Arabité, islamité, ‘soudanité’

Being Arab, Muslim, Sudanese

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(FREEDOM, PEACE AND JUSTICE)

A Glossary of the Third Sudanese Revolution

by Barbara Casciarri and Stefano Manfredi

March 2020
**Being Arab, Muslim, Sudanese.**

*Reshaping belongings, local practices and state policies in Sudan after the separation of South Sudan*

The project focuses on dynamics of Arabization and Islamization in relation to national identity-building in Sudan through an analysis of the three notions articulation within practical processes and the practices of social actors. The central socio-anthropological approach is based on a micro-scale perspective, while also paying attention to macro-scale phenomena, in particular state policies on citizens’ affiliations to an identity forged from categories of Arabness, Islamity and national integration. The aim of the project, which is rooted in classical works on issues of ethnicity, religion and nationality, is to give renewed impetus to the scientific contribution of the debate on the relations between Arab identity and Islam and the issues at stake in the relationship between State and citizens in an African country in which the colonial legacy and ethno-cultural pluralism have made the objectives of nation-building particularly complex.

Founded by the AUF (Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie) as a PCSI (Projet de Coopération Scientifique Inter-Universitaire), the project has four institutional partners: CEDEJ Khartoum, the University of Khartoum, University Paris 8/LAVUE and the Max Planck Institute. Barbara Casciarri (University Paris 8) is the scientific coordinator, Jean-Nicolas Bach (CEDEJ Khartoum) is the project leader and Mohamed A.G. Bakhit (University of Khartoum) is the coordinator of the Sudanese research team.

ABSTRACT

The 2018-2019 Sudanese revolution can be analyzed from the perspective of the words people repeated, chanted, shouted, wrote and painted during their persistent, and ultimately successful, struggle for liberation from an oppressive system. Embedding old and new values, and circulating beyond the frontiers of age and gender, and social or regional origins, these words have crafted a common symbolic space within their revolutionary experiences, themselves becoming an actor in the construction of a collective subject and the reshaping of its identity. Based on primary and secondary sources, this glossary provides a sociolinguistic analysis of 46 entries that were chosen due either to their wide-scale occurrence or to their thematic prominence within popular discourse about the revolution, and have been classified into three categories: keywords, slogans and actors.

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A glossary of the Third Sudanese Revolution

1. Language, identity, and revolution

The issue of the relationship between language and identity has always been central to sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology alike. Broadly speaking, it is possible to identify three main theoretical approaches to the role of language in identity construction can be identified. First of all, the traditional “objective” perspective sees identity as an invariable social factor that can be defined on the basis of fixed criteria such as language, ethnicity or class. In contrast, the “subjective” approach presents identity as a psychosocial variable that depends on the empirical categorization of individuals in which there is only a possibility that language will play a role. Lastly, in the “relational” model as resumed by Bucholtz and Hall (2005), identity is seen as a complex sociocultural phenomenon that emerges and circulates through social interaction. Because it is relationally constructed, identity is therefore a product, and not a source, of linguistic practices, and can be linguistically indexed through styles, registers and linguistic labels and structures.

Language usage as moving vectors of value systems also embodies socio-cultural meanings, and reveals traces of their circulation among individuals and groups, making the study of them more widely relevant for anthropological approaches, with their emphasis on the role of language as an identity marker. Of course, as the basis of identity self- and hetero-ascriptions, “diversity” also includes “language diversity”. Others do not speak like us, so we tend to consider ourselves as a collective subject because we speak the same way, using the same words with same semantic and social meanings. While linguists generally speak of language diversity to refer to the existence of different, standalone systems of signs (languages) that are inherently bounded by given linguistic communities, anthropologists focus on linguistic diversity as a factor of identity construction and ethnic differentiation. For their part, sociologists like Gramsci (see Carlucci 2013) and Bourdieu (1997, 2001) stress the importance of power relations indexed by language, which is fundamentally viewed as a means of social coercion (via language policies and regimentation) and/or consensus building (via discourse). Even though language practices may be a powerful source of diversification and social hierarchization both between and within social groups, they can also act as a powerful unifying element in particular situations, one of which is revolutionary processes. Indeed, during phases in which a stable order is being challenged, changes in traditional linguistic resources and the development of new ones may lead to the emergence of new speech communities that use the same linguistic forms for addressing insiders and outsiders and achieving shared political objectives (Yuan et al. 1990: 61).

More importantly, as noted by Seloni and Sarfati (2017: 783) in their analysis of the linguistic landscape of Gezi Park (Istanbul) in 2013, “Languages produced during social protests provide important counter-narratives to dominant discourses, and more importantly make those narratives visible to the local, national, and transnational publics”. Indeed, language practices are
by definition endowed with performance and agency and therefore participate in the creation of revolutionary change rather than merely functioning as a means of information-sharing (Yuan et al. 1990: 67). Informal language practices that uprisings help to forge or renew can be increasingly charged with political meaning. For example, a struggle for the political and symbolic re-appropriation of liberated spaces may lead protest movements to rename crucial figures or places as counter-memory markers of the insurrection. The cases of Tahrir Square (“Liberation Square”) in Cairo after the 1919 revolution or Enqelab Street (“Revolution Street”) in Teheran after the 1979 revolution (Bayat 2010) are just two examples of the institutionalization of these renaming practices. In the so-called “Arab Springs” in 2011, even in the case of those uprisings that were brutally repressed, the revolutionary impetus was expressed during the struggles by the renaming of places, thus giving new counter-meanings to common spaces, such as in Sanaa (Yemen) where a Taghir Square (“Change Square”) was created in the key location of the university, standing in opposition to the existing Tahrir Square (“Liberation Square”), where those loyal to the President gathered (Bayat 2017). The 2018-2019 Sudanese revolution can also be analysed from the perspective of the words people repeated, chanted, shouted, wrote and painted during their persistent, and ultimately successful, struggle for liberation from an oppressive system. Embedding old and new values, and circulating beyond the frontiers of age, gender, social and regional origins, these words have crafted a common space within their revolutionary experiences, themselves becoming an actor in the construction of a collective subject and the reshaping of its identity.

There has been increasing interest in the sociolinguistic aspects of revolutionary movements all around the world in recent decades, and it has recently been renewed by the eruption of protests against both oppressive and liberal regimes in different political and sociolinguistic contexts (for example, in France, Hong Kong and Chile). As far as the Arabic-speaking world is concerned, great attention has been paid to the language of the 2011 Arab Springs. Egypt undoubtedly represents the best-known case study in this context. The volume edited by Mehrez (2012) offers a wide-ranging overview of oral, written and visual attestations of language practices during the Egyptian revolution. Bassiouney (2012, 2013) provides a critical analysis of diglossic codeswitching and identity construction during the 2011 revolution, while Panovic (2016) analyses writing practices during the Egyptian revolution and notes a process of vernacularization. The Arab Fund for Arts and Culture produced an open-access English-Arabic dictionary of 125 words used during the Egyptian revolution which is often cited as a comparative source for this glossary. In the case of Tunisia, Baraket and Belhassine (2016) have published a well-documented journalistic list of keywords and slogans used during the so-called “Jasmine Revolution”. In the context of this overall situation, detailed information about the linguistic resources used during the initial phases of the Syrian uprising in 2011 is lacking, and there is still no sociolinguistic information relating to the Algerian revolts in 2019. Using these studies as a backdrop, we have a large comparative basis for analysing the spread of shared revolutionary words and slogans across the Arabic-speaking world, primarily through the medium of the internet. Despite this, the glossary reveals that the third Sudanese revolution of 2018-2019 (which has begun to be referred to as “December”, using the English month for the time it broke out, as was the case with the previous ones – “October” for 1964 and “April” for 1985) has only been affected by the linguistic practices of the Arab Springs to a limited extent, while developing a genuinely local linguistic repertoire, both new and inspired by previous national revolutions.
2. The Third Sudanese Revolution (December 2018 - July 2019)

In mid-December 2018, popular demonstrations broke out in towns in the Sudanese provinces (Damazin, Atbara and Dongola) and rapidly spread to different parts of the country, as well the capital, Khartoum (Deshayes, Etienne and Medani 2019). Although the government underestimated the event, responding with its customary repression, and Western media paid little attention to what they labelled as mere “food riots”, the mobilization grew stronger in the days that followed. Although shortages of bread and oil acted as the spark, the movement immediately revealed clear political objectives, demanding the ouster of the regime led by Omar Al-Beshir that had been in power since the Muslim Brotherhood-backed coup d’état in June 1989. Over three months regular demonstrations, strikes and other forms of everyday revolt followed in the capital and other regions, bearing witness to the determination of the protesters despite harsh repression, with arrests, tortures and killings by the security forces (NISS), other armed forces and the militias defending the regime. The Sudanese diaspora abroad also played a crucial role in providing financial and political support and spreading information about the ongoing revolution, which remained largely ignored by the Western media and among the international community. At the beginning of April 2019, this movement, which consistently maintained its non-violent dimension and, besides the central role of the Sudanese Professional Association, followed a horizontal approach and rejected leadership from the various parties, succeeded in achieving the ouster of both the regime and the first military junta in the space of just five days. The location of the Army Headquarters in Khartoum then became a huge space that was appropriated as a “counter-square” (Bayat 2017) by the protesters day and night (and hence became known as the “sit-in”), where a collective dynamic of popular participation, sharing of daily lives, political and cultural creation and exchange was adopted for almost two months. Although the massacre by the armed forces at the “sit-in” area on 3 June 2019 represents the most tragic event in this long struggle (there were more than a hundred deaths and dozens of injuries, rapes and missing persons), giving rise to fears that the revolutionary process would come to an end, the success of the demonstration on 30 June attests to the victory of the movement. During the summer, negotiations between the Forces for Freedom and Change coalition and the Transitional Military Council resumed, leading to the formation of a civilian government headed by the economist Abdallah Hamdok in September. In an uncomfortable collaboration with military elements within the Sovereign Council, a transitional period of three years, which is scheduled to end with general elections for a democratic civilian government, was decided on. Below, we provide a brief, non-exhaustive chronology of the revolution based on eleven key dates. Apart from their symbolic value, most of these dates can be found in the glossary as temporal references for contextualizing the varied usage of the linguistic forms.

- **13-19 December 2018** – The first waves of protests begin in Atbara and Damazin. Other demonstrations are quickly organized in all the major Sudanese cities, including Khartoum, Port Sudan and Dongola;

- **29 December 2018** - 32 Darfuri students who had taken part in the protests are arrested and forced to publicly confess their membership of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army;

- **1 January 2019** - On the occasion of Sudan’s Independence Day, the revolutionary forces publish the Declaration for Freedom and Change;
22 February 2019 - Following mounting protests across Sudan, ‘Omar Al-Bashir declares a state of emergency and announces the dissolution of the central and regional governments;

7 March 2019 – Huge demonstrations are organized to coincide with International Women’s Day to honour the women who have taken active part in the protests;

6 April 2019 - On the anniversary of the 1985 revolution, after being blocked on their way to the Presidential Palace, protesters converge on and occupy the esplanade in front of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces in Khartoum;

11 April 2019 - ‘Omar Al-Bashir is removed by a military coup d’etat and placed under arrest. General ‘Awad Ibn ‘Awf is appointed as the head of the Transitional Military Council;

12 April 2019 - Following intense street protests, General ‘Awad Ibn ‘Awf resigns from the Transitional Military Council and is replaced by ‘Abdel Fattaḥ al-Burhan;

3 June 2019 - Armed groups of the Rapid Support Forces attack and disperse the sit-in in front of the Supreme Command of the Army Forces in Khartoum, causing more than a hundred deaths and hundreds of injuries;

30 June 2019: After almost a month of internet black-out and occupation by RSF armed forces in Khartoum, a one-million-march (milyūniyya) brings together the largest number of protesters from Greater Khartoum and surrounding towns in the streets;

17 July 2019 – After initially being agreed on verbally, the political agreement between Transitional Military Council and the Forces and Freedom and Change is eventually signed in Khartoum. A new transitional era begins for Sudan.

Without going into a deeper political analysis of the process, we wish to stress that the term “revolution” has been used by the actors since the beginning of the uprising in December 2018, and has continued to be used after the fall of the regime and the formation of a civilian government. The actors seem to view the 2018-2019 event as being the third Sudanese revolution, the first having been in October 1964 the (fall of Abboud) and the second in April 1985 (the fall of Nimeiry) (Berridge 2015).

3. The aims and organization of the glossary

The primary aim of this glossary is to document the third Sudanese revolution through an overview of its “language”. We use the word “language” here to refer to the whole set of linguistic resources (that is, linguistic forms) used by both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary actors from the beginning of the Sudanese revolution on 13 December 2018 until the signature of the agreement between the Transitional Military Council and Forces of Freedom and Change on 17 July 2019. This vast, heterogeneous collection of material encompasses a wide variety of linguistic forms, including, among others, single words, slogans, poems, songs, public speeches and manifestoes. Found in both oral and written practices, these linguistic forms reveal the ideological dimension of language during a time of revolution. Broadly speaking, the third Sudanese revolution can be described as an Arabic-speaking phenomenon: that is, most of the linguistic resources of the revolution are derived from Arabic. This also means that owing to the diglossic pattern of bilingualism that characterizes the entire Arabic-speaking world, the
“language” of the Sudanese revolution offers evidence of heterogeneous practices along a continuum of varieties, from Sudanese Arabic to Standard and Classical Arabic. This heterogeneous linguistic material is also affected to a certain degree by English as the language of international communication. In contrast, the so-called “indigenous” languages of Sudan are almost completely absent from the linguistic repertoire of the revolution. Against this backdrop, this glossary reflects the changes and reconfigurations of a number of linguistic resources used during the revolution, while also framing them within the Sudanese socio-cultural and political context and, where possible, within the broader context of the Arab revolutions (for Egypt, see Keratin and Mehrez 2012, Khalil 2012; for Tunisia, see Baraket and Belhassine 2016).

The glossary is based on multiple sources of documentation. First, most of the written material comes from activist networks operating in Sudan and the diaspora during the revolution. The linguistic forms discussed in the following pages have also been contextualized by formal interviews and informal discussions held in Khartoum with people from different backgrounds during fieldwork missions by the authors in August-September 2019, November 2019 and February 2020. When matched with secondary sources, these qualitative primary sources enable a better grasp of the actors’ perceptions and the meanings embedded in the words, as well as their links to the collective memories of other Sudanese revolutions or cultural values associated with particular terms. The contextual use of the linguistic forms is also documented by pictures, videos and songs obtained from various internet sources. The glossary includes 46 entries that have been chosen due to either their wide-scale occurrence or their thematic prominence within popular discourse about the revolution. The 46 entries can be divided into the following three categories, which are marked by different colours in the glossary:

1) **Keywords**: single words introducing basic notions that emerged during the revolution (32 entries);

2) **Slogans**: fixed expressions created by demonstrators during the revolution (8 entries);

3) **Actors**: formal and informal institutions that played a major political role during the revolution (6 entries).

For obvious reasons, these operational categories are arbitrary. For instance, “keywords” may occur either as standalone “slogans” or in combination with other recurrent words. Similarly, political “actors” can also be identified by means of specific “keywords”. However, the three categories adopted by the authors for this glossary offer a useful functional classification of the entries. The 46 entries are presented in Arabic alphabetical order, regardless of the presence of the definite article ال [al-], whose occurrence is discussed where relevant. Each entry is introduced as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entry in Arabic</th>
<th>Phonological transcription</th>
<th>English translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>سلام</td>
<td>Salām</td>
<td>Peace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The entries are analysed in terms of both their linguistic features and their uses in a pragmatic context. The linguistic forms are thus contextualized within the timespan of the Sudanese revolution and in relation to the actors using them. A number of instances of semantic changes that occurred during the revolution are also documented. The glossary also raises a
number of problematic issues relating to the translation of the revolutionary vocabulary showing
the spread of a common English-based lexicon implemented by Western media. Further
contextual uses of single entries are discussed, together with other slogans and expressions that
are not included as separate items. These additional linguistic forms are always presented in
Arabic with a transcription in square brackets [...] (see below for the transcription conventions)
and an English translation in quotation marks “...”. If necessary, a double transcription (Sudanese
Arabic and Standard/Classical Arabic) is provided. Cross-references between different entries are
signaled in round brackets and bold type (see …). Discussion of the entries is often accompanied
by images illustrating written attestations of the linguistic forms in Arabic and English. These are
mainly in the form of banners that were exposed during the demonstrations and as electronic
documents published on the internet. Links to video and audio clips showing the contextual uses
of the linguistic forms are also provided. Finally, the glossary is followed by a list of the main
hashtags used for tagging specific single entries or other relevant themes on social media during
the revolution.

Because it is preliminary in nature, the glossary is obviously far from being exhaustive. Many
keywords and slogans that emerged during the third Sudanese revolution have been disregarded.
Similarly, the linguistic variations reflected by the glossary do not cover the domains of poetry or
music, which played a major communicative role during the uprising. Also, the glossary does not
include the personal names of leading figures of the revolution and counter-revolution. More
generally, the entries do not provide a truly critical analytical dimension, as they are intended to
document a limited set of linguistic resources. We are also aware that as the third Sudanese
revolution must be viewed as a process that most consider to be still under way, the parallel lives
of these words and the people who use them are undergoing changes: words and slogans that are
reported may be dropped, take new meanings, be replaced by others or manifest variations and
nuances among different speakers. Despite these limitations, we believe that this glossary
represents an important first step towards developing a deeper sociolinguistic analysis of the third
Sudanese revolution and the importance of sharing words in a revolutionary context as a means of
reshaping the borders of sameness and diversity, and thus, ultimately, as a standpoint from which
to observe the moving processes of identity construction. It provides first-hand data combined
with open-access resources that may turn out to be useful for further investigations into language
ideologies and discourse analysis, as well as the social history of the revolution.

4. Transcription conventions

The glossary follows the most common conventions for the transcription of Arabic, as
summarized in table 1. The transcription distinguishes between Standard/Classical (abbreviated as
CA) and Sudanese Arabic (abbreviated as SA) realizations. Note that the [I] of the definite article للـ [al-]
is transcribed in its assimilated form, depending on the nature of the consonant following it
(for example, *al-s > as-s; *al-r > ar-r; etc.).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic Letter</th>
<th>Transcription</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>أ</td>
<td>١ (in medial / final position)</td>
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</table>

Table 1 Transcription conventions for Arabic
Glossary

إضراب
Idrāb
Strike

إضراب [idrāb] is the Standard Arabic term for “strike”. Historically, it has been used with the same general meaning by other (Sudanese) movements. During the third Sudanese revolution, إضراب [idrāb ša‘bī] (“popular strike”). In the call for the general strike on 28-29 May 2019, on the other hand, it appears as إضراب سياسي [idrāb siyāsī] (“political strike”) in a leaflet signed by the Sudanese Professional Association (see تجمع المهنيين السودانيين) inviting civil disobedience (see عصيان) in workplaces. In the same document, the term (“political strike”) is defined as وسيلة من الوسائل للمقاومة السلمية [wasīla min al-wasā’il li al-muqāwama as-silmiyya] (“one of the tools for peaceful resistance”). Banners exposed during the demonstrations on 28-29 May 2019 also used more common expressions such as الإضراب العام [al-idrāb al-‘āmm] (“the general strike”) in Pic. 1 or الإضراب الشامل [al-idrāb aš-šāmil] (“the total strike”) in Pic. 2.

Following the massacre (see مجزرة القيادة العامة) of 3 June 2019, the Forces of Freedom and Change (see قوى إعلان الحرية والتغيير) again called for a general strike and civil disobedience.

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The verb امَّتِسَم [i’taṣam] is found in the Quran with the meaning (“keep people together (thanks to the faith)”). In Modern Standard Arabic, on the other hand, the verbal noun امَّتِسَم [i’tiṣām] denotes an act of revolt in which protesters occupy public spaces until their demands are met. Although the term is not semantically related to the notion of “sitting”, it is broadly translated as “sit-in” in English. The term امَّتِسَم was widely used in this sense by Egyptian and Tunisian (Baraket & Belhassine 2016: 173) protesters in 2011. In the context of the third Sudanese revolution, امَّتِسَم primarily refers to the action by protesters who converged on and occupied the esplanade in front of the Supreme Command of the Army Forces (القيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة) on 6 April leading to the removal of ʿOmar Al-Bashir on 11 April 2019. The protesters remained there until the fall of the first Military Council. Later on, they were joined by large numbers of people, making this public space a protest hotspot during the negotiations between the Transitional Military Council (المجلس العسكري الانتقالي) and the Forces of Freedom and Change (قوى الحرية والتغيير). Those who took part in the sit-in have been referred to as ممَّتِسَمِن [mu*tasimin], an active participle that has been generally translated as “protesters”. The term امَّتِسَم also occurs in the hashtag #المشي_القيادة_العامة.

انتفاضة [intifāda] is a verbal noun from the verb نفَّس [nafaḍa] which means “to shake off” or “to get rid of”. The term انتفاضة انتفاضة used with the meaning of “uprising, revolt” has been part of Arabic political vocabulary since the late colonial period, but it only came into common use following the first Palestinian Intifada in 1987. It generally refers to acts of revolt, which may be more ephemeral and less radical than revolutions (الثورة). In the Sudanese context, the term انتفاضة first appeared during the demonstrations that followed the fall of Nimeiry’s regime on 6 April 1985. It has also been widely used to refer to various acts of revolt during the 2019 revolution. The hashtag #المدن_السودان_انتفاضة [mudn as-sīdān tantafaḍ] (“the towns of Sudan rise up”) first appeared in early December 2018, and is also the title of a song by Ayman Mao, a famous Sudanese rapper and former activist in the Girifna movement.
Although it was formed in August 2018, the Sudanese Professional Association (SPA) only started to emerge as a crucial actor in the insurrection with its Declaration for Freedom and Change, which was symbolically issued on 1 January 2019, Sudan’s Independence Day. Since then, it has become a fundamental political actor in insurrectional events in Sudan and the diaspora movement in Europe and elsewhere. The logo of the Sudanese Professional Association in Pic. 8 (which uses the three colours of the Sudanese flag, red, black and green) illustrates its main sources of members – doctors, lawyers, pharmacists (centre), the intellectual professions and teachers (right), and workers (left) – with two shaking hands at the bottom, evoking union across the social classes. Although a number of members of the organization have a political background in Sudanese parties (particularly the Sudanese Communist Party), the Sudanese Professional Association is the most innovative political actor of the third Sudanese revolution.

**Pic. 8**

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The term ترس is commonly used in Sudanese Arabic to refer to two traditional engineering devices: the embankments built to contain the Nile’s floodwaters and the mud levees that demarcate rain-watered agricultural plots in rural areas. In the revolutionary domain, by keeping its original meaning of “a material device for stopping the flow of something”, the term ترس typically defines the stone barricades built in the streets during the fighting. At the outset of the movement, young protesters were told to build تروس [turūs] (“barricades”) to prevent the police and armed forces from entering their neighbourhoods. Following the fall of the regime, sit-in spaces (see اعتصام) were also protected by a system of barricades around them, with checkpoints.
organized by activists to ensure the safety of those entering the spaces. An iconic video made after the massacre of 3 June (مجزرة القيادة العامة) shows people silently building barricades together to prevent the forthcoming raids by the Rapid Support Forces (قوات الدعم السريع). The same root is used as a verb ترس [tarras] with the meaning “to build barricades”.

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تسقط بس
*Tasguṭ bass*
*Just fall*

This is probably the most widely used and mediatized slogan of the third Sudanese Revolution. It consists of تسقط [tasguṭ] an imperfect 2nd person masculine form of the verb سقط [sagaṭ] (“to fall”) followed by the adverb of degree بس [bass] meaning “only, just, that’s all”. Though commonly translated into English as “just fall (that’s all)” by both Sudanese activists and the international press, تسقط بس might be better translated as “you’d better fall”. تسقط بس is a genuinely Sudanese slogan with typical features of the national Koine, such as the [g] for the Standard Arabic ق [q], in both oral and written usage (transcribed in Latin script as *tasgot bas* in Pic. 4).

The slogan makes no any particular socioeconomic claim; it simply expresses popular exasperation towards the regime while demanding its fall. It was used from the first phases of the revolution as an injunction addressed directly to ‘Omar Al-Bashir. A plural variant تسقطوا بس [tasguṭu bass] (“you’d (plural) better fall”) quickly developed to address members of the regime. After 6 April 2019, protesters reused the verb سقط “to fall” in celebrative slogans such as سقطت تب [sagaṭat tabb] (“it has definitely fallen”) and سقطت سقطت يا كيزان [sagaṭat sagaṭat yā kīzān] (“it fell, it fell, oh members of the regime”) (see كوز) in which the 3rd perfect feminine person سقطت [sagaṭat] (“it has fallen”) implicitly refers to the government (i.e. حكومة [ḥukūma]). Later, following the establishment of the Transitional Military Council (المجلس العسكري الانتقالي), the variants تسقط تاني [tasguṭ tāni] (“you’d do better to fall again”) and تسقط تالت [tasguṭ tālit] (“you’d do better to fall for the third time”) were used to address Generals ‘Awad Ibn ‘Awf and ‘Abdel
Fattaḥ al-Burhan respectively. Owing to its widespread use, تسقط بس gave rise to other slogans based on the pattern X + بس [bass], as in the case of the الشارع بس [aš-šāri‘a bass] (“(we) just (want) the street”) (see الشارع) and مدنية بس [madaniyya bass] (“(we) just (want) civil rule”) (see مدنية). The verb تسقط (“to fall”) also occurs in its nominal form إسقاط (“fall (down)”) in the Standard Arabic slogan الشعوب يريد إسقاط النظام [aš-šā‘u rub yurīd isqāṭ an-nīzām] (“the people want the fall of the regime”) (see الشعوب, النظام), which was widely used during the Arab Springs and then again by Sudanese protesters.

 تسقط بس is new to the Sudanese context insofar as it was never documented before December 2018, although semantically similar expressions were used during other uprisings in the Arab world. These include the imperative forms إنزل [inzil] (“stand down, get out”), إرحل [irḥal] (“go away, get out”) and dégage (in French) (“go away, get out”), which were adopted by Egyptian and Tunisian protesters in 2011. Though mainly used as a shouted slogan، تسقط بس was widely employed on banners and posters that were displayed during demonstrations. In this context, the slogan is found in both Arabic and its short English translation “just fall”, as shown in Pic. 5.

The slogan has also been widely hashtagged as #تسقط_بس in all the main social media and in a large number of electronic flyers, like the one shown in Pic. 6.
The revolution

"At-tawra, As-sawra"

is probably the only slogan from the third Sudanese revolution to have been translated into several of the so-called “indigenous” languages of Sudan (which are commonly referred to as رطانات [ruṭanāt] in Sudanese Arabic). In a series of flyers distributed on the Facebook page of the Sudanese Translators for Change, تسقط بس was translated into a dozen Sudanese languages, including “Fellata” (Fulani, in Arabic script, Pic. 7) and “Zaghawa” (Beria, in both Arabic and Latin script, Pic. 8).

Lastly, تسقط بس has also been extensively used as a refrain by Sudanese hip-hop singers, both in Sudan and in the diaspora.

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الثورة

The revolution

Al-thawra

in Standard Arabic [at-țawra] and in Sudanese Arabic [as-sawra], is the common term for “revolution” in the sense of a radical, multilevel change. The term appeared in the actors’ discourse soon after the first uprisings in December 2018, while external observers and the media continued to prefer other terms like “riots” or “revolts”, gradually shifting towards “transition” when the civil government was formed. Protesters adopted the term الثورة at the time of their first demonstrations, notably in the second part of the slogan حريّة سلام وعدّالة الثورة خيار الشعب, where “the revolution is the choice of the people” follows the three crucial demands “freedom, peace and justice.” Revolution is also often referred to as an “ongoing” process by the expression الثورة مستمرة [at-țawra mustamirra], which was in widespread use after the fall of the regime in April 2019, and even after the massacre of 3 June 2019. Without the definite article آل [al-], the term ثورة is also shouted as a standalone word between poems and chants. In the narrative discourse on the event, comparisons are often made with the Sudanese revolutions of 1964 and 1985 (but not with the
Mahdist Revolution of 1881-1885 or the first nationalist revolution led by the White Flag League in 1924), thus making it possible to refer to 2018-2019 as the “third Sudanese revolution”. Based on the same root, the noun ثوار [t̪uwar] “revolutionaries” has been used in association with other terms such as march (see موكب) and committee (see لجنة). There is also evidence of use of the form ثورجي [sawraj] “revolutionary” marked by the suffix [-ji], which has been borrowed from Turkish. In collective memories of revolutions and prominent uprisings, people commonly use the Western calendar name of the month to denote them in brief: thus, “October” stands for the 1964 revolution, “April” for the 1985 revolution, and “September” for the violently repressed revolt of 2013. In line with this practice, it seems that they have started to describe the 2018-2019 revolution as “December”.

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الجديد الالكتروني
*Al-jidād al-iliktrūni*
*The electronic chicken*

Already in use before the revolution, this term has been used by Sudanese activists to refer to people employed by the regime to spread rumours and fake news on the web in order to alter public opinion. The association between a common domestic animal (the chicken) and the modern nature of electronic technology adds a humorous touch to the expression, which can be seen in some pictures (Pic. 9), such as the one that replaces the well-known FKC brand with ʿOmar Al-Bashir and the label KEC (Keizan Electronic Chicken) (see كوز).

Pic. 9

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This term came into common use during the Darfur war (since 2003) to refer to the armed militias supported by the Khartoum government. It is the result of a merger of the Arabic words جن [jinn] “genie” and جواد [juwād] “horses” to express the image of an [armed] horseman who resembles a devil. The term جنجاويد entered the broader political lexicon later, when members of these militias were restructured and reorganized into the so-called Rapid Support Forces (see قوات الدعم السريع). Their role in the violent repression of urban social movements was already noted during the uprising of September 2013, but their presence became more visible and institutionalized in Khartoum after the events of the 2019 revolution. جنجاويد was used as a collective noun more often, while its singular form جنجاويدي [janjawīdi] was used more rarely to refer to individual members of the Rapid Support Forces.

Jihāz al-amn wa al-muxabarāt al-waṭani
The National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS)

This is the notorious apparatus of security agents that played a primary role in political control and repression during the regime. Well-paid, and with more privileges, compared to other security bodies (the police and the army), its loyalty to the regime made it the strongest source of support for political repression before and during the revolution. It was much feared by the people, whose narratives about the occupation of the Army Headquarters (القيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة) before the fall of the regime on 11 April report armed clashes between the NISS and the army, who fired on them to protect the protesters. The NISS is more briefly and commonly referred to as جهاز [jihāz] “the service” or “the device” or الأمن [al-amn] “security”. Young activists also use the singular noun أمنجي [amnaji], using the Turkish derived suffix [-ji], to refer to members of the NISS.

Jawwa’ta an-nās ya raggāṣ
You have led the people to hunger, you dancer

This is one of the first slogans of the 2019 Sudanese revolution. Seen for the first time in Atbara on 19 December 2018, it was also used by diaspora activists before 11 April 2019. The adoption
of the term رقص [raggās] “dancer” to ridicule ‘Omar Al-Bashir makes reference to the fact that he would perform traditional dances after his public speeches.

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حرامية

Harāmiyya

Thieves

This is the plural of the Sudanese Arabic noun حرامي [harāmi] (“thief”). It was used before and during the recent movement to refer to corrupt members and supporters of the regime and their responsibility for the economic crisis that preceded the revolution. The term can be found in the slogan سلمية سلمية ضد الحرامية [silmiyya silmiyya ḍidd al-ḥaramiyya] (“pacifism, pacifism against the thieves”) (see سلمية). The notion of “thieves” is also expressed by the Standard Arabic term لصوص [luṣūs].

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حرب

Harb

War

As civil war has been a constant for Sudan since its independence in 1956 (North-South, Darfur, Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, Eastern Region), there is an especially strong focus on war in the context of revolutionary narratives. Since the very beginnings of the revolution, protesters have explicitly demanded that the ongoing conflicts in Sudan cease. Armed conflicts are condemned because they ravage people and territories alike, dividing them along the ethnic lines drawn by the regime, and because they are a money pit that worsens the economic crisis and encourages corruption and international isolation. War was denounced in a march (see موكب) that took place during the demonstrations of 14 February known as موكب الحروب والانتهاكات [mawkib al-ḥurūb wa al-intihakāt] (“the march of wars and violations”), see Pic. 10.
The Declaration for Freedom and Change in January 2019 demanded an immediate halt to all armed conflicts. Since the fall of the regime, both the Transitional Military Council (المجلس العسكري الانتقالي) and the subsequent transitional government have engaged in negotiations with the regional armed movements. Although the term حرب is not explicitly used in slogans, the call for pacifism (سلامية) and peace in the main slogan “freedom, peace and justice. The revolution is the choice of the people” (حرية سلام وعدالة الثورة خيار الشعب) testifies to the centrality of “war” in revolutionary discourse.

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Haraka Movement

This term generally refers to any “(socio-political) movement”, as distinguished from (political) parties. In the Sudanese context, the term حركة has historically been associated with the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), which is referred to in Arabic as الحركة الشعبية [al-حَرَاكَة الأَش-شا’بيّة] (“popular movement”). The Girifna movement, which was founded in 2010, is defined on its website as حركة مقاومة شعبية سلمية [حَرَاكَة مُقاومة شعبيّة سلميّة] (“popular peaceful movement of resistance”) (see سلمية). The plural forms حركات [حَرَاكَات, حِرَاكَات] are also used to refer to “demonstrations” or “mobilizations”, as in a video that went viral on the internet showing a group of children chanting and dancing against the “corrupt regime” of ‘Omar al-Bashir.

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Hurriyya Freedom

This is the Standard Arabic term for “freedom”. As such, it has always been extensively used during all sorts of popular uprising in the Arab world. Widely seen in both Tunisia (Baraket & Belhassine 2016 : 131) and Egypt during the Arab Spring in 2011, حريّة is the first term in the triad “freedom, peace and justice. The revolution is the choice of the people” ( сериал الرَّأْب خيار الشعب). The importance of freedom as opposed to the dictatorial nature of the regime can also be seen in the standalone use of the word حريّة repeated rhythmically while clapping one’s hands. Even though the protesters’ discourse often recalls notions of “political freedom” and “freedom of expression”, the demand for freedom is extended to other domains as well. The wall painting in Pic. 11 reads الفن حرية [الفن حرية] (“art is freedom”), revealing the focus on artistic performance as part of the revolution.
Freedom, peace, and justice. The revolution is the choice of the people

This is one of the most common slogans of the third Sudanese revolution, and was chanted both before and after the removal of ‘Omar Al-Bashir. However, activists who have been interviewed have said that the slogan was created on the occasion of the funeral of Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud, Secretary-General of the Sudanese Communist Party from 1971 until his death in 2012. The slogan is in two parts. The first is the triad عدالة سلام وحرية [ḥurriyya, salām wa ‘adāla] (“freedom, peace, and justice”), representing the main demands of the revolution, while the second, الثورة خيار الشعب [as-sawra xiyār aš-ša'b] overtly states that “the revolution is the choice of the people”. It is mainly used as a shouted and, apart from the [s] in place of the Standard Arabic [t], the slogan does not exhibit any features of Sudanese Arabic. Although it is innovative in the context of Arab revolutions, we find a number of similar expressions in Egypt such as تغيير حرية عدالة اجتماعية [taġyīr, ḥurriyya, ‘adāla igtima‘iyya] (“change, freedom, social justice”, Keraitim & Mehrez 2012: 27) عيش حرية عدالة اجتماعية [ēš, ḥurriyya, ‘adāla igtima‘iyya] (“bread, freedom, social justice”, Sanders IV 2012:127) and in Tunisia [šoġol, ḥurriyya, karāma waṭaniyya] (“work, freedom, national dignity”, Baraket & Belhassine 2016: 71) in 2011. The Sudanese slogan has also been widely hashtagged in its short form #عدالة_سلام_حرية.

حق

[ḥaq] is the Standard Arabic for “right” in the legal and political sense of the word. In Sudanese Arabic, حق [ḥagg] is found in its singular and plural forms حقوق [ḥugūg] “rights” with
the same meaning. حق has also been grammaticalized as a possessive particle corresponding to the English “of” and used to form possessive pronouns such as “mine” and “yours”. حق/حقوق, meaning “right” or “rights” were widely used during the revolution in association with the demand for “justice” (i.e. عدالة ['adāla]). حق showed up in posters and banners from the very beginning of the revolt, such as the one in Pic. 12 calling for the first demonstration in Port Sudan on 20 December 2018, on which we read اعرف حقك وطالب به [a'rif ḥaggak wa ṭālib be] (“know your right and claim it”).

Pic. 12

حق also occurs in a number of slogans in Sudanese Arabic, like حقنا كامل ما بنجامل [ḥaggina kāmil mā binjāmil] (“all our rights, with no compromises”). In other cases, حق is more likely to have a possessive reading: اراح كلنا نرجعو حقنا [arāḥ kullina narja ḥaggina] (“Let’s go together and take back what’s ours”). The revolutionary experience also seems to have popularized notions like حقوق الإنسانية [huqūq al-insaniyya] (“human rights”) or حقوق المرأة [huqūq al-mar’a] (“women's rights”), which had previously been restricted to the discourse of intellectuals and the political elites, and introduced them into daily discourse.

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الدم قصاد الدم ما بنق بل الدية

Ad-damm guṣād ad-damm mā binagbal ad-diya

Blood for blood. We don’t accept the blood price

This slogan has been widely used to honour the martyrs (see شهيد) of the revolution, particularly after the massacre of 3 June (see مجزرة القيادة العامة). The sentence “Blood for blood. We don’t accept the blood price” is traditionally used in reference to local practices of retaliation or reconciliation following murders. In the context of the revolution, it is interpreted either as a demand for judicial proceedings through the courts independently of Islamic and tribal values (which are both associated with the الدية [diya] “blood price” system) or as the desire to punish murderers with the death penalty. The slogan presents typical features of the Sudanese Koine, such as [g] in place of the Standard Arabic ق [q] and the preverbal marker بـ [bi].

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This is an English loanword that is typically used in Sudanese Arabic to refer to people (mainly fashion-conscious boys) who wear dreadlocks. During the revolution, the semantic reference of the term and its plural variant راسطات [raṣṭāt] “rastas” expanded to encompass the notion of “young leaders of the revolt”. The term has also been used by members of the regime (see كوز) and the transitional military council (see المجلس العسكري الانتقالي) with different indexical meanings. First, راستة was associated with a derogatory meaning like “beatnik” to reflect a stereotypical image of the young militants leading the revolts in the streets. In this regard, the forced shaving of young males, a frequent act by security forces before the revolution, confirms that having long hair was stigmatized as a rejection of Islamic morals, and thus as a marker of political opposition. Later, in a famous press conference held on 6 July 2019, General al-Burhan ended his speech with “a special greeting to the yobs, the rastas, and the girls” تحية خاصة لناس الرصة. In this case, the use of راسطات [raṣṭāt] “rastas” in association with other terms borrowed from an informal register of Sudanese Arabic (i.e. ناس الرصة for “yobs” and سانات for “girls”) was interpreted as a clumsy attempt to create solidarity with the young revolutionary leaders in anticipation of the announced political negotiations. Not surprisingly, al-Burhan’s speech soon became a subject of humour on social media.

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سلام

Salām
Peace

سلام is the conventional Arabic word to define a situation of “peace, absence of war”. During ‘Omar Al-Bashir’s regime, the term was instrumentalized from the perspective of the Islamic notion of دار السلام [dār as-salām] “the abode of peace” as opposed to دار الحرب [dār al-ḥarb] “the abode of war” (see حرب), which commonly refers to territories where Muslims are engaged in wars against infidels. During the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005) دار السلام became a common toponym of “pacified” locations such as IDP camps, as is the case with دار البشير [wād al-bašīr] “Wad Al-Bashir”, an IDP camp in the Western Greater Khartoum region that has been renamed دار السلام “Dar al-Salam”. Similarly, during the war in Darfur, one of the government’s strategies for dominating rebel areas was to change place names to conform to Islamic values, as with the village of Auwad ibn Tawǎf [Idd al-Ḡanām] “Idd al-Ghanam” (literally “the goat’s well”), which was renamed دار السلام “Dar al-Salam” (literally “the well of peace”).

سلام is one of the most significant terms used by protesters during the third Sudanese revolution. This can be partially explained by its semantic association with “pacifism” (see سلمية).
keyword of the revolution. Far from any reference to its Islamic interpretation, the term سلام has been widely used to demand an end to ongoing conflicts led by the government both inside Sudan (Darfur, Blue Nile, and Southern Kordofan) and outside its borders (Yemen). The term سلام is found in this sense in the famous triad “freedom, peace and justice”. It is also used in more contextual slogans, such as in the short text issued by the Hajj Yusuf Revolutionary Committee (لجنة الانتقالي) during the negotiations between the Transitional Military Council (المجلس العسكري) and the Forces of Freedom and Change (قوي الحرية والتغيير). The text begins with لا سلام لا كلام [lā salām lā kalām]; although the expression is commonly used to emphasize a situation of enmity, including between individuals - in the sense of “neither greetings (سلام) nor talk among us” - it can be translated in this context as “there will be no negotiation without peace”.

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سلمية Silmiyya
Pacifism, non-violence

The term سلمية (“pacifism”) is closely linked to the notion of peace (سلام), and underlines the non-violent nature of the movement. Pacifism is conceived here as a strategy for avoiding criminalization and a lack of international support, as happened during the uprisings of September 2013. Some activists report the use of the slogan سلمية سلمية ضد الحرامية [silmiyya silmiyya ḍidd al-ḥaramiyya] “pacifism, pacifism against the thieves” (حرامية) during the general strike in 2016. The term is also the title of a song that embraces many of the revolution’s keywords and slogans. سلمية was also used during the Syrian revolution in 2011. In Place Tahrir, in Cairo, on the other hand, سلمية “pacifism, pacifism” was a plea of sorts to establish an urgent, non-violent rapport with the army (Khalil 2012: 251).

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الشارع Aš-šāriʿa
The street

During the revolution, the noun الشارع [aš-šāriʿa] (“the street”) was used metonymically to refer to the main site of revolutionary action, and it is also used to denote a space of more extensive socialization and artistic production after the fall of the regime. Derived from the very common “just fall,” the slogan الشارع بس [aš-šāriʿa bass] “(we) just (want) the street” also appeared on a banner distributed after the installation of the Second Military Council, as shown in Pic. 13.
Here, it is clear that occupation of the “street” is seen as the only way to carry out the revolutionary process. Some activists have also used the term الشارع to refer to the first phase of the revolution, prior to the establishment of the sit-in (اعتصام) in front of the Supreme Command of the Army Forces (قيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة) on 6 April 2019.

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شرقت شرقت عطبرة مرقت
Šaragat, šaragat, ʿAṭbara maragat
It glowed, it glowed, Atbara arose

This is one of the very first slogans of the third Sudanese revolution. It was shouted in the streets of Atbara from the first protests on 19 December 2018. Atbara, together with Damazin, was one of the first towns to rise up because of its tradition of working class struggles, which had endured since the colonial period. The slogan consists of the repetition of the verb شرقت [šaragat] “it (Atbara) glowed” followed by the sentence عطبرة مرقت [ʿaṭbara marag], which can be translated as “Atbara got out (in protest), Atbara arose”. It makes no political or socioeconomic demands; it is basically just a metaphor likening Atbara’s revolt to a rising sun. After the fall of ‘Omar Al-Bashir, the slogan was also used in Khartoum on 23 April 2019 to welcome the arrival of a huge parade (موكب) leading thousands of protesters from Atbara to the Sudanese capital. Linguistically, شرقت شرقت عطبرة مرقت presents typical features of Sudanese Arabic, such as the use of the verb مرق [marag] “to go out” with the meaning of “to rise”. The slogan was also the title of a famous revolutionary song.

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الشريعة
Aš-šarī‘a
The Islamic law

Islamic Law, which was imposed for the first time in independent Sudan in 1983 and then “frozen” after the fall of the Nimeiry regime in 1985, became the official legal reference after the 1989 coup d’état backed by the Muslim Brotherhood. After the independence of South Sudan in
2011, Omar Al-Bashir announced that the new situation favoured the full application of the sharia to the henceforth (Arab) Muslim nation. The demand for the abolition of Islamic Law was a crucial feature of the revolution and was implicit in the call for civil rule (see مدنية); it was also consistent with the identification of the political and economic elites of the contested regime as Islamists. The term is also found in a slogan of a counter-revolutionary demonstration asking for الشريعة to be maintained in Sudan: [aš-šarī‘a, aš-šarī‘a, abadan ma binbī‘ah] “Islamic Law, Islamic Law, we will never sell it”.

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الشعب
Aš-ša‘ab
The people

[aš-ša‘b] “the people” is the most common expression in slogans and other discourses to define protesters as the collective political actors of this revolution. Although this use is nothing new compared with previous Sudanese revolutions, local narratives tend to stress the more inclusive dimension of popular participation during this third revolution, recalling that the uprisings in 1964 and 1985 were both led by an avant-garde (of students, trade unionists and parties, and the army) acting on behalf of the people. In 2018-2019 الشعب seems to have described a collective actor that transcended regional, ethnic, and class differences by a joint opposition to the ruling elites of the regime. The notion of الشعب “the people” is typically opposed to that of the regime (see النظام), as in the famous slogan الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام [aš-ša‘b yurid isqāṭ an-nizām] (“the people want the fall of the regime”), which was borrowed from the 2011 Arab Spring. The الشعب is also found in the second part of the main slogan Freedom, peace and justice. The revolution is the choice of the people (see حرية سلام وعدلة الثورة خيار الشعب).

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شفاتة
Šaffāta
Rascals

This is the plural form of the Sudanese Arabic noun شفت [shīfit], which is typically used to denote an “opportunist”, someone who is able to use his shrewdness for personal gain thanks to his proximity to the regime and its apparatus. The term went through a semantic renewal during the revolution when it began to be used to refer to young rascals who supported the revolution without fearing a direct clash with police. The term appears in a famous song entitled شفتة جو بوليس جرى [šaffāta jow bolīs jara] “the rascals arrived, the police ran away”. As a collective actor, the شفتة “rascals” are often said to have played a pivotal role in the revolution, together with young women (see كنداة).
The term شهيد [šahīd] is found in the Quran with the meaning “(faith) witness”. It has a wider use in Arabic, however, in the sense of “martyr”, meaning an individual who is killed for a religious and/or political cause. Widely used during other uprisings in Arabic-speaking countries, شهيد denotes every person who is deliberately killed because of his/her conscious support for a revolution, thus bearing witness to a noble cause. Since the beginning of the revolution, protesters have honoured martyrs (شهداء [šuhadā’]) in dedicated marches (موكب) as in Pic. 14.

The Families of Martyrs Association was one of the signatories of the 1 January Declaration by the Sudanese Professional Association (تجمع المهنيين السودانيين). During the sit-in (اعتصام) in April and May, a ritual daily moment of silence was set aside to remember the martyrs, to whom a number of wall paintings were dedicated, as shown in Pic. 15 (to the martyrs ‘Ali Fadul and ‘Awadiya Ajabna, Deim).
During the 30 June march of one million people (see مليونية), protesters stopped at martyrs’ houses to mourn and offer condolences to their families. This crucial figure is also present in a number of slogans, such as دم الشهيد دمي أم الشهيد أمي [damm aš-šahīd dammi umm aš-šahīd ummi] (“the martyr’s blood is my blood, the martyr’s mother is my mother”). The variant دم الشهيد بدم ما بنقبل الدية [damm aš-šahīd bi damm mabinagbal ad-diya] (the martyr’s blood for blood. We don’t accept the blood price) was also used, as can be seen in Pic. 16.

Pic. 16

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شير
Share

This is an English loanword whose semantic coverage was originally limited to the social media sphere (“share, sharing on social media”). During the sit-in (see اعتتصام), the term شير entered the revolution’s lexicon to describe the practices of the mutual exchange of food and other goods or services among protesters, which have subsequently acquired a powerful symbolic value. In local narratives, شير as an iconic outcome of daily revolutionary life is perceived positively both as a return to Sudanese traditions (generosity, hospitality, and gift) and an implicit form of resistance to the hegemony of market values in a neoliberal capitalist context.

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عدالة
‘Adāla
Justice

This is the third element of the famous triad “freedom, peace and justice” (see حريّة سلام وعدالة الثورة خيار الشعب), and echoes the demands for rights (see حق) for marginalized and oppressed categories (women, ethnic minorities, political activists, etc.). The term was used throughout the
revolution in relation to various significant events. After the fall of the regime, the notion of عدالة lay at the heart of the demonstrations that took place during the trial of ‘Omar Al-Bashir (mainly associated with a demand that he be charged with “crimes against humanity and genocide”, according to the 2008 ICC arrest warrant). Following the massacre (see مجزرة القيادة العامة) on 3 June 2019, on the other hand, عدالة was linked to a demand for judgments against the military and political actors responsible for killings and missing people (see المفقودين). Finally, after the appointment of the civil government in September 2019, the call to demonstrations for عدالة targeted a complete renewal of the judiciary. Compared with other contexts such as Egypt, where we find the slogan حريّة عدالة اجتماعية [taġyīr, ḥurriyya, ‘adāla igtima’iyya] “change, freedom, social justice,” (Keraitim & Mehrez 2012: 27), the meaning of عدالة during the third Sudanese revolution seems more akin to “formal justice” rather than “social justice”.

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عصيان
‘Iṣyān
Disobedience

This term first appeared as عصيان مدني [‘iṣyān, madani] “civil disobedience” (see مدني) on the occasion of the general strike of 28-29 May 2019. Later on, the term عصيان was used in the call for continuing peaceful resistance after the attacks by the Rapid Support Forces (see قوات الدعم السريع) on 3 June 2019. Even though عصيان is sometimes considered to be a particular form of strike (see إضراب) when people occupy their workplaces without working, it refers more generally to a protest expressed in the form of non-cooperation orders issued by the management of offices, schools, companies, etc. and thus corresponds to a general strategy of peaceful resistance.

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قوى إعلان الحرية والتغيير
Quwa i’lān al-ḥurriyya wa at-taġyīr
Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC)

Established on 1 January 2019 as a collective means of political representation, the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), also known as the Alliance for Freedom and Change (AFC), was a coalition of twenty-two political groups of various kinds, including the Sudanese Professional Association (see تجمع المهنيين السودانيين) and the National Consensus Forces. On the same date, the coalition issued its Declaration of Freedom and Change, which set out three main requests: 1) the unconditional end of ‘Omar Al-Bashir’s presidency; 2) the formation of a National Transitional Government (with 9 main goals); and 3) the cessation of all violence against protestors. Throughout the revolution, the Forces of Freedom and Change promoted civil disobedience (see عصيا) and strikes (see إضراب) as a means of peaceful resistance. After the removal of ‘Omar Al-Bashir, the Forces of Freedom and Change became the main political opponent of the Transitional Military Council (see المجلس العسكري الانتقالي).
The Rapid Support Forces are the armed militias that operated during the war in Darfur. They are also popularly referred to as Janjaweed (جناوئد). Administered by the National Intelligence and Security Service (جهاز الأمن والمخابرات الوطني), the Rapid Support Forces have been led by General Mohammad Hamdan Dagalo, who is better known as “Hemetti”, since June 2019. The Rapid Support Forces also took part in the Libyan and Yemeni civil wars (حرب). During the revolution, they were used on various occasions to carry out violent attacks on peaceful demonstrators, provoking hundreds of deaths and injuries. The Sudanese Professional Association (تجمع المهنيين السودانيين) denounced the murders carried out by the Rapid Support Forces on several occasions, as during the massacre of 3 June 2019 (مجزرة القيادة العامة).

This is the official name for the Army Headquarters, a huge block in the Burri district near the old Blue Nile Bridge in Khartoum. During the demonstration on 6 April, protesters who had been driven back from the Presidential Palace retreated towards the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces demanding protection from the army. From that time, the place became the heart of the sit-in (اعتصام) for about two months, expanding into the surrounding streets and bringing people together from the whole of Greater Khartoum and Sudan. Often referred to simply as [al-qiyāda] “the Command” or [midān al-qiyāda] “the square of the Command”, it has been generally translated as the “Headquarters” by the international media. The term also occurs in the hashtag #العامه_لقياه_اعتصام “the sit-in at the Supreme Command”.

The term [kandāka] (“Kandaka” – also “Candace” in the Western tradition) has its origin in Meroitic, a possibly Nilo-Saharan language that was spoken in Upper and Lower Nubia between 2000 BCE and 600 CE. The Meroitic word refers to the sister of the King of Kush. The term emerged in a political context with the meaning of “strong, engaged woman” during the protest in 2012, in which there was significant participation by young and old women alike. It reappeared
and spread during the 2018-19 revolution, which also witnessed the increased importance of women’s activism. The expression حبيبي كنتِاكة [ḥabōbti kandāka] “my grand-mother was Kandaka” can be found on a number of banners and in several chants. Although some have noted the underlying exclusivism of the image – “Kandaka” evokes a woman from the ruling class in northern riverain groups – the term became iconic for all Sudanese women involved in the revolution, and came into everyday use, going beyond the cultured elites. The central role of women in the revolution was witnessed by dedicated marches such as the موكب المرأة السودانیة [mawkib al-mar’a as-sūdāniyya] (“the march of the Sudanese woman”), which was organized on the occasion of the demonstrations of 7 March (see الموكب). The term كنتِاكة can also be widely found on banners displayed during the demonstrations as the one in Pic. 17.

![Pic 17](image17.jpg)

The same is true for posters shared on social media, such as the one below, on which we read الكنداكات رمز الثورة [al-kandakāt ramz at-tāwra] (“The Kandakas are the symbol of revolution”) (see Pic. 18.)

![Pic 18](image18.jpg)

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This Sudanese Arabic term كوز [kōz] literally means “small water cup”. It is commonly used to refer to the cylindrical tin cup with a handle that is found all over Sudan. Used for offering water as a first act of welcome to guests, it is typically found near the زير [zīr] “water jar” that gives free access to water in public spaces or homes. كوز therefore traditionally embodies shared values of hospitality and concepts of water as an unmarketable gift. After 1989، كوز (together with its plural form كيزان [kizān]) began to be used metaphorically to refer to members of the Islamist regime. The origin of this new semantic reference of كوز can be traced to a quote by Ḥassan Al-Turabi (the former head of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood and leader of the Islamic Revolution until his removal in 2000): [الدين ببحر و نحن كيزانه نغرف منه] (“Religion (Islam) is a sea and we are the cups (كيزان) scooping from it”). Unused in other Arab countries، كوز has a semantic equivalent in أزلام [azlām]، a Qur’anic term meaning “divining arrows” used by Tunisian activists to refer to the members of Ben Ali’s regime (Baraket & Belhassine 2016:41). In Sudan، the use of the term كوز with the derogatory meaning “member، supporter of the regime” spread quickly during the revolution and entered everyday usage، also in the feminine form كوزة [kōza]. Both the singular كوز and the plural كيزان were often used in shouted slogans before and after ‘Omar Al-Bashir’s removal، as in the case of [اى كوزندوسوا دوس ما بنخاف ما بنخاف] (“Every member of the regime (كوز) we will stamp on him. We have no fear، we have no fear”)和 [سقطت سقطت يا كيزان] (“it has fallen، it has fallen، oh members of the regime (كيزان)”) (see تسقط بس). Besides its metaphorical use، كوز has also been a source of humour and creativity among Sudanese protesters. The pictures below show the use of tin cups during demonstrations following the fall of the regime to express the desire to get rid of (كيزان) and put them in prison (Pic. 20)، turning it into dark humour with the image of a cup filled with blood after the massacre of 3 June 2019 (Pic. 21) (see مجزرة القيادة العامة).
The image of كيزان as a dominant élite controlling all aspects of political and economic power is also found in several hip-hop songs both during and after the revolution.

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This term was commonly used during Omar’s Al-Bashir regime as a short form of لجنة شعبية [lajna ša’biyya] “popular committee”, a political institution created in 1989. During the revolution, the term لجنة was associated with new institutions forged by people to support their political actions. For example we find [al-lajna al-‘amma li ṭuwaḥ Ḥajj Yūsuf] (“The general committee of the revolutionaries of Hajj Yusuf” (a Khartoum neighborhood) or لجان المقاومة السودانية [lijān al-muqāwama as-sūdāniyya] ("Sudan resistance committees") in posters calling for the 14 February demonstrations, see Pic. 22.
These committees are reputed to be clandestine cells that organized various forms of struggle during this revolution (some say they were already present in the previous uprising in September 2013). After the fall of the regime and the official dissolution of the former system of لجان شعبية ("popular committees") and لجان المقاومة ("resistance committees") were created in several quarters, and their members, who were involved in tasks of organizing local daily life (censuses of inhabitants, follow-ups of service issues, price controls in the markets, etc.), began asking for them to be made official as new local representation bodies.

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مجزرة القيادة العامة
Majzara al-qiyāda al-ʿamma
The massacre of the Supreme Command

This expression literally means "the butchery of the Supreme Command". Mainly used in its short form المجزرة [al-majzara] "the butchery" ("the massacre"), it is a metaphorical reference to the brutal removal of the sit-in (see اعتصام القيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة) on 3 June 2019. The intervention of the Rapid Support Forces (see قوات الدعم السريع) that resulted in 130 deaths and hundreds of injuries is more neutrally defined by government sources as فت قق الاعتصام [fakk al-iʾtiṣām] or فت قق الاعتصام [faḍḍ al-iʾtiṣām] ("the dissolution of the sit-in"). The episode has been widely hashtagged both in Arabic as مجزرة القيادة العامه and in English as #KhartoumMassacre.

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المجلس العسكري الانتقالي
Al-majlis al-askari al-intiqāli
The Transitional Military Council (TMC)

The Transitional Military Council (TMC) was established on 11 April 2019, immediately after the removal of ʿOmar Al-Bashir. Initially headed by General ʿAwad Ibn ʿAwf, who resigned just one day after his appointment, the Transitional Military Council is formally controlled by General ʿAbdel Fattah al-Burhan, who signed a political transition agreement with the Forces of Freedom and Change (see قوي إعلان الحرية والتفاهم) on 17 July 2019. After the massacre of 3 June 2019 (see مجزرة القيادة العامة), the Sudanese Professional Association (see تجمع المهنيين السودانيين) denounced the direct involvement of the Transitional Military Council in the murders carried out by the Rapid Support Forces (see قوات الدعم السريع).

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During and after the third Sudanese revolution, the feminine adjective مدنية [madaniyya] (“civil”) was commonly used to modify the nouns سلطة [sulṭa] (“authority”, or “rule”) (for example، سلطة مدنية أو ثورة أبدية [sulṭa madaniyya aw thawra abdiyya] (“civil rule or everlasting revolution”), see Pic. 23) and حكومة [ḥukūma] (“government”) (see Pic. 25، on the left) in contrast to both سلطة عسكرية [sulṭa ‘askariyya] (“military rule”) and سلطة إسلامية [sulṭa islāmiyya] (“Islamic rule”).

The adjective مدني / مدنية “civil” has also been employed since the initial phases of the insurrection in combination with other revolutionary keywords. This is the case with the “Civil Forces Assembly” تجمع القوى المدنية [tajammu’ al-quwa al-madaniyya]، which signed a statement asking for international support for the revolution on 1 January 2019 (Sudan’s independence day). Owing to its widespread use، مدنية started to be used as a noun، summarizing the rejection of both subsequent military councils and the call for an immediate transfer of power to a civil government. This also produced a shift from the core slogan حرية سلام وعدالة [ḥurriyya salām wa ‘adāla] (“freedom، peace and justice”) to مدنية سلام وعدالة [madaniyya salām wa ‘adāla] (“civil rule، peace and justice”). Similarly، the slogan مدنية بس [madaniyya bass] (“we just want civil rule”) partially replaced the more common بس تسقط بس [tasguṭ bass] (“just fall”) (see pic. 23)، as we can see in the following graffiti.
Several videos taken at the moment of the violent removal of the sit-in on 3 June 2019 (see مجزرة القيادة العامة) show the Rapid Support Forces (see قوات الدعم السريع) asking protesters the question مدنية وَلا العسكريّة [madaniyya walā ‘askariyya] “civil rule or military rule?” , and beating those who persisted in giving the former as a response. During the transitional period, the adjective مدني / مدنية “civil” continued to be associated with different forms of struggle, as in the case of the call for “civil disobedience” عصيان مدني (see عصيان) on the occasion of general strike of 28-29 May 2019. The emphatic version مدني [madaniyaaaaw] began to be widely used in the same period on posters and banners like the one on the right of Pic. 25.
This slogan was formalized during the initial stages of the third Sudanese revolution in December 2018. Like other slogans, it consists of two parts: the reiteration of the verb مرقنا [maragna] (“we got out”) followed by ضد الناس السرقوا عرقنا [ḍidd an-nās as-saragu ‘aragna] (“against those who stole our sweat”). The slogan clearly makes reference to the corruption of ‘Omar Al-Bashir’s regime and to the exploitation of labour in Sudan. The use of the verb سرق (“to steal”) is functionally related to the term thieves (see حرامية) which has been widely adopted to refer to members of the regime (see كوز). The slogan also presents typical features of Sudanese Arabic such as the use of the invariant relative pronoun ال [al-] (assimilated as [as-]) “who, that”.

المفقودين
Al-mafqūdīn
The missing ones

The passive participle مفقود [mafqūd] (according to the Standard Arabic pronunciation) literally means “disappeared”. When defined by the article ال [al-], the plural form المفقودين metaphorically refers to all “the missing” who disappeared either during the first months of revolt before the fall of the regime or during the massacre at the sit-in on 3 June 2019 (see مجزرة القيادة العامة). A special march for the missing called مليونية المفقودين [milyūniyya al-mafqudīn] (“the one million person march for the missing people”) (see مليونية), was called for 30 August 2019, and the hashtag مفقودين_مجزرة_القيادة_العام was launched as a tool for sharing information about missing protesters.
Leaflets with images of individual missing persons (with their names and the alleged date and place of disappearance) and the label مفقود “missing” have been displayed on walls (see Pic. 27). Gatherings demanding information on the fate of the missing have been organized in several neighbourhoods in Khartoum.

![Leaflet with image of missing person](image)

**Pic. 27**

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Milyūniyya

One million people march

The feminine Arabic noun مليونية is presumably a semantic calque of the English compound noun Million Man March, a huge demonstration of African Americans called by Louis Farrakhan in Washington D.C. on 16 October 1995. مليونية was first used by Egyptian activists during the 2011 revolution to call a demonstration on 29 March 2011 (the same day as Mawlid Al-Ḥussayn), to protest against the sacking of Sufi shrines by Salafi groups (Keraitim & Mehrez 2012: 59-60). مليونية was also used during the Tunisian revolution in association with other revolutionary terms by both Islamist – such as مليونية النهضة [milyūniyya an-nahḍa] (“The one million people march of the Nahda party”) – and secular activists – such as مليونية النصر [milyūniyya an-naṣr] (“The one million people march of victory”). In Sudan, on the other hand, مليونية has been associated with demonstrations, like in the case of the national demonstration on 6 April 2019, on the anniversary of the 1985 Sudanese revolution. مليونية was later used to call a national demonstration on 30 June 2019 as a civil response to the massacre of 3 June 2019 (see مجزرة القيادة العامة). Owing to the internet ban imposed by the government for a month after the removal of the sit-in, people turned to wall paintings to call the demonstration by writing مليونية 30 يونيو [milyūniyya talaṭīn yunyū] (“the one million march of 30 June”) in the places chosen for the gatherings.
Million has been widely used in banners and posters posted on social media (see Pic. 27). Owing to its widespread use, the term has now expanded its semantic reference to include the more general notion of “demonstration”.

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Mawkiib
March, gathering

This term literally means “procession, parade”, but during the movement it was also used with the general meaning “gathering”. Mawkiib is often associated with one or more terms specifying the nature of the “parade” or “gathering”. These additional terms can be related to a specific theme, as is the case with موكب الحروب والانتهاكات [mawkiib al-ḥurūb wa al-intihakāt] (“the march of wars and violations”) (see حرب), which took place during the demonstrations on 14 February, or the السودانية موكب المرأة [mawkiib al-mar’a as-sūdāniyya] (“the march of the Sudanese woman”) organized on the occasion of the 7 March demonstrations (see Pic. 29).
In other cases, موكب is associated with toponyms indicating the origin of the protesters who gathered to take part in wider demonstrations. More typically, موكب can be widely found on banners hung on buses and trains to show the geographic provenance of protesters heading to Khartoum. Pic. 29 shows one of these banners, which bears the words ثوار موكب شندي [tuwār mawkib shandi] (“The revolutionaries of the Shandi gathering”) (see الثورة).

Lastly, موكب can also be associated with both geographic and social labels, as in the case of موكب الكندكة الغضروفية [mawkib al-kandāka al-qudūfiyya] (“the gathering of the Kandaka from Gedaref”) in Pic. 30 (see كندكة).

Apart for these semantic nuances, which are all consistent with the general notion of a moment of a gathering of different people, the adoption of the term موكب is said to be motivated by a strategic
decision to replace the more usual term [muzāhara] (“demonstration”), as it had been sullied with the negative connotation of a “riot”, implying violent acts by the demonstrators. During the third Sudanese revolution, therefore, موكب became the commonest synonym for “demonstration” or “cortège”.

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النظام
An-nizām
The regime

The term نظام [nizām] (according to the Sudanese Arabic pronunciation) literally means “system, order”. When defined by the article ال [al-], the term نظام metaphorically refers to “the regime” in the sense of a state apparatus for social control. Used throughout the Arabic-speaking world, النظام is generally used to contrast the notion of people (see الشعب) as a collective revolutionary entity. This occurs notably in the slogan الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام [aš-ša‘b yurīd isqāṭ an-nizām] (“the people want the fall of the regime”). Widely seen during the Arab Spring, it emerged for the first time in Tunisia in 2011. In the Sudanese context, الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام is probably the only shouted slogan presenting Standard Arabic features that clearly denote its borrowed nature. Despite this, it was one of the most widely-used slogans during the sit-in (see اعتصام) in front of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (see القيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة).

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يا العنصري المغرور كل البلد دارفور
Ya al-‘unṣūrī al-magrūr, kulli al-balad Dār Fōr
Hey (you) arrogant racist, we are all Darfur

This slogan emerged in the early days of the protests in response to the regime’s attempt to split the revolutionary movement along local ethnic lines. On 29 December 2018, 32 Darfuri students who had allegedly taken part in the demonstrations were arrested, tortured and forced to publicly confess their membership of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army. As a consequence of this, يا العنصري المغرور كل البلد دارفور started to be used extensively by demonstrators throughout Sudan to express their solidarity with the detainees, while stressing the supra-ethnic and anti-racist nature of the revolutionary movement. The slogan consists of two parts. The first is يا العنصري المغرور [yā al-‘unsūrī al-magrūr], a vocative utterance directly addressed to the “arrogant, racist” ‘Omar Al-Bashir. The second is كل البلد دارفور [kulli al-balad dār fōr], which literally means “the whole country is Darfur”, though it has been widely translated into English as “we are all Darfurians”. This translation may have been inspired by the widespread pattern “We are all X”, the origin of which can be traced back to the May 1968 slogan Nous sommes tous des juifs allemands (“we are all German Jews”) shouted by French protesters as a response to the government’s attack on Daniel Cohn-Bendit, one of the political leaders of the movement. Mainly used as a shouted slogan، يا العنصري المغرور كل البلد دارفور has been commonly translated and hashtagged as #WeAreAllDarfur.
in all the main social media. The slogan produced other variants such as يا العنصري يا جبان كل البلد نسوان [yā ‘unsūri ya al-jabbān kulli al-balad niswān], (“Hey (you) racist hey (you) coward, we are all women”) to strengthen the claim for gender equality (see كنذاقة). Racism, as enacted through the political instrumentalization and hierarchization of ethno-cultural differences, is considered as one of the regime’s main crimes. The lack of عنصرية [‘unsuriyya] “racism” between people of different origins taking part in the sit-in (see اعتصام) is a recurring element in people’s narratives. Thus the idea of “unity in diversity”, which had already been spread by the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement during the second civil war, is now considered to be fundamental for building a “New Sudan”.

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يا خرطوم ثوري ثوري لن يحكمنا لصوص كافوري

Ya xarṭūm tawri tawri lan yaḥkimna luṣūṣ kāfūri

Hey Khartoum the revolutionary, the thieves from Kafuri will not govern us

This slogan can be found in written documents (Pic. 31). It presents typical features of Standard Arabic, such as the negative marker لن [lan]. It consists of two parts: the vocative utterance يا خرطوم ثوري ثوري [ya xarṭūm tawri tawri] (“Hey Khartoum the revolutionary”), followed by لن يحكمنا لصوص كافوري [lan yaḥkimna luṣūṣ kāfūri]. Unlike other slogans, it refers directly to the political and spatial configuration of Khartoum. It makes reference to Kafouri, a neighborhood in Khartoum Bahri on the banks of the Blue Nile, with its huge villas inhabited by political or economic élites close to the regime. This location is epitomized here as the main site of a corrupt ruling bourgeoisie. The slogan asserts a refusal to be governed by thieves, and uses the Standard Arabic term لصوص [luṣūs] for metric reasons instead of the more common حرامية [ḥaramiyya].

Pic. 31
## Appendix: list of hashtags

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Bibliography


Arabité, islamité, ‘soudanité’.
Enjeux de la redéfinition des appartenances, des pratiques locales et des politiques étatiques au Soudan après la séparation du Sud


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Arabité, islamité, ‘soudanité’

Being Arab, Muslim, Sudanese