

## Secularization of religion in Indonesia: From Custom to *Pancasila* and back to *adat*

Stephen C. Headley (CNRS)

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**Introduction:** *Why would anyone want to promote or accept a move to normalization of religion? Why are village rituals considered superstition while Islam is not? What is dangerous about such cultic diversity?*

These are the basic questions which we are asking in this paper. After independence in 1949, the standardization of religion in the Republic of Indonesia was animated by a preoccupation with “unity in diversity”. All citizens were to be monotheists, for monotheism reflected more perfectly the unity of the new republic than did the great variety of cosmologies deployed in the animistic cults. Initially the legal term secularization in European countries (i.e., England and France *circa* 1600-1800) meant confiscations of church property. Only later in sociology of religion did the word secularization come to designate lesser attendance to church services. It also involved a deep shift in the epistemological framework. It redefined what it meant to be a person (Milbank, 1990). Anthropology in societies where religion and the state are separate is very different than an anthropology where the rulers and the religion agree about man’s destiny. This means that in each distinct cultural secularization will take a different form depending on the anthropology conveyed by its historically dominant religion expression. For example, the French republic has no cosmology referring to heaven and earth; its genealogical amnesia concerning the Christian origins of the Merovingian and Carolingian kingdoms is deliberate for, the universality of the values of the republic were to liberate its citizens from public obedience to Catholicism. Man, having become the measure of all things, permits humanism to gradually dominate the traditional cathedral-centered *polis* where a partially religious hierarchy of values had once been enthroned. Henceforth the person was increasingly defined as citizen of the republic. Outside of Western Europe, even in Eastern Europe where papo-caesarism was unknown, this inversion never took place (cf. G. Dagron, *Empereur et prêtre*, 1996).

What sort of “secular” state is the Indonesian Republic with its five recognized religions, yet where Islam overshadows all others (Irfan Ahmad 2006)? In any case it is not unique as the institution of a similar system in the Russian Federation during the 1990’s shows us. More specifically this took the form of a shift: monotheism *à la* Pancasila and not Islam would be the basis of citizenship. Naturally, Islam seems the common denominator to many inhabitants of the archipelago. The anti-colonial, nationalist movement had already shown that ethnic labels could be removed from groups when they worked towards “unity in diversity”. A disenchanted cosmology provides a secular (i.e., this century) space where nature can be manipulated. In the past, Indonesians wouldn’t sell their rice because it was a gift from the goddess Sri. In the twentieth century this was understood to make for poor citizens (Asad 2003:27). The domestication of “religions” to the norms of a republican social morphology required secularizing those horizons of transcendence which risked to contradict the pretensions of the new republic to being the greater “whole”. Cultural diversity, too many cults and customs with their strong public norms and values, challenged the secular structure of the republic which proposes citizenship instead of tribal collective identities.

Only Islam was in a position to oppose such a ground shift, such a politicizing of the vision of what it meant to be a person, for only Islam, having organized itself into political parties in the first quarter of the twentieth century, was able to operate on the level of

statehood. For more than ten years, starting in 1949, S.W. Kartosuwirjo's regional rebellion *Darul Islam* challenged the new republic as would-be founders of an Islamic state appeared. Since the suppression of the Darul Islam, other models of re-establishments of Islamic states have been imported from abroad, such as Hizbut Tahrir<sup>1</sup>. Radical groups such as the Solonese branch of this movement give gentle titles to their public meetings in order to obtain permission to hold them. They implicitly recognize that nowadays encouraging violence is frowned upon. In 1945, Muslim demands that *shariah* be obligatory for all Muslims was not incorporated into the constitution. The so-called Jakarta charter was premised on the belief that acculturations represented by regional custom or *adat*-based religion presented an unwanted imbeddedness, i.e. to a local, insular Islam. For different reasons Muslims agreed about this latter diversity and from 1949 till 1955 the insistence on this *piagam* Jakarta was abandoned. Once the Soeharto regime came to power (1967+), military-imposed unity was strengthened, and openly declared as the "raison d'État", and eventually was the pretext for suspension of modern legal procedures that destabilized local *adat*. Can regional custom be eliminated by a republic in the name of the rule of law, by claiming it does not qualify as religion? Successive Indonesian governments and Islam have seen society through such a prism of uniformity. For Islam, Allah's sovereignty is reflected in the mirror of mosque-based prayer, while for the republican government political control and surveillance were activities which the Javanese, and their pre-eminent kingdoms, placed above the laws of God. Such in brief is the Indonesian republic's vision of secularization until recently.

This paper considers the post *Reformasi* (1998+) demand for an application of *shariah* to all Muslims. Such a move could neutralize the diversity of local *adat* which implicitly had been admitted by normal Pancasila "plurality"<sup>2</sup>. This chapter is less a political or ethnographic study than a general reflection on Javanese *adat*. My stepping off point is the following: Javanese culture presupposes that differences create spaces for communication. Political strategies for accumulating identity hinders the creation of such spaces. When difference is treated as division, as in the Soeharto period (1967-98) the relations that bridge the differences are destroyed. The "other" becomes a danger and the different parties can be easily instrumentalized. Difference is "good" as long as the cultural and religious groups have kept each other in focus. For that to be so, above and beyond their differences, some common "higher" values must motivate them to remain in contact. Following Louis Dumont, I have called this "encompassment"<sup>3</sup>, a concept he used in his description of the articulation beyond the diversity of the Indian castes.

*Adat* as Javanese village custom was traditionally "encompassed" by, but not separated, from the law of the palace. Especially in settling village disputes over land tenure, the authority of the founding fathers and spirits of the village was expressed in local cults and adjudications. *Adat* was an indigenous anthropology, a religious and administrative synthesis for local use. It was rendered redundant by the arrival of direct colonial administration. I am deliberately opposing state-sponsored Pancasila management to spontaneous religious praxis, because I consider that Soeharto's approach to this normalization imposes it as a norm, not so

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<sup>1</sup> - In Arabic *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, this "Party of Liberation" boasts itself to be the vanguard of the Sunni. Its aim is to join all Muslim states into a caliphate ruled by an elected caliph. Its founder, Taqiuddin al-Nabahani, a court judge (*qadi*) from Haifa, began his movement in 1953; it is now present in some forty countries, with some one million adherents, and is especially active in Western Europe. Cf. Matringe, Denis, 2005.

<sup>2</sup> - I am referring to Pancasila's as propagated under Soeharto's New Order. I am not referring to 2006 Pancasila's re-packaging as the indispensable national foundation (*dasar negara*) of the republic by such distinguished figures as Azyumardi Azra which is dealt with in Francois Raillon's paper.

<sup>3</sup> - Cf. Louis Dumont, *Essais sur l'individualisme. Une perspective anthropologique sur l'idéologie moderne*. Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1983.

much of religion, as of secularization. This included the obligatory study of the Ordre Baru's own version of *Pancasila* ideology<sup>4</sup>, the substitution of New Order sovereignty above and beyond Allah. The political regime protected, “umbrella”-ed (*dipayungaké*) and overshadowed the more traditional, “normal” wholeness of the Godhead, the *tauhid* of Allah. Endemic local insecurity in the *reformasi* period encouraged the re-emergence of older notions of sociability which permitted the creation of local micro-holisms, each cultural area possessing its own character<sup>5</sup>. Sometimes, as on the north coast of Java, the outbreaks were orchestrated by outside *dhalang* (manipulators) but in southern Borneo or central Celebes, the results of tensions resulting from immigration (so called “*transmigrasi*”) had produced much deeper roots of local conflict<sup>6</sup>. The return to local *adat*-based administration sometimes reduced the levels of intolerance provoked by the top-to-bottom *Pancasila* approaches to local religious diversity. To conceptualize the diversity of *adat* revivals outside of Java, we will first bring in the most recent data collected on this topic.

### ***Adat* in Indonesia today**

The post 1998 re-deployments of local *adat* have been surveyed by Davidson & Henley (2007). I will begin by taking into account the Indonesia-wide results of their research before returning to the Javanese data which is the topic of this paper. Is the revival of different *adat* in Indonesia since 1998 no more than vague appeals to “sedate order and consensus”, as Davidson & Henley suggest? Since 1998 has *adat* everywhere come to connote activism, protest and violent conflict? This shift in connotation is certainly true of certain areas with Bugis immigrants, most notably in Kalimantan and Sulawesi, but not everywhere.

The issues of political recuperation of conflict are more general than ethnicity, for the social tensions sown by the New Order regime were found everywhere. In their first congress in 1999 the Jakarta-based *Aman* (*Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara*, Alliance of Nusantarian Customary Law Peoples) stated pointedly: “If the state will not acknowledge us then we will not acknowledge the state”. After Soeharto's fall in May, 1998, this is comprehensible in the context of the “decentralization and dismantling of the authoritarian state”. Yet, is custom really “radical conservatism”, arming a “new-protean politics of *adat*”? Although Davidson & Henley admit that “Today much of the way societies are organized, rights allocated, and disputes resolved in Indonesia still has little to do with the state or its law”, they nonetheless defined traditional *adat* in two ways: (1) “a complex of rights and obligations” (2007: 3) “...tying together history, land and law in a specifically Indonesian way”; (2) “a formulation of an ideal society”.

Davidson & Henley immediately add: “Neither our concentration ... on power politics nor our use ... of the term ‘deployment’ should be taken to imply that political manifestation of *adat* necessarily reflect the cynical manipulation of tradition by self-interested actors”. But why must one defend *Aman* or any other group from instrumentalization? If Davidson & Henley (2007:4) are trying to provide a “nuanced and critical” assessment of the way *adat* is used to redress basic injustices, the very nature of *adat* sociability should be the focus of their evaluation. They share to a certain extent the prejudice of the Soeharto era and its *Pancasila*

<sup>4</sup> - On the debates between 1945 and 1978 on the content and way in which *Pancasila* should be studied cf. Marcel Bonneff, et al, *Pantjasila, trente années de débats politiques en Indonésie*. Paris, Éditions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1980.

<sup>5</sup> - Among the new approaches to kinship, the term sociability is used in different ways. Cf. Janet Carsten (ed.), *Cultures of Relatedness. New Approaches to the Study of Kinship*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000.

<sup>6</sup> - Over the last few years, inter-religious violence has been provoked in *Tasikmalaya* (*Institut Studi Arus Informasi*, 1998), *Situbondo* (in east Java, Hariyanto 1997), southern Borneo (*Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia*, 1997); Aceh, Maluku and Riau (*Tim Peneliti LIPI*, 2001).

state-administered normalization of religion that ignores how local societies reproduce themselves in space and time.

The recent diverse adoption and or revivals in Indonesia of local *adat* may be understood as an exercise in empowerment that brings along with it “inherent restrictions and dangers”. Having tried to circumvent “Indonesia’s notoriously corrupt and ineffective formal legal system” (Davidson & Henley 2007: 4), the adopting of *adat* is not that often a justification for ethnic violence. How often are individual interests really being subordinated to communities dominated by traditional elites? Davidson & Henley’s rush to judgment leads them (pp. 4-5) to the view that as a political ideology, *adat* is especially subject to political manipulation because it is an informal, un-codified idealization of stability and order. But this is a comparative political approach, preoccupied by the topics of democratization, legal reform and ethnic violence and not an anthropological one which in a given cultural setting would want to ask which values are circulated by customs. A preoccupation with “power” is a straight-jacket which hinders the understanding of the social morphologies articulated by the revival of *adat*.

Davidson & Henley present four factors to explain the nature and causes of this revival of custom: (1) support from international organizations; (2) oppression of the New Order regime; (3) opportunities of *reformasi*, and (4) the role of *adat* in the political imagination of nationalism. Is it true as the cynical observers of indigenous identity believe (2007:6), that “indigenous” is defined not so much by ancestry, culture or marginality and more by wily recuperation in the international discourse on indigenous rights? While these authors realize this is an extreme view, they tend to refuse any coherence in culture because of their horror at its instrumentalization. What today in our world is not instrumentalized? What of the unending lies which are marshaled to project the practice of democracy? So what if for some “indigenism” is nothing more than a “handy tool” in the struggle against globalization, as long as it serves local interests. Davidson & Henley (2007: 9) show that the second cause of the revival of *adat* is that of the disenfranchisement, the refusal of political rights. Under Soeharto, cultural difference and ethnic identity went unrecognized and were brutally punished if proclaimed in the public sphere. After the fall of Soeharto (1998), the reaction in areas of heavy transmigration was one of renewed self-organization of the indigenous populations and, more rarely, pogroms towards immigrants by the “locals”.

Once the top was off the pressure cooker of the Soeharto decades, the *reformasi* era provided positive opportunities (Davidson & Henley 2007:14) “... to find bases for political order other than the bureaucratic hierarchy, economic patronage, state propaganda, and the military force of the New Order”. Under Soeharto’s New Order, religions were directly administered via Pancasila, which was touted as promoting “tolerance”. This in fact meant “normalization” or standardization, according to the norms of universal scripture based religions, for those areas “lacking” real “religion” (i.e., monotheistic *agama*). The difficulty of creating new democratic institutions at the local level, the prevalence of social injustice, the weakness of the existing legal system, and the threat of violence and disorder inclined people in many places to look to tradition as an alternative source of both consensus and justice. This revival of *adat* in certain areas like Lombok and West Sumatra can be seen to be a secular complement to Islam without any ultimate cosmological reference.

One of the main concerns of Davidson & Henley is to distinguish between protection through, as opposed to domination by, *adat* “politics”. Tania Li, in the final chapter of their book (2007:365-6), claims that both on the local and the national level appeals to *adat* “tend to privilege elites, especially senior men, who are empowered to speak on behalf of a presumed whole”. Worse still, the link between ethnic rights and ethnic cleansing seems to these authors to evoke the *Blut und Boden* of Nazi Germany. Clearly there are limits to the usefulness of an

empowerment so locally focused. But local micro-holisms are nonetheless real social groups, and an improvement on the anarchy that the New Order left behind. If everything is treated as a question of empowerment, then there is no need to speak of any hierarchy of values, for power is the only value that characterizes social relations.

Davidson & Henley (2007: 31) also defend another thesis, namely that in Indonesia Islam has historically provided the most “effective bridge between local cultures”. For if one is looking to create *civility*, “in the Enlightenment sense of toleration and restraint with respect to differences in culture, opinion and faith”, then it is possible to claim that Islam “plays a kind of civilizing role in Indonesian political life”. This is not true everywhere, for as the authors write (2007:32-3): “The current *adat* revival, not coincidentally, is concentrated either in areas where the progress of Islamic conversion is blocked by Christianity or Hinduism, or in areas where Islamic conversion has taken place but pre-Islamic elements remain unusually important in social life...”.

The authors’ ultimate critique arises from their belief that *adat* is almost always an expression of some wishful thinking about the ways things ought to be rather than how they are. Given the weakness of the formulations of *adat* in the last sixty years, this fear is understandable. Nor has *adat*, historically speaking, fulfilled its promise and therefore (Davidson & Henley 2007:33), “*adat* as a guarantee of peace and harmony is misleading not only as a prescription for the future but also as an interpretation of the past”. Yet can not the same thing be said of democracy, that hope-filled renaissance of sociability always profiled on a yet further horizon?

Can *adat* be measured by the yardstick of civil society? What is supposed to transcend class, gender and religion is secularism; failing vertical hierarchies and increasing horizontal solidarities are interpreted as giving people reasons for adopting a secular ethic. Yet the credibility of the concept of “civil society” has had a short shelf life in many parts of the world. In eastern Europe (Hann 2006), the cement of nationalism is strongly linked to identifications of forms of eastern and western Christianity. Here we see how the most universal of religions can be provincialized (i.e., Poles are Catholics, Russians are Orthodox, etc.). But then why *a priori* should civility be defined by trust in and the recognition of individual agency in complex societies? If that is the case then the Indonesian *adat masyarakat* communities had better be dissolved in order to attain a more complete reign of the ideology of individualism, where a “principled conception of the individual upon which rights and duties and obligations of a civil polity and society”<sup>7</sup> can be brought centre stage. That way we could slowly eliminate (2007:35) “... the *adat*-based claim to preferential rights on the basis of historical precedence, cultural identity, and territorial possession, a claim which challenges the principles of equality and legal impartiality on which Indonesian (and most other modern) citizenship, at least in theory, is based”.

Having subjected *adat* to such a severe critique, Davidson & Henley finally recognize (2007:38) that *adat* is a “specifically Indonesian ideological tradition in which land, community and custom ... provide the normative reference points for political struggles”. Secondly, that (2007:41) “Firm legal acknowledgement of customary land rights, together with restitution of already alienated *adat* land ... are matters of simple justice”. But, unless one speaks in the most abstract legal terms, the revival of community trust is no simple matter of justice. If one adopts the point of view of the community, (and the authors recognize this (2007:40): “... national legislation is increasingly irrelevant to local developments”) *adat* has been caught up [in] a profusion of local conflict and contestation which for the moment is

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<sup>7</sup> - Quoted by Davidson and Henley. Cf. A. Seligman 2000:75, “Trust, confidence and the problem of civility”, pp. 65-77 in L. Romer (editor), *Civility*. Univ. of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame.

largely beyond legal and institutional control. So is *adat* just a “tool of ethno-politics” as Li suggests in the concluding chapter?

### **Javanese *adat*, religion and society since 1800: a brief chronology**

Today *adat* can be a tool of ethno-politics if it is reduced to a form of political power. This raises a second basic question: When were there last any Javanese *adat*-based cosmologies independent of political concerns? *Adat* is no longer coterminous with Javanese rural society; today Java is thoroughly post-traditional and yet the countryside has not become a modern society! How to explain this paradox? Since tradition, village-based customs, were “eclipsed” there have been many more developments, and yet, to everyone’s surprise, something of *adat* has survived. One hears the ancient terminology in the mouths of landless peasants. Suspended but not forgotten, *adat* has made a timid return.

We should recognize that all forms of sociability, including customs articulated in a village, create the social relations which form its basis. A society only exists if it takes on the form of a totality. Its parts are subject to the conditions of reproduction of this whole (Godelier 1996:221) In the village *slametan* (communal ceremonial meal) this exchange of values has continued to express, in the form of gifts and counter-gifts (cf. § 4 below), social relations in a multi-level discourse (Beatty 1999, ch. 2). One may consider Marcel Mauss’ understanding of reciprocity (*hau* or *mana*) irrelevant to Javanese anthropology, but we remain indebted to this French sociologist for having shown that society exists only if its social forms compose a totality defining its mode of reproduction.

I doubt that the word “society”, used by social scientists or by colonial Javanese historians is natural or innocent; as often as not it represented an imagined or invented community. The introduction by the colonial administration in twentieth-century Java of the word *masyarakat* (society) was motivated by the preoccupations of governance. What then is Javanese about these villages? This neologism *masyarakat* appeared as a loan word from late nineteenth century Malay into Javanese in the 1920’s. Prior to that, the Arab word *dunia* (world) or the Javanese more cosmological vision, *jagad*, had been used by the Javanese to designate the social backdrop of human events. Certainly order (*tata*) was always associated with the rulers’ palace cities, but custom (*adat*) was considered the norm of the countryside. In this sense the order of the capital cities and the norms of the village have been opposed and/or harmonized in passed centuries (*Desa mawa cara, negara mawa tata*). What passed unnoticed in the “obscurity” of village life was custom defined by Javanese sociability and not limited to its imported administrative concepts.

Can we place Javanese *adat* in a periodization of the last two hundred years? Islam joined the anti-colonial struggle at the beginning of the nineteenth century with the anti-Dutch *jihād* led by prince Dipanagara (1825-1830). Its defeat marked the end of the old order of the central Javanese kingdoms (Carey 2007). After the end of the Java War (1830), the only way to envision central Java was in terms of *kraton* (palace) and *kumpeni* (the Dutch East Indies administration; Houben 1994). The former principality where I worked beginning in 1973, the area of north and east of Surakarta, saw the introduction of the Mangkunagaran’s (the lesser of the two Surakartan principalities) taxation laws in 1855 (*Mangkoenagaran Rijksblad* no. 2 and 3, Headley 2004: 175-184). Although this system of indirect taxation was still based on apaupe attribution of Javanese aristocrats, leasing to foreign plantations for rent had been going on since before the outbreak of the Java war (1825). The Mangkunagaran even went so far as to create its own sugar plantations (Pringgodigdo 1950). Needless to say, in this context Javanese *adat* no longer had the upper hand in village *faire valoir*, except in the poorest regions which did not interest the plantations.

On the margin of that village-plantation polarity existed an increasingly independent Muslim Javanese vision of Java (Ricklefs 2007). And at that time the so-called *abangan* (peasant Islamic) mentality also appeared alongside a Christian outlook. A unified value system was breaking up rapidly into incompatible visions of the island world. What Ricklefs (ch. 7:2007) has called the *budi* (intellect) and *buda* (Hindu-Buddhist) aristocratic (*priyayi*) reaction to Islam came in the last third of the nineteenth century. On a national level, the issue of the sovereignty of Allah in the early twentieth century was again raised when the above polarities became politicized. At the beginning of the twentieth century the new nationalistic youth organizations all had an ethnic dominant. In the newly politicized atmosphere, with the beginning of the first pan-Indonesian organization, the Sarekat Islam (1911), and the foundation of the Muhammadiyah movement (1912), the anti-colonial movement became both an urban and no longer an ethnically-bound phenomena. The villages were no longer the centre of any social ethos. The Javanese villagers raised questions about political hierarchy which were motivated by their preoccupation with territorialized local realities. Most everyone supposed that in the post-independence standardization of the *custom* that regulated local village cults, *adat* would be part of the past. Passing back and forth from questions of general anthropology to issues of Javanese ethnology, we will see why this was not so. To do this, three aspects of Javanese society will be examined: 1- Using the example of the village of Kerek in East Java, determine village custom once was: the example of Kerek in East Java. 2- Evoke the mythology of the first Javanese kingdom which is purported to embody the political origins of Javanese *adat*. 3- Sketch out how micro-holisms can evolve out of “Javanese” monotheisms when they acculturated back into local custom (*adat*).

In conclusion, I will try to evaluate the way in which these factors fit together in terms of the normalization of Javanese religion.

### 1. Socio-cosmic classification in East Java: Kerek (Tuban)

The revival of *adat* in post-*reformasi* Indonesia is not nearly so cosmologically refined, but in fact shows just those foundational traits that Roxanne Euben (1993) claims are irrelevant in the West. This may well be why Javanese *adat* seems so retrograde to Western political scientists. Isn't *adat* just another example of the re-invention of tradition? The mythology behind *adat*, which is still alive in the Javanese *wayang*, has no clear chronology because myths are regularly recomposed with later ones. Even Muslim legends are integrated into early Javanese myths (Headley 2004: ch. 11).

Rens Heringa, in an article (2007) on Javanese rituals in the village of Kerek, south of Tuban (east Java), provides a very full description of the classificatory categories that used to be found throughout Java in extremely varied forms. Beginning in the 1980's, outside influences on Kerek (seventeen villages divided into nine hamlet clusters) began to break up this inter-village coherence<sup>8</sup>. So even these more remote villages testify to erosion of socio-cosmic categories of Javanese mythology. For the purposes of a study of *adat*, Heringa's description of Kerek is our benchmark.

In the isolated villages in the porous limestone hills eighty kilometers south of Tuban on Java's north coast, the food exchanged in these rituals sketches out male and female complementarity. Heringa shows how

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<sup>8</sup> - Since the 1850's, Dutch and later Indonesian government attempts to create normal Javanese villages has been reported. A typical administrative measure was to insist that the head of a household, or *kepala soma(h)*, must be a male. This reflects the patrilineal tendency in central and eastern Java over the last three centuries, where landholding families taking over positions as village headman would leave their rice fields only to the eldest son. In Java certain villages escaped such “planification” and maintained their specific *adat*, sharing out their lands in other proportions.

“... the exchange of set ingredients and food symbolically regenerates all levels of kin relationships comprising human and non-human social bonds. The villagers of Kerek in the 1980’s still imagined that they were the “owners” (to use the governmental jargon) of the woods and the guardians of the water sources. Their Javanese religious expression (generally referred to as *kejawèn*) had incorporated only limited aspect of Islamic practice” (2007:1).

Heringa’s formulation of “religious expression” is felicitous in that it avoids treating as personal belief the socio-cosmic fit, the need to “create a balanced whole” between the sky above, the earth and the netherworld, sought in their rituals. It also leaves wide open the possibility for many other non competitive expressions of Javanese religions. These categories remain important locally; they articulate those networks of cooperation in nearby villages elsewhere called *moncapat* or *moncalima*. Ideally four-five, but here nine (4+4+1), participate in a rotating specialization, beginning with the eastern village and ending with the northern. This “... results in uniting the territory into a vast conceptual kin group that cooperates in the production of the basic needs of clothing-and-food (*sandhang-pangan*)” (2007:1).

Both empirical and classificatory kinship patterns express ways of sharing and exchanging. In the enduring cycles of life and death, vegetable, human and spirit continually change positions on the scales engendered by these cycles intersection. Stages of life are thus defined by binary oppositions of male-female, inside-outside, high-low, dry-wet, hot-cool. Heringa characterizes the values of such classification, similar to that of Roti in eastern Indonesia: “the interplay of categories (as ones which) marks the contexts where alternative perspectives may apply”. It is not only food but culinary processes and ingredients that are defined by these classifications. At the top of the scale of life-giving ceremonial ingredients one finds rice, certain slices of meat, coconut and *lontar* (borassus palm leaves used for manuscripts) “fruits”, and at the lower end (yet equally important ritually for their proximity to water and water spirits), fruits filled with seeds, creepers, chicken and eggs, as well as root crops.

The generations are also allotted specific roles. Thus, young adults serve food and drinks at the beginning of the ritual, while elders, esteemed to be closest to the spirit world, distribute the snacks at the end. Classificatory “grandfathers” in the northern village (i.e., at the end of the life cycle) grow the coconuts and chilly pepper used in the ritual meat soup. They also provide the *lontar* sap that is used in the fermented *tuak* drink. Leaves from the *lontar* tree, once dried, are sent from the northern village to the southern one to be plaited by young girls into ritual containers at the start of the new cycle of regeneration. Seniority governs the levels of respect, such that elders (*wong tua*) are mediators with non-human seniors, ancestors, spirits and gods. In a prospective marriage, the groom should be from a descent level elder than that of his fiancée. The female side (*aris wedok*) which normally initiates the marriage process, with the male side (*aris lanang*) hereby showing that the two affined groups, differentiated by gender, are also distinguished by precedence, i.e., seniority. Likewise, the calendar of the ritual cycle fits in with the annual calendar, weddings and circumcisions taking place preferably after the June dry rice harvest during the dry hot season. Pregnancy rites per force occur throughout the year, rituals to prevent rain must be held to preserve the virtues of dryness even if this is out of season.

In short, kinship involves both sharing and exchanging. This weaves a balanced consubstantiality of persons as expressed by their classification system. While the study of Javanese *adat* indicates that the Javanese cognatic kinship system is insignificant compared to the territorial basis of the Javanese village, in Kerek, Heringa (2007:4) has shown that the cyclical cooperation between hamlets (*dhusun*) is a classificatory kinship model actually articulating distinctions. Kinship terms classify the villages differentially and the same kinship terms are used to address the spirits, suggesting that the cosmological classifications are homologous with the social ones.

The basic distinction in Javanese sociability is between one's own "body" (*awaké dhéwé*) and other persons (*wong liya*). It is important to note that one's own "body" includes three ascending and descending generations! "Other persons" is not a fixed category since it includes those who are "not yet (part of) one's family" (*'rung kulawarga'*). Heringa describes how some "others" become affines without becoming part of one's own (family). It is the way in which the two groups, one's "own body" and "other persons" relate that is organised by *adat*. *Awaké dhéwé* give each other the care (*momong*) given to small children. Clothing and food (*sandhang pangan*), as well as shelter, are automatically shared without discussion. Relations with "others" (*wong liya*), be they married into the *kulawarga* or not, are simply a gamble (*mung dolan*). To engender harmony between these two groups, one's "own body" and "other persons", the basic means is the exchange of food during *slametan*, which sets into motion exchange between villages classifying space, time and generation by assignation in this matrix. It also involves fierce competition for prestige. On the other hand, gifts between co-resident consanguineous kin is rare, whereas contribution to co-resident affines is compensated by a return gift. Sharing is very different from exchanging!

## 2. Micro-holisms: Javanese village *adat* yesterday and the ethos of custom today

So *adat* survived ever since the 1820's down to the present day in networks of kinship and neighbourhoods. Since the beginning of this article we have mentioned the phenomena of local social integration through community down-scaling. With the contemporary revival of *adat*, one is replacing reliance on the state by reliance on smaller scale, custom-bound social morphologies. This has been found throughout Asia on the village level wherever the state is weak or ineffectual. Although in the area of Kerek in east Java, relations with village Muslims were not yet an issue, in Java generally, *adat* has come to be one means of mediating locally Muslim-Christian relations. Let me explain what I mean here.

What later came to be called *adat*, i.e. local custom, by definition predates the arrival of monotheistic religions, but *adat's* role waned with the rise of anti-colonial movements and the advent of national independence, which replaced the notion of the local world (*dunya, jagad*) by that of societies (*masyarakat*) composed of individual citizens. This is true *mutatis mutandis* in the Indonesian lowland and less often so in the highland (cf. documents on the site "conflictrecovery.org").

It is important to notice how Indonesian Christianity differs from Indonesian Islam. West European Protestants and Catholics had already been integrated into in a pluralistic society in the secularized European public sphere. What made the Christian tradition of God as totality, as society and world, different from Islam was its marginalization in western Europe with the advent of nation states more than two hundred years before Indonesia gained independence. Indonesian Islam on the other hand is still working through its relation with the secular state. This is occurring throughout the Pacific rim of East Asia, with varying results. This occurred just as the colonial powers began looking for overseas possessions and can be seen in the nineteenth-century reluctance of European colonial powers to be implicated in the spread Christianity which they feared might jeopardize public order. The replacement of the God as whole by the societal totality of the nation state was already part of the social landscape of eighteenth-century Europe's increasingly "privatized" Christianity. This of course was not the case of Islam. In turn the civilizing mission of Europe did not need to include spreading Christianity, which soon became simply a private aspect of the colonizing mother state's culture of governance (cf. Luizard 2006).

For instance, the revival of *adat* I saw in Java<sup>9</sup> is also occurring in China. Tu Weiming (1999) suggests there is a “convergent” religious evolution. He observes the emergence of a common aesthetic and ethos of the religious practice between different Taoist, Buddhist, Confucian and Christian Chinese. This is possible because, on the village level they can be centered on the common values of peace, harmony, equilibrium, sympathy, uprightness and communion. This way of handling pluralism articulates tolerance on the basis of existing social values. In Eurasia, in the Russian Federation for instance, this entails a “hierarchical pluralism” of religions (Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism), deployed to create an ascriptive hierarchy depending on their shared religious past.

To bring this revival of custom and traditional cosmology into focus, it is useful to concentrate on two historical phenomena: (I) showing where secularization has reinforced rigidities in the public expression of religion, and (II) showing how inculturation in traditional customs revives local cosmologies.

(I) According to European secularization theory, religion has lost its role as a unifier of values and behavior (Berger 1999, ch. 1; Blumenberg 1988; Monod 2002). Modernity has indeed attempted to secularize the world, but this has produced an equally strong reaction on the part of South Asian and Southeast Asian Islam. Since the 1980’s, contemporary expressions of Islam “suffered”, but also often “benefited” from the contributions of such “modernity”. Muslim organizations have become more participatory and the WEB has contributed to a better access to catechization (*dakwah*). However, a secularized private personalized “spirituality” with little shared transcendence has no public authority. In the first phases of the post-colonial era the issue was: can the nation state be created without its own ethical core? And, if not, which ethical core would it be? If it had no public expressions of transcendence, which supposedly connote intolerance, the answer was negative! These post-colonial states wanted to marginalize religion on the model of their eighteenth-century European predecessors.

In religious circles, authority is supposed to be granted by the faithful to respected figures. Such sacred authority should not be manipulated by the ambitious seeking power. This was Davidson & Henley’s critique of the instrumentalization of *adat*. When the category of power replaces that of religious authority, as the resurgence of religion in international relations now demonstrates, the potential of “religious” figures for the accumulation of supposedly politically powerful identities reduces the authority of the religions they are supposed to represent. Such an impoverished ideology fragments the community of believers as the instrumentalization of Islam has recently proven. A local defense against such bastardization is down-scaling, i.e. the reduction of the social scale of intervention. That having been said, each nation has its own tightly woven sociability; it is often almost impossible to distinguish the truly religious in such a society from those who manipulate them for gathering votes or influence. In Java it is at the local level that relations of Christians and Muslim communities are the least affected by the above constraints.

How then can Muslim or Christian monotheism inculturate back into local custom, local cosmologies? This is an unexpected development for modernity. Inculturation of monotheism back into traditional customs revives the shared traits of both the local *adat* and the monotheisms. By having separated faith and reason, the Enlightenment affirmed that only science could understand the rationality of the created world with its separate cosmology.

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<sup>9</sup> - (2004) “Raising the Heavens: contemporary Christian and Muslim reaffirmations of transcendence in central Java”, 4<sup>th</sup> EUROSEAS Conference (Paris, Sorbonne), Panel 4 - *Ethnicity, Religion and Nation-State in Southeast Asia*, 1-4 septembre 2004.

Traditional cosmologies in Asia describe another kind of “observable” cosmos, encompassing the correspondences between the macro- and micro-cosmos dimensions of the universe and man. The very body of man is a temporary transposition of macrocosmic elements into a human microcosm. These cosmologies do not expect that the universe has been or will be a uniform and isotropic continuum of matter and time as does “modern” science. A necessary law which requires no other further explanation is the goal of science, while the traditional Asian cosmologies were interested in parallels, in correspondences between the here and there. So it is not by chance that Southeast Asian Christian communities sometimes relate to indigenous religions by participation in the compatible dimensions of the local cosmologies, for these in fact explain more about local societies than do many nation state ideologies. These local ritualized cosmologies articulate their social morphologies in ways that mobilize many sectors of the population otherwise unrelated to this common inherited custom. In this sense a local cosmology can bring together in the differentiated, modest but real local whole.

Here are some of the ways that down-scaling occurred in central Java. In the aftermath of imported and internal violence, post-May 1998 Solo became a map of destruction (*peta kerusuhan*). Portals went up at the entrances to all the *kampung*. There was a generalized loss of confidence in the police and the courts with the result that intra-*kampung* networking began to flourish. Neighborhoods adapt rituals where they can be performed with renewed relevance<sup>10</sup>.

Beginning in 1999 the formalistic and scripturalist Islamic sectarian movements and their militias also appeared (Reinbold, 2006). There were morals squads, anti-Western hotel sweepings, pro-Bashir demos (leader of the *pendok pesantrèn* al-Munir), pro-*sharî'ah* rallies (Schulte Nordholt, & Klinken, 2007). The debate over the new education bill (abbreviated *Sisdiknas*) requiring, *inter alia*, Islamic education for Muslim pupils in Catholic private schools gained support from fundamentalist (*primordialisme*) Muslims (for instance by municipal decree of the mayor in, Magelang, October 2002) and criticism from Christians. The Roman Catholic review *Akar Rumput* (Semarang, June 2003) called this a “reductionist movement” (*aliran reduksionisme*), i.e., reducing religions with political agendas. They were identifying education with religious education, *ketuhanan* (divinity) with *agama*, especially the missionary religions (*agama dakwah* or imported religions) (*Berita* 4.VII.03). While the earlier twentieth-century Muslim modernists were nationalists, the new recent radical Muslim modernists thought that statehood must be Islamic and that the only revealed law was *sharî'ah*.

As soon as the violence of May 1998 subsided, various associations (*panguyuban* and *warga*) appeared favoring tolerance and mutual respect to counter these “reductionist” groups (*golongan*). The semantics of their slogans reflects their outlook: “No state” (*Emoh negara*, Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, *Kompas*, Feb. 2000); they wanted non-nationalistic social movements, calling them “civil society without the state” (*masyarakat sipil tanpa Negara*) (Abdul Munir Mul Khan 2003:83) The inter-faith groups (*forum lintas agama*) were not ecumenical, but were convened between local mosques and churches to prevent further importations of violence (*menaikkan semangat perdamaian*). Meanings and values were changing rapidly.

The commodification of religious education has forced believers to look up and notice how low the sky has become (Paryanto, 2003). In the press for instance, Ayu Utami speaks of an incomplete God, on the other hand I. Haryanto (quoting Manguwiyaya) speaks of education that is not “afraid of God”. In the down-scaling examined in this paper, universalism is not defined by individualism (atheistic fundamental human rights) promoted by certain secularized NGO's, but holistic, albeit a micro-holism concerning a limited social space. By

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<sup>10</sup> - Cf. S.C. Headley, “Of Sacred Wells and Shopping Malls: Glimpses of the Reconstruction of Social Confidence in Solo after Soeharto”, pp. 227-241, in Jan Mrazek (ed.) *Puppet Theatre in Contemporary Indonesia: New Approaches to Performance-Events*. Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 2002.

raising heaven / cosmology (*jagad ageng*) so that it covers “all mankind”, here and there Christians together with Muslims are locally trying to put religion out of the reach of the manipulators of Pancasila. This praxis of *agama* espouses a notion of transcendence, of majesty (*linuhur*). Since NGO’s are by definition middlemen (*maklar*) dependent for their financing on their often European (Australian, American) sponsors Indonesian human rights *à la Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (Komnas HAM)* may be manipulated. Religious groups are also subject to manipulation, but at least here we can speak of an outright degradation of the founding relationship of Creator to the Creature (*Pengciptanya makhluk*), expressed in Allah’s mercy (*rahmat*), which “normally” should be kept out of reach of politicians.

The fears of those in Solo faced with the up-coming 2004 elections concerned money politics, militias, the new *ninja*-PKB killings (notably, Asmuni Ishak in Lumajang; Rafiq and Nono Gustam in Jember), dozens in east Java 1999. This was understood to mean the return of professional agitators (*Jakarta Post* 3.XII.03) and prompted certain Javanese to search for a religious praxis without “attributes” (turbans, Hebrew greetings, like *shalom*, among Christians), which could neutralize commoditization or religious belief for electoral purposes (*Solopos* 27.VI.03, page 4). If not, certain Solonese were saying, faith in Allah will be manipulated and experience of God, once instrumentalized, will then diminish. By this they meant that the political strategies for accumulating religious identities bastardizes the contents of the vocabulary of *tauhid* (monotheism); finally lowering heaven, which then loses its capacity to encompass everyone. This represents a new vision of the effects of secularization.

The kind of equality offered all *agama* in Soeharto’s version of Pancasila was an evaluative indifference, from which Indonesia is still suffering. In Soeharto’s Indonesia of the 1970’- 80’s Java was a weakened society, no longer strong enough to fend off those who manipulate the practice of a religious faith. Javanese were seeking a new totality (*keseluruhan, keutuhan, kesemestaan*) to be attained by a hierarchy of values held in common and articulated through a succession of encompassments.

Local newspapers were criticizing the political vocabulary, saying that concept of *masyarakat* had lost its civil value; faced with fundamentalism (*mengadu domba* or ram battle), there is no society, yet associations (*panguyuban* and *warga*) were still capable of envisaging a common heaven (*jagad*). Here we see the importance of the community culture (*budaya warga masyarakat*). The revival of *adat* claims that the society of the state is no society. For central Java the rediscovery of a common Javanese culture / cosmology has proven to be the most neutral way for Christians and Muslims to defend their communities and to promote peace in their shared inhabited social space.

In south central Java the submerged, constructive voices, appealing to the vision of a complete society have been ignored by the commercial media. The young Muslims of the bureau for the study of Islam and Society in Central Java (LKiS) distributed their broadsheet *al-Ikhtilaf*, “the Difference (i.e., between us all)”, in mosques serving some twenty million Muslims in central Java every Friday morning. Three days after September 11th terrorist attacks, the edition of 14<sup>th</sup> of September was entitled “From individual piety toward social devotion”, that of the 19<sup>th</sup> of October “*Shalat*<sup>11</sup>, an effort to restrain oneself from the desire to go on the rampage”, and the edition of the 26<sup>th</sup> of October, “The feeling of humanity, torn apart”. Behind the choice of topics and headlines, one can feel mounting frustration. Each issue expressed the need for peace and tolerance based on a vision of the whole of Javanese society. Their work was not reported by the media, be it local or international.

Sometimes small anecdotes of daily life were the pretext to re-evaluate the Javanese mentality. In the September 15<sup>th</sup> (2000) issue of *al-Ikhtilaf*, thus a year before Al-Qaeda

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<sup>11</sup> - The five daily Muslim prayers.

attacks, an article was entitled “To expose the prejudices between communities of believers”. Wening Tandas Ati recalled how a middle-aged woman, after a Javanese friendship (*silaturahmi*) meeting<sup>12</sup> in the town of Parakan, said to him,

““Sir, you’re a Muslim aren’t you? How is it that you have such a feeling of love. What moved you to become like this?” I was stunned by this question. What I understood was that a Muslim cannot possess a feeling of love. If I speak about attention to, receiving and respecting difference (*al-ikhtilaf*), this lady finds it strange that the person speaking in this way is a Muslim. As a Muslim who has inherited the *hadīth* (saying of the Prophet reported only by oral tradition) stating that it is not enough to believe, if one doesn’t not love one’s brother as oneself. I was quite wounded by her question. But seeing the woman’s innocence, I began to reflect. This mother had probably had bad experiences living with Muslims. As a follower of the Catholic religion, she may often have been marginalized and ostracized by her neighbors. Most likely she was mocked and condemned for practicing (her) religion that fulfill a call from God. And the Muslims who acted arbitrarily towards her would not have felt that there was anything wrong in what they did”.

### 3. The foundation of Javanese polities: from myths to kingship to state and back to *adat*

Current views of society in Java, while highly fragmented, can be brought into focus by looking at the partial revival of *adat* as an alternative to the society propagated by the Indonesian republic. Both Javanese Islam and Javanese *adat* share a preoccupation with promoting non-governmental forms of sociability. *Adat* is good for circulating social values, and as such is a norm immediately beneficial to its local practitioners. Not that this is the primary phenomenon in the social landscape, but its use in the revival of village life, both rural and urban, favours local autonomy. This is the best indicator of what the fall of the Soeharto regime has permitted in terms of new forms of sociability.

The word society may not have been part of the Javanese lexicon until recently, but all things have a beginning and Javanese myths described the origins of their world’s order. The initial foundation of Javanese custom and religion by indigenous Javanese rulers is recounted in a myth concerning the first Javanese kingdom (Headley 2004, ch. 2-3).

As elsewhere in Southeast Asia (Platenkamp 2008), in Java royal relative age affinity was the foundation of the mythic foundation of the first kingdom. The elder sister and rice goddess, Dewi Srī, abandoned her incestuous relationship on earth with her younger brother Sadana and became a python (*naga*) in the rice fields, guaranteeing their fertility, while Sadana became the first king in Mendhang Kamulan (“origin of the rice shaft”). Shortly afterwards they both leave their new role and return to heaven when ordered back by Shiva. The elder female sibling is still the rice goddess for the Javanese peasants while her double, the maid (or queen) of the southern ocean (Lara Kidul), becomes the invisible consort of the kings of Surakarta and Yogyakarta, resting on a bed in the heirloom (*pusaka*) room behind the throne. Meeting or copulating with her was only possible for the reigning king, but the whole palace was mobilized to present her with offerings every Thursday evening, just as the peasant women did at the same moment in their granaries in their village homes. Here elder is not autochthonous but sexually potent and the origin of sovereignty (*daulat*). Kings come and go, but Srī never changes. She is a kingdom’s ultimate heirloom (*pusaka*). The primordial myths lay out her *adat* by describing her cult on Thursday evening, which mobilized rice cultivators and royalty. *Adat* in this sense encompasses the behavior of women rice farmers and male kings. Srī is both an elder sister and a partner for the king Sadana. Her name, written in

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<sup>12</sup> - These take place during the month following the end of Ramadan (ninth month of the Muslim lunar year) and consolidate social solidarity at all levels of society: factories, political parties, hamlets, etc.

Javanese script, is found over the lintels of the doors of the inner rooms of the palace. There it is less a name of address than an epithet; Srī means auspicious; she is the consort of Vishnu (name given to Sadana once a king). Access from our lower world (*jagad alit*) to the higher world (*jagad gedhé*) passes through elder sister rice goddess. For peasants, access to this macrocosm which blesses their crops and guarantees the appropriateness of the ritual sacrifices is guided by the *adat* or customs that structure and found her cult. The greater and lesser world need to be brought into correspondence for the prevention of epidemics and coherent sovereignty. The formal properties of that “well-fittedness” are recapitulated in the elder female and younger male incest, which needs to be undone for these now separated polarities to provide trans-generational fertility and intra-generational potent sovereignty. *Adat* remains senior to kingship, providing younger sibling an occasion to encompass what might have remained unapproachable, elder sister. In the myth of Srī and Sadana incest produces a disjunction and then a series of similar “couples” who capture the original incest, are obliged to abandon it and go their separate, but hierarchical ways.

Other myths also describe this period as that of a disjunction or separation of the macrocosm from the microcosm. As the heavens are separated from the earth, the shaping of the first human society is recounted. The human body is taken as a trope of the shape of society. The myth of these primordial times concern the engendering, the feeding and the assemblage of incomplete human person, understand society (cf. Headley, 2005). In these so-called “half men” myths, incomplete persons provide an occasion to reflect on what makes society whole and how the incomplete or partial body of a person is a trope of an incomplete society<sup>13</sup>.

The primary interest of studying these Javanese myths which today are no longer well known is to understand how the Javanese used to think a whole human and hence a whole sociability was to be constituted. In the nineteenth century such myths troubled the strictly reformist Javanese Islam but, of course, not the various Javanese philosophical or meditation groups (*kejawén* or Javanism; *kebatinan* or “interiority groups”). Although Java was once a traditional society, in the twenty-first century clearly Java presents hybrid contradictory traits one can call pseudo-holism. Nevertheless, one can say that a person – holist axis still exists behind the multiplicity of Javanese beliefs and religious praxis.

<sup>13</sup> - Here in tabular form are two Javanese “half man” myths (Headley 2005) showing how both unfinished half-men represent incomplete societies.

<b>Figure 1:</b>	<i>Half person:</i>	<i>Half person:</i>
<b>CODE :</b>	<i>the Sléwah boy (Jarasanda)</i>	<i>young man, Kala</i>
<b>1. Conception</b>	By fission : a split fruit.	by disjunction : sperm fallen into the ocean in the absence of his <u>mother.</u>
<b>2. Nutrition:</b>	zero degree of marriage: solitary and invincible.	Kala seeks human blood for food “because” he never knew his <u>mother.</u>
<b>3. Mariage</b>	by bisection: he can only be killed by being split on a meteor.	Kala’s is given by his father a cook who is his mother his mother.
<b>4. Killing:</b>	zero degree of nutrition : Jarasanda becomes a food offering but even the ogress find him uneatable.	by the ritualized recounting his own incomplete conception in a genesis myth

Andrew Beatty (personal communication; also Beatty 1999) is of the opinion that the notion of an individual spiritual culture is alien to the praxis of social conformity in daily Javanese life. Mainstream mysticism is about group sessions, a hierarchy and an anti-individual ethic. There is a universal self, not at all a New Age personal creation. Javanese mysticism is about the relationship between community and cosmos.

## Conclusions

At every level of our analysis of Javanese village life, we find both endogenous and exogenous factors constraining the reproducing of local society in space and time. Their simple assignment to one or the other of these categories (local/national; traditional/modern; indigenous/imported, as in Islamization or *dakwah*) is commonsensical and in itself does not explain anything. To say that the authority of village custom was overwhelmed by the power of the colonial prefectural (*kabupaten*) administrative and police apparatus or, for instance, that villagers were obliged to institute the standard urban Muslim ritual calendar replacing the local ones commemorating local protective spirits (*dhanyang dhusun*), etc., are important descriptive statements, but not yet analytical ones. *Why would anyone want to promote or accept such a change begins to address the issue of normalization.* Standardization can take many forms including *pro forma* normalization, one example where one simply pronounces as a state of fact something which “seems” to have already taken place, i.e., the recent construction of a mosque “makes” a village Muslim. This is, in fact, not a statement about the religious praxis of the villagers but about what the builder of the mosque thinks of their “backward” beliefs.

Recall that at the end (1860's) of the cultivation system (or *cultuurstelsel* involving forced deliveries of export crops) the Dutch colonialists were preoccupied with “traditional village institutions” protecting an imagined village equality, which they had just done their best to destroy. We could call this contradictory kind of normalization counter-factual, for the conditions pertaining to its realization have already disappeared. In the 1980's, a hundred years later, the “culturalization” (*dikabudayaké*, in Javanese) for local or foreign tourism of Javanese *adat* was understood to be the death knell of village ritual entertainment where its exploitation was organized for by the newly enfranchised middle class (Pemberton 1994). In fact, if “pure” village rituals are generally all about articulating scales of difference, it is because these are hierarchical. It is thus that they reproduce themselves from generation to generation. They account for the totality of relations that order society. Clearly the governance deployed by the Republic of Indonesia sought to control villages, yet despite state terror under Soeharto, local hierarchies of values did not always disappear.

What we need to understand is how local society manages to preserve its internal constraints or how it is obliged to abandon them definitely, faced with “modernity”. After the long night of the Soeharto New Order regime (1966-1998), what surprised people was the revival of both local Javanese *adat* and, even before Soeharto fell, that of Javanese Islam. This should not have been a surprise, however, because both are *prima facie* addressing the defects of the New Order. In what way do they differ from Pancasila? Nominally, in the abstract, the values they express are rather similar. By contrast, there is little spontaneous consensus in the New Order ideology. There is less artificiality in the redeployments of Islam, its renaissance (*nadha*) through regeneration, (*dakwah*) and in the Javanese (*kejawèn*) efforts to remain traditional (*asli*). A cynical effort to willfully impose a norm unaccompanied by a wide local consensus breeds anomie, the opposite of what the initial “Pancasila-sation” of religion in the early years of the Republic was supposed to achieve. As Umar Dani, founder of the Solo conservatory of dance and musical arts, said to me in the mid 1980's, Pancasila is best suited for creating atheism. The authority of custom is not consciously constructed, even if it may be the object of competition. Who really defends it? Momentarily in a village the young may be

harangued into action “because this is our *adat*”. Debates exist among Muslims concerning whose vision of Islam is the purer one. What secondary customs can be dropped or updated as opposed to primary fundamental traditions. When their normative nature does exclude inspection, when revealed (*wahyu*) texts and the ascetical art of cultivating one’s *ressenti* of the divine can be objectified, one can feel a pluralism at work.

If what we have said here by way of a conclusion has any general validity, then one should be able to distinguish between the manipulation of a norm and its place in a hierarchy of values which a traditional society has inherited, follows and perpetuates. The second option is clearly foreign to modernity. Since the fashion of the “modern” democracy has rarely kept its promises, many Javanese find the renewal of stricter Islamic practice, top to bottom sponsorship of Ministry of Religion programs, and sub-prefectural reforms of corporate responsibility less palatable than *adat* such as they remember and practice it. This is especially true when one is dealing, not with building roads or installing high tension pylons, but managing daily life through the help of one’s neighbors or marrying one’s daughter. In Java secularization began with an implicit distinction between local tradition and the foreign and secular. For centuries the *santri* (a student or practitioner of strict Islam) managed to avoid being recuperated by the successive *kraton* (palaces). This meant avoiding the authority of the different government administrations of religion. The ministry was created in 1946 with a Muhammadiyah incumbent, Rasjidi, in 1949. With independence, the NU began to take over the *Kementrian Agama*, for they still hoped that Islam would be proclaimed the official religion of Indonesia.

Just as the Dutch in the nineteenth century co-opted *adat*’s capacity to mobilize local networks, Soeharto also used local traditions of *sambatan* / *gotong royong* (mutual aid) to impose *corvée* labor. This corresponds to a second period of secularization: Generally neither effort elicited a defiant refusal to participate on the part of the Javanese peasants, even if there were spates of short-lived peasant rebellions (cf. Kartodirdjo, 1973). These passed generally unnoticed, as did the fact that the villagers lost their own socio-cosmic references due to this exploitation. Custom may be stamped out but this is usually harder than one imagines. Normalization, standardization of religion, on the other hand, is subject to much superficial acquiescence. Then, once the threat that accompanies it is absent, the modern volatilizes as a consequence of its artificiality. Likewise, the Christian and Muslim efforts failed to discourage the Javanese from praying at the graves of their ancestors on the eve of the New Year. This is just one example of that spontaneity, of that cultural *ressenti* whose roots are deeper than the political imagination of norms. Governments are characterized by evaluative indifference to much of the culture of sociability that guides “their” citizens daily lives. Rather than ask: *why would anyone want to promote or accept a move to normalization of religion, or consider village rituals superstition while Islam is not*, we should first of all notice how shallow the political imagination can become. When one thinks like a nation state or a bureaucracy, does one forsake the shared experience and social diversity that is unconsciously accepted by the average Javanese with the confidence that such difference actually underpins and sustains a common hierarchy of values? “Representation” to the average Javanese does not mean the election of presidents, but participation in the life-accompanying rituals and in the conviviality their families have always practiced in time of transition and need. To bring these ways of living into practice one has to return to an understanding of person that leaves a large place for reciprocity. Rational choice theory and all such theories imply an ideology of individualism that is not yet vectored by Javanese daily life nor even by Islam. The Javanese living in the same *kampong* still have more to share with each other, no matter what their respective “religions”, and this has been formulated in an *adat* that evolves with each generation, enhancing their sociability.

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## STEPHEN C. HEADLEY

**Affiliation : Groupe Sociétés, Religions, Laïcités (GSRL (UMR 8582), CNRS-EPHE, Paris)**

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