

Being a « martyr » [syahîd] in Java today :

A deformation of sacrifice?

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1 . Introduction.

In central Java on the southern edge of the town of Surakarta (Solo) there in the hamlet of Ngruki is Pondok Pseantren (Koranic school) of Abu Bakar Ba’ashir, the leader of the Jemaah Islamiyah movement, responsible for the four terrorist bombings in Indonesia since 2002. This movement says these bombers are *syahîd* (martyrs in Arabic and Indonesian). Although in past centuries this term *syahîd* was used in Malacca, southern Celebes, Aceh and even in Bali¹, none of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Javanese anti-colonial holy wars raised in the name of *sharia* ever used the term *syahîd* to describe their fallen warriors². Thus Javanese Islam presents an anomaly³. Does the presence in central Java of the Jemaah Islamiyah “benefiting” from the support of al-Qaeda, in anyway explain this important innovation, for instance by the inevitable fragmentation of the *umma* under the influence of these extremists. If one emerges from the virtual representation of Java in the media, this new use of the word martyr remains as marginal as ever in Java and there are cultural reasons for this. Such is the position this paper defends.

Outside of one short visit in 2003 to al-Munir, the Ba’ashir’s madrasah - *pesantèn*, I had little occasion and even less desire to speak to the young students there. My reticence was principled. I did not want to give them more important than the media had already managed to do. A subject like the legitimacy of naming a suicide bomber a martyr is ambiguous and is better treated by cultural history and Islamic jurisprudence than with one off interviews with immature students. In a region as exocentric as Indonesia to the historical centres of the

¹ - Cf. Appendix .

² - In Indonesian the term *zahid* (cognate with *syahîd*) usually means ascetic or anachorite.

³ - For a good general introduction cf. “Currents in contemporary Islam in Indonesia” by James J. Fox delivered at Harvard Asia Vision 21 (29 April- 1 May, 2004): http://-rspas.anu.edu.au-papera-anthropology-04_fox_islam_Indoensia.pdf.url .

Islamic world, comparison must be made not only with the Middle East, but also within Indonesia itself given its demographic importance. Despite formal prohibitions against such terrorist violence by the local Muslim authorities, the local differences in the use of the terms martyr prove to be of first importance. The use of the term in the nineteen-sixties by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, or the Buddhist monks in South Vietnam also show that in each society a certain political “claustrophobia” gives the term martyr its new semantic content.

I am not arguing that we ignore the predicament of the extremists only that anthropological observation of contemporary politicised events is haphazard at best. When an author as competent as Robert Hefner published his book, *Civil Islam. Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (2000) less than two years after Soeharto’s dictatorship’s collapse, it was the bearer of an immense hope, immediately shattered by the failure of the *reformasi* movement during the following two years. Rather than exploring these troubled political waters, I believe anthropologists are better equipped to ask questions such as whether Javanese values today are still structured by its socio-cosmology. In other words is Java then a post-traditional society or a quasi holistic one or even a pseudo-holism?

To permit us answer this question, we will focus on the role of sacrifice in the accomplishment of martyrdom. How and what does martyrdom purify? In Java the value of purification historically precedes and encompasses that of sacrifice for the former is both individual and social. Individual by its agent and social by the benefits it brings.

2 . Our initial argument :

- 1. We need to know in which Indonesian social morphologies, designation of “exterior” (*zahir*) martyr (*syahîd/mujahidin*) appears applied to the fallen soldiers of Muslim warfare.**
- 2. Apparently these displays of violent martyrdom cannot appear everywhere for until the end of twentieth century in Java it was never used despite its appearance earlier elsewhere, for instance in the *Syair Perang Makassar* in 1677 in the Southern Celebes. Even during prince Dipanagara’s five year holy war**

(*perang sabil*) against the Dutch (1825-30), launched from Yogyakarta in central Java, the term *syahîd* was still not used.

3. Historically speaking an early but different use of the term *syahîd* in Indonesia is found in Sumatra, where, following the illustrious precedents of al-Hallàj (858-914) and al-Gahzzâlî (1058-1111), the poet Hamzah Fansuri (early seventeenth century) and other Sumatra devines became odes of ascetical martyrdom. Subsequently the word “martyrdom” (*sasahidan*) in certain Javanese mystical texts thus came to designate one who seals his belief with his death (*shâhid*). Drewes (1996:212) has written that, “...the phrase *ilmu sasahidan* (doctrine attributed to Siti Jenar) probably implies that the Shaykh Siti Jenar testified to the Unity of God and Man and, because of this profession of faith died a martyr. In a late nineteenth century Javanese text in the Mangkunagaran Palace library (MN 701; cf. N. Florida p. 448), the *Niti Mani*, the so-called eight instruction involves “evidence-giving” (*sasasidan*), i.e. acknowledg(ing) our willingness to reside in the Essence of the Lord, the Supreme Pure, becoming the veritable Attributes of Allah.” (Rinkes 1996:33)

4. Today on the other hand the multitude of retrograde Muslim militias proclaim they have armies ready for martyrdom. The media give uninterrupted coverage to these groups. They usually under Salafi influence and often armed and financed by the Indonesian army to accomplish its dirty work. Even as their outlandish discourse fills their web sites with religious justifications⁴, they hardly differ from the criminal gangs (*préman*) also employed part time by the army and Indonesian politicians in general to accomplish tasks in the shadows of society.

5. This radicalisation does have a history however. The genealogy of Middle Eastern reform Islam (Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) ; Rahid Rida (1865 - 1905); etc) was well known to the founder of the first Javanese puritan reform movement, Achmad Dahlan (1868-1923). The destruction of the tombs in Medina during the conquest of Mecca by Ibn Saud was one of the founding motivations

⁴ - The idea of a suicidal *syahîd* is obviously imported from the Middle East James Fox (2004 :14) cites some of the titles of their pamphlets: *Palestinian Women’s Drum-Beat Sumons to Jihad ; Killing oneself or a Martyr’s Death ; Martyr’s Bombing from the Perspective of Islamic Law*. This hyperbole seems to belie the fact that , as we will see below, suicidal martyrdom is forbidden and this has be reiterated recently by Indonesian *ulama* in the most solemn manner.

for the creation (1926) of the Muhammadiyah by Dahlan and the younger generation (*kaum muda*) under the influence of the Wahabi reform already present in Sumatra since the eighteenth century.

6. Let us return to our initial question, in which social morphology did the term *syahîd* appear in Java. Beginning in the early twentieth century with the entry of the Muslim *umma* into the anti-colonial struggle, it was thought that the political version of Wahabi would consolidate the use of sharia in an independent Indonesia. Participation of Muslim political parties in the anti Dutch struggle and later after 1949, in the political life of the Republic consolidated instead a trend towards secularisation that Javanese socio-cosmology inherited from the nineteenth century was ill prepared to resist.

7. The effect of this secularisation was twofold. Firstly there occurred a loss of religious evidence, that is to say a disappearance of meaning which I attribute essentially to the introduction of the ideology of individualism which accompanied the constitution of Muslim political parties. What is meant here? When religion is commodified, objectified to create political blocks, Islam is rendered manipulable for non-religious ends. This deprives it of its interior conviction derived from mosque-based prayer. The crisis of religious authority leads to a new understanding of an individual's liberty as opposed to traditional authority, authorised in the name of the *umma* to pronounce anathemas, etc.. The divine (*illahi*) becomes the arena of enterprise of everyone; religion is not laicised as much as it is secularised (*duniawi*) in its articulation with the ambient society. Such a stalemate of Islam *nahdah* (renewal) is often accompanied by an effort to re-islamize (O. Roy 2002; 98-101).

8. The second aspect of this secularisation concerns the individualisation of the Muslims faith which is no longer that of the whole of society but only that of a group of individuals. Many of the actors in the radical landscape of Javanese Islam belong to no local *umma* whatsoever. Until recently in many lands Islam was one with the neighbourhoods, and so the non-practicing Muslim neighbours. A good example of this is the request for mutual forgiveness at the end of Ramadhan in Java which reached out to everyone, Muslims and non-Muslims alike. What was required next in the milieu of politicised Islam was a war of ideas (*ghazwul fikri*) in order to accomplish a purification of a pluralistic society by an exclusive Muslim community. These catechists reflected the de-

territorialisation of the *jema'ah* or communities of faith. Something similar was occurring in Western European Islam⁵. Secularised (*jahiliyah*) society awakened in Java a dissatisfied Puritan impulse that sought a strong group cohesion capable of producing “complete” (*kaaffah*) muslims. The origin of this tendency can be traced back to the Tarbiyah movement that began on the campuses of Bandung (West Java) in the 1970's

9. During the same period, two complementary changes in Javanese Islam were taking place: the *dakwah* movement, which started Salman mosque in Bandung, worked through small cells (*usroh*) that permitted it to distinguish itself from the ambient society, was attempting to make passive Muslims become active, committed ones and the Sufi brotherhoods (*tarékat* like Qadriyyah-Naqshabandiyyah) were being reinforced by the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). This second movement was devotional, employing prayer formulas like those of the *zikir* and *wirid* repetitive recitations. These might obtain for their practitioners tears of repentance to purify their hearts (*qulbum salim*). Obviously the violence of the Laskar Jihad militias, etc. were not compatible with such interior (*bathin*) devotions. Yet both believed that to renew the *umma* meant to change the world. All except that which is *haram* (forbidden) may be transfigured, reoriented towards Allah through the strength of Muslim intentions or *niat*. This allows one to bridge the hiatus between prayer and daily life using a form of continuous prayer that irrigates both likewise.

10. Secularisation is not a new phenomenon in Java, since it began with the Dutch colonisation in the early 1600's, but it is interesting to look at it today as Java passes through the debacle of a failed *reformasi* following Soeharto era. The process is a paradoxical and anti-nomical one. As the state and indeed society becomes more and more secularised, in a symbiotic manner it has less and less strength to distinguish itself from Islam which seeks its endorsement due to

⁵ - Olivier Roy (*Islam Mondialisé*, ch. 3 ; 2002 :87). « La séparation entre religion et culture est donc un fait. La reconstruction néo-éthique n'est qu'une manière illusoire de rétablir un lien nécessaire entre religion et culture, en définissant une contre société ou une sous-culture dans un ensemble qui n'est pas musulman. Illusion, parce que en fait c'est la société dominante, l'autre, qui définit non seulement la place mais la nature même de ce qu'on appellerait la « communauté musulmane ». L'expérience minoritaire conduit nécessairement à penser l'islam comme une expérience religieuse, peut-être totalisant pour le croyant, mais sans possibilité d'inscrire cette totalisation dans la société existante. Bien plus, ..., cette séparation de fait entre l'expérience religieuse, le politique et le culturel, c'est-à-dire, en un mot, la sécularisation, s'impose peu à peu aux sociétés traditionnellement musulmanes. »

Javanese Islam's own weaknesses. We get glimpses of this today when radical Islam claims that was never more urgent that martyrs commodify themselves into being human bombs in order to purify Java from its pagan and / or secularised culture. Such suicides deprive Islam of the grass roots social endorsement that in the past made it more than a personal religious choice. I believe this shows why it is difficult for Javanese Muslims to endorse such *syahid* to purify Muslim faith. If that is true as I will try to show below, it should not surprise us are witnessing a partial return of Javanese *adat* or custom. Having already written an extended structural survey of Javanese purification myths (Headley 2000), in this paper I would like to bring together some indicators showing not how Javanese purifications rituals are changing, but how the Javanese are changing and putting purification rituals in different *topoi* of their social interactions.

11. It is important to stop here. I suggest that in the traditional perspective in which comparative Indonesian anthropology allows us to understand Islam is that of a a society fully articulated by ritual exchanges between all its domains (the living and the dead; the god spirits and mankind; the energies of the earth and those of the sky), the notion of purification refers to nothing other that possibility of a full cycle of exchange inside a cosmos. The value of purification is the value of such exchange.

For Olivier Roy (2002:124) in the re-islamisation accomplished by the reformist movements one witnesses , “ la totalistion (qui) ne vient pas d’une transformation préalable de la société, mais de la transformation de soi-même. Ici on imagine le changement social comme une conséquence de cette « conversion » de soi. » Such a conception seems highly contradictory if simultaneously the one depends on the other which could explain the recourse to violence.

Purification of society by the praxis of Islamic monotheism avoids the question of a shared cosmology by reformulating Islam as a set of shared personal values. Certainly it is through an individual forgiveness (Arabic: *istighfâr*; Javanese: *apura*) that in Islam one can purify the mirror of one’s soul in order that it reflect the light of Muhammad. Whatever the social consequences of such a conversion, at the outset this is not a social endeavour. And if

martyrdom there is, then one would expect it to be of the ascetic kind more often than that of human bombs.

12. The first meaning of *jihad* in Islam has always been that of a personal ascetic struggle against one's passions, that in order to become closer to Allah. Now the Javanese are being told by a small minority of fanatics that in Java *jihad* means blowing oneself up killing as many other Indonesians and foreigners as possible; to become a martyr contributes to stamping out the encroaching presence of the infidels or *kafirs*. This recent re-definition of purification is largely refused by the Javanese in the name of the social harmony their cosmology promotes and which such so-called *syahid* destroys. Most Javanese say that this is not their Islam. What is Javanese about Islam then? In its Javanese setting, Islam just as elsewhere, has been fitted into local culture over the centuries and continues to thrive there. A banal example: never has pilgrimage for meditation (*ziarah*) on the graves of Muslim saints been more popular than today in Java. Sunnah piety has sanctioned the intercession (*tawassul*) of the friends of Allah on behalf of those who frequent their graves. This is recommended (*mandub*) by a Sahih Muslim *hadith* and in the Safei school of law. (George Quinn, IIAS, 2006). The last thirty years of reformism on the part of the Muhammadiyah have little to eradicate this. Javanese Islam is also about remaining Javanese. This requires periodic purification.

3. Martyrdom, Sacrifice and Purification

Rites of purification today : in Indonesian languages purification often means something very concrete like for example liberating a village from stain (in Bali); in Java untangling a family or a part of society from a bad destiny (an epidemic, a civil war, political corruption, ecology blight)⁶. Very generally, purification is not only purification of one's person from stains but also re-configuration of one's entourage. And extremely banal example in Javanese as well as Bali is a ritual purification of a whole village subsequent to an act of incest or bestiality for fear that the soil of the village will remain hot, contaminating its inhabitants and preventing the growth of crops.

⁶ - *ruwatan*, in Javanese is related not to *reged*, dirty but to *ruwed* = tangled confused, disturbed.

The re-definition of purification by small groups of Muslims extremists in Java may be clarified by two comparisons . The first is historical; purification rituals in Java can be described diachronically. The *candi* Suku was constructed in the late fifteenth century during the period of the fall of the empire of Majapahit and the rise of the sultanate of Demak. The victory of Sadewa over Durga depicted in the Suku temple relief's to the east of Solo on the slopes of Mt. Lawu, is a purification, but such medieval myths deprived of their mantras and their detailed ritual settings which have only come down to us in manuscripts, do not provide very satisfactory materials for periodisation of Javanese ritual change. The remaining option is comparative. Taking into account changes in Javanese ritual and comparison with that of nearby cultural areas, for instance from twentieth century Bali ethnography, can be are very instructive (Angela Hobart 2000). Although this telling us nothing of how Java used to be (as some Dutch scholars imagined in the nineteenth century), Balinese purification rites or *ruwatan* do give us a clear idea of at least one comparative morphology in which purification is a constant, almost daily, preoccupation. An example: on March 30th, 2006 the governor of Bali shuts the islands ports and airports for twenty four hours for a day of silence consecrated to the purifiatoin and offerings. As Bigitta –Schaubin (2004) has shown the prefects and governors of this island still benefit from the systems of ritual exchanges that weave through the village temples and sanctuaries of Bali.

Today the signs of the collapse of traditional Java are too numerous to imagine that traditional purifications are not obliged to address the current state of society. The depths of the crisis of Javanese institutions of governance, as portrayed everyday by the media, can even make the recourse to traditional rites and customs , at first glance, seem foolish. Nonetheless several examples will show that his is not the case; the older social morphology occasionally still lies just below the surface of current events. Three examples:
a –the current revision of the 1969 law on the construction of places of worship is highly contested by non-Muslims who believe it is designed to prevent them from building houses of worship by local authorities, something which has already been happening. But is there is a culture of law in Indonesia? To start at the top of the government, Ridarson Galingging raises the question whether to replace or prosecute chief justices: «...drafting of a government regulation in lieu of law

on the re-evaluation of Supreme Court justices.” At the end of his article, the writer insists that President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono abandon the idea of the regulation and concentrate on investigating and prosecuting corrupt justices instead. In such an atmosphere the informal norms of adat law have a role to play.

b. The anti pornography law of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia is criticised for several reasons. Because it courts the tastes Salafists, because it discourages tourism in places like Bali, , but also because of its approach to women. In Aceh for instance there were protests on the Intl. Woman’s Day led by local women to contest the “ *sharia law and the controversial pornography bill, both which they said unfairly criminalized women's sexuality and behavior.* » I conclude that the need to respond to the demands of the populace is better served in many cases by local *adat* than by national legislation.

c – The media are run as regular business activities and rarely intervene as moral forces defending the victims of state supported terror. Nonetheless there are a few exceptions: the poisoning of the human rights activists Munir on a plane for Amsterdam, or the trial of Yusman Roy, a Muslim convert, empoisoned in Malang for having prayed with fellow Muslims in Indonesian language rather than in Arabic. The media is simply banned from Irian Jaya so as not to provide unpleasant testimony to the events there, while Laskar Jihad was quite free to encourage its *mujahaddin* to leave for the Irian just as a few years beforehand it had sent them to the Moluccas to engage in holy warfare.

To sum u ,one can say that today that the Indonesian police and judiciary are a camouflage to the collective ills of their society as much as they are remedies.

4. The Debate today:

The debate over Muslim suicide bombings in the Middle East introduced the term of martyrdom in a new context altogether. The ascetic *shahîd* is interior (*bathin*) and hence superior to the battlefield martyrdom since the latter is exterior (*zahir*) to the person. Recently⁷ a declaration to discourage the youth

⁷ - In July 2002 before the first terror bombing the NU issue a *fatwa* through its Basul Maslail on the basis of such an eventual attack ; cf. Mike Laffan in Islamic Law and society, vol. 12, no.1 (2005) , pp. 114-117 .

from joining terrorist groups (issued 18 November 2005 by the two major Indonesian Muslim social movements, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah) declared that such suicidal martyrdom was “*haram*” (forbidden)⁸. Blowing themselves up with bombs aimed at soft targets such as Balinese nightclubs, killing innocent people and destroying the local economy, did not command the same spontaneous respect from the Javanese population as did the martyrs al-Aksa in Israeli-controlled Palestine.

Its vocabulary :the political hyperbole surrounding Javanese Islam is reflected, *inter alia*, in the semantic inflation undergone by the word martyr / *shahîd*⁹. Loose and vague semantic inflation is evident in the press. In recent newspaper articles (*Tempo*, 23 April 2001). one finds such expressions as : “volunteers for martyrdom (*relawan mati shahîd*) in response to a call to sign up with the Front Pembela Kebenaran to support President Gus Dur in huge Jakarta political rally; 68,332 volunteers responded! In a press conference (*Tempo*, 18 October

⁸ - It is not only the Americans that have lost sight of Osama bin Laden’s foundational (*al-qaeda*) ambition to establish a caliphate (cf. John Brennan *Washington Post*, 26 February 2006). Rhetorical up-scaling in correlations is everywhere present. In the *Wall Street Journal* former President Abdurrahman Wahid wrote (December 30 2005) about the contrast between Right Islam and Wrong Islam after bin Laden obtained a *fatwa* from a “misguided” Saudi ulama for the use of nuclear weapons against America. It would be useful to know how these same Javanese Muslim leaders reacted to the Karni (northern Palestine) crossing suicide bombers video declaration in which they claim, “We are a blood drinking people and we know there is no better blood than Jewish blood.” Cf. *Ha’aretz* 15 February, 2006

In the same vein, in Northern Malaysia a journalist, Mohamad Nasir from Alor Setar (Kedah) recently wrote (cf. Michael Vatikiotis, *International Herald Tribune* 23 February 2006) that the conflict between Muslims living in southern Thailand (Patani area) and the Thai government is a product of American policy encouraging the Thai government to put down the Malays in southern Thailand. In fact of course these Muslims Malay peoples currently in Thai territory, have changed hands between Thai and Malay rule several times of the last centuries. What is currently disappearing is their dual (Thai / Malay) cultural identity. Cf. Alexander Horstmann ???

There seems a specific kind of fight into the future away from daily reality. Sidney Jones reported in October (*Tempo* no. 07/VI, 2005) that the new hardliners are called Thoifah Muqatilah. They trained by Jamaah Islamiyah now much weaker than in 2002 when it had four *mantiqis* in Malaysia, Singapore, Sualwesi - Kalimantan Timur and Australia. Recruiting through Islamic study groups the new organisation (Associated Press Jakarta 2nd February 2006) is divided into totally independent cells called “Winning Teams” (Thaifah Mansurah).

⁹ - A. L. Wensinck begins his article on “The oriental doctrine of the martyrs”⁹ by showing that the term *shahîd* is already found in the *Kor-ân* (Sûra 9:20; 47:’; 61:11, etc.), but in the sense of witness not that of martyr. There are three kinds of witnesses. God is the witness of man’s deeds (Sûra 4:164), as are the angels and the prophets and faithful. This parallels the New Testament use of the Greek term martyr applied to God, accompanied by Christ and the apostles, as the witness of the deeds of men. This in turn is based on Old Testament traditions found in 2nd Samuel, Job and Isaiah (cf. Wensinck notes, p. 155). It is the later tradition (notably Bukhârî writing on *djihâd*) that will develop that doctrine that paradise lies in the shadow of the sword and that the martyrs are the highest inhabitants of paradise. Just as in Christianity, Islam also understood that the suffering of martyrdom resulted in the forgiveness of their sins and their not passing through any last judgement. Christianity however stressed that on the day of the general resurrection the martyrs interceded on behalf of those to be judged.

2003) the head of the Ngruki Pondok Pseantren (Koranic school) Abu Bakar Ba'ashir proclaimed in a *fatwa* that Al Ghazi (member of the Philippino Moro Mujahidin) was a martyr. On December 1- 2003 (cf. *Tempo* same date) the Ijtima Ulama Komisi Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia proclaimed their support of « martyr bomb» actions (*aksi bom shahîd*). Nonetheless the same Majelis Ulama Indonesia (*Tempo* 27 November 2005) stated that no individual is permitted to define himself as martyr of the *jihād* (“*jangan definisikan sendiri makna jihād*”). This provoked an immediate reaction from the spokesman of the student executive body at Ngruki Pondok Pseantren (Koranic school) (*Tempo*, November 29 2005) challenging the MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) and the Dept. of Religion's interdiction. subsequently Muhammad Thalib the senior teacher (?*ustadz*) at al-Mukmin said that more time was needed to provide for a definition of the condition of *shahîd*, *jihād* and terrorism.

Everybody was engaged in their own initiatives, trying to attract the maximal media attention. Their motivations, not to mention their financing, were at once obvious and well camouflaged¹⁰. Iman Samudera, the main Bali bomber jailed, said (*Tempo* 17 August 2004) that « my path is already clear, to die a martyr » (« *Jalan saya sudah jelas, mati shahîd.* »). The Front Pembela Islam in November 2004 (*Tempo* Nov. 28) promised to send *mujahidin* to Falujah in Irak. This article was entitled: « Die a martyr with the FPI » (*Mati Shahîd Bersama FPI*). In these understandings of injustice, everyone was made a potential candidate of martyrdom (*shahîd*). Munir, the famous human rights activist poisoned while flying to Amsterdam, was treated as a martyr (*mati shahîd*) i.e. a victim, in the newspapers (cf. *Tempo* 7 September 2005). Also the rapid mass burials of the victims of the tsunami in north Sumatra were assimilated to martyrs (“...*korban tsunami kekategoriakan sebagai shahîd akhirat sehingga penaganannya mengikuti prosedur umum yaitu dimandikan, dikagankan, disalatkan dan dikuburkan.*”)

Munir was a “genuine” martyr but there are not many like him. What meaning does martyrdom really have outside the recent political manipulation of the term? In Java to grasp any notion of Muslim witness or martyrdom (the sord *shahîd* has both these meanings), it is necessary to escape the present and its media hype. One needs to go further back than the fall of General Soeharto's

¹⁰ - Cf. Associated Press, Jakarta Feb. 28, 2006

dictatorship (May 1998) and even the renewal of Islam in Java that took place since the 1980's. There was an earlier reticence in Java concerning what it meant to be a martyr and that may well explain the current ambiguities.

A gradual rise in Indonesia, and more especially in Java, of Muslim piety occurred in the last quarter of the 20th century. In May of 1998 with the fall of Soeharto's dictatorship, both Indonesian and international media reported that this piety became increasingly manipulated and recycled towards a new political agenda. To commoditise the political dimension of confessing the Muslim faith in Java by the use of high contrast hyperbole in the media became a facile exercise. The central Javanese city of Surakarta (or Solo) is the locale of most of my research (Headley 2005). According to Robert Hefner's survey, there were some seventy militias in Solo in late 1999. The leaders of the three largest militias (FPI or Islamic Defenders' Front; the Laskar Jihad and the Indonesian Mujahidin Council's Laskar Mujahidin) were led by Hadrami/Yemeni Arabs living in Indonesia, with links to the Middle East. The first two militia were significantly armed and supported by discontented elements of the Indonesian Army.

This violent *surenchère*, comes from what Hefner calls (2005:275), the "sectarian trawling across the state – society divide". By this Hefner means "...the habit of some in the political elite (both at the national and the provincial level) of neutralising the opposition by inflaming sectarian passions and mobilising supporters along ethno-religious lines." Even if the factionalism amongst the political elite and local communal tensions in Indonesia can be dated back to the Dutch colonial regime, Hefner points out that they were mightily reinforced by the Soeharto's "new order" regime (1966-98), playing off rival ethnic, religious and political groups against one another. By 2000 factionalism gained a new lease on life once the post- Soeharto *reformasi* movement had been stalled by the remnants of the old regime (Golkar, the Soeharto party, and army) and after the new legislation on decentralisation. The newly autonomous and enriched provinces presented a whole new field of corruption and manipulation to be exploited by local leaders. How was this done? To quote Hefner again (2005:283): "Focalisation and transvaluation"¹¹ require the active presence of agents who have the discursive resources and

¹¹ - These are S. J. Tambiah's terms used in his 1996. book, *Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia*. Berkeley University of California Press.

social authority to disseminate a meta-narrative of communal peril and riposte. This discursive legerdemain also requires that the voices of moderation within the target community be silenced.”

Yet the situation of Javanese Islam should have been a relatively comfortable one. Unlike the Middle East there is no foreign occupant to be attacked. Java has a population of 120 million. Some 90 % of these Javanese are declared to be Muslim, there is only a small Christian minority (6%) on this island. Ever since its inauguration in 1950, the ministry of religion in the Republic of Indonesia has been completely controlled by Muslims. In spite of this favourable situation there was no Muslim political unity. It was this situation, of which the Javanese despair, leaves the Muslims open to political manipulation

Strategies for accumulating Muslim political unity have divided the *umma* ever since the entrance of the community of the faithful into the political arena under Dutch colonialism with the creation of the Sarekat Islam in 1912. This remains even more true today. Nurcholish Madjid, a senior Muslim social analyst and theologian, said shortly before his death last year, that no Muslim party can convincingly claim to represent Islam. On the contrary the *umma's* participation in political life has been a vector for the introduction of the modern ideology of individualism in the *umma*. This has compromised the Muslim pretension to unity through justice and righteous¹².

The experience of Muslim faith amongst the Javanese has always been diverse, if not contradictory. The Muhammadiyah movement has tried to purify this diversity and its local expressions. The Javanese, imbued with their own version of Sivitic meditation practices were always interested by their Muslim parallels. Thus their attraction to Muslim witness (*shahîd*) often takes ascetical forms¹³; this path of interior (*bathin*) martyrdom, called “great” jihad, was responsible for much of the propagation of Islam in Java. Three comparison with other values closely associated with the witness of the martyr will show how Javanese tradition weaves them together sometimes with a Muslim dominant both also without that tonality.

5. Three comparisons

¹² - Here I refer to *haq* (fair and just relationships). The sense of ranking (Arabic, *tarthîb*) does include the Dumontian sense of an evaluation that is comparative and reversible.

¹³ - There exists a tradition of competition for God's grace (Arabic, *tafâdhul*) that encourages piety.

- 5.1- Sacrifice (*korban*) :
5.2- Well-being (*selamat; salam*)
5.3- Justice (*kadilan*)

The word Arabic word *shahîd* is means both witness in the judicial sense of testimony and martyr for one's faith. As mentioned above, its use in Javanese has been rare until recently. The usual word for witness in Javanese is derived from the Sanskrit, *sa(/e)ksi*. In Malay, the national language of the Republic of Indonesia, "witness" can be expressed either by *shahîd* in this juridical sense or by this Sanskrit cognate *saksi* (witness), with the same legal meaning of testimony. So when Indonesians and Malays use the word *shahîd*, meaning martyr in the Koranic sense, it may overlap in the adjacent meaning of "witness", and more recently with that of victim, as in one who is victimised, who suffers unjustly.

Beyond the slippage inherent in political rhetoric, the question of *shahîd* in Java can only be explored if one is ready to admit that while the Javanese are familiar with the Sunna understanding of martyrdom, this notion *shahîd*, witnessing to Islamic truths, is displaced by Javanese culture, by the way the Javanese experience personhood (self in Javanese is *pribadi*; in Arabic ? *shakhs*). We will demonstrate this by reference to three themes evoked in many descriptions of *shahîd*: sacrifice, fulfilment and justice. If the Javanese religious vocabulary has been almost entirely displaced by the Arabic lexicon, this is not to say the semantic contents of the Javanese vocabulary have not survived. In each case below the Javanese meaning bifurcates from the Muslim notions of sacrifice, fulfilment, and justice (in Arabic: *korban*, *selamat* and *adil*). The terminology moves back and forth between an older indigenous socio-cosmic references and a Muslim ones. Yet the values indicated by this bifurcation are not diametrically opposed to one another. These are experienced as natural thanks to an inversion of the values. This inversion operates as follows. One is Javanese as one faces in the interior insular world of one's ancestors and Muslim when one faces towards the archipelago of the Republic of Indonesia. The two "identities" cohabit comfortably within the same persons.

5.1 - SACRIFICE (*korban*): As mentioned above, *shahîd* can be taken in the sense of a sacrifice (*korban*) of oneself (*pribadi*). This refers to the "great" ascetical *jihad*; here martyrdom bifurcates between two representations:

The Javanese have very clear iconographic representations of the cosmos they are fitting into. The Javanese seek to be part of a socio-cosmic totality, ie their place in the whole of society. They “sacrifice” their individuality to this whole. There are ample myths before and after the impact of Islam to testify to this (Headley 2005).

In Islam the individual creature, the *makluk*, is presented as sacrificing/submitting his own will to Allah’s will in order to receive mercy in a personal, private experience. The sacrifice occurs without any iconographic support whatsoever and without participation in the body social. This sacrifice witnessed by Allah and takes two major forms. The expectation of every Javanese who participates annually in the Ramadhan fast is that the sacrifice of the month of abstinence (*puasa*) leads to the joy of forgiveness on the day of liberation (*lebaran*) that breaks the Ramadhan month of asceticism. The second is what the Prophet called the martyr’s death (*mâta shahîdan*) due to excessive love given to the devotee as grace of God the Exalted. It requires isolation with God. Some cannot contain the secret of their love and through this intoxication burst forth saying , “I am God...” (Hamzah Fansuri circa 1704 in his *The Drink of Lovers*)¹⁴.

Commentary: A martyr is sacrificing his life when he “dies for Allah”. This, however, may risk falling afoul of the *haram* against suicide as affirmed by Hamzah Fansuri (Al-Attas 1970:445) and reaffirmed most recently in Indonesia in November 2005 by both the NU and Muhammadiyah (cf. *Tempo* 27 November 2005 and *Suara Merdeka* 18 November, 2005). Deliberate suicide or *korban* is *haram*; one can only sacrifice oneself ascetically. Nowadays the fanatical Javanese Muslims avoid the ascetical *jihad*, the so-called “great” struggle ascetical combat with the enemy that is inside oneself, and project the combat outside: Israel, the Bush war machine, etc. Nonetheless there remains a strong contemporary interest in the traditional ascetics, especially among the Javanese youth. Some of this enthusiasm is youthful romanticism for *tassawuf* mysticism. On the other hand the recent novels and essays concerning figures

¹⁴ - cf. Syed Muhammad Naguib al-Attas, *The Mysticism of Hamzah Fansure*, University of Malaya, 1970, pp. 326-7 and (for the translation) pp. 444-6).

like the ascetic Siti Jenar¹⁵ who proclaimed the union of self (*ingsun*) and the universal soul (*suksma*), express a real respect for such non-violent sacrifice. Siti Jenar was condemned for his radical monism and put to death by a council of nine *wali* gathered in the kingdom of Giri to discuss the unicity of Allah. To their embarrassment, white blood flowed from his severed head on the palace floor which wrote; “There is no God but Allah and Mohammed is his prophet¹⁶.” Even if Siti Jenar was not a martyr in the strict sense, his death showed that the *wali* had just put to death not a heretic but a saint.

5.2-SELAMAT (from the Arabic *salam*) to the Javanese means harmony, wholeness, security and is related to the process of completion (Arabic *qabul*; Indonesian: *pengabulan*; *kelengkapan*): Just as with sacrifice, the notion of completion and fulfilment or *selamat* of a Javanese takes on two different meanings depending on whether one envisages oneself as Javanese and contemplates one’s proper place in the cosmic totality or one aspires to the state of the individual *muslimin* capable of *shahîd*:

A member of a group (*warga*) a Javanese is placed in a whole located by socio-cosmic hierarchy indicated by appropriate techniques of divination using grids of cosmic correspondences as interpreted through these numerical and cylindrical prognostics. Obviously from a Muslim point of view, this mentality, this fitting of the microcosm into the macrocosm, is guilty through and through of “associationism”, that innovation (*bida’ah*) which destroys the or unity of Allah (*tauhid*).

In any hierarchy of purification, the Muslim perfect man (*insan kamil*) is envisaged as being standing before Allah, his creator. It is then that one

¹⁵ - Cf. *Boekoe Siti Djenaar ingkang toèlen*, 1931, 2nd. edition, Kediri, Tan Khoen Swie. Achmad Chodjim, *Syekh Siti Jenar, makna “kematian”*. Serambi, Jakarta 2002. Abdul Munir Mulkhan, *Syekh Siti Jenar. Pengululan Islam Jawa*. Yogyakarta, 1999.

¹⁶ - If Siti Djenaar is a monist in the Indian tradition, his common identification in Java with al-Hallaj is unjustified for Hallaj only drew back the veil on his experience of prayer which is forbidden by the *shari’a*. The radical monism of Siti Djenaar continued to be converted into pantheism by Javanese Muslims the most famous of whom was probably Ranggawarsita in the late nineteenth century who elaborated in *Wirid Hikayat Jati* an ascent of the soul to Allah after death, all the while respecting the terminology of the emanation of cosmos from Allah.

incarnates the condition of the first Adam, a state of *selamat*. Confessing the truth of one's religion is first of all ascetic and mystical and not so often envisaged as taking place on the battlefield. For the Malayo-Indonesian world, the great Sumatran Sufi poet Hamzah Fansuri epitomized this when he writes in his exposition on Love and Gratitude (seventh chapter of his *Drink of Lovers*, written in 1704¹⁷):

“Love¹⁸ cannot be achieved by personal endeavour except through the grace of God the Exalted. The sign appertaining to those who love is the fearlessness of death ...As the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says: “Whoever dies of excessive love has died a martyr's death [*mati shahîd*].” Here the meaning of *shahîd* is close to that of *fana* or complete self-extinction of the mystical union with God of the radical monists.

5.3-JUSTICE (Kadilan) : Here the divergence between the Islamic and Javanese understanding of the role in martyrdom is from the outset defined socially and politically. What is considered “just”, expressed a culturally held concept of justice can be a force for cohesion (as per Malinowski), creating a “legal sensitivity” (C. Geertz) especially in the context of the anti-colonial struggle. In the case in Java, the messianic Javanese ‘king of justice’ (*ratu adil*) is a king of a golden age prophesised by Djajabaja¹⁹. In the early nineteenth century Prince Dipanegara claimed that during his meditation on the summit of Mt. Rasamuni, he received a direct revelation from Ratu Adil (the Just King). His subsequent claim to be the defender of Islam was contested by his Islamic spiritual advisor, Kyai Maja²⁰. Although in Islam Allah alone is just and what rights we have are

¹⁷ - Syed Muhammad Naguib Al-Attas, *Mysticism of Hawzah Fansuri*. University of Malaya, 1970, p. 325, 444.

¹⁸ *Berahi* in Malay comes from the Sanskrit *birahi* which means both love and passion in the Tantric sense.

¹⁹ - According to Sartono Kartodirjo (*Agarian Radicalism in Java*; OUP, 1974: 95) the first Javanese rebel leader to assume the Javanese messianic title of Panembahan Erutjakra was Prince Dipanegara, son of Paku Buwana I, during the reign of Amangkurat IV (1719-1727). Sartono goes on to show how (1974:97) the Javanese messianic tradition was only partially syncretised with the Imam Mahdi of the Muslim messianic traditions. Although the latter was not identified with the former, the premillennial period required in both instances that Islamic law be applied. It is only after the appearance of the just king, the the Imam Mahdi will appear.

²⁰ - Peter Carey (personnel communication, 27. Feb. 2006) writes: “As for Dipanegara and the *shahid* of the Java War, the simple truth is that there weren't any because he never used such Islamic terms in

those which he has over us, the Muslim participation in the Javanese anti-colonial struggle was put forward as a holy war (*prang sabil*). This notion of holy war appears in the archipelago with the arrival of the Portuguese in the fifteenth century and the Dutch at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Surprisingly the term *shahîd* is not used in the Java war (1825-1830) nor later in Banten (1888) in west Java (Sartono 1966:168-171; ch. 5 *passim*). Finally in the early twentieth century such anti-colonial resistance takes on “modern”, ie political, forms and vocabulary.

Justice in Javanese tradition: I will try to stay as close as possible to a sociological approach in this modest article because arguing from first legal principles in the manner of Muslim theologians risks to skip over those dimensions of martyrdom which are proper to a given social struggle (*jihad*). These require definitions in each instance and the last ten years of political strife in Java has show that Muslim institutions of meaning can often disagree.

As mentioned above, the notion of justice in Javanese history is apocalyptic or messianic expectations. We know that the concept of warrior martyr (in the sense of a lesser *jahid*) had been around at least since the earliest Dutch Malay wars²¹. Yet even if the “just king” (*ratu adil*) awaited by the Javanese to expel the Dutch, was presented during the last great uprising against the Dutch (the Java War of 1825-30) as that of the struggle of a holy war against the infidels (*kafir*), I have found no use of the term *shahîd* to describe the Javanese peasant soldier fallen on the field of battle. Its leader the prince Dipanagara did indeed present himself (against the advice of his Muslim councillor Kyai Maja)) as the

his Babad or any other works - indeed he never once refers to 'Allah' in his babad - only to the Sankrit term 'Hyang Widi' etc. He refers to martyr-like deaths – e.g. his younger brother - Pangeran Adisurya who died on Mt Sirnabaya (Bagelen), but this death is also referred to in Sankrit terms as a '*moksa*' (i.e., remainderless) death not that of a *shahîd*. ...I am quite sure that the concept of *shahîd* remained pretty much in the eye of the beholder – i.e. the Dutch and their religious advisers, but not on the Javanese side where Sanskritized forms of belief - Javanese-Islam if you will - reigned supreme.

²¹ - A Malay historical poem (*Syair perang Mengkasar*) written almost two hundred years earlier (1670) describes the holy war led by Arung Palakka and his Makasarese army from southern Celebes) against the Dutch for the control of the monopoly of the spice trade. Both the author, Enci' Amin and his patron, Sultan Hasanuddin, were members of a Sufi brotherhood (Qadiriya or Khalwatiya) and so familiar with the Sufi notion of *shahîd*. At the same time as being history, even in a rather disconnected narrative, this poem also provides historical allegory (*pasemon*), comparing the battle leaders with wayang figures, yet the battles against the Dutch are considered essentially as a holy war against the infidels and the Makasar soldiers who lost and died are all treated as *shahîd* or martyrs (Braginsky 2004:570-578).

royal protector of religion” (*ratu paneteg panatagama*), but the accompanying notion of *shahîd* is not present.

After the collapse of this resistance, Europe replaced Arabia as the primary reference and “dominant influence on Java..” (Carey 1981:XLVII). In the second half of the twentieth century the memory of those who died in the “liberation” war against the Dutch (1945-49) were commemorated as *shahîd* in a special Yogyakarta monument, but there the notion of the confession of the faith was not in the fore front. The notion of sacrificing oneself for the truth of one’s faith remained in the shadow of a very different understanding of justice stepping off from Java’s relation to the surrounding cosmos, their whole world (*jagad*),.. The notion of witnessing in Islam was displaced by the Javanese notions of recursive encompassment where the king , his palace and therefore his kingdom represent (as a microcosm) all the villages a higher level by opposition to a macrocosm, what the Javanese call the greater world (*jagad ageng*).

Dualistic systems such as ruler : ruled contain this potential for violence not found in earlier mediated dichotomies that hierarchy differentiates by referring the two values to a higher one. Classifying their distinction through a third quality encompasses their opposition. The difference between encompassment and inclusion existed well before the introduction of a Republican regime in 1949 as Sartono has shown in his studies on the millenarian radicalism of the nineteenth century Javanese peasant revolts against the Dutch colonial administration²². “... the cultural identity of the peasants is inseparably bound up with their religion, they were and are predisposed to reassert this sense of identity in religious terms when threatened by alien values, ideas and practices.” (Sartono, 1972:75). These two kinds of encompassment can be diagrammed as appears below:

²² Cf. Sartono Karodirdjo, *Protest Movements in Rural Java: A Study of Agrarian Unrest in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries* . Oxford University Press, 1974; and “Agrarian Radicalism in Java:...” pp. 71-125 in Claire Holt (ed.) *Culture and Politics in Indonesia*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London. 1972.

Figure 1- Recursive inclusion : on the lower level A is opposed to B, & on the higher A represents B.





Figure 2- Inverted inclusion: a village ‘kingdom’ in revolt



An impoverished relationship between ruler and ruled in recently disenchanting, decolonised societies are not mediated by a higher third principle; this results in their being held together by violence²³. This occurred most

²³ - Cf. B. Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies;...Part two Ruler and realm in early Java*. The Hague/ Bandung, 1957. The first contradiction can be seen in an important myth about the founding Javanese society. In this widely known myth, an elder sister (Sri) descends to earth to marry her younger brother (Sadana). She becomes the goddess of rice and he becomes the first king at (in certain versions) Mendhang Kamulan. Their elder sister/ younger brother relationship is a cosmological one, clearly encompassed by a reference to their common father, to the heaven from which they descend and to which they return after their father Siva forbids them to maintain this incestuous relationship. Their separation and return to heaven does not prevent Sri from receiving earthly offerings in return for fertilising the rice harvests since she remains present, albeit invisibly, in the household granary. In the same manner, although Sadana also returns to heaven, he became the first Javanese ruler of a legendary kingdom Mendhang Kamulan in the royal genealogies.. In comparison to the “queen of the Southern

remarkably under General Soeharto in the second half of the last century (1967-98), for violence was a value which the smiling General was apt to deploy in the most public and appalling manner. In this sense the public displays of violence used by the Soeharto regime reflects the difference between violent inclusion and cosmic encompassment of the two figures distributed in a higher third relationship. Horizontal juxtapositions of difference with no possibility of hierarchising the values found in these distinctions finally result in their being held together by violence²⁴.

Allah's witness as justice / providence: The term *shahîd* does not appear in the *Kor'ân* itself, but when it does appear later on, it designates three classes of witnesses: Allah as a witness of man's deeds; the angel's witness of man's deeds and the prophets' and the faithfuls' witness. Allah is thus the first instance of divine justice and providence or mercy (*rahmat*). From this point of view, the contemporary efforts at defending Islam and preserving Islamic identity are not Kor'ânic the project of sociability. The current crisis of the Indonesian state has put in to question the governability of Indonesia, its ethical and religious legitimacy. Does the Republic of Indonesia have any Islamic identity? Even a secular state is it a just state; can its institutions be in any sense a source of justice?

Sea" or Ratu Kidul for short, as his elder Sri is called in palaces in Surakarta and Yogyakarta²³, Sadana, often designated as Wisnu, remains a pale figure except in the throne room where his statue stands next to Sri's. The superiority of elder sister Sri remains uncontested. She is seen to still lie invisibly in the regalia chamber (*kobongan*) behind the throne. She is the female ancestress from whom all Javanese kings descend, but also their divine mistress as she beds them once a year in ritual courtship. In this sense she is a renewable regalia for each generation. Her generational renewal is ritualised through sexuality, but fundamentally contact with Lara Kidul, as with the goddess Durga discussed below, is portrayed as potentially lethal. These goddesses intervene instantaneously, for better or for worse. Sri and Sadana have parallels with and the foam princess (*junjung buih*) in mainland Southeast Asian kingdoms and in Borneo²³.

When I speak of antinomy I am referring to the potential for contradiction of values that are not reconciled by being ranked in an order of values. The potential opposition of an elder sister / younger brother relationship is avoided because the (1) elder sister / (2) younger brother are encompassed in their (3) cosmic origin, children of the same mythic father. If one deprives the model of sovereignty of elder sister – younger brother asymmetry stemming from their heavenly siblingship, one is left with a simple this worldly secularised version of the duality of ruler without genealogy and ruled.

²⁴ - Jim Siegel has shown this in *A New Criminal Types in Jakarta. Counter Revolution Today*(1998), where he argues that both criminals and revolutionaries have a common place of origin, death which it is the government's "duty" to display to its subjects.

Commonalities, sameness, are often a starting part for inclusion and membership for purposes of classification²⁵. The initial appeal of the creation of an Indonesian republic in this archipelago was to surpass the single culture of Java in a higher if diverse unity. Qualities of prescriptive status and role assignments found in such traditional hierarchical societies as pre-twentieth century Java were judged too rigid for the creation of a multi-cultural and ethnic just society. Now that there are no completely traditional societies left and all have become hybrid, the appeal of a vague term like Muslim identity that evokes a sense of belonging with its normative expectations and self-esteem. It remains to be seen whether the project is bankrupt because no whole, no nation was really created. In analysing the changing models of sovereignty in Southeast Asia, Jos Platenkamp (2004) states that in the traditional hierarchical societies' cosmological sovereignty:

“...connects the various social groups, constituting society to the cosmos as a whole (my emphasis) ...cosmological concept of sovereignty tend to be declared applicable beyond precisely demarcated territories...(and) ...define the membership of society and authorise access to its resources ...by requiring the acknowledgement of socio-cosmological exchange relations rather than the occupation of a strictly defined territory.”

6. Being a « martyr” [syahîd] in Java today :A deformation of sacrifice?

The various observations of the Javanese society in Surakarta I met with in 2003, expressed a preoccupation, not with witnessing to a Muslim identity, but with society. Since the 1960's the now dilapidated ideal of the republic of Indonesia has inspired no modernist tradition of nationalist *shahîd*. While the kinds of archaic socio-cosmic hierarchy the Javanese continue to appeal to hardly express individualism, and can't be considered a major component of modernity, nonetheless their preoccupation is with society. For instance,

²⁵ - Often, the Javanese identify “Java” with civilisation as in the expressions: *during Java* “mentally immature” (literally, not yet Javanese); *njawani*, to make a Javanese impression; *ora ngerti Jawané*, idiomatically “to not get it” (literally, not to understand in a Javanese way). In an eleventh century inscription the “non-Javaneses” (*tan Jawa*) were the equivalent of slaves. This kind of ethnocentrism does not constitute a hierarchy of values; there is no encompassment of contraries and inversion, but simple rejection. A cosmological sovereignty on the other hand is oriented towards the outside world and requires foreigners to function. In short there is no place there for racism.

Mochtar Buchori stated recently that, “The present generation does not want an Islamic state. They want an Islamic society.”(*South China Morning Post* 27.VII.04). The word “just” (*adil*) society is a perfect gloss for that of an “Islamic” society in the minds of the Javanese in favour of adopting the canon law of *sharî’ah* as civil law. The stakes are high for what constitutes sociability, whether revealed in the *Kor’ân* or in Javanese custom.

It is worth remarking that in the Javanese language, the word *masyarakat* (society) is a neologism; the Javanese traditional notion for “society” (*jagad; donya*) was usually invested with dual values, that of the fullness of social life (*jagad alit*) when it was configured in congruence with the macrocosm (*jagad ageng*). I have translated this fit by the word *kelengkapan* or “completion”. In Javanese completion is related to Durkheim’s understanding of society as a process which a population strives to create an organic whole amongst communities sharing the same space. The word society, as it was invented by the eighteenth century philosophers of the nation states, refers to a already given totality.

Why does the society have these two very different meanings? E. Viveiros de Castro (1996:514) explains society’s semantic contradictions, by suggesting that it is important to see how the word appeared in each social setting. In Europe at the end of the Middle Ages, the only totality was the world encompassed by its Creator, God (Milbank 1990: ch.1). With the appearance of the nation state such a cosmology definitively disappeared, God was ushered off stage and man appears as the measure of all. Thus human society becomes the only totality. It is just this passage from cosmology to political anthropology that the Javanese are resisting, hence the reluctance towards according a role for political martyrdom. For those supporting the institution of *sharî’ah* the notion that the politics of democratic society can represent the universal condition of man is illegitimate. For them the nation-state’s society is an anti-Muslim, anti-*umma*. The unit of measure cannot be man because it is Allah who judges man with his truth and has rights over man which it is in his interest to accept. Viveiros de Castro (1996:516) contrasts early modern natural law (from Hobbes to Hegel), i.e. *societas* and the ethnically based community sharing a universe of traditional meanings legitimated by religion *universitas* thus: « The key metaphor for this view is the constitutional and territorial state, and its

central problem is the foundation of political order.” In brief, outside of the territorial nation state, there is no totality.

In our preoccupation with the sociology of central Java, we have seen how at the beginning of the twentieth century, during the first years of the anti-colonial movement, the Javanese persuaded themselves that they were a nation, one of several societies belonging to a higher political totality. As has been often pointed out, the term *bangsa*, which originally meant ethnic group was used for this surpa-ethnic identity, while *warga* which was introduced to mean “citizen”, is now being reused in Javanese in a non political way to designate a member of a group in an inclusive society that is not the state’s. In Javanese, the nineteenth century neologism of Arabic/Malay origin, *masyarakat* initially had the meaning “one’s acquaintances and companions (*pasruwungan lan bebrayaning ngaurip*; Poerwardarminta, *Baoesastra Jawa* 1931: 297). In Arabic, *mashâraka* had meant public. It was not until independence (1949) that *masyarakat* in Indonesia became the commonly accepted word for society. This excursion into etymology is meant to show that for the Javanese the notion of society remains a project and not a given like the reality of the nuclear family (*brayat*), the neighbours (*tangga*), the ancestors (*leluhur*) or the Muslim congregation (*jema’ah*). The project of society (*masyarakat*) resembles the *umma’* except that this community of the faithful is trans-national whereas the Javanese *masyarkat* is insular. For the Javanese society is a performance, just as a ritual is, while for Dutch colonialists society represents a condition to which they denied their colonial subjects access. For the Javanese, on the contrary, society is a form of sociability, an ethic of articulation and hierarchy of custom (*adat*) and its culture. In Javanese the word for culture; *budaya* comes from *budidaya*, strong effort; *mbudaya* means to be entrenched, to be part and parcel of society.

To promote peace in their shared inhabited village space, for much of central Java after 1998, the rediscovery of a common Javanese culture / cosmology has proven to be the most neutral way for Christian and Muslims to defend their communities. There is little point in witnessing to Muslim values unless the ambient hierarchy of values is Islamic. Nor is ethnicity a rallying point for cohesion. The common themes of Indonesian culture (foetus sibling acting as protecting spirits; cylindrical divination, ancestor worship, etc.) blunts the contrast between much of Javanese culture and that of other islands such that

non Javanese may feel well-assimilated into Javanese village and urban life. This allows Javanese cities, at least, to include numbers of non Javanese Indonesians. In résumé, more unites the Indonesians living on Java than divides them. In our sense, traditional Javanese religion is a cosmology that allows them to share spaces and is not coterminous with ethnicity. Here the content of ethnicity is not as volatile as on other islands and the practices of Javanese sociability have been used to stabilise inter-religious tensions when they arose.

This sociological sketch explains why *shahîd* is still interpreted by the Javanese in terms of asceticism rather than death through martyrdom on the battle field with the infidel. Radical manipulation of religious adhesion results in dizzying up-scaling across the planet where lie the “real” enemies and cause of very local Javanese problems²⁶. National traditions of Islamic martyrdom are forged by state tyranny and foreign invasions. Java has not yet developed them despite numerous attempts to use the revolt of Darul Islam and Kahar Muzakkar’s revolt against the young republic in the 1950’s as founding precedents. No one institution in Java has yet established itself as the guardians of the faith to the exclusion of all others. In Java the interpretations of violence and their use for further violence to create a culture of war, militancy and terror has not yet reached the sophistication of the Pakistani Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM; 1984+). The potential of any ethnic group (*quam; kaum* in Malay has lost this meaning) for an accumulation of identity in Java is not comparable to the situation say of in the Sindh in Pakistan²⁷.

I believe it is important to stress that many more Javanese are practicing down-scaling whenever possible to resist the *fuite en avant* of the up-scaling of the a few Muslim radicals. To limit the numerous attempts to manipulate religion, Javanese moderates have devised a way to raise the heavens. This is sometimes called Islam hadhari or civilisational Islam (cf. Farish Noor).

Since the fall of Soeharto's regime (May 1998), the collaboration of Javanese Christians and Muslims to assure local peaceful co-existence in the city of Surakarta goes against the grain of several of the medias’ descriptions of

²⁶ - A brief look at the articles of the Islamic magazine *Sabili cybernews* amply demonstrates this kind of inflation. In Jenin (northern Palestine) today the youth portray Che Guevara as the archetypal leader of the Palestinian national liberation movement; this shows the influence of popculture as escapism.

²⁷ - cf. Oskar Verkaaik, *Migrants and Militants. Fun and Urban violence in Pakistan*.

contemporary Java. Affirming the transcendence of their monotheistic faith, these believers are trying to depoliticise the society which currently manipulates them. By fighting off this commodification of Islam and Christianity designed to produce political divisions and faith-based votes, such Javanese are reinventing a nineteenth century cosmology where the sacred canopy embraced both religions and adequately reflected their residential community wherein Christians and Muslims were never separated out on the basis of religion. The cry battlefield martyrs, “Allah Akbar”, seems out of place compared to the community networks of the moderates whose labours never make it into the local or international press.

If in Java religious identity does not nurture ethnicity, even within the same families such religious adhesion is often multiple. Religious conversions, still on-going in Java, do not involve crossing ethnic boundaries. To prevent the further appearance of political commodification of religious beliefs (i.e. all Javanese must be Muslim) under the pressure of the *aliran reduksionisme*, all kinds of social groups (*warga2*) are saying no to the politics of the state. Envisaging a society free from the state (*masyarakat tanpa negara*) is not another utopian dream but the result of the awareness that the concept of society as seen by the state does not allow the Javanese to protect themselves from violence from above. The kind of universalism their monotheisms provide them with have more in common with the earlier holisms of the nineteenth century than the pseudo-holism of Indonesia’s Pancasila (five-principled)²⁸ "democracy".

This prompts a search for a religious praxis without "attributes"(in Sufi parlance, *bil’a akhlâk*), which could neutralise confessional commodification for the benefit of political parties. Otherwise faith in Allah will be manipulated and experience of God diminished ; the strategies for accumulating religious identities with political finalities bastardises the contents of the vocabulary of *tauhid* or monotheism. Finally heaven is lowered, losing its capacity to encompass and overshadow everyone. The kind of equality offered all *agama* in Soeharto's version of Pancasila, from which Indonesia is now suffering, was an evaluative indifference. While Central Java is now too weak a society to completely fend off those who manipulate the practice of a religious faith,

²⁸ - Namely : belief in God, nationalism, humanitarianism, social justice and democracy.

nonetheless Javanese are seeking a new totality (*keseluruhan, keutuhan, kesemestaan*) to be attained by a hierarchy of values held in common and articulated through a succession of encompassments.

Politicised *shahîd* in this perspective seems to many Javanese a bogus kind of witness. Genuine martyrdom is supposed to offer its willing victim forgiveness for he/she bypasses final judgement by Allah for his sacrifice. The four terrorist suicide bombings since 2002 in Indonesia seem a far cry from that ideal.

Appendix: Muslim Martyrs in Bali:

¹ - Henri Chambertloir écrit (dans une lettre personnelle) : J'ai visité à Bali, en 1990, avec Claude Guillot, quatre tombes musulmanes keramat. C'est peu; nous n'avions aucune intention d'effectuer une recherche systématique; nous voulions simplement avoir une idée du *ziarah* dans un milieu où l'islam était minoritaire. Cependant, les informations recueillies laissaient entendre que ces tombes étaient représentatives des autres, réputées nombreuses, mais difficiles à localiser.

Les "saints" sont des étrangers. Les tombes ne diffèrent pas fondamentalement de celles que l'on trouve à Java, non plus que les rites, les légendes, ou la diversité des visiteurs. Ce qui frappe, par contre, c'est que les "saints" semblent être tous des martyrs, alors que ce n'est pour ainsi dire jamais le cas à Java.

Plusieurs tombes avaient été restaurées peu avant notre visite, et le *ziarah* était relativement actif.

1) Village de Kusamba, sur la côte sud-est, avant Padangbai en venant de Den Pasar. Aux abords du village (en partie musulman), cungkup de maçonnerie récemment restauré à l'intérieur d'une enceinte; puits à proximité. Tombe moderne (maçonnerie et carrelage); deux stèles de pierre, enveloppées de tissu blanc, sous baldaquin.

Tombe de Sayid Habib Ali al-Hamid, qui serait mort au tournant du 20^e siècle. Il était autrefois appelé "al-Aydrus", mais son identité "al-Hamid" a été révélée il y a environ dix ans par un descendant. Il passait à cheval au marché, alors que le cokorda participait à un combat de coqs; on lui ordonna de mettre pied à terre; il refusa ("Je suis aussi roi que le roi"); les hommes du cokorda le tuèrent, mais ne purent l'achever que lorsqu'il leur remit son propre poignard. On l'enterra et, le jour même, son sorban et son songkok apparurent sur les stèles de bois; la nuit, son sang s'embrasa et s'envola vers le ciel. Les gens du voisinage disent voir certaines nuit une grande lueur au-dessus de la tombe.

La tombe est ramai depuis une dizaine d'années. Les pèlerins viennent surtout de Java, mais aussi de Makassar, Lombok, etc. Certains passent la nuit sur le site. Les Chinois de Klungkung et des Hindu viennent parfois prier, notamment pour la loterie (SDSB); les pèlerins des environs sont rares.

2) Village de Manggis, à mi-chemin entre Klungkung et Amlapura. Au flanc d'une colline, dans une enceinte récente avec padmasana à l'extérieur, cungkup abritant deux tombes (gradins recouverts de carrelage). Ce sont celles de Habib Abdurrahman et de sa femme. Le Habib est mort tué.

Les pèlerins sont des musulmans de Karangasem, ainsi que des Hindu lors des kuningan.

3) Village de Ujung, sur la côte, à l'est de Amlapura. Enceinte murée assez vaste restaurée, ou peut-être construite, en 1987. Deux tombes sous un baldaquin (les stèles sont enveloppées); ce sont celles d'un inconnu et de sa femme. On a voulu le tuer; il a disparu. Un autre baldaquin abrite une autre tombe, également d'un inconnu. Le site est visité par les musulmans des environs.

4) A proximité du village de Satra, à quelques km à l'ouest de Gelgel, au lieu-dit Gujarat, se trouve l'emplacement d'une tombe qui, il y a très longtemps, fut emportée par la rivière en crue. C'était la tombe de Dewi Fatimah, venue de Java avec 40 *pengiring* pour islamiser la région. Elle est apparue depuis à plusieurs reprises; elle est très belle.

Un *pura* a été construit juste à côté de l'emplacement de la tombe. Il est interdit d'y faire des offrandes de porc.

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