brexit scenarios. The UK is both an exporter of waste to EU and non-EU countries and an importer of waste from other EU countries. In particular, it is estimated that Ireland ships 40% of its hazardous waste to the UK for treatment.\(^{405}\)

**Movement of waste**

Articles 34 and 3(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 on shipments of waste prohibit the export of waste for disposal and mixed municipal waste for recovery operations from the EU to a third country, unless it is a member of EFTA and a party to the Basel Convention. As a Commission notice to stakeholders sets out, once the UK become a third country, it will no longer be possible for EU Member States to export hazardous waste to the UK.\(^{406}\) The House of Lords EU Committee Energy and Environment Sub-Committee asked Defra Ministers to clarify the impact of this on UK businesses if they were no longer able to receive imports of hazardous waste from the EU.\(^{407}\) Dr Thérèse Coffey replied that “we have estimated the impact to be very small”.

On the export of waste shipment from the UK to other countries, the Commission notice states that “[i]mports of waste into the EU-27 will be governed, as of the withdrawal date, by Title V of Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006, whereby imports of waste from a third country party to the Basel Convention remains allowed, subject to the requirements set out in that Regulation”.\(^{408}\)

**Trade and tariffs**

Further concerns are about whether it will take a long time to export waste out of the country and whether there will be “frictionless” trade with EU after Brexit.\(^{409}\) Dr Coffey was asked about this by the Lords Energy and Environment Sub-Committee:

**Lord Krebs:** (...) the Environmental Services Association told us that a hard Brexit, if that were the outcome, could disrupt some of the trade in waste and drive up costs of waste management. Do you think that it is unnecessarily worried?

**Dr Thérèse Coffey MP:** I think it is. It might come back to the concept of frictionless trade and its checks and mechanics, rather than to the regulations. I see no reason why it is in the interests of different countries to make those changes. We are not anticipating particular problems, even if it did happen.\(^{410}\)

\(^{405}\) Letter from the House of Lords European Union Committee to Dr Thérèse Coffey MP, 17 January 2018

\(^{406}\) European Commission on The Withdrawal of the United Kingdom and EU Waste Law, February 2018

\(^{407}\) Letter from Dr Therese Coffey MP to the House of Lords European Union Committee, 31 January 2018

\(^{408}\) European Commission on The Withdrawal of the United Kingdom and EU Waste Law, February 2018


\(^{410}\) Lords EU Committee, Energy and Environment Sub-Committee, Corrected oral evidence: Impact of Brexit on the UK’s trade in waste Wednesday 10 January 2018, Q16
Dr Coffey also replied to questions about the possibility of tariffs being imposed on the export of UK waste in the situation where there was a reversion to WTO trading rules. She expressed confidence that because the EU was an importer of waste, “the tariff would end up on them for importing our waste, which would not be in their interest” and that “If tariffs ended up being the outcome, it would increase the costs of materials for EU companies. I expect that we will want to work together to make sure that that is not the outcome.”

EU Emissions Trading Scheme

The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is a mandatory cap-and-trade scheme for greenhouse gases. It operates in 31 countries (the 28 EU countries, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) and covers the 45% of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions that come from energy intensive sectors. The EU ETS is currently in its third trading phase (2013-2020).

If there is no deal the UK would drop out of the EU ETS before the end of Phase 3 and all relevant EU legislation would cease to apply on exit day. This scenario - leaving part way through a trading phase - would have practical consequences for the overall EU ETS market and both EU and UK participants. Some of these are discussed further below.

More generally, a no-deal scenario would not impact the UK’s domestic targets to reduce emissions under the Climate Change Act 2008 (which are more ambitious than EU targets) and the Government has committed to continuing to meet its international climate change commitments.

While both the UK Government and the European Commission have proposed that the UK continues to participate in the EU ETS until the end of any transition/implementation period, and thus the end of Phase 3 of the scheme (2020), neither party has formally indicated their preference on the UK’s post-Brexit participation in the scheme. So the UK could also stop participating in the EU ETS under the terms of a negotiated withdrawal agreement, albeit under different terms and a longer timeframe. The Government has confirmed it is committed to carbon pricing but is concerned that the EU ETS has not set a sufficiently strong carbon price signal. The Minister of State for Energy and Clean Growth, Claire Perry, has said:

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411 Ibid, Q17
412 The greenhouse gases covered by EU ETS are carbon dioxide (CO₂), nitrous oxide (N₂O) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs). Greenhouse gas emissions are linked to global warming. See for instance the US Environmental Protection Agency, Overview of Greenhouse Gases.
413 European Commission, Climate Action, EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), [accessed 18 July 2018]
414 Lords EU Committee, Energy and Environment Sub-Committee, Oral evidence: EU Emissions Trading Scheme, 14 March 2018, Q1
417 See Cm 9593, para 140
We are committed to carbon pricing as a tool and want the best possible way to deliver that carbon pricing. If there is a long-term opportunity to improve the carbon pricing signal in the economy by amending or changing our relationship with the ETS, we would be short-sighted not to take that.\footnote{Lords EU Committee, \textit{Oral evidence}, 21 March 2018, Q6}

If the UK leaves the EU ETS on exit day, a key risk identified in 2017 was that UK participants could flood the market with a mass sell-off of EU ETS allowances, which would result in a crash in the price of carbon. In October 2017 the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) was reported to have said:

\begin{quote}
A hard Brexit scenario poses a risk of approximately 220 million allowances issued by the United Kingdom to be offloaded onto the market between 1 January 2018 and 29 March 2019.\footnote{Reuters, \textit{EU measures to safeguard carbon market from Brexit}, Julia Fioretti, 18 October 2017 [accessed 9 August 2018]}
\end{quote}

To safeguard against this, both the EU and the UK have amended legislation\footnote{The EU amended the \textit{EU ETS Registry Regulation}; the UK amended the \textit{Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme Regulations 2012} by passing the \textit{Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme (Amendment) Regulations 2017}} with the aim of avoiding a mismatch between the functioning of the EU ETS and the timing of Brexit for the 2018 compliance year. The purpose of the amendments was to ensure that 2018 UK allowances retain their value while also ensuring that they do not flood the market on the UK’s exit. Further explanation of these safeguarding measures is set out in the European Commission press release: \textit{Update on safeguard measures for EU ETS} (13 February 2018).

In \textit{evidence on the EU ETS} to the Lords Energy and Environment Sub-Committee, the Managing Director of Sandbag (a climate change think tank), Debbie Stockwell, explained some practical implications and the default position if there is no agreement and no UK participation in the EU ETS:

\begin{quote}
The default position, if a deal is not reached about UK involvement in the ETS, is that the UK would leave the Scheme at the point of leaving the EU. That said, transitional arrangements could be put in place to enable the UK to remain in the Scheme until the end of Phase 3. In our view, it would be much simpler for the UK to remain in the Scheme until that time. In practical terms, the UK would cease to be subject to the ETS Directive on departure from the EU and relevant UK legislation would need to be repealed. The EU would need to adjust the terms of the Emissions Trading Directive: for example, the cap and how it applies to the remaining 27 Member States.\footnote{Lords EU Committee, Energy and Environment Sub-Committee, \textit{Oral evidence: EU Emissions Trading Scheme}, 14 March 2018, Q1}
\end{quote}

Energy and climate lawyer Silke Goldberg, Partner at Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, picked up on other possible practical and legal implications of ‘no deal’, including for the Single Irish Electricity Market, the uncertainty for scheme participant companies that would need to make very short-term and quick adjustments, and the impact on existing contracts:
There are a number of practical implications. You have already mentioned Ireland, so let us start there. The practical implication for the Single Irish Electricity Market would be distortion of the electricity price on the island of Ireland. At the moment, SEM works on a pool basis. From May onwards, it will move to bilateral. That effectively means that SEM, the single Irish electricity market, would need to cope with some of its participant electricity generators and market participants being subject to the EU ETS, and others not. That might have an impact on the pricing on the island of Ireland, and a distortive effect on electricity pricing and the functioning of the Single Irish Electricity Market.

The Commission, in its Regulation of 12 February 2018, has already issued arrangements to mark UK allowances for the possibility of there being a no deal and related surrender arrangements. There is also the practical implication that that, in itself, could distort pricing for companies that rely on UK-issued EU ETS allowances.

Typically, companies do not enter EU ETS trading arrangements for compliance on an extremely short-term basis. Companies know that over the next however many years, for Phase 3 of the EU ETS, which we are currently in, they have a particular carbon strategy. That strategy may be curtailed, and companies may need to make very short-term and quick adjustments. That will have practical consequences. Perhaps Lawrence can add to that in further detail.

From a legal perspective, that may have an impact on the existing contracts. It may be quite disruptive, and it will require an awful lot of organisation, in a scenario with quite a lot of price distortion. At the moment, the EU ETS is at a seven-year high. It trades at around €11. Brexit, in a no-deal scenario, will almost certainly have a negative impact on it.422

Other potential no-deal impacts identified are the loss of income from auction revenues to the Treasury (£530 million last year423) and the possibility of legal action by adversely affected companies.424 The Government has confirmed it is preparing for a range of scenarios for the EU ETS, including ‘no deal’,425 but has not commented in detail on the practical/ legal implications of a sudden exit.

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422  Lords EU Committee, Energy and Environment Sub-Committee, Oral evidence: EU Emissions Trading Scheme, 14 March 2018, Q1
423  Lords EU Committee, Oral evidence: Minister of State for Energy and Clean Growth, 21 March 2018, Q10
424  See: ENDS Report, Environmental risks of no-deal Brexit loom large, Dr Paul Hatchwell, 10 August 2018 [subs only] [accessed 13 August 2018]
425  Lords EU Committee, Oral evidence: Minister of State for Energy and Clean Growth, 21 March 2018, Q12
13. Transport

The UK Government’s transport priorities since the vote to leave the EU in July 2016 have been focused on air transport rights to fly, continuing membership of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), road haulage and delays at UK ports, particularly Dover. In June 2018 the Department for Exiting the European Union (DExEU) published a framework for UK-EU partnership on transport post-Brexit. This was followed by a White Paper on the future relationship in July 2018. The White Paper sets out the UK’s broad ambitions for a Brexit deal, these are:

- an **Air Transport Agreement** which seeks to maintain reciprocal liberalised aviation access between and within the territory of the UK and the EU, alongside UK participation in EASA;
- exploring options for **road transport**, including reciprocal access for UK and EU road hauliers and passenger transport operators;
- close cooperation on **maritime**, including with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA); and
- **bilateral rail agreements** with relevant Member States to support the continued operation of services through the Channel Tunnel and on the Belfast-Dublin Enterprise line.\(^{426}\)

In July the National Audit Office (NAO) published a report looking at how the DfT is organising itself to support a successful exit from the EU, and set out what the Department had done to date to prepare for exit. The key figures from the report were that:

- 18 out of 314 EU Exit work streams the Department for Transport is responsible for delivering and reporting progress on to the Department for Exiting the European Union as at June 2018
- 63 statutory instruments still to be introduced by the Department for Transport by March 2019, on top of 64 business-as-usual statutory instruments, as at April 2018
- 14 work streams out of the 18 reported to the Department for Exiting the European Union that were on track in March 2018 for delivery of the contingency solution by March 2019. One work stream was not reported on.
- 52.5 additional full-time equivalent staff needed in 2018-19 to work on EU Exit, on top of 84 existing full-time equivalent staff
- 100,000 – 7 million estimated range of the number of International Driving Permits (IDPs) to be issued in the first year in the event of no deal being reached
- £180 million amount the Department for Transport and its arm’s-length bodies have estimated they will spend on EU Exit by March 2022

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\(^{426}\) DExEU, *The future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union*, Cm 9593, 12 July 2018
• £3.1 million out of £5.6 million actual HM Treasury funds spent on EU Exit by the Department for Transport in 2017-18, against HM Treasury funds authorised in the Supplementary Estimate.\(^\text{427}\)

The NAO stated that the DfT has two EU Exit objectives:

• to maintain and develop the current levels of transport connectivity between the UK and the EU to underpin the UK’s future trading relationship; and

• to continue to collaborate, in certain areas, with the EU and international agencies to maintain critical regulatory arrangements, and to manage transport impacts at the border resulting from any change, for example in customs.\(^\text{428}\)

To meet these objectives DfT is:

• supporting the government’s negotiations on those issues where the Department has a direct interest;

• preparing the necessary primary and secondary legislation; and

• planning for both a ‘no deal’ scenario and a negotiated settlement for 18 of the 314 work streams (as at June 2018) supporting EU Exit across government.\(^\text{429}\)

In terms of the legislation required to prepare for Brexit, the NAO reported the DfT’s estimate that:

… it still has to prepare 127 SIs [statutory instruments, or secondary legislation] before 29 March 2019 – 64 of which relate to ‘business-as-usual’ activities, and 63 of which relate to exit. It has laid 45 ‘business-as-usual’ SIs since December 2017. Programming and preparing the legislation will be a significant challenge for the rest of 2018 and early 2019.\(^\text{430}\)

NAO further stated that between December 2017 and May 2018, the planned laying dates for 38 Statutory Instruments (SIs) were moved back (Largely due to the extra time it took the Withdrawal Act to pass through Parliament). NAO remarked that “the timetable for laying all the SIs is now further compressed and adds further pressure to the already tight programme across government”.\(^\text{431}\) It further stressed that many SIs “are linked and delays may have a knock-on effect on the programme”.\(^\text{432}\)

In October 2018 the Hansard Society reported that DfT had laid the most Brexit SIs of any Government Department (18).\(^\text{433}\) It has a further 50 to deliver by March 2019.\(^\text{434}\)

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\(^\text{427}\) NAO, *Implementing the UK’s Exit from the European Union: Department for Transport*, HC 1125 2017-19, 19 July 2018, p4

\(^\text{428}\) Ibid., para 3

\(^\text{429}\) Ibid., para 4

\(^\text{430}\) Ibid., para 2.22

\(^\text{431}\) Ibid., para 2.25

\(^\text{432}\) Ibid., para 2.26

\(^\text{433}\) “Westminster Lens: Brexit Statutory Instruments Dashboard”, Hansard Society, 26 October 2018

\(^\text{434}\) Letter from Bernadette Kelly to Meg Hillier MP, 18 October 2018
Proposed negative SIs relating to transport, made under the Withdrawal Act, are listed on the Gov.uk website. At time of publication of this paper, there were 12 SIs listed.

As regards ‘no deal’, as stated above, the Government believes a ‘no deal’ scenario could be managed in an “orderly” fashion and on 23 August 2018 the Department for Exiting the EU began to publish ‘technical notices’, on how to prepare for Brexit if there is ‘no deal’.435

Below is set out, by mode, what these notices say about the implications of ‘no deal’ and the potential impacts of such an outcome.

13.1 Aviation

Government technical notices

On 24 September the Department for Transport published three papers on aviation, covering flights, safety, and security.

On flights between the EU27 and the UK in the event of ‘no deal’, the relevant paper states that:

- UK and EU licensed airlines would lose the automatic right to operate air services between the UK and the EU without seeking advance permission. This would mean that airlines operating between the UK and the EU would need to seek individual permissions to operate.436

It goes on to state that in this scenario the UK envisages granting permission to EU airlines to continue to operate and would “expect EU countries to reciprocate in turn”. If such permissions are not granted, there could be disruption to some flights. In these circumstances the UK approach would be as follows:

- In order to ensure permissions were granted and flights continued, the UK’s preference would be to agree a basic arrangement or understanding on a multilateral basis between the UK and the EU. Alternatively, bilateral arrangements between the UK and an individual EU country could be put in place, specifying the conditions under which air services would be permitted. By definition any such agreement would be reciprocal in nature.437

On flights to and from the rest of the world, it states that there would be two approaches:

- For airlines from one of the 111 countries with whom the UK has a bilateral Air Services Agreement (ASA), including China, India and Brazil, there would be no change; and
- For airlines from one of the 17 non-EU countries with whom air services to the UK are currently provided for by virtue of the UK’s membership of the EU, replacement arrangements will be in place before Exit Day.

435 DExEU, UK government’s preparations for a ‘no deal’ scenario, 23 August 2018
436 DfT, Flights to and from the UK if there’s no Brexit deal, 24 September 2018
437 Ibid.; at the AOA conference in October 2018 Mr Grayling stated that one cause of disruption to flights could be EASA refusing or delaying the certification of UK-certified planes [“UK-EU Flight Disruption ‘Theoretically Possible’ in the Event of a No-Deal Brexit, Admits Chris Grayling”, The Independent, 29 October 2018]
The paper states that the UK “has already agreed a number of these agreements, and is confident the remaining agreements will be agreed well in advance of the UK leaving the EU”.438

On **air traffic management**, the paper states that the UK would no longer be able to directly participate in the EU’s SES initiative, but that the UK “would continue to work through EUROCONTROL to ensure the safe and efficient management of airspace across its 41 members. The UK will continue to lead the way in providing safe and efficient air traffic control services”.439

A separate paper on **aviation security** states that if the UK leaves the EU in March 2019 with no agreement in place on aviation security, the existing regulations and procedures will still be retained in domestic law under the EUW Act. It states that:

Given this, and the higher standards of aviation already in place in the UK, there is no reason for the UK’s aviation security regime not to be recognised by the EU as equivalent, which would mean no additional security restrictions would need to be imposed by either the EU or the UK. However, if the EU does not recognise the UK’s standards, there would be a number of possible implications for passengers and cargo.440

These could include passenger and baggage rescreening at EU airports for UK passengers catching an onward flight. The paper notes that the European Commission has “indicated that they will not recognise the UK aviation security system”, with potentially “significant operational and cost implications for … EU airports, and passengers may have to factor increased time for rescreening into their travel schedule”.441

As regards cargo, the Commission has set out that, in the absence of any agreement, the default regulatory position will require carriers to hold ACC3 designations442 from an EU Member State in order to transport cargo from the UK into the EU. The paper states that the EU “has not yet provided details of how carriers should apply for an ACC3 designation”. The paper states that an outcome where the EU does not immediately recognise UK security standards as equivalent (given standards are higher than in the EU) would “have significant implications for the EU air cargo industry, their supply chains, and the consumers of the products to be shipped” and that the UK therefore expects that its recognition of EU security standards “will be reciprocated in turn by the EU”.443

A separate paper on aviation safety deals with **EASA**. It states that in the event of ‘no deal’, the functions currently performed by EASA in

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438 Ibid.
439 Ibid. **Eurocontrol** was created via an international convention in 1960. It is an intergovernmental organisation with 41 Member and 2 Comprehensive Agreement States. The aim behind the creation of Eurocontrol was to have an organisation that would be entirely responsible for upper airspace in Europe. Its primary objective is the development of a pan-European air traffic management system.
440 DfT, **Aviation security if there’s no Brexit deal**, 24 September 2018
441 Ibid.
442 Air Cargo or Mail Carrier operating into the Union from a Third Country Airport
443 Ibid.
relation to approvals for UK designed aeronautical products and approvals for third country organisations would be conferred on the CAA.\footnote{DfT, *Aviation safety if there’s no Brexit deal*, 24 September 2018; the Civil Aviation Act 1982 (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018 (see section 6.7, above) prepare for this contingency}
The CAA has set up a microsite, explaining in more detail what would happen in the event of ‘no deal’. The site contains detailed advice for the following:

- **Aerospace design organisations**;
- **Aerospace maintenance organisations**;
- **Aerospace production organisations**;
- **Air Navigation Service Providers**;
- **Airlines and AOC holders**;
- **Airports**;
- **Approved Training Organisations**;
- **Cabin crew**;
- **Commercial pilots**;
- **Continued Airworthiness Management Organisations**;
- **Declared entities**;
- **Drones**;
- **Engineering training organisations**;
- **Flight training examiners**;
- **Licensed engineers**;
- **Private pilots**; and
- **UK-registered aircraft: qualified owners**

The CAA has also created this short introduction to what a ‘no deal’ means for aviation safety regulation. One issue it deals with is that of commercial pilots.\footnote{Following some concerns from the CAA about how the issue had been reported by the media, see, e.g. CAA press notice, “*CAA statement on Sky News aviation and Brexit story*”, 11 September 2018}
The CAA states that for most UK-registered commercial pilots, there would be little impact from ‘no deal’ as a consequence of global aviation rules.\footnote{Under the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)} Pilots with UK licences who want to fly EU-registered aircraft post-Brexit would need to transfer their licence to another EASA member state before Brexit, or seek a second licence. If pilots currently hold a commercial licence from another EASA member state, they would need to seek validation from the CAA to operate UK-registered aircraft if they want to fly outside the UK. The CAA states that it “is currently developing processes to make this as seamless as possible”.\footnote{CAA, *The CAA’s guide to Brexit No Deal & Aviation Safety*, CAP 1714, 24 September 2018, pp5-6}
UK airlines, aircraft manufacturers and other members of the aviation industry are now able to register with EASA as a ‘third country’, in preparation for a ‘no deal’.  

**Impact**

The impact of ‘no deal’ on aviation has been widely debated. For example, in its December 2017 report on a ‘no deal’ Brexit, the Lords EU Internal Market Sub-Committee stated that “The consequences of failure to reach a deal [on aviation] would be grave”. There has been speculation that the UK-Spain market could be particularly badly hit. In a March 2018 report the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Select Committee set out the potential consequences of a UK exit from EASA:

> If the UK is to make a managed departure from EASA, it would require a transition period in which special arrangements are made with the EASA, the US Federal Aviation Authority and other global regulators. The Civil Aviation Authority would need to undergo a major investment and recruitment programme if it is to take over the functions of EASA at some point in the future, and Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreements with mutual recognition agreements would need to be negotiated with the EU, US and other major markets. Given the complexities involved, this transition may need to last beyond the two years that the Prime Minister has said is likely to be appropriate for the economy-wide implementation period. This disruptive and costly process is unlikely to result in any significant divergence in regulation.

The UK in a Changing Europe stated in a September 2018 paper that:

> Brexit in any form will be disruptive for airlines, but failure by the UK and the EU to reach agreement would leave the industry in chaos. Because the sector has its own system of regulation, based on the 1944 Chicago Convention, there is no WTO safety net in aviation. Moreover, although the Chicago system has provided a stable framework for the development of aviation since the second world war, it is unwieldy, difficult to change and restrictive.

It went on:

> Some argue that … fears are exaggerated and that it is in the economic interests of both the UK and the EU to avoid [no deal]. It is true that contingency measures could be mobilized to retain basic connectivity – for example, the UK could grant access unilaterally – but such steps would merely limit the damage. They would certainly not provide for a continuation of the advanced system that currently exists. A UK-EU air services agreement, as well as UK bilaterals with third countries, would take years to
What if there’s no Brexit deal?

negotiate, as each side aims to secure the best deal for its airlines under uncertain conditions.453

Watson Farley & Williams argued in a March 2017 paper that “the connection between aviation and the EU Single Market is not inherent and compromise may be possible, but will require both sides to be bold”.454 It further stated that:

… the logic of requiring the UK to leave the single aviation area because it is leaving the Single Market is not easy to follow … it would be perverse to allow the creation of new restrictions on flying between the UK and the EU when third countries such as Canada, on another continent, have the possibility of securing fully open skies provided ownership and control restrictions on both sides are eliminated […]

It would be wrong to say the EU-Canada agreement could be a “model” for a future UK-EU aviation deal; it would be more correct to say it shows the link between membership of the Single Market and the single aviation market is not essential.455

The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) published a ‘no deal fear checker’ in August 2018. This stated that there is mutual self-interest on the part of the UK and the EU27 in ensuring that planes can still fly:

First, the UK is a world leader in aviation, which means it has plenty of leverage. The UK market itself is the largest in the EU, and the third largest globally, after only the US and China […]

Second, the mutual interests are strong. Grounding UK airlines would be hugely damaging for the EU economy, particularly in areas like tourism. And, of course, foreign airlines presumably want to continue to fly to and from the UK as well. Since these agreements are reciprocal, it is unlikely that other countries would deny the UK the most important rights when they would then almost certainly lose them too.

Third, even if this is left to the last moment, there are several quick fixes. In particular, the UK and EU (or a third country like the US) could agree at least a temporary extension of the current arrangements by something as simple as a memorandum of understanding.456

The International Air Transport Association (IATA) has urged “an early resolution for aviation in the Brexit discussion” in order to ensure that passengers have security about their travel arrangements:

Time is precious. The Brexit clock is ticking towards a deadline of March 2019. But the aviation deadline is earlier. Normally passengers can book travel about a year in advance. At a minimum, the flight schedules and seat and cargo inventories must be available at least six months in advance. So that puts the airlines’ deadline at October 2018…457

There were reports towards the end of 2017 that some airlines were tightening their terms and conditions for flights booked in advance for

453 Ibid., p27
454 WFW, Keeping Skies Open After Brexit, 29 March 2017, p4
455 Ibid., p5
456 IEA, “No Deal” Fear-checker No. 1: “Planes won’t fly”, 27 August 2018, p2
457 IATA press notice, “UK Aviation Priorities: Clarity on Brexit and Expanding Heathrow”, 8 November 2017
after Brexit, warning customers that they may not take off and that airlines will not pay compensation if planes are grounded.\textsuperscript{458}

\subsection*{13.2 Rail}

\textbf{Government technical notices}

On 12 October the Department for Transport published two papers on rail transport and rail safety and standards.

On \textbf{operator licensing} in the event of ‘no deal’, the relevant paper states that:

We want to give businesses greater clarity and continuity and are therefore proposing to recognise operator licences in the UK that have been issued by another EU country for 2 years following exit day in a ‘no deal’ scenario. At this point an operator wishing to run services in the UK would need to apply to the ORR for UK documentation. We are already aligned with EU law in this area, so we expect this to have a minimal impact on business and we would work with the ORR to ensure the application process is reasonable and proportionate.\textsuperscript{459}

It further states that GB-based domestic operators operating on ORR-issued licences will see no impact from a ‘no deal’ scenario. The ORR will continue to recognise the licences of operators in GB using licences issued by an EU27 country for up to two years after exit day. At this point they would need to apply to the ORR for a GB licence to continue operating, though they would not need to be established in the UK. Any operators currently operating on an ORR-issued licence in an EU27 country would need to apply for an operator licence in an EU27 country. DfT states that “In order to ensure certainty, we encourage those who need to re-apply for an operator licence to begin this process as soon as possible”.\textsuperscript{460}

On \textbf{safety certification} in the event of ‘no deal’, the relevant paper states that in light of the European Commission’s statement that in the event of ‘no deal’ certificates and licences issued by ORR to operators currently running train services in the EU would not be valid there after exit, the Government wants to “provide businesses with greater clarity and certainty and are therefore proposing to recognise certain documentation, such as safety certificates, and train driver licences, issued by another EU country for a limited period after exit day if there’s no deal”.\textsuperscript{461} The notice provides more detailed information on various certifications and authorisations.

On membership of the \textbf{EU Agency for Railways (EUAR) and technical standards}, it affirms the Government’s intention not to seek membership of EUAR but only to disapply technical standards where there are clear benefits:

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{458} “Airlines may not guarantee flights after exit from EU”, \textit{The Times}, 18 October 2017; see also: “Ryanair confirms roll out of “Brexit clause” in tickets”, \textit{City A.M.}, 31 January 2018
\textsuperscript{459} DfT, \textit{Rail transport if there’s no Brexit deal}, 12 October 2018
\textsuperscript{460} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{461} DfT, \textit{Meeting rail safety and standards if there’s no Brexit deal}, 12 October 2018
\end{footnotesize}
The technical specifications for interoperability and the safety regime have been developed by the EU Agency for Railways (EUAR) in conjunction with EU countries and stakeholders. As new rules and standards are developed by the EU after exit, as a third country, the UK will have the flexibility to align with or diverge from these as it wishes. We will only diverge where there are clear arguments for doing so and after fully engaging with industry to assess the impact - particularly the commercial and cost impact to industry.

To enable this flexibility, we do not intend to seek formal participation in the European Union Agency for Railways (EUAR) if there’s no deal. However, we encourage UK industry to participate with EUAR at technical and working level.462

Finally, on train driver licences, the notice states that train drivers in the UK using licences and certificates issued in an EU27 country would be able to continue using this documentation for up to two years from Exit Day or until they expire, whichever is earlier. They would then need to obtain a GB licence from ORR. Anyone currently driving trains in an EU27 country on an ORR licence would need to obtain a new EU27 licence and certification documents from the national safety authority of the country they wish to drive into.463

**Impact**

Unlike in the areas of aviation, roads and ports there has not been a great deal of discussion as to the potential impact of a ‘no deal’ Brexit on the rail industry. This is partially due to the Government’s intention to negotiate bilateral deals with relevant partners for cross-border travel whatever the outcome of the negotiations.

In evidence to the Lords EU Internal Market Sub-Committee in October 2018 Damian Testa from the Railway Industry Association (RIA) set out how ‘no deal’ could impact SMEs and expressed concerns about the mutual recognition of standards:

> ... in a no-deal scenario, clearly UK-EU trade will be impacted if we enter a regime where we have both border checks and tariffs that did not apply before. Our members are multinationals and SMEs. A multinational with an office in the EU and in the UK clearly has more resource with which to manage that situation. For SMEs, it will be very hard to get to grips with a new administrative system to import and export when hitherto they have never had to do that, so there is concern about that.

> There is concern about the impact of tariffs on competitiveness. We still have insufficient detail about what the regime is going to be. Everyone is working on the assumption that it will be the WTO most favoured nation tariffs. That is an issue. We have the immediate issue of standards. On 29 March next year, as a member state, we will work to European technical standards for interoperability. Come 30 March, the EU will not recognise the standards in the UK because they will not be called TSIs.

> There is a further complication. The current approach of the Department for Transport is to transpose those standards into UK law, but it will have to name them differently. For argument’s sake, let us call them UK technical standards. Although that

462 Ibid.
463 Ibid.
language would mirror the EU standard, there will not be mutual recognition of it on day one. There will be legal and regulatory implications for EU-based businesses in the UK. There will be export-import implications around the standards. There is a lot of uncertainty about what the immediate impact will be.464

As regards the operation of the Channel Tunnel after Brexit, in the event of ‘no deal’, John Thomas of RDG told the committee that:

I find it difficult to believe that the French would not want a bilateral agreement to ensure that cross-channel services keep running. Essentially, it would just be replicating the arrangements that we already have on driver licensing and cross-acceptance of rolling stock, along with arrangements for access, charging and suchlike. Those things happen already today, so it is just a matter of replicating them in a bilateral agreement. I find it difficult to believe that there would not be the will on both sides to do that.465

There were reports in October 2018 that the French Government was preparing in case of all eventualities, including a ‘no deal ’ Brexit. Nathalie Loiseau, France’s Europe minister, said that France had set up the mechanisms to pass emergency legislation to manage ‘no deal’, including the introduction of checks at the Channel Tunnel.466

13.3 Roads and vehicles

Government technical notices

On 13 and 24 September the Department for Transport published papers on road-based transport, covering haulage, driving, vehicle type approval and insurance, and operating bus and coach services abroad.

On driving in the EU27 in the event of ‘no deal’, the relevant paper states that a driving licence may no longer be valid by itself when driving in the EU and that anyone moving to an EU27 country to live may not be able to exchange their licence after the UK has left the EU.467 In the event of ‘no deal’. Drivers may be required to obtain an International Driving Permit (IDP) to drive in the EU27, which they would need to carry with a driving licence when driving outside the UK. DfT explains that there are two types of IDP:

There are 2 types of IDP required by EU countries. Each is governed by a separate United Nations convention.

One type is governed by the 1949 Geneva Convention on Road Traffic.

The other type is governed by the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Traffic.

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464 Lords EU IMSC, Uncorrected oral evidence: Future UK-EU transport arrangements, 11 October 2018, Q11
465 Ibid., Q19
466 “France prepares Channel Tunnel checks in case of no-deal Brexit”, The Local France, 16 October 2018
467 DfT, Driving in the EU if there’s no Brexit deal, 13 September 2018
The version of the IDP you would require depends on which EU country you are visiting and whether it is party to the 1949 or the 1968 convention.

Each type of IDP is valid for a different period.\(^{468}\)

It cautions that drivers would need both types of IDP if they are visiting EU countries covered by different conventions, for example France and Spain.\(^{469}\)

The Government states that after Exit Day on 29 March 2019, arrangements for EU27 licence holders who are visiting or living in the UK would not change.\(^{470}\)

On **commercial road haulage** in the event of ‘no deal’, the relevant paper reiterates much of what the Government has been saying for the past eight months, throughout the passage of the *Haulage Permits and Trailer Registration Act 2018* (see HC Library briefing paper [CBP 8297](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/commercial-road-haulage-in-the-eu-if-theres-no-brexit-deal)).

Briefly, in the event of ‘no deal’:

- EU27 countries may choose to recognise that UK-issued operator licences and associated authorisations are based on the same standards as EU Community Licences and do not require further authorisations, but cannot be guaranteed.

- If they do not, UK hauliers will be able to use ECMT permits if there is no deal. In addition, some old bilateral agreements between the UK and specific EU27 countries may come back into force. The UK would also seek to put in place new bilateral agreements with EU countries to provide haulage access. Some of these bilateral agreements would also require the possession of a permit to allow access to the EU country concerned.

- ECMT permits will be available to enable journeys to the EU, but these are limited in number. The process for managing the issue of permits is set out in the 2018 Act.\(^{471}\)

On the **Certificate of Professional Competence (CPC) for HGV drivers** in the event of ‘no deal’, the paper states that the UK will maintain a CPC scheme and recognise EU27-issued CPC documentation.\(^{472}\) However, there is no guarantee of any recognition for UK-issued CPCs in EU27 countries. The paper states that:

UK drivers will be able to operate in the EU when driving trucks covered by an ECMT permit, or any existing, reinstated or new bilateral arrangements without the need of an additional qualification. However, to drive for EU operators, drivers holding a UK-issued CPC would also need to hold a CPC issued by an EU country.\(^{473}\)

On **bus and coach services** in the event of ‘no deal’, the relevant paper states that UK bus and coach operators could no longer rely on

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\(^{468}\) Ibid.

\(^{469}\) Ibid.

\(^{470}\) Ibid.

\(^{471}\) DfT, *Commercial road haulage in the EU if there’s no Brexit deal*, 24 September 2018

\(^{472}\) Ibid.

\(^{473}\) Ibid.
automatic recognition by the EU27 of UK-issued Community Licences. It affirms the Government’s intention to accede to the Interbus Agreement in its own right by Exit Day “or as soon as possible thereafter should this prove necessary”. This “would enable UK operators to run occasional services into the EU. It cannot be guaranteed at this stage that the agreement would be extended to cover regular services”.

Due to the UK’s ratification of the 1949 and 1968 conventions on road traffic UK drivers would continue to be able to drive in EU27 countries after Exit Day, though they may also require an IDP.

On vehicle type approval in the event of ‘no deal’, the relevant paper states that type-approvals issued in the UK would no longer be valid for sales or registrations on the EU27 market and EU27 type-approvals would no longer be automatically accepted on the UK market. This means that affected manufacturers would need to ensure that they have the correct type-approval for each market. It confirms that the UK will continue to recognise UN-ECE approvals for systems and components.

Finally, on vehicle insurance in the event of ‘no deal’, the relevant paper states that access to the Green Card-free circulation area would cease. This would mean that UK motorists would need to carry a Green Card as proof of third party motor insurance cover when driving in the EU27, EEA, Andorra, Serbia and Switzerland. The converse would be true for EEA motorists wishing to travel to the UK with their vehicle. It goes on:

The validity of UK Green Cards in these countries is subject to agreements that need to be reached between the UK’s Motor Insurers’ Bureau and the relevant National Insurers’ Bureaux. These agreements ensure Green Cards are recognised and facilitate the settlement of claims for traffic accident victims.

Impact

The road haulage industry has repeatedly cautioned as to the risks of failing to secure an adequate deal. For example, in March 2018 The Guardian reported the views of James Hookham, the deputy chief executive of the Freight Transport Association (FTA). He stated that the industry’s biggest concern was “the lack of any progress in agreeing new systems for avoiding customs checks”. He went on:

There is still much detail to be agreed in the two-and-a-half years between now and the end of the transition period – a tiny period of time in business terms considering the scale of the challenge. It is now critical that both sides focus closely on trading

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474 DfT, Operating bus or coach services abroad if there’s no Brexit deal, 24 September 2018
475 Ibid.
476 Ibid.
477 Ibid.
478 DfT, Vehicle type approval if there’s no Brexit deal, 13 September 2018
479 DfT, Vehicle insurance if there’s no Brexit deal, 24 September 2018
480 Ibid.
481 Ibid.
arrangements to minimise the potential for delays, which will otherwise hit supply chains and economies on all sides hard.\textsuperscript{482} The Freight Transport Association (FTA) told the Lords EU Internal Market Sub-Committee in September 2018 that “there is no such thing as a WTO fall-back option for road transport” and went on to caution:

An agreement on road transport (or land transport) is absolutely necessary and in the interest of both the UK and the EU. In a no-deal scenario, the only readily available solution is a permit system under OECD called ECMT (“European Conference of Ministers of Transport”). ECMT permits come with strict quotas that can only be raised if the 43 participating countries unanimously agree. The quotas for 2019 are already set and OECD countries do not intend to increase them for the following years. ECMT permits would cover 2% to 5% of transport needs and would only allow 1,224 UK haulage companies to operate in the EU. Similar restrictions would be faced by EU hauliers willing to operate in the UK. This would not only decimate the UK international haulage industry, it would also affect all sectors of the economy that rely on international just-in-time supply chains.\textsuperscript{483}

In a June 2018 report the European Scrutiny Committee indicated that the effects for EU27 hauliers could also be ‘striking’:

… non-UK operators currently dominate the international market, with over 86% of the freight traffic moved in and out of the UK (not including Ireland) currently moved by non-UK operators (although some of these businesses are subsidiaries of UK companies that have based themselves in other EU States). Considered in purely commercial terms, many EU27 operators have a clear interest in maintaining reciprocal market access in road transport.\textsuperscript{484}

As regards passenger transport, CPT told the Lords EU Internal Market Sub-Committee in September 2018 that in the event of ‘no deal’:

…coach passengers would have to transfer at the border between coaches that are authorised to operate over the roads that lead to their desired destination. This would be inconvenient for all passengers, but particularly so for older people and school groups. It would create additional congestion in ports as a result of more complex movements. We can foresee a major reduction in “Battlefields of the Somme”—type educational day visits if groups have to use two coaches for the British and French / Belgian parts of the trip, with a channel crossing in between where they have to carry their own bags.\textsuperscript{485}

\textsuperscript{482} “Businesses face unanswered questions a year from Brexit – sector by sector analysis”, The Guardian, 26 March 2018
\textsuperscript{483} Lords EU IMSC, Written Evidence – Freight Transport Association (TRA0017), September 2018, para 9
\textsuperscript{484} ESC, Thirtieth Report of Session 2017–19, HC 301-xxix, 12 June 2018, para 8.16
\textsuperscript{485} Lords EU IMSC, Written Evidence – Confederation of Passenger Transport (TRA0006), September 2018, para 6
13.4 Ports

Government technical notices
A number of notices have been issued with regards to importing and exporting, but these are essentially customs issues and relate to specific industries such as food and agriculture. They are not dealt with here.

Impact
The main concern for ports is the impact of changes to customs, border and immigration processes in the event of ‘no deal’ and the knock-on impacts for inland transport of goods.

In an October 2018 report the NAO warned:

In the event that the UK leaves the EU without a negotiated solution, or in any other circumstance where World Trade Organization rules will apply to the transit of goods between the UK and the EU, new infrastructure will be required to enable an effective compliance regime […]

Departments are planning on the basis that there is insufficient time to build significant new infrastructure before 29 March 2019. It could take up to three years to put new infrastructure in place because ports, airports and other border crossing point operators, which are responsible for funding infrastructure to deliver the border compliance regime, will need certainty about how the border will operate so that they can access the necessary finance and comply with local and national planning processes.

At its most fundamental, leaving the EU Customs Union and Single Market means that without some form of agreement goods travelling to and from Europe will be subject to new authorisations and other requirements as of March 2019. The BPA explained that “traders will need to undertake new border processes which could be most challenging for freight on lorries travelling through ‘roll-on roll-off’ ferry port gateways [which] collectively facilitate the majority of the UK’s EU trade”. It further stated that there would “of course” be opportunities for IT solutions for customs procedures but these “could take time and all those in the logistics chain will need to assess how they will meet the new arrangements”.

The Road Haulage Association’s Chief Executive, Richard Burnett, explained about the effects on the road network around Dover and about the potential consequences of action taken by the French authorities on the other side of the Channel:

The Dover Strait handles 10,000 lorries each day and processing them through the port is currently seamless.

The stark reality is that if customs controls are put in place, it will take an average of about 45 minutes to process one truck on both sides of the channel. If that happens then the queues of HGVs in Kent will make the jams seen in the summer of 2015

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487 BPA press notice, “British Ports Association highlights consequences of a ‘no deal’ Brexit scenario to EU ports as well as those in the UK”, 23 August 2018
488 Ibid.
appear as little more than waiting for the traffic lights to change […]

If [the French] put customs processes in place in March 2019 to check all lorries traveling between the UK and the EU hauliers will be faced with the prospect of coming over to the UK and having to wait for days – even weeks, before they can return home. This will be a huge deterrent to them making the journey at all.489

In October 2018 French authorities reportedly stated that there were no plans to close the port of Calais to cross-channel traffic in the event of ‘no deal’ and that “while there might be delays if the event of a no-deal, it was in France’s interest to minimise these”.490

However, in its June 2018 evidence to the Transport Committee the FTA cautioned that based on input from its sister organisations across Europe, “we have evidence that few companies are preparing for Brexit on the continent”. It went on:

This is particularly the case for road transport operators, especially small ones, who are not familiar with trade and customs procedures, or with the requirements for operators under the Union Customs Code, and who do not have the resources to prepare adequately. A large proportion of operators transporting goods between the EU and the UK (and vice versa) are EU-27 registered companies, rather than UK hauliers. The risk if they are not prepared adequately is to have queues of uncompliant lorries at the borders, that would create significant disruptions in ro-ro ports. We are starting to perceive an increasing ‘Brexit fatigue’ on the continent, in particular, with many companies deferring preparation to a later time, when ‘rules’ will supposedly be clearer. Ports on both sides are taking steps to prepare for Brexit, both in terms of IT systems and physical infrastructure, but preparations have also been slowed down significantly by the lack of clarity regarding future arrangements.491

13.5 Maritime

Government technical notices

On 13 September the Department for Transport published two papers on maritime transport, covering maritime security notifications and seafarer certificates of competency.

On maritime security notifications in the event of ‘no deal’, the relevant paper explains that under Article 6 of EC Regulation 725/2004, shipping companies (including ferries carrying passengers and lorries) are required to submit security information prior to entering an EU port. Sometimes this is referred to as a pre-arrival notification (PAN). Article 7 allows EU countries to issue exemptions from the requirement to provide this information to companies operating scheduled services

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489 RHA press notice, “Brexit and the UK haulage industry – no deal, no jobs, no food”, 29 July 2018
490 “Brexit: French officials dismiss UK fears of Calais ’go-slow’”, BBC News, 26 October 2018
491 Transport Committee, Written evidence submitted by the Freight Transport Association (FTA) (FAB0023), June 2018, para 17
between ports located in their territory, or between ports within their territory and that of another EU country.492

The DfT states that in the event of ‘no deal’ Article 7 exemptions would not be permitted from EU27 countries for vessels, irrespective of registration/flag, operating scheduled services from the UK.493 DfT advises shipping companies holding such an exemption to engage with EU27 countries to ensure they understand what information they would be required to provide and how it would be submitted. The UK intends to continue issuing exemptions for scheduled services from an EU27 country to a port in the UK, or between ports in the UK, after Brexit “regardless of the outcome of negotiations”.494

On seafarer certificates of competency in the event of ‘no deal’, the relevant paper explains that at present, the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) mandates that crew members carrying out certain duties must have a certificate of competency (COC). A COC must be renewed every five years. EU legislation has harmonised the way that EU countries apply the STCW requirements. This has led to two different procedures for recognising seafarers’ qualifications.495

DfT states that in the event of ‘no deal’, endorsements issued before withdrawal by EU27 countries to seafarers holding UK COCs would continue to be valid until they expire. After exit, the rights and obligations placed on the UK as a signatory to the STCW convention would remain, including those for recognising certificates issued by third countries. Therefore, the UK Government’s intention is to:

- continue recognising all certificates that we currently recognise, including those issued by EU and EEA countries after exit
- seek third country recognition of UK certificates by the EU under the STCW convention496

It further explains that EU27 countries that wish to continue accepting new UK COCs would need to write to the European Commission, in accordance with the procedure in EC Directive 2008/106. They would then be able to recognise such certificates.

Impact
Oxera Consulting told the Lords EU Internal Market Sub-Committee in October 2018 that:

The most obvious implication of a ‘no deal’ scenario from a maritime perspective is that free movement of people and goods between the UK and EU will no longer be possible. Given the

492 DfT, Getting an exemption from maritime security notifications if there’s no Brexit deal, 13 September 2018
493 Ibid.
494 Ibid.
495 DfT, Recognition of seafarer certificates of competency if there’s no Brexit deal, 13 September 2018
496 Ibid.
importance of the EU as a trading partner, the implications could be significant […]

Another important effect of a ‘no deal’ scenario would be on the ability of the UK to export maritime business services to customers in the EU. The UK is currently a leading centre for maritime support services including ship broking, insurance and P&I clubs, legal services and dispute resolution, and financial services.497

Also in October there were reports that Chris Grayling had told the Cabinet that the Government “could commission ships to get supplies through Belgian and Dutch ports if traffic between Dover and Calais clogs up”.498 The Times reported that “Senior government figures said that the plan had not been discussed at cabinet but it could have been raised as an idea in the department of transport”.499
14. Higher education, science and research

Access to research funding and Erasmus+

Research funding

The UK currently does disproportionately well in securing EU research funding and UK Universities are the top performers in receiving EU funds based on scientific excellence. Recent figures show that UK Universities receive over £836 million in research grants and contracts from EU sources, representing more than 14.2% of all income from research grants and contracts. Million+, The Russell Group and the British Heart Foundation said in their evidence to the House of Lords EU Committee inquiry on a no-deal Brexit that ‘no deal’ could stop the UK’s access to EU research funds and prevent UK collaboration in EU projects:

MillionPlus argued that no deal would be “extremely damaging for UK universities and should be avoided if at all possible”. They cited in particular the reputational damage, deterrent effect and confusion that could arise from the designation of EU students as international students. No deal could also place existing EU-funded research projects in jeopardy.

The Russell Group concluded that no deal would affect universities’ ability to deliver world-leading research and education. No deal on the rights of EU citizens to live, study and work in the UK could lead to a loss of talented researchers and technicians with specialist skills who could not be replaced easily by UK nationals. If the UK and EU did not secure an agreement on science and research collaboration, UK institutions would cease to be eligible for Horizon 2020 funding on the day of exit. This would mean funding for existing projects would be withdrawn and researchers would immediately lose the ability to bid for this funding, with a detrimental impact on international competitiveness.

The British Heart Foundation also noted that the EU was a major funder of UK research, and helped to promote international collaboration. Uncertainty about what could happen to UK access to Horizon 2020 funding after March 2019 could discourage EU researchers from approaching British counterparts to collaborate on projects. They too expressed concern about the reputational damage caused by uncertainty over the status of EU researchers and healthcare professionals in the UK.

In October 2017 EU Commissioner Carlos Moedas also said that ‘no deal’ could result in the UK losing EU funding from the date of withdrawal from the EU:

“For research, ‘no deal’ means programmes could potentially stop with barriers erected in ongoing projects, and significant projects and programmes terminated or not initiated”

Million+, 25 October 2017

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500 The Royal Society, UK research and the European Union, December 2015
502 House of Lords paper 46, Brexit: Deal or no deal, 7 December 2017
Until the UK leaves, its researchers, universities, organisations, and companies are eligible to participate and receive funding in Horizon 2020.

But the eligibility criteria must be complied with for the entire duration of the grant. This is why it was important to be transparent and inform UK-based applicants now that if the UK withdraws from the EU without concluding a withdrawal agreement they may be required to leave the project and no longer receive funding.503

The Russell Group have further warned of the dangers of no deal on international research competitiveness:

A sudden cliff-edge in research funding from the EU will have a serious impact on our universities’ international competitiveness in research. It is already the case that talented researchers at our universities are being approached by universities in other European countries with offers of academic contracts, so a sudden loss of access to EU research programmes in the UK could motivate many to relocate.504

The Government guidance published on 23 August provides further information in “Horizon 2020 funding if there’s a Brexit no deal”.

**Erasmus+**

On the 30 May 2018 the EU Commission announced that for the funding cycle starting in 2021 any country in the world would be able to participate in the Erasmus+ programme if they met set requirements. It is possible, therefore, that in the event of ‘no deal’ the UK might still be able to access the Erasmus+ programme, provided the UK meets criteria for admission to the scheme.505

The Government guidance published on 23 August 2018 includes a paper, “Erasmus+ in the UK if there’s no Brexit deal”, which gives some information on no deal implications for studying in the EU or the UK.

**EU students**

‘No deal’ could potentially result in EU students being re-classified as international students, being charged higher fees and denied access to student support. Million+ have said that a ‘no deal’ which resulted in EU students being treated as international students would have a very

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503 Holyrood, Brexit ‘no deal’ will rip up university research funding, warns European Commission, 26 October
504 Lords EU Committee, Brexit: Deal or no deal, 7 December 2017, Written evidence from Russell Group (DND0044)
505 In its proposal for the Erasmus+ programme for the period 2021-27, published on 30 May, the European Commission said that countries outside the EU and the EEA would be able to participate fully as long as they do not have a “decisional power” on the programme and agree to a “fair balance” of contributions and benefits. Any agreement with third countries would include “the calculation of financial contributions to individual programmes and their administrative costs”. See Erasmus+ exchange programme set to open to all countries in 2021, Times Higher Education, 31 May 2018.
significant and negative impact on EU student mobility and the EU market”.506

EU staff in UK universities
EU staff represent 16% of the academic workforce.507 Million+ has said that a no-deal could result in EU staff leaving UK universities and that this would have a particularly damaging effect on university foreign

language and Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) departments:

The situation would be even starker for EU staff, as their legal status would be in question and their rights not guaranteed. It would be difficult to make any claim to say they will definitely be able to stay in the UK to work, if indeed they then still wanted to. Any significant loss in EU staff, through voluntary means or otherwise, would disproportionately impact on certain key subjects, like foreign languages and STEM courses, as EU staff make up significant proportions of staff in those subject areas. It would also, as for students, damage the effective running of institutions and the image and reputation of the sector. This would be particularly concerning at a time when the UK is already being seen as less open than its competitor nations, and when it is losing international market share to direct competitors like Australia and Canada.508

The Russell Group has also warned about the damaging effect of a loss of highly qualified EU staff:

If EU staff were required to meet current Tier 2-style visa conditions in the absence of an agreement which guarantees their rights to stay, our analysis shows that nearly a quarter of existing EU staff (over 6,000 people) at Russell Group universities would not be eligible to work in the UK. This includes a significant number of staff with postgraduate, doctoral and other higher degrees (over 2,100 individuals). This would be a great loss for the UK’s science base and one that could take many years, and probably decades, to rebuild. It is certainly not the case that EU staff at Russell Group universities could be replaced easily by UK nationals (particularly in the short term) as they are unlikely to have the specialist skills, expertise and experience to match those brought to the UK by excellent European academics.509

506  House of Lords paper 46. Brexit: Deal or no deal, 7 December 2017, Written evidence MillionPlus (DND0013)
507  Universities UK submission to the House of Commons Education Committee inquiry on ‘The impact of exiting the European Union on higher education’, November 2016.
508  ibid
509  House of Lords paper 46. Brexit: Deal or no deal, 7 December 2017, Written evidence – Russell Group (DND0044)
15. Internal security

The UK currently participates in approximately 40 EU measures that aim to support and enhance internal security and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Measures identified as being of particular significance include the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), access to databases, including the Second Generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), European Criminal Records Information Exchange System (ECRIS) and Passenger Name Records (PNR), and participation in agencies, in particular Europol and mention the Prüm Convention\(^{510}\) – the framework for the exchange of DNA profiles, fingerprints and vehicle registration data.

The Government would like future cooperation with the EU on all the EU police and criminal justice measures in which the UK currently participates, suggesting it anticipates a significant operational impact if this cooperation were brought to an abrupt no-deal end.

15.1 Data protection and exchange

Under the EU’s data protection framework, personal data can only be transferred to third countries when an "adequate” level of protection is guaranteed. The EU can make an adequacy decision so that data can flow from Member States to third countries, or one or more specific sectors in those countries. The European Council’s guidelines for future EU-UK relations state that the protection of personal data "should be governed by Union rules on adequacy”.

In its December 2017 report on deal or no deal, the Lords EU Committee warned that a complete ‘no deal’ would bring UK-EU cooperation in a number of areas – including data exchange - to a “sudden halt”.\(^{511}\) This would be “deeply damaging for the UK”.\(^{512}\)

However, David Davis told the Committee that in the absence of a full deal, a “bare bones” deal could include an agreement on data sharing:

(…) in the event that we did not get a full deal, the interest of both sides on, say, counterterrorism co-operation, justice co-operation or data exchange co-operation is so great that I find it hard to believe that we will not get some fundamental deal there…\(^{513}\)

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\(^{510}\) This Convention (often referred to as ‘Schengen III’) was signed on 27 May 2005 by Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain. It deals with cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime.

\(^{511}\) House of Lords European Union Select Committee, Brexit: deal or no deal, HL Paper 46, December 2017, p3

\(^{512}\) Ibid, para 48

\(^{513}\) Ibid, para 34
15.2 Cooperation in law enforcement and criminal justice

Both the UK and the EU have emphasised the importance of maintaining cooperation in the field of security, law enforcement and criminal justice. The Home Secretary told the House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC) that security “is something that should not be linked to any of the other discussions”, and that the UK’s proposals are “completely unconditional”.514

However, if there is no agreement at the point of exit, the UK will cease to have access to the EU measures in this area.

Possible impact of ‘no deal’

Representatives from the worlds of law enforcement, criminal justice, and security and intelligence have provided insights into the possible consequences of the UK losing access to EU measures in this area. The impacts centre around three broad themes: loss of operational capacity, loss of strategic influence and an increased demand on resources resulting from the need to compensate for these losses. The consensus is that a no-deal scenario would have a significant negative impact on public safety.

Concerns have also been raised about the impact of a loss of cooperation on the security situation in Northern Ireland and around the Irish border (see section 8).

Sir Rob Wainwright, former Director of Europol, said in evidence to HASC:

Serious crime today and terrorism today is without doubt a transnational problem and requires that kind of response, of course. That is precisely why the UK, as much as any other member state of the European Union, has invested so much effort over the last three decades in constructing the closest possible, most cohesive and effective cross-border police co-operation arrangements in Europe. It is therefore axiomatic to say that in the face of these threats that are continuing to grow and evolve in that way that any dislocation in that effort, any break-up of that would lead of course to a decrease in the overall effectiveness of all of us to keep all of our citizens safe here in the UK, but across Europe as well. I think therefore that is a well-understood point.515

Asked whether there was cause for concern given the different positions of the UK and the EU in negotiations on future security cooperation, he said:

We should be worried if we reach a point of no deal or effectively no deal on security because that will certainly have an adverse effect on our collective ability in Europe to fight crime and terrorism.516

Asked specifically about the consequences of ‘no deal’, he said:

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514 Oral evidence on the work of the Home Secretary, 10 July 2018, Q489
515 Oral evidence: EU policing and security cooperation, HC 1356, 3 July 2018, Q1
516 ibid, Q32
We would survive as a country, of course. However, without a doubt we suddenly lose access to instruments of very direct and practical operational value to the UK on an everyday basis. That would be quite serious for the ability of our national police authorities to keep us safe.517

Sir Julian King, European Commissioner for the Security Union, expressed a similar view to the Lords EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee

[If there is no agreement, we all stand to lose, because we will be less well-equipped to cooperate effectively against these shared threats [terrorism, cyber, and serious and organised crime].]518

Members of the Association of Policing and Crime Commissioners’ Brexit Working Group wrote to the Home Secretary on 2 August 2018, expressing concerns that a no-deal scenario would lead to a significant loss of operational capacity, which could pose significant risks to communities.519 The letter from Matthew Scott (Kent), Lord William Bach (Leicestershire) and Martyn Underhill (Dorset) stated that “[t]he UK and EU share a common and ever evolving threat picture. We believe that a comprehensive partnership in all areas of policing and security cooperation is of mutual benefit to all”. They continued:

Through discussions with the NCA and NPCC, we understand that considerable additional resource would be required for policing to operate using non-EU tools and that such tools would be sub-optimal – potentially putting operational efficiency and public safety at risk.

It is also recognised that recruitment, vetting, and training of staff to use these tools would take a substantial amount of time.

Should an implementation period not be agreed, contingency plans will need to be implemented by the end of March 2019. Given that the implementation period decision is not likely to be known until October 2018, the resultant five month window is likely to be very challenging.

We are therefore concerned that a ‘no deal’ scenario could cause delays and challenges for UK policing and justice agencies.

The Police and Crime Commissioners asserted that the “shared tools, measures, initiatives and capabilities” developed over the years of the UK’s EU membership had “saved many lives”, and that ways had to be found “to protect these mutually important capabilities […] to ensure the safety and security all our citizens”. The PCCs called on Sajid Javid to “[c]onfirm that the Home Office has developed effective contingency plans for a ‘no deal’ scenario”.

The Law Society of England and Wales suggested in written evidence to the Lords EU Committee Home Affairs Sub-Committee that leaving the EU without a deal on security would lead to legal and organisational

517 Oral evidence, ibid, Q63
518 Brexit: the proposed UK-EU security treaty, Uncorrected oral evidence, 14 June 2018, Q115
519 'No deal Brexit poses serious risk to public safety, say police leaders', The Guardian, 6 August 2018
chaos, and create a void which could be exploited by terrorists and criminals.520

The Committee’s subsequent report Brexit: the proposed UK-EU Security Treaty reiterated its previous conclusion521 that current cooperation arrangements were “mission-critical” for the UK’s law enforcement agencies.522

Operational impact

Databases

The House of Lords EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee concluded in their report Brexit: future UK-EU security and police cooperation, that access to EU law enforcement databases and data-sharing platforms is integral to day-to-day policing, and that loss of access could pose a risk to the safety of the public.523

In its report, Brexit: the proposed UK-EU Security Treaty, the Committee stated:

Were the UK to lose access to the EU’s security databases, information that today can be retrieved almost instantaneously could take days or weeks to access, creating not only a significant hurdle to effective policing but a threat to public safety.524

These conclusions reflect evidence taken from law enforcement bodies, former members of the security and intelligence agencies, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the legal profession, among others.

Richard Martin, Deputy Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, told the Committee that under current arrangements police officers on the street are able to run checks on a car or person on the police national criminal database and on SIS II simultaneously. He described this ability as “absolutely essential” in order to keep people safe.525 He suggested that without access to these databases, the police would not be able to make as many checks, and the system would be much slower and less efficient. Delays in access to information on suspects could mean that opportunities to prevent crime would be lost. He concluded that a loss of access to databases would mean “[W]e will get a poorer picture, a lot more slowly than we do now, which will affect our operational capability”.526

Steve Smart, Director of Intelligence at the National Crime Agency, set out the operational impact at a tactical and strategic level:

At a tactical level, the impact of losing access to those datasets is that more bad people will get into the UK, and it will be harder

520 Law Society of England and Wales, written evidence
521 In Brexit: future UK-EU security and police cooperation, 7th Report, 2016-17, HL Paper 77, December 2016
523 Lords EU Committee, Brexit: future UK-EU security and police cooperation, 7th Report, 2016-17, HL Paper 77, para 120
524 HL Paper 164, para 152
525 Lords Home Affairs Sub-Committee, Brexit: the proposed UK-EU security treaty, oral evidence, 2 May 2018, Q59
526 Ibid, Q63
for us to find and deal with them. At a more strategic level ... As an organisation, we are looking to build, on behalf of wider law enforcement, a national data exploitation capability over the next three years. Not being able to link to the data that our European partners hold, the data that sits at Europol and on the Schengen information system, would undoubtedly have a negative impact on what we can do with the data we already have.\textsuperscript{527}

Rob Wainwright told HASC that the UK derives specific and important operational value from all the main databases, including the Europol Information System, SIS II and the Prüm Convention.\textsuperscript{528} He explained that the ability to quickly circulate information about criminal and terrorist suspects has a direct operational benefit.

The analogy might be that a serious criminal, maybe a sex offender from one member state, would be registered on the Schengen Information System in case, unknown to those authorities in Germany or France, he were to travel around Europe, then were he to arrive at Dover Docks, then the fact that he is on the Schengen Information System would allow our border officials here to identify him as that suspected offender. If those officials do not have access to that common database on which the other authorities have placed his name, then it is pretty obvious what possible detrimental effect that might have on the ability of that border official to make the right decision about letting him in the country.\textsuperscript{529}

These concerns were shared by Lord Evan of Weardale, former Director General of MI5. When asked whether the loss of access to databases could cause problems for the security service, he agreed that it could:

\textit{[O]ne of the main ways in which we seek to reduce the risk of harm is by getting criminals locked up who are involved in planning terrorism or whatever. For that, we have to rely on law enforcement agencies because the Security Service has no law enforcement powers. From that point of view, a very important part of the overall counterterrorism efforts in the country is dependent on law enforcement, which in turn is reliant upon international cooperation.}\textsuperscript{530}

It should be borne in mind that Article 7 of the \textit{draft Withdrawal Agreement} makes clear that the UK will not be able to access “any network, any information system and any database established on the basis of Union law” at the end of the transition/implementation period, unless there is a further agreement authorising it to do so.

**European Arrest Warrant and other criminal justice cooperation measures**

Writing in \textit{The Times} on 9 August, Ed Davey, Liberal Democrat spokesperson for Home Affairs, asserted that losing access to the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) would mean UK criminals could evade...
Justice in other European countries, and that criminals from elsewhere in the EU would be able to evade justice in the UK.531

In support of this contention, he quoted the then Home Secretary Theresa May in 2014, who described the EAW as “a vital tool for ensuring that justice is done in this country and for keeping the British public safe”, without which the UK risked becoming “a honeypot for all of Europe’s criminals on the run from justice”. Mr Davey cited the example of an ongoing case in Ireland, in which an individual is seeking to resist extradition to the UK to stand trial for murder, arson and rape, on the grounds that he will not be able to rely on EU derived rights after Brexit.532

Debbie Price, Head of International Justice at the CPS, gave evidence to the Lords EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee on the impact of losing access to criminal justice cooperation measures, including the EAW, on prosecuting crime. She highlighted the operational importance of speed in being able to obtain people, evidence and the proceeds of crime, which the current arrangements facilitate. She also raised the issue of legal certainty:

[A] reversion to a different set of instruments will lead to a period of legal uncertainty where things need to be tried and tested in the courts, which takes a lot of resources, time and money from everyone involved.533

She explained that alternative extradition arrangements were slower and more expensive, and that alternatives to the European Investigation Order and Mutual Legal Assistance mechanisms would also be slower. This could lead to a capability gap, for example where someone was on remand awaiting trial, but it was not possible to obtain crucial evidence in time for the trial.

She also noted potential costs to victims and witnesses of having to travel to trials in other countries if extradition was not possible.534

Richard Martin suggested that criminals may seek to exploit changes to extradition arrangements:

[C]riminal groups are not daft. They may already be thinking that, if certain powers do not exist, there are opportunities for them to either operate here, knowing it is far harder to be extradited from the country, especially if they are a foreign national, or vice versa.535

Jim Brisbane, CPS Brexit lead, gave evidence about contingency planning. In the context of the EAW, he explained that there was a need to ensure that the correct processes were in place and that the CPS had the necessary expertise to deal with extradition in a different context. He suggested this would require additional resources because

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531 Accept the jurisdiction of the ECJ – or criminals will walk our streets, Ed Davey, The Times, 9 August 2018
532 See Court of Justice of the EU, Case C-327/18 PPU
533 Brexit: the proposed UK-EU security treaty, oral evidence, 16 May 2018, Q104
534 Ibid, Q108
535 Brexit: the proposed UK-EU security treaty, oral evidence, 2 May 2018, Q67
the process would be less streamlined and there would be more legal challenges. However, it was not yet possible to estimate the scale of the additional demand.\textsuperscript{536}

Rob Wainwright suggested that the loss of the EAW would have an adverse impact on the UK’s overall security arrangements.\textsuperscript{537}

Richard Martin and Steve Smart discussed the resource implications of losing access to existing measures. Richard Martin said their contingency planning included looking at the impact of losing access to the EAW:

- If that is the case, it is much slower and there are a lot more manual linkages. It means that we have to get a warrant for certain things. That means there is an impact on the CPS.

- We are now trying to quantify what that means at ground level for local policing and what each organisation will need in order to process things in a different way at a slower rate…. Other things include … what our overseas liaison network looks like. What might our footprint in Europol look like as a third country? How many people do we need? Do we need greater influence? Does that equal more people or are there key countries that we need to be better represented in?\textsuperscript{538}

**Northern Ireland**

The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) provided evidence to the Lords EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee on the impact of losing access to EU measures in the context of cooperation with the Garda in Ireland in relation to the border. PSNI noted the importance of good working relationships, but also emphasised the need for a clear legal framework:

- For example, the loss of European Arrest Warrants would impact on the PSNI ability to pursue those who use the land border to evade prosecution. This will affect Counter Terrorism, Serious/ Organised Crime and Volume Crime. […]

- There is significant interaction and relationships between Organised Crime Groups operating on both sides of the Border and they often work together across a number of types of organised crime. It is likely that organised crime groups will seek to exploit any new arrangements for criminal gain. Many of these groups have links to terrorist activity and the funding of acts of terrorism.\textsuperscript{539}

Others have also noted that the loss of the EAW would be felt particularly acutely in Ireland/ Northern Ireland context. Alternative extradition arrangements allow for exceptions for offences that are political in nature, and for the extradition of own nationals, both of which may lead to a barrier in extraditing those suspected of involvement in dissident Irish Republican terrorism.\textsuperscript{540} Any reversion to a system based on requests via diplomatic, rather than judicial, channels (as is the case with extradition arrangements outside the EAW) would

\textsuperscript{536} Brexit: the proposed UK-EU security treaty, oral evidence, 16 May 2018, Q106
\textsuperscript{537} Oral evidence: Eu policing and security cooperation, HC 1356, 3 July 2018 Q56
\textsuperscript{538} Brexit: the proposed UK-EU security treaty, oral evidence, 2 May 2018, Q68
\textsuperscript{539} Police Service of Northern Ireland, Written submission to the House of Lords EU Sub-Committee on Brexit: the UK-EU Security Treaty, June 2018
\textsuperscript{540} For example, European Union Committee, Brexit: the proposed UK-EU security treaty, 18\textsuperscript{th} Report of Session 2017-19, HL Paper 164, para 165-167
also pose difficulties in an environment where political relationships may be strained.

Robert Hannigan, former Director of GCHQ, suggested that the presence of a physical border on the island of Ireland would be a threat to internal security in itself:

> It is hard to see any of the current solutions not resulting in more smuggling, and anyone who has worked there knows that smuggling and crime on the border are corrosive to the peace process because the money tends to go to paramilitary groups, or the rump of paramilitary groups. That is a worry. It is the threat and the criminality that might be affected rather than the cooperation.541

### Strategic influence

Rob Wainwright told the Lords EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee that a change in the UK’s relationship with Europol would be felt mainly in the context of strategic influence. He explained that the UK is currently the lead Member State in a number of important projects in the areas of modern slavery, large-scale fraud and cocaine trafficking, for example. The UK is also currently chair of the counter-terrorist programme board at Europol and has been one of the primary architects in the development of police cooperation systems in the EU.542

Steve Smart and Richard Martin both emphasised the need for the UK to continue to be able to influence the development of law enforcement tools in light of the evolving nature of crime.543 Steve Smart pointed out that the UK was responsible for instigating many of the measures to which law enforcement now hopes to retain access, such as the EAW and PNR. He suggested that as the threat changes, new tools will be needed and “[w]e have to maintain the ability to drive that discussion”.544 If the UK ends up with a radically different relationship with Europol to the one it has now, influencing and shaping Europol’s agenda would be a lot harder.545

As an example of UK influence, Richard Martin said the UK had been successful in persuading Europol to include firearms on its list of priorities:

> … which allows them to collect intelligence against that, allows them to develop products, and gets it on to some of the work groups that we need to have. It was our influence that got it on. It was not originally on. Areas such as that would concern me.546

Lord Evans and Robert Hannigan also regarded a change in the UK’s status as detrimental to its ability to influence. Mr Hannigan suggested that although for cultural reasons the UK could still be a bridge between the EU and the Five Eyes countries:547

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541 Brexit: the proposed UK-EU security treaty, oral evidence, 16 May 2018
542 Brexit: the proposed UK-EU security treaty, oral evidence, 7 March 2018, Q3
543 Brexit: the proposed UK-EU security treaty, oral evidence, 2 May 2018, Q60
544 Ibid, Q65
545 Ibid, Q66
546 Ibid, Q66
547 The USA, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK.
There is no question that removing ourselves from one of those groups is going to have an impact as we become another member of the Five Eyes that is outside the EU.\textsuperscript{548}

Lord Evans expressed concern that the UK’s absence from the Council of the EU and the European Parliament would mean the loss of a well-informed and influential voice in the formation of policy that impacts on national security:

We will not be there in the same way in future. It was always noticeable that when the Club of Berne [a group comprised of heads of EU security agencies] would brief the permanent representatives in Europe, which we did periodically, at a quasi-political level, they were always keen to have the British there, because we tended to be better connected in some of those areas and more familiar with some of the policies than some of the smaller countries perhaps were. We were able to be a helpful voice, which will be more difficult going forward. That is an area of vulnerability.\textsuperscript{549}

Robert Hannigan agreed, and emphasised the role of the UK in the debate about balancing privacy and security in the context of investigatory powers:

That is an important point on data, in particular. After the referendum one of the concerns that I picked up from counterparts in Europe was that the strongest voice at one end of the spectrum on balancing privacy and security and getting a sensible UK-style balance would be gone. There is a wide spectrum among the member states. Some are at the extreme other end. I know that some of our colleagues worry a lot about the absence of that voice.\textsuperscript{550}

Steve Smart suggested that as the Five Eyes partners look to the UK to put forward their point of view within Europol, a loss of access to Europol would therefore have a negative impact on them as well.\textsuperscript{551}

**Could the UK fall back on other mechanisms for international cooperation?**

In some areas there are existing fall-back options, but they have been characterised as suboptimal in comparison with EU measures.

The 1957 Council of Europe Convention on Extradition could be an existing fall-back option on extradition. However, it does not impose time limits and requests are made through diplomatic rather than judicial channels. There are also more grounds on which extradition can be refused, so this process would probably be slower,\textsuperscript{552} more costly and lead to fewer extraditions. Furthermore, because there are EU measures, some EU Member States have repealed legislation giving effect to the Convention.

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\textsuperscript{548} Brexit: the proposed UK-EU security treaty, oral evidence, 16 May 2018, Q99
\textsuperscript{549} Ibid
\textsuperscript{550} Ibid
\textsuperscript{551} Brexit: the proposed UK-EU security treaty, oral evidence, 2 May 2018, Q64
\textsuperscript{552} According to Camino Mortera, Centre for European Reform, “extradition under the Convention takes almost 20 times longer than it does with the EAW”, Financial Times, 7 September 2018.
A 1959 Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters could provide a fall-back in the context of mutual assistance in criminal investigations. But this would also be a slower, more bureaucratic process than under existing arrangements, and it has not been ratified by all EU Member States.

In police cooperation, the UK would have to rely on cooperation through the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and bilateral agreements. Interpol’s capabilities are less developed than those of Europol, and the quantity and quality of data shared via Interpol are regarded as inferior.

Camino Mortera of the Centre for European Reform suggests:

… the UK could try to negotiate a surrender agreement similar to the one Norway and Iceland have with the EU. But this agreement took 13 years to negotiate, is still not in force, and will allow countries to refuse to extradite their own nationals. 553

Richard Martin explained in evidence to the Lords EU Sub-Committee that law enforcement teams working with the Home Office on contingency planning were looking at using the Interpol database I-24/7. However, he suggested that this would have limitations compared to existing mechanisms:

[The fall-back options] all have limitations compared to what we currently have, but we are mapping through all those processes. What does that look like when it is a bit slower? How does that work for officers on the street, and the NCA officers, when they are doing their roles? …

If there was a cliff edge scenario … we would have these fallbacks ready to use. They would be clunky and they would be slower, but we would still be able to operate in a way around all that. 554

Steve Smart added that in some areas there were no obvious fall-back options, and reliance on what was available would make law enforcement agencies less dynamic and less effective:

We will not be able to work at the speed we work now, assuming all things remain the same. There will be a resourcing issue, both for national policing and for the NCA, if we end up with a treaty that does not give us a lot of what we currently have. 555

National security is not part of EU law and remains the responsibility of Member States. Some have therefore suggested that the impact of Brexit of any sort in this area will be minimal, because intelligence cooperation can and will continue at an intergovernmental level. Before the EU referendum, Sir Richard Dearlove, former head of the Secret Intelligence Service, suggested that the cost of Brexit to the UK in national security terms would be low, because the practical business of counter-terrorism and counter-espionage is conducted principally through bilateral relationships. 556

553 Financial Times, What Brexit means for extradition, 7 September 2018
554 Brexit: the proposed UK-EU security treaty, oral evidence, 2 May 2018, Q62
555 Ibid
556 Richard Dearlove, “Brexit would not damage UK security”, Prospect Magazine, 23 March 2016
Andrew Parker, Director General of MI5, seemed to support this view in a speech in Berlin to the German domestic intelligence agency BfV in May 2018. He described existing structures for bilateral and multilateral intelligence cooperation in Europe, before concluding:

This highly developed national security collaboration largely takes place outside EU structures, and doesn’t depend on membership. So, at the primary level, Brexit makes no difference to the strength of those partnerships. 557

However, he then went on to explain how EU mechanisms contribute to this cooperation:

But that is not the whole story. National level and multilateral security work between European nations draws strength from a range of important EU systems and arrangements. Exchanging data through EU law enforcement databases, and Passenger Name Records on the travel of terrorist subjects across Europe provides vital intelligence. Practical cooperation to efficiently arrest and surrender terrorists and criminals using the European Arrest Warrant enables the swift delivery of justice. And our exchanges with EUROPOL and other EU bodies, where the UK is a major contributor, make us all safer. 558

A similar point was made by Lord Evans in evidence to the Lords EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee. He said that most cooperation took place bilaterally or multilaterally outside EU measures, but added:

It is important, certainly from MI5’s point of view, that you cannot understand the counterterrorism work of MI5 in isolation from the law enforcement and policing work because we have an extremely interrelated model between the intelligence agencies and the police. The dependence of the law enforcement community on Europol, the European Arrest Warrants, law enforcement cooperation and so on was therefore extremely important to the overall efforts that we made collectively, although MI5 was not itself a member of Europol because we are not a law enforcement agency. 559

Robert Hannigan explained that for GCHQ, relationships with European counterparts were extremely important, but that cooperation takes place largely outside EU structures

Over the last five years there has been an extraordinary change in the quality and quantity of sharing with European counterparts, driven partly by terrorism but also by other threats, cyber in particular and Russia. In general, the cooperation is better than ever. One of the things that all the agency heads did after the referendum was to reassure each other that that would continue. The legal basis … is bilateral in most cases. It does not touch on EU structures. Where it is multilateral in signal intelligence and cyber, it is done through a series of bilateral legal frameworks that exist between the SIGNIT agencies of the Five Eyes and a number of European countries both inside and outside the EU. 560

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557 Director General Andrew Parker Speech to BfV Symposium, 14 May 2018, mi5.gov.uk [accessed 8 August 2018]
558 Ibid
559 Brexit: the proposed UK-EU security treaty, oral evidence, 16 May 2018, Q94
560 Ibid
Government contingency planning

HASC reported in March 2018 that the National Crime Agency was unwilling to give public evidence on its contingency planning and expressed frustration that as a result, the public debate on this aspect of Brexit has been lacking in detail and urgency.561

The Committee recommended that the Government devote a substantial proportion of its Brexit planning fund to policing and security cooperation, including detailed impact assessments of losing access to existing measures and fully costed plans for contingency arrangements such as UK-based call centres for bilateral cooperation with EU agencies.562

In a follow-up inquiry, the Home Secretary told HASC that the Government was preparing contingencies for security arrangements but that they would be “suboptimal” in many areas, providing the example of the 1957 European Convention on Extradition.

HASC concluded that contingency planning in this area had been inadequate and that the Home Office’s Brexit planning budget was largely devoted to the UK’s future immigration system:

It is often said that the primary purpose of any Government is to protect its citizens from violence and harm – yet crucial questions about the UK’s future security relationship with the EU remain unanswered, and the issue continues to be side-lined by public debate about customs, borders and immigration after Brexit. […]

Without urgent action to make progress in these negotiations, and to put workable contingency plans in place for a ‘no deal’ scenario, the safety and security of UK and EU citizens will be put at serious and unnecessary risk.563

Are there any potential advantages to ‘no deal’?

The Government’s current position, as reflected in the July White Paper, accepts the EU’s requirement that future cooperation in this area should be underpinned by safeguards, including the UK’s continuing membership of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and adherence to adequate data protection standards.

In a no-deal scenario, the UK would no longer need to adhere to these requirements and would therefore have greater latitude in its approach to balancing security against other factors. Some have advocated departure from the ECHR in order to pursue security objectives,564 but the Government has committed to adhering to it.

562 Ibid, para 139
564 Sir Michael Fallon suggested in a Commons debate on returning fighters that the ECHR makes it difficult to prosecute individuals who have travelled to join terrorist organisations overseas, and that the UK should therefore withdraw from it (HC Deb 23 July 2018, c727). A similar point was made by Colonel Richard Kemp writing in The Telegraph, 24 July 2018 about the prosecution of returning fighters: “Brexit
Proponents of Brexit also suggested during the referendum campaign that there would be a security dividend in the UK obtaining greater control over its borders, and thus being able to apply more stringent tests to EU nationals entering the country.565

Richard Martin made a similar point in evidence to the HL EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee, suggesting that post-Brexit there would be an opportunity to have stronger borders and to have more intervention at borders. However, he noted that this opportunity was dependent on having access to information about people attempting to enter the country.566 Other representatives of law enforcement, such as Rob Wainwright, suggested that a loss of access to databases would have a detrimental impact on border security, as noted above.
16. External relations

16.1 The EU’s international agreements

The UK is currently party to numerous international agreements with third countries as an EU Member State. The EU’s Europa online treaties database lists 1,256 international agreements to which the EU is party. How many of these are pertinent to the UK is as yet unclear. But as most aspects of external relations are Member State or shared competences, there are more options available to the UK to establish working bilateral mechanisms for cooperation in a no-deal scenario.

A report in the Financial Times in May 2017 suggested that there were 759 separate EU international agreements with potential relevance to the UK. These included 295 agreements related to trade (discussed in section 6), as well as agreements on regulatory co-operation, fisheries, agriculture, nuclear co-operation and transport co-operation (including aviation agreements enabling air transport). The agreements cover 168 countries, with multiple accords with certain countries.

Liam Fox has indicated that such high figures are misleading, and that not all of the treaties would require action to maintain continuity following Brexit. Some of these treaties have been superseded, are redundant or no longer relevant to the UK, and there are also multiple agreements that could be understood as one agreement. It is not possible to identify which treaties remain in force from the FCO UK Treaties Online database. Dr Fox said in December 2017 that work was “ongoing” to “identify the full range of agreements that are affected by exit and to take action to ensure continuity for businesses and individuals on exit”.

UK relations with most of the states that are party to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) are, at least partially, mediated through that relationship. So ‘no deal’ would mean the UK would drop out of the Association Agreement with Ukraine, for example, and in addition to losing the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, it would not be able to participate any longer in EU-led stabilisation initiatives there.

The impact of ‘no deal’ on trade agreements specifically is discussed in section 6.3.

FCO funding

According to the NAO report, Implementing the UK’s exit from the European Union. The Foreign & Commonwealth Office, April 2018, “Under a ‘no deal’ outcome with the EU the FCO will request a further

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567 The ENP seeks to link countries to the east and south of the territory of mainland Europe to the EU.

568 For further information, see House of Commons Briefing Paper 8370, UK adoption of EU external agreements after Brexit, 24 July 2018, and House of Commons International Trade Select Committee report on Continuing Application of EU trade agreements after Brexit published on 28 February 2018.
£65 million for 2018-19” and possibly more to support some of the Overseas Territories. The report notes:

Having previously reduced the number of UK diplomats across the EU27, the FCO now intends to increase them in order to enhance its ability to engage bilaterally with member states. Although the FCO does not have reliable data on actual numbers, it is clear that the number of UK diplomats reduced substantially in the decade up to the EU referendum. To compensate for leaving the EU institutions the UK is increasing staffing numbers across the FCO’s Europe network in the EU27 member states. In March 2018, the FCO announced 250 new posts in its overseas network, including the Europe network.

Overseas aid spending

The EU has been one of the UK’s largest multilateral aid partners. We are still waiting to find out whether any UK aid will be channelled through the EU after Brexit. It is reasonable to anticipate that about 10% of the UK’s 2019/20 aid budget will potentially be available for reallocation after Brexit. This looks all but certain in the event of ‘no deal’.

The Government spent £884 million in aid through the EU in 2017, around 6% of all aid spending.569 If the UK stops contributing to all EU development activities, this will not result in it spending less money on aid (because it is legally obliged to continue to spend 0.7% of gross national income as aid each year); it will, however, mean that this aid will have to be spent differently.

In the July 2018 White Paper on the future relationship between the UK and the EU, the UK Government proposed that the two parties make a series of cooperative accords, one of which would cover international development and international action.570 This would provide a framework under which the UK could continue to participate in EU activities, potentially including those which spend aid money. The EU does already have agreements with third countries covering specific aid programmes, implying that such collaboration is possible.

Current proposals for future EU development funding emphasise converting multiple funding streams into a single external action instrument, rather than the kind of openness and flexibility towards non-member states which the UK has said it would like to see. So, whether there is a deal or not, it remains unclear whether (and if so, how) the UK might participate in EU development activities in future as a third country.

In recent months, there has been concern that the European Commission may decide that UK-based humanitarian NGOs should be immediately ineligible to continue to receive EU funding in the event of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit. In response, the UK Government has pledged to cover

569 DFID, Statistics on International Development: Provisional UK Aid Spend 2017, 5 April 2018
570 DExEU, The future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union, 12 July 2018
any loss of EU funds by UK-based humanitarian NGOs acting as lead consortium partner or sole implementer of pre-existing programmes.

A more detailed explanation of the UK’s aid spending, and a discussion of the possible ways in which it could change after Brexit, are covered in a House of Commons Library briefing paper, UK aid: frequently asked questions.

16.2 External security

Foreign and defence policy

With no deal the UK would lose access to Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) decision-making mechanisms used to co-ordinate joint responses to foreign policy challenges across all EU Member States. A recent example is the EU response to the Skripal assassination attempt, when the EU recalled its ambassador from Moscow, and EU Member States, as well as NATO partners and the US, ordered the expulsion of Russian diplomats. There are also questions around intelligence sharing, if there is no legal mechanism in place to share classified information (as discussed in section 14 above).

But the implications of ‘no deal’ for UK defence policy and the UK armed forces would be arguably relatively limited.

Successive Governments have stated that NATO is the cornerstone of European defence and security, supported by a network of strong multilateral and bilateral alliances and partnerships of which the UK is a participant, including permanent membership of the UN Security Council. From the UK’s perspective the EU has instead been a notable ‘soft power’ actor, focusing on crisis prevention, crisis management and post-conflict stabilisation. In terms of military capabilities the UK could also be considered a net contributor to the EU.571

Were the UK to leave with EU with ‘no deal’, the most immediate implication would be that that UK would no longer be able to participate in CSDP missions, the EU battlegroups or in organisations such as the European Defence Agency (EDA). All military personnel deployed on EU-led operations, such as Operation Althea in Bosnia, would have to return to the UK, along with all UK military staff seconded to the EU.572 Yet, the UK’s ability to project military power would arguably remain largely unaffected at this time. ‘Hard’ power would continue to be the purview of NATO or ‘coalitions of the willing’;

571 The UK is one of the largest and most advanced military powers in the EU in terms of manpower, assets, capabilities and defence spending. It currently provides 20% of the EU’s force catalogue, including strategic enablers such as airlift, refuelling and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance. It is also one of only five EU countries capable of deploying an operational HQ and therefore taking command of a mission. At present the UK provides the operational HQ of the CSDP mission Operation Atalanta. On the other hand, the UK contributes only 3-5% of CSDP spending (it varies a little depending on whether military only or civilian and military together are taken into account.

572 It would also no longer be able to provide the operational headquarters of Operation Atalanta, although this would also be the case under any withdrawal agreement.
while any shortfalls in soft power projection could be compensated for through other multilateral or bilateral frameworks.

In terms of capability development, the UK would no longer be able to participate in the European Defence Agency, or any projects currently underway under the remit of the European Defence Research Programme (which is part of the European Defence Fund). Even during the proposed transitional period, the UK could already be excluded from certain EU-funded research & development projects related to defence because of their ‘sensitive’ nature.

In the longer term, however, and regardless of a ‘no deal’ scenario, the UK could seek to re-negotiate its participation in EU military operations via a third party framework agreement, in much the same way that the United States, Canada and Norway have. The same is true of the European Defence Agency, and the European Defence Fund, although under current assumptions third country access to the European Defence Fund will be tightly controlled and therefore the impact on the UK will be the same whether it leaves the EU with an agreement or not.

Indeed, in the event of a ‘no deal’, and were the UK to pursue third country agreements in the longer term, then the majority of the negotiations and debate would centre around exactly the same discussions which are happening now with respect to Brexit. Yet, the political will of the EU27 to positively engage with the UK in such negotiations following a ‘no deal’ scenario is debatable. As a result the process could be lengthy, and the terms of engagement could be less favourable.

There is a school of thought which would argue that, in defence terms at least, the EU needs the UK. And given recent shifts in the international security environment, the increasing belligerence of Russia and a US President who appears to have very little time for European security or the US’ European allies, engaging the UK as a third country participant in CSDP regardless of a no deal scenario may not be so unappealing. There is another view that it could be helpful for the UK to

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573 The UK is currently part of the Pythia project and Ocean 2020 project. The ‘capability’ strand of the EDF (the European Defence Industrial Development Programme) is currently being established, with a view to the first projects being financed from 2019. Third party arrangements allowing access to the fund are currently being negotiated and would be relevant to Brexit regardless. The UK is also not currently part of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Details on all of these initiatives is available in Library Briefing Paper CBP 8216, European defence: where is it heading?

574 As a result, Canada and Norway have both contributed forces to Operation Althea in Bosnia, Canada has provided personnel for EU police Missions in Bosnia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, while Norway has contributed assets to Operation Atalanta (EUNAVFOR) and has provided forces to the EU Nordic Battlegroup.

575 In 2006 Norway, for example, signed an administrative agreement with the EDA which allows it to participate in the Agency’s research and technology projects. Switzerland also has a similar cooperation agreement. Under current Brexit discussions the UK will still have to conclude an Administrative Agreement with the EDA to continue participating in specific EDA capability projects.
be leaving, after years of blocking developments such as an Operational Headquarters. 576

But there are also non-EU initiatives afoot, such as French President Macron’s European Intervention Force proposal, in which the UK could take part whether or not there’s a Withdrawal Agreement, if there is sufficient political will. 577

**Sanctions**

A no-deal Brexit seems not to have been discussed during debates on the *Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill.*

The UK Government currently imposes sanctions and updates the anti-money laundering (AML) regime using powers in the *European Communities Act 1972.* Those powers will disappear with the repeal of the 1972 Act on exit day and the commencement of provisions under the *Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act*, which gives the UK Government new powers not dependent on EU membership.

If the UK agreed to continue implementing EU AML and sanctions law during a transitional period after Brexit’s official date, it would delay the inception of an independent UK policy in these areas.

A no-deal Brexit would give the UK Government the immediate freedom to implement regulations that differ from the EU’s. Sanctions and AML regimes are, however, usually coordinated internationally (depending on the regime), for example at G7 meetings, by UN resolution, or following decisions by the international Financial Action Task Force. The freedom to impose unilateral UK rules is unlikely to be exercised very often. The Government has in any case repeatedly insisted - including during the debate following the statement on 5 September 2018 on the Salisbury Skripal investigation - that it intends to keep aligning its sanctions policy with the EU’s. This is unlikely to change in a no-deal scenario.

**Government guidance**

On 12 October 2018 the Government published guidance on sanctions policy if there’s no Brexit deal. It stated that the UK would carry over all existing EU sanctions, mostly in the form of regulations using the powers in the Sanctions Act. Many of the necessary regulations would be put before Parliament before March 2019, to prepare for the possibility of a no-deal exit.

Any sanctions regimes that had not been carried over using the Sanctions Act would become retained EU law through the powers in the *EU (Withdrawal) Act*, meaning that there would be no gaps.

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576 A decision to establish an EU Military Planning and Conduct Capabilities (MPCC) unit to run “non-executive” training missions in parts of Africa was adopted in June 2017, having been blocked by the UK Government, which objected to the use of the term ‘operation headquarters’.

Appendix

Brexit planning elsewhere in the EU27

Austria

The Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz would prefer to extend negotiations rather than surrender to a hard Brexit if a deal on the Irish border is not agreed.578 According to Bloomberg (19 July), Austria does not anticipate customs problems “because the current WTO regime could handle shipments to and from the U.K”. It is also “confident the country’s banking industry is prepared for all scenarios”.

Belgium

The Belgian Government is reported to be hiring more agents for the port of Antwerp and looking into “the need for scanners, sniffer dogs, weapons and drones to beef up post-Brexit customs surveillance” to monitor its coastline and the North Sea.579

Open Europe reported in August 2018:

The Belgian customs administration has also set up an internal committee which will be responsible for the extra infrastructure and for training the new staff. It has drawn up a list of potential items that may be needed after Brexit, which reportedly includes more luggage scanners, sniffer dogs, manual scanners, drones to survey the coastline, a submarine to examine ships in the North Sea, as well as vehicles, computers, work spaces, and uniforms. There are also plans to coordinate with neighbouring countries, the European Commission, Belgian ports and airports.

Special attention is being devoted to the ports of Zeebrugge and Antwerp, which are big re-exporters of goods to the UK. Together with the Dutch ports they account for the majority of total inbound and outbound traffic with Britain’s ports. The CEO of Zeebrugge, which has 46% of its traffic with the UK, has claimed the port will be ready for Brexit. It is building a digital platform to speed up bureaucratic procedures, and thinks it may be better equipped than some competitors, because it specialises in people-free freight.580

Bulgaria

Bloomberg reported in July 2018 that Bulgaria was preparing for the risks of three possible Brexit scenarios: a comprehensive agreement, a partial agreement, and no deal. In September or October the Government would “develop a detailed action plan for the three scenarios”.

578 See Politico, 6 July 2018
579 New York Times, 19 July 2018; The Express, Brexit no deal MAPPED: How EU countries are secretly preparing for no deal UK exit from EU, 20 July 2018
580 Open Europe, The view from Brussels: How are the EU27 preparing for a ‘No Deal’ Brexit? Pieter Cleppe, 30 August 2018
Denmark

Denmark has been making contingency plans for a no-deal Brexit, including setting aside 700 million kroner to cover extra payments to the EU. Finance Minister Jensen said:

> We don’t expect Brexit to materially impact the 2019 budget structurally, so the budget will be stable and reliable. But what actually will happen is that our payment to the EU may change if we get a hard Brexit.

Through 2019 and maybe into 2020 we’ll be negotiating the EU budget for years to come and we’ll be missing the voice of the U.K. when advocating fiscally responsible spending.581

On 2 October Prime Minister Rasmussen told the new Danish Parliament “We are employing customs officers and preparing the system”. He also assured British citizens living in Denmark that “no matter the end result of the negotiations”, they would be looked after.582

In their Negotiating Brexit chapter, Jensen and Kelstrup reported that the Danish Government’s Brexit task force is collecting intelligence from ministries and stakeholders on areas that will be affected by a no deal Brexit and preparing contingency plans.

Finland

The Finnish Government has instructed ministries to prepare for any outcome in the Brexit negotiations. It is concerned mainly about the aviation industry, “but no concrete contingency preparations have started”.583

A report on the fate of UK nationals living in Finland said that according to officials at the Interior Ministry, “up to now, not much thought has gone into the scenario of what should happen to more than five thousand British passport holders who currently live and work in Finland”.584

France

France is reported to have been preparing for Brexit “for almost two years in sectors spanning from fisheries and borders to financial services”.585

Prime Minister Édouard Philippe said on 27 August that France would be ready in the event of a ‘cliff edge’ exit. He has “tasked ministers to

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581 Bloomberg, Hard Brexit? Denmark Prepares for Worst with Budget Reserve, 30 August 2018
582 The local.dk, Brexit is ‘tragedy’, Danish government will ‘look after’ Brits in Denmark: PM, 2 October 2018; YouTube, 2 October 2018
583 Bloomberg, How Europe Is Bracing for Messy Brexit: Dogs, Drones, Do Nothing, 19 July 2018
584 Newsnowfinland, Interior Minister: No guarantees for Brits in Finland if Brexit deal fails, 17 October 2018
585 The Express, Brexit no deal MAPPED: How EU countries are secretly preparing for no deal UK exit from EU, 20 July 2018
prepare contingency measures that would be necessary... to mitigate the difficulties linked with this unprecedented challenge”. France is preparing measures on the status of UK citizens living in France and ensure smooth border controls. “The approximately 150,000 British citizens living in France are being actively encouraged by Macron’s government to apply for a ‘carte de séjour’ residency permit to avoid administrative chaos post-Brexit”. Reports maintain that if there is no deal, Mr Philippe wants plans in place to “facilitate the residency of British nationals already living in France” and to ensure “the greatest possible fluidity of border controls”. The Government will shortly present a bill to the French Parliament.

According to The Guardian, Xavier Bertrand, a former French minister and president of Hauts-de-France, has said that “Calais was prepared to solve the problem of space for checks in Dover”. The port had acquired 17 hectares (42 acres) of land, which could be used for customs inspection posts and storage. France is also reported to be planning to recruit 700 new customs officials, some of whom will be based in Calais. An additional 250 members of staff have been recruited in 2018, rising to around 700 by the end of 2020. The port also wants to test a new “Fastpass” virtual queuing system, whereby preloading passport and cargo information would increase the speed of border inspections.590

Speaking at Chatham House on 13 September 2018, Europe Minister Nathalie Loiseau said the French Government would introduce emergency legislation within weeks to protect its citizens from the impact of Britain leaving the EU without a deal in March 2019. She warned that in the absence of any contingency plans, Eurostar trains could be stopped on reaching French territory, and planes from the UK could be prevented from entering French airspace.591 She also said that France was against a “blindfold Brexit”, in which there would be a withdrawal agreement but key details of the future UK-EU relationship would be deferred until the UK had left the EU. She said:

We have to have a clear sense of the balance of rights and obligations on the future relations between the UK and the EU27. Details will be worked out afterwards, but it would be to the benefit of neither the UK or the EU27 to remain vague on what is going to be our future relations at the moment of leaving.

586 France24, France and Germany are making contingency plans for a no-deal Brexit, with Paris looking at residency issues and Berlin examining medical supply chains with the UK, 29 August 2018
587 Ibid
588 The Local Fr, No-deal Brexit: French government makes contingency plans for Brits living in France, 28 August 2018
589 The French customs authority has produced detailed online information (in French) for businesses on how to prepare for Brexit.
590 Dover-Calais ‘facing economic catastrophe’ due to Brexit’, Guardian, 17 July 2018
591 See also Independent, Eurostar will not run if there is a no-deal Brexit, French Europe minister warns, 13 September 2018; EurActiv, Hard Brexit may stop Eurostar trains entering France: French minister, 14 September 2018
Loiseau added that there was “a need for clarity and perspective for our fellow citizens, for our businesses”.

She also said that those who had suggested the significance of the Irish border was being exaggerated were being irresponsible, stressing the need for a legal backstop to avoid a hard border in Ireland. She insisted: “we cannot wake up on 30 March to tell our Irish colleagues we don’t have a solution and we must go back to a hard border”.[592]

In October the Government published a draft bill providing for measures to be taken in the event of ‘no deal’ to reinstate checks on goods and passengers going to and from the UK, and inspections of food, plants and live animals. BBC News summarised the Bill as follows:

The draft bill would give the government (rather than parliament) the power to introduce new measures by emergency decree if it needed to avoid or mitigate the consequences of a hard or no-deal Brexit.

But politicians representing channel ports are warning that chaos and long queues would be unavoidable and both the French government and the EU need to take further steps to avoid that happening.

The draft bill also focuses on citizens’ rights in the event of no deal, including what would be the legal situation of UK nationals resident in France. The bill also raises the possibility of other UK nationals needing visas to visit France.

Any emergency legal measures introduced to ease the situation would, the bill says, depend on the UK taking reciprocal steps, which the UK government has already indicated that it would do.[593]

The Senate debated Brexit preparedness on 6 November.

Germany

Like France Germany is making preparations for Brexit, “including the recruitment of additional personnel to deal with a less open economic relationship with the UK”.[594]

Although traditionally it is the Chancellor’s office that deals with EU policy, there is a cross-ministerial Brexit Task Force headed by the Foreign Ministry and a dedicated Brexit team in the Finance Ministry.

In 2017 the Deutscher Industrie und Handelskammertag (Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce) looked at the possible impact of Brexit on German business:

In the estimation of German companies, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union will represent a significant drag on the trade of goods and services. The business outlook of companies which are engaged in trade with the United Kingdom is worsening significantly, as expected cost burdens due to taxes and tariffs and increasing bureaucratic hurdles at

592 The Guardian, France may stop trains and planes from UK under no-deal Brexit, 13 September 2018.
593 BBC News, Reality Check: What are EU countries doing to prepare for a no-deal Brexit? 6 November 2018
594 BBC News, Reality Check: What are EU countries doing to prepare for a no-deal Brexit? 6 November 2018
Europe’s new borders will negatively affect business on both sides. The magnitude of this effect largely depends on negotiations between the United Kingdom and the EU. Regardless of the specific outcome of these negotiations, almost one in every ten companies is already planning to shift investments away from the UK because of Brexit and towards Germany or other countries within the EU internal market.\textsuperscript{595}

Many German businesses have been preparing for Brexit, including for the possibility of a no-deal Brexit. \textit{Deutsche Welle} looked at some of their “worst scenario” planning:

Among other measures companies are setting up new facilities, looking for other suppliers that operate within the single market and are hiring people in order to process goods through customs […]. They are even setting up new servers because they are uncertain about “whether the free flow of data is still possible with the UK and the EU”.\textsuperscript{596}

By contrast, the \textit{Financial Times} commented in May 2018 that Germany did not think much of the UK’s preparations:

Certain themes crop up regularly in such articles and conversations with Germans about Brexit. The first is sheer amazement at how ill-prepared British politicians were for the talks, how ignorant they were of basic facts about how the EU works and, consequently, how unrealistic their negotiating positions have been.\textsuperscript{597}

\textit{Draft Brexit transition law}

Preparations for Brexit have included managing the status of the estimated 100,000 British citizens living in Germany and Germans living in the UK.

In July Germany published a draft law, the \textit{Brexit-Übergangsgesetz} (Brexit Transition Act), which provides that during the transition period the UK would be deemed to be an EU Member State for all purposes of German Federal Law (though not state law). In May there were reports of record numbers of Britons applying for German citizenship\textsuperscript{598} and the new law would also allow qualifying Britons living in Germany to become German citizens during the post-Brexit transition period.\textsuperscript{599} The German Cabinet approved the bill on 5 September 2018 and it will now go to the Bundestag.\textsuperscript{600} The German Foreign Ministry outlined the wider purpose of the Bill and the citizenship provision as follows:

The main aim of the bill is to create legal clarity for the transition period as regards provisions of federal law that refer to membership of the EU. The bill contains a clear and simple transitional rule for the transition period: wherever federal law

\textsuperscript{595} The Impact of Brexit on German Businesses, Results of the IHK Business Survey, Going International 2017, March 2017
\textsuperscript{596} Deutsche Welle, Growing unease over Brexit in German business community, 28 June 2018
\textsuperscript{597} Financial Times, Germans see Brexit as a UK own goal, 1 May 2018
\textsuperscript{598} See, for example, Deutsche Welle, Brexit causes record number of Britons to be granted German citizenship, 23 May 2018
\textsuperscript{599} See Brexit Legal, Germany Provides Draft of Brexit Implementation Act, Jens Rinze, 26 July 2018
\textsuperscript{600} The act must be approved by the Bundestag with the consent of the Bundesrat.
refers to the EU Member States, this will also include the United Kingdom as long as none of the stated exceptions apply.

The bill also includes a provision to help British and German citizens who apply for citizenship of the other country before the end of the transition period. Under this provision, they will be allowed to retain their original citizenship even if the decision on their naturalisation is made after the end of the transition period. In such cases, dual citizenship will be tolerated under certain conditions.601

Greece

In July Georgios Katrougalos, Greece’s alternate foreign minister, said the Government was studying the “improbable” scenario of no deal and was trying to estimate the possible consequences and taking the necessary measures.602 A Greek Government working paper has warned that in the event of a no-deal Brexit, the financial fallout from a shortfall in the EU budget up to 2020 could leave Greece facing “increased financial and political instability”. The paper proposed that in the event of no deal, Greece should seek a special agreement with the EU, as it would be unable to finance a budgetary shortfall through national funding.603

Ireland

After the UK vote the Irish Government announced a range of contingency plans to address the potential impacts of the withdrawal process.604 These included prioritising British-Irish relations, Northern Ireland, trade, investment, North-South border impacts, competitiveness and macro-economic issues, research/innovation funding and energy.

In a statement on 17 January 2017, the Irish Government said it was “acutely” aware of the possible risks to the Irish economy of Brexit, but that it was also aware of potential “economic opportunities”, including in terms of mobile investment:

Bids for the EU agencies currently located in London—the European Medicines Board and the European Banking Authority have already been announced and the State enterprise agencies are actively pursuing opportunities for increased investment, business and job creation in Ireland.605

On 23 January 2017, the Guardian reported comments from Prime Minister Kenny that Ireland wanted a special provision in any Brexit deal to allow Northern Ireland to rejoin the EU should it be united with the Republic of Ireland:

601 Auswärtiges Amt, Brexit transition act, 5 September 2018
602 Bloomberg, How Europe Is Bracing for Messy Brexit: Dogs, Drones, Do Nothing, 19 July 2018
603 Daily Telegraph, Greece warns ‘no-deal’ Brexit would plunge country into ‘financial and political instability’, 17 August 2018
604 Department of the Taoiseach, Irish Government Brexit Contingency Plans Announced”, 24 June 2016
605 Department of the Taoiseach, Government Statement on Brexit, 17 January 2017
In other words, that in such future time, whenever that might be, were it [reunification] to occur, that the north of Ireland would have ease of access to join as a member of the European Union again […] We want that language inserted into the negotiated treaty, the negotiated outcome, whenever that might occur.606

The Irish Government’s 2018 National Risk Assessment – Overview of Strategic Risks analysed a range of Brexit-related risks for Ireland and concluded:

While the Irish Government will continue to do all in its power on both a domestic and European front to work for a Brexit agreement in line with Irish interests, the risks to our interests, our trade, our economy at both the macro and micro level8, and our relationship with Northern Ireland, and the UK which could emerge from potential Brexits are manifold and significant, and it is likely that Brexit will remain one of the most significant risks facing this country over the coming years.

Leo Varadkar has said his Government is making contingency plans for a no-deal Brexit, including extra customs officers and veterinary inspectors to deal with changes in trade rules.607 Ireland has also been considering whether to relocate part of the emergency oil stocks that it stores at UK refineries back to Ireland or to other EU countries.608 The Government was also reported to be drawing up plans to stockpile insulin, vaccinations and other medical supplies.609

Foreign Affairs Minister Simon Coveney presented Brexit contingency plans to the Cabinet on 18 July 2018.610 Speaking after the Cabinet meeting, the Taoiseach said:

The key decisions are particularly focused on areas where the Government has direct responsibility and on measures that need to be taken on an East-West basis, such as customs and veterinary controls at ports and airports. The Government also reiterated its position today that it would not countenance a return of a border on the island under any circumstances, including in the event of a hard Brexit.611

Simon Coveney said a “huge amount of work has been underway across Government and its agencies for many months”, and that the Government would also be carrying out preparations “on an EU-wide basis, in cooperation with our EU partners”.612 The Government is holding public events on Brexit, including road shows called ‘Getting Ireland Brexit Ready’.

606 The Guardian, Irish Leader Calls for United Ireland Provision in Brexit Deal, 23 February 2017
607 See The Telegraph, Brussels warns EU countries: get ready for a no-deal Brexit, 19 July 2018
608 Sunday Independent, Ireland set to remove oil reserves from Britain as Brexit deadline looms closer, 15 July 2018, and Cabinet to move Irish oil reserve from UK, 15 July 2018
609 Irish World, ‘No deal’ will mean ‘no drugs’, 1 August 2018
610 See RTÉ, 1,000 new customs and veterinary inspectors to be hired, 20 July 2018
611 Merrion Street, Irish Government News Service, Cabinet Agrees Brexit Preparedness Measures, 18 July 2018
612 Ibid
Finance Minister Paschal Donohoe made several announcements in the Budget, “including investing 300m euros (£260m) in training schemes for sectors that could be hit by Brexit”.\(^{613}\) Open Europe reported in August 2018:

> Other measures include setting up a new system on the Irish stock exchange to settle shares and securities, lobby the EU Commission to relax state aid rules, offer businesses a ‘Be Prepared’ grant of up to €5,000 and making sure Irish pensioners with a UK pension continue to receive it.\(^{614}\)

In the Oireachtas on 4 October 2018 Deputy Maurice Quinlivan (Sinn Féin) asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade about contingency plans “for businesses for a situation in which the landbridge through Britain becomes unusable for Irish lorries travelling to and from the Continent”\(^{30826/18}\). Simon Coveney replied in some detail about the work of the Government’s Landbridge Project Group, concluding.

> Our work on the landbridge must also include the possibility of a no-deal or worse-case outcome.

To this end, relevant Departments have now been tasked by the Government to roll out detailed Action Plans with a view to advancing, as appropriate, the mitigating measures which have been identified in the areas of their responsibility from the planning to the implementation phase. In line with this approach, the Government has already approved a number of key Brexit preparedness measures focused on East-West trade which will also take account of the continued use of the landbridge.

**Italy**

Italy considers a no-deal Brexit unlikely. Guglielmo Pichi, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, thought there would be a deal “because it is the interest of both parties”.\(^{615}\)

**Malta**

Mr Muscat said his Government had set up a Brexit task force on which the Opposition also sat, which was coordinating Malta’s Brexit preparations. The Times of Malta reported:

> Dr Muscat said the government did not want to be fatalistic about Brexit, but was already preparing for worst case scenarios.

> “Even in the worst possible case, our health agreement with the UK will remain,” he said, adding that Malta was not only an EU member state, but also a member of the Commonwealth.

> The Customs Department, Dr Muscat said, was among the most prepared to deal with a Brexit, and so he was confident in its ability to manage such a transition.\(^{616}\)

\(^{613}\) BBC News, Reality Check: What are EU countries doing to prepare for a no-deal Brexit? 6 November 2018

\(^{614}\) Open Europe, The view from Brussels: How are the EU27 preparing for a ‘No Deal’ Brexit? Pieter Cleppe, 30 August 2018

\(^{615}\) Interview on BBC Today programme, 19 September 2018

\(^{616}\) Times of Malta, Muscat confident of post-Brexit agreement between Malta and the UK, 23 October 2018
Netherlands

The Dutch government has carried out several assessments of the impact of Brexit on the Netherlands, including the rights of Dutch citizens, the economy and medical sector. In the State Opening of Parliament in September 2017, Bert Koenders emphasised that in the Brexit negotiations, “the main priority should be to clarify the rights of EU citizens, eliminate uncertainty for businesses and ensure that existing financial obligations are met.”

The Dutch government has planned for extra officials, mostly in the port of Rotterdam, “to prepare for the extra bureaucracy required for British goods to go through customs before entering the EU after Brexit”. According to the New York Times (19 July), “[t]he Dutch government is hiring nearly 1,000 customs officials”. The Government is also recruiting up to 90 veterinarians for animal and food inspections and warehouses for inspection are being considered.

The Government’s web-based ‘Brexit impact scanner’ can be used by SMEs to assess their exposure to potential problems related to Brexit, and it offers €2,500 ‘vouchers’ for small companies to obtain independent advice about the Brexit implications for their business.

The UK being the Netherlands’ third largest trading partner, the Dutch customs authorities are expecting an increase of the number of customs operations by a third and are expanding the staff capacity by 20%.

MLex reported on 4 September on research for the Dutch Government by Kantar Public that concluded that around 18% of Dutch companies doing business with the UK are “actively preparing for Brexit”, up from 10% in 2017. The study was carried out in the period 28 June – 3 July among 245 companies doing business with the UK.

A letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the House of Representatives, 7 September 2018, sets out the state of preparation for Brexit (contingency planning and preparedness at national and EU level). The Government website provides information for citizens and businesses on how to prepare for Brexit.

Poland

Several ministries have been analysing the potential impact of no deal. “The government is determining how many additional customs agents

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617 Government of the Netherlands, What impact will Brexit have? [accessed 2 October 2018]
618 Government of the Netherlands, Foreign Affairs Budget 2018 [accessed 2 October 2018]
619 Reuters, Dutch cabinet drafting ‘playbook’ for chaotic Brexit: parliament, 9 July 2018
621 ‘Nederlandse Douane nog niet klaar voor Brexit, honderden extra mensen nodig: ‘Het effect is echt groot’’, (The Netherlands Customs administration not yet ready for Brexit, need more people: ‘The effects are major’), De Volkskrant, 16 February 2018
622 See also DutchNews, Just one in five Dutch firms are ready for Brexit, ministry says, 4 September 2018
will be required and is investigating measures to limit the risks to business”. 623 Deputy Foreign Minister Szymański said in July that Poland had been “making preparations to assess a ‘no deal’ Brexit both from a financial point of view, as well as with regard to business, administration and citizens’ rights”. 624

The Visegrad Group website reported on the Government’s preparations for business:

Poland’s Ministry of Entrepreneurship and Technology (MPiT) wants to prepare companies, accountants and tax advisors for the UK’s departure from the EU. It has started a mailing campaign to help them adapt to Brexit-related changes. “The results of the negotiations concerning the exit of Great Britain from the EU are still unknown”, the ministry noted. “Polish businesspeople should therefore prepare for several possible scenarios. Each of the variants means great changes for businesses that import and export goods and services to and from Great Britain or are part of the production-delivery chain which ends there”, it added.625

Portugal

According to Bloomberg, Portugal is not expecting major changes or increases in staff at the ports of Sines and Lisbon from any kind of Brexit: “Almost three-quarters of goods trading at the port of Sines -- the nation’s largest -- is with countries outside the EU, so it’s already well equipped to deal with shipments to and from non-EU nations”.626

A Reuters report said Portugal was “actively courting wealthy British to move and invest there in the run up to Brexit”.627 There have also been bilateral initiatives, such as consolidating an Anglo-Portuguese science partnership involving Imperial College.628

A report by the Confederation of Portuguese Business (CIP) that estimated Portuguese exports to the UK could fall by more than 25%. It recommended that the Government and industry “step up efforts to promote Portugal in the British market, particularly for sectors most at risk such as tourism, electronics and the auto industry”.629

Spain

An Elcano policy paper in May 2018 stated that in preparation for a possible no deal:

623 Bloomberg, How Europe Is Bracing for Messy Brexit: Dogs, Drones, Do Nothing, 19 July 2018
624 Poland in English, Poland preparing for ‘no deal’ Brexit; deputy minister, 20 July 2018
625 Visegrad Group, Ministry aims to ready firms, accountants and tax advisors for Brexit, 25 October 2018
626 Bloomberg, How Europe is Bracing for Messy Brexit: Dogs, Drones, Do Nothing, 19 July 2018
627 Reuters, Portugal wants Britain to welcome all EU migrants after Brexit, 26 July 2018
628 Portugal resident.com, Portugal and UK “prepare to reinforce scientific collaboration” ahead of Brexit, 24 April 2018
629 Politico, Portuguese business pushes for Brexit deal, 31 October 2018
... it is important for Spanish companies to design contingency plans for coping with a reduction in business, whether in terms of preparing for changes in the regulatory framework or seeking alternative customers and suppliers in other markets, both within and beyond the EU.630

It also noted the possible effects on the Spanish tourism industry ("Spain receives millions of British tourists every year, accounting for almost a quarter of visitors to the country"): it is important that the Spanish tourism industry prepares for a possible reduction in British visits and draws up contingency plans both with the Spanish authorities and with British tour operators, who are equally dependent on tourism to Spain.

Fears about the effects on tourism have continued.631 On 6 November the Independent reported that Spanish tourism Minister Reyes Maroto is meeting UK tour operators “to discuss contingency plans to ensure millions of British tourists can still visit her country in the event of a no-deal Brexit”.632

According to BBC News, “Spain is taking the mañana approach to planning for a no-deal Brexit”.633 Economy Minister Nadia Calvino said on 29 October in London that “for the time being, nothing was being done to prepare for no deal. There is no written plan or anything formal and […] the government was waiting another few weeks before planning for a no-deal scenario”.

But the Government has woken up to the need for Brexit planning, including contingency planning for a possible no-deal outcome. Open Europe reported:

Spain’s government has been running an analysis of the different potential outcomes of the Brexit talks, including the ‘cliff-edge’ scenario, based on input from companies and business groups. It has also been working on a plan to shield its tourism industry from any disruption to air travel and will allow UK citizens to use their existing Spanish ID as a post-Brexit entitlement paper, which is a more flexible arrangement than the one France has in mind.634

Politico reported on 2 November 2018 that “Only 31 percent of Spanish companies have made contingency plans for Brexit, and just 19 percent have started implementing those plans, according to a survey of 2,000 executives conducted by KPMG in coordination with the CEOE, Spain’s biggest business lobby”.635 But the report went on to outline Government initiatives to help business – some of which are in denial – to prepare for Brexit:

Industry and Commerce Minister Reyes Maroto this week announced a series of actions aimed at “helping companies

630 Spain and the prospect of Brexit, Salvador Llaudes, Ignacio Molina, Miguel Otero Iglesias & Federico Steinberg, May 2018
631 See, e.g. The Express, ‘UK is our main market!’ Spain in Brexit PANIC as tourist boss warns of no deal DISASTER, 11 October 2018
632 The Independent, Spain seeks contingency plans with UK tour operators over fears of no-deal Brexit, 6 November 2018
633 BBC News, Reality Check: What are EU countries doing to prepare for a no-deal Brexit? 6 November 2018
634 Open Europe, The view from Brussels: How are the EU27 preparing for a ‘No Deal’ Brexit? 30 August 2018
635 Politico, Madrid tells businesses to get ready for (any) Brexit, 2 November 2018
prepare contingency plans” for Brexit, including informational meetings with business leaders and a public website.

“We have to inform companies that any scenario can occur,” she told reporters. “Some [companies] still convey to us hopes that nothing will happen, and the reality is that something is going to happen.”

In the Spanish Parliament Prime Minister Sánchez and Foreign Minister Borrell have emphasised the need for public administration and business leaders to make “their own contingency plans” to face “any kind of scenario that can occur after March 29, 2019”. Deputy Prime Minister Carmen Calvo has been “coordinating plans across all government departments”, preparing to hire extra customs officers and “laying out urgent regulations on trade protocols or phytosanitary standards”.636

**Sweden**

In 2017 the Swedish Government asked four expert agencies to analyse the consequences of Brexit in a few specific areas. Their conclusions are summarised on the [Swedish Government website](https://www.government.se). It has established a ‘preparedness group’ to look into the potential consequences of no deal, but is hopeful of a deal.637

Sweden’s financial regulator, *Finansinspektionen* (FI), has called on “investors clearing derivatives through London “to prepare for their counterparties to be considered unauthorised after the UK leaves the EU in March”.638 The FI analysis, *Consequences of Brexit for the Swedish Financial Market* (21 June 2018) recommended that investors “assess the likely consequences for liquidity and solvency, and take capital and liquidity planning into account”, and that companies should the possible effects of Brexit on their business models and strategies, and how to “manage potential adverse effects”.639 The Swedish Chamber of Commerce for the UK has issued guidance, *Brexit – what is it, and how will it affect my business?* (30 October 2018) on its website.

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636 *Politico*, ibid
637 *The Guardian*, ibid
639 Ibid
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