Ontology, Neutrality and the Strive for (non-)Being-Queer

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Abstract:
Since “gender” has been continually the name of a dialectics of the continued institution of gender into an ontological difference and the failure of gendering, it is worth addressing the prospects of any gender-neutral discourse through the tools of Badiousian ontology. As established by Badiou in Being and Event, mathematics – as set theory – is the ultimate ontology. Sets are what gendering processes by reactionary institutions intend to hold, in contradiction to the status of the multiplicities proper to each subject qua subject. This tension between subjectivity and gender comes to the fore through the lens of the ‘count-as-one’, the ontological operator identified by Badiou as the fluid mediator between set-belonging and set-existence. After having specified these ontological preliminaries, this paper will show that the genuine subject of feminism is the “many” that is negatively referred to through the “count-as-one” posited by the gendering of “the” woman. Maintaining the openness of this “many” is an interweaving philosophical endeavour. It is also a political task for any theory receptive to the oppressive load proper to the institutions of sexuation, as deployed through modern capitalism – that is, any queer theory. In its second step, the paper will therefore expose the adequacy of the Badiousian ontology to provide theoretical resources for articulating the field of a genuine queer nomination. It will finally appear that “non-gender” structurally corresponds in the field of a post-capitalist politics of the body to what Francois Laruelle (1984) designated as non-philosophie within the field of metaphysics.
Introduction

It is often heard that queer theory continues radical feminism by experiencing its aporia. However, the multiplicity of feminism makes it hard to formulate a clear account of this relation. Moreover, the intrinsic discordance of queer theorists about what “queer” means or should mean (Germon 2010, Sedgwick 1996, Chambers 2007) seems to indicate that the logics of this transition from feminism to queer theory is ontologically pervaded by the shadows of ontological divergences. Even though one could confidently argue that the overarching background of the theory is what unifies many of these attempts (Stewart 2008, Pedwell and Whitehead 2012) into something likely to be called a radical discourse as well as a radical social practice, we are left with an interrogation concerning the nature and content of such unity.

The question one should ask, at this point, is simply: “Who is the subject of feminism?” To what extent can this subject be, as such, likely to open the fluxes that went through the contemporary queer discourses and the proliferation of meta-discourses which, in the current literature, emphasise the varieties of gender: not only being male or female, heterosexual or homosexual, but being cis- or trans-, and so on (Edelman 2004)? Obviously, where the sexual difference used to be, now stands this uncountable plurality of various designations, which constitute by themselves what “queer theory” is about (Munoz 2009).

But precisely, what is the subject of the enunciation of this theory? How can it be such
that it opened the way to this gendering proliferation, on the sole basis of a feminist emancipative discourse? Moreover, if the whole situation can be summarized in one phrase, i.e., “the dismantling of the gender”, one has to question who / what is the formative force likely to support such a process and to speak in its name. In other words: who is this subject? And what shall it name, when it is naming the predicates that queer theories vindicate?

This paper intends to clear the ground for asking those questions. Fortunately, in recent philosophy, Alain Badiou has advanced a theory of the subject (Badiou, 2009) that is articulated to his radical renovation of ontology – exposed in detail in his Being and Event. A subject can only be understood through this theory of event, which, in turn, stems from the acknowledgement of a radical ontological claim concerning set theory as the theory of multiplicities (as it will be introduced below). This multiplicity resonates with the multiplicities opened in the queer predications, as I just emphasised: such anticipation motivates in advance the reasons we may address Badiou’s ontological theory in order to make progress on the question of the subject of feminism and its queer potentialities, that is, its potentiality for initiating a non-gendered neutral space (space in both the social and the metaphysical senses) (Butler 1999).

Therefore, I will show first how Badiou’s ontology allows us to capture the logics of the gender difference, as both an ontological and political process. This makes visible a dialectics of gendering institutions and dismantling sexual potentialities into neutrality – parallel to the logics of deterritorializing / reterritorializing made famous by Deleuze and
Guattari (2004) – that pervades both the political capitalist machineries (Ahmed 2008) and the traditional metaphysics. On these grounds, we will question the subject of feminism, and show its essential relation with any queer nomination. The last step to make consists in recognising the limits of a formulation of the queer potentialities in a Badiousian framework: here, it will appear that the object of a queer nomination, i.e., the \textit{neutrality}, calls for a novel re-affirmation which takes place, in philosophy, under the modes of what Laruelle recently called “non-philosophie”.

1. Badiou’s thesis on ontology, and the politico-logics of gender difference

Ontology is about what there is in the world, and across all possible worlds. Since Plato’s early challenge of a commonsensical ontology based on the senses, philosophers have been struggling with what would constitute the proper criteria for deciding what exists (Quine 1953, Deleuze and Guattari 1994). This includes the issue of deciding what is the same as what, and what is distinct from what. Defining an ontology is always at the same time setting a metaphysical difference, and a \textit{difference between different differences} – differences that are existing differences, and differences that are only nominal (Derrida 1976). But precisely, the difference between man and woman, or male and female, and the other differences whose structure has been always constituted through the spacing of those ones – e.g., the Freudian homosexual and heterosexual “choices of object”, and positions (Freud 1919) – are to this extent an unavoidable target of the ontological questioning. What is the ontological status of this difference?
“Naïve ontology” is about philosophizing on ontology with no regard to the status of the gender difference, which is at the same time inscribed within the philosophizing act – since the philosophizing subject is always situated regarding this difference (Jagose 2008). “Deconstruction” is the name of what goes out of this naiveté, because it puts to the fore of the ontological quest the consequences this quest could have regarding the status of the gender difference (see e.g., Derrida 1982, Kofman 1994). Yet an ultimate presupposition of naïve and deconstructing ontology altogether, is the fact that there should be a difference. Putting this assumption into brackets means questioning not only ontology, but also the deconstruction of ontology. Should there be something neutral instead of the gender difference?

Within social practice, neutrality is indeed the horizon of the fights – be they fights from transgender, transsexual, or queer minorities. They all question the room left for neutrality, or, in more political terms, the right to be neutral (Rubin 1984). But what precedes shows that this fight is also a metaphysical fight. It is a play that has been, and is still, going on within ontology, and beyond that, within deconstruction itself. As it will appear in the end of this paper, this fight is the fight of the non (“no”), as it should be heard in the non-philosophie that François Laruelle advocated (Laruelle 1996, 2010). Non-philosophy is the (non-)alternative to the deconstruction of ontology.

Granted, to be a cis-heterosexual white European woman is to display a set of
properties. Ontology warrants that these properties can be named by predicates. Ontology is what in the end makes it legitimate, normal, and theoretically available, that to be someone is to be such a list of predicates. Neutrality means to be within none of these differences. Neutrality has no ontological status; it is the Impensé of the metaphysical quest for ontologies (in the sense of Heidegger’s understanding of metaphysics as undissociably ontological and theological (Heidegger 2004). This Impensé is, in terms of the practice, a lack of room for any social practice grounded on the refusal to comply with any of the sexual and gender orientations. Ultimately, neutrality is the refusal of the difference between sex and gender, because the difference between nature and culture, as the foundation of our modernity (Latour 1993) has been bracketed. But how to genuinely think of neutrality, this metaphysical Döppelganger of the current fight instantiated by queer existence? It is here that Badiou’s philosophy will be of help. Moreover, Badiou’s thinking of the event is exactly what is needed to make sense of neutrality, as the queer horizon of metaphysics, or, in Derridian words, the queer ‘Shibboleth’ (Derrida 1986b).

To substantiate this claim, recall that as it has been established by Badiou in Being and Event, mathematics – as set theory – is the ultimate ontology. This revolutionary claim sets metaphysics on new ground due to its appeal to an axiomatic grounding process: pace Husserl or Heidegger, it decouples ontology from what consciousness qua the transcendental subject traditionally operated in philosophy. More radically than the Derridian deconstruction of logocentrism, it breaks paths with the centrality of the logos by uncoupling the enunciation (grounded on the subject of enunciation) and the

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Mathematics is the ultimate ontology, and, more precisely, as Badiou emphasised in his theory of the event, mathematics is set theory (Badiou, 2005, 2009). From now on, all utterances of a difference, be it ontic or ontological, empirical or transcendental, should be pronounced from the horizon of the axiomatics of set theory, and its crucial ontological character that is the centrality of the void. As Badiou has repeated in his re-conceptualisation of set theory, the empty set, the void, is the basis of the whole construction of sets. The origin of the set is the null set or the void taken as the set; and then sets can be achieved by adding this set, one more time, to the void: the centrality of the void is the major advance made by Cantor when he founded set theory. This crucial rethinking of mathematics allows a new founding of ontology, conceived of as a pure theory of multiplicity. The void central to the theory turns out to be the essence of the manifold and the fullness that is axiomatically conceived of in a theory of multiplicities. This theory is set theory, and it is Badiou’s giant step in thinking that one acknowledges this mathematical theory as the true ontology. Such major advance gets rid of any transcendental grounding and decouples the subject from the ontology, qua theory of multiplicities (Badiou 2005, 121).

As is well known, subjectivity therefore receives a status that is not acknowledged in any theory whose approach to subjectivity, as a grounding for ontology, merges it with ontological distinctness and the procedures for generating the differences – be they on a
negative mode as differences (Badiou, 2001, 2009). Where differences are instituted as
differences on the background of their potentiality for being indifferent, the operation,
that is made possible by the axioms but transcends them, is called the “count-as-one”
(Badiou, 2005). Multiplicities through the count-as-one are settled into a set, which
makes the differences still in-different (in a difference with themselves that, earlier on,
Derrida would have labelled as difference) into ontological differences. This puts us on a
new, firm setting to apprehend difference per se, as an ontological difference, and,
moreover, the gender difference, as a difference differing from any difference because it
has originally set the subject apart from him/herself (Esteban 2009).

Sets are indeed what gendering processes by reactionary institutions intend to hold, in
contradiction to the status of the multiplicities proper to each subject qua subject. Being
a “woman”, being a “male” “homosexual”, being an “autistic” “child” is possible only
because it applies the ontologically generative procedures that are labelled as sets
(Irigaray 1993b; Wittig 1976 for a poetic illustration): the set of “male white
homosexuals”, the set of “black children”, etc., each set being what, through its
overlapping and intersections, decides which difference may tolerate which other
difference (Butler, 1993; Sedgwick 1990). Understanding that ontology is first of all
couched as set theory qua theory of multiplicities allows one to get an insight into those
generative procedures that ascribe subjects their differences and create their gendered
nature as something apparently ontologically founded (Love 2007). Therefore it provides
one with a critical grip onto those procedures.
Neutrality regarding these differences would mean a lot, practically speaking, because the subject should be defined in opposition to these procedures which are indiscernibly ontological and social and thereby enforced by institutions (Wiegman, 2000; Grosz 1995). The institutions of capitalism are clearly oriented toward the instauration and enforcement of differences, which allows crucial features of capitalist economy such as division of labour or transmission of social power in the form of a capital. Gendered difference is part of those features – being involved in the sexual economy of transmission through generation and inheritance (Héritier 1994, Mc Kinnon, 1996). But subjects may not be existing at the same place as their differences, and this non-existence-at-place is what, to some extent, determines the ontological dialectics proper to gender: being ontologically different and not being, as a subject, part of this difference. Event is the Badiousian name of this absence, as one can clearly derive from the Badiousian framing of the event (Badiou, 2005). On the other hand, sex, sexuality, girlhood, femaleness, virility and so on, all those names are diffractions of the gender dialectics as it is settled and unsettled by the ontologically grounded repression of the event qua event (along all of its axes that Badiou described: political, scientific, literary and romantic). History is full of avatars of this repression, as well as of the trace of the fight that has been either fought, or un-fought but inhabited by the virtualities of the fight.

To sum up this insight, sets are indeed what gendering processes by reactionary institutions intend to hold, in contradiction to the status of the multiplicities proper to each subject qua subject. This tension between subjectivity and gender comes to the fore
through the lens of the ‘count-as-one’, the ontological operator identified by Badiou as the fluid mediator between set-belonging and set-existence. Belonging to the set of the black homosexual females means having been put into a set of differences by the instauration of a set, made up of blackness, homosexuality and femaleness (Foucault 1980; Ferguson 2003; Wiegman 2014) – all three properties not existing as such before the set came to existence and it came to existence through the count-as-one.

Now, the question raised by any contestation of the gendering of the world as overpowering feature of modern capitalism precisely is the question of the non-existence of this set – as an example of gendered, situated, cis- or trans- labelled, set – as a set. Feminism pervaded the whole of the difference mechanisms as institutionalised sets, because, as Harding (1986) put it, ‘Feminisms are totalizing theories. Because women and gender relations are everywhere, the subject matters of feminist theories are not containable within any single disciplinary framework or any set of them.’ Addressing this dialectics of the event and the institutions of the gender through the thesis of set theory as ontology will allow us to discern what a radical neutral position for queer theory and queer movement would ontologically mean. The political grounding will get clearer, and the lines for a real politics of the gender neutral would be likely to be defined. Section 2 addresses such a dialectics from the viewpoint of a theory of the subject.
2. The subject of feminism

A philosophical issue raised by both political feminist and queer theory, even if it has been overlooked in the last two decades, is the question of the subject of feminism. To some extent, this subject cannot be a woman, or a man, or a homosexual male, and so on, because it is posited in being not as divided, distinguished, imprinted by these predicates, but in a position that is logically and ontologically prior to the setting of these distinctions. It is the *sine-qua-non* condition for a feminist theorising, and, even more than that, a feminist naming and predicating. Otherwise, the feminist discourse will only be, in the stage of the gesturing of an already trapped character (Wiegman 2014) – trapped in a discourse paved by the phallocentric system of differences, or what will be called for now the non-neutral. It will be, to use Heideggerian wording, an ontic and not an ontological contestation of what has been instituted pre-originally by the phallogocentrism (Irigaray, 1977; Kofman 1985), and therefore, it will be doomed to failure.

So feminism, as ontological, should *have* a subject, which in turn has the resources to *be* what being-a-woman in itself is. Or, in better words, it *has* feminism – as a subject – at the same time (and in the same move) as it *is* feminism. This is exactly the procedure that is allowed to us by Badiou’s theory of the subject, to the extent that it complements the ontological move explained previously, centring ontology on set theory. The subject of feminism is precisely the subject to the extent that it is not belonging to the sets, *qua* sets of differences, assigning them – the differences – to individuals and then grounding their
belonging to sets (Badiou, 2005). Once it has been clear that logocentrism and phallocentrism are indeed two sides of the same coin (Irigaray 1993; Kofman, 1985), overcoming logocentrism through the axiomatic founding of the sets as sets is exactly the move needed to account for any ontological contestation of phallocentrism. This leads us to the atopical location where the subject is – or rather, because the subject “is” not, since it is not part of the logics of sets – the subject “subjectives” (in the verbal mode – exactly in the way Heidegger famously wrote das Nichts nichtet in Was ist Metaphysik?). In this atopical location, the subjectification of the subject, prior to any sets, therefore to any predicates or to any differences, is what the feminism is, qua subject. In other words, the subject of feminism is precisely that, which has not been included in the set of sets, because precisely – as it has been recognised since Russell, but not genuinely taken into account before Gödel and Badiou in philosophy – there is no set of all sets. This non-existence of the all-inclusive set is the reverse of the subjectifying of the subject, which is, in other words – through the equivocation between logocentrism and phallocentrism – the subject of feminism.

As it is posited by this subject – which is cashed out in terms of feminist discourses, even though the position of the subject is ontologically what supports the discourses (against Foucault’s supremacy of discourses, which obviously misses the real set-theoretical nature of ontology – (Foucault 2002) – none of the differences that make up males, females, and so on, as fixed predicates in the ontic regime of designation, should be proper to naming the subject. This subject, as referred to this logic, is the ne-uter.
namely, the neutral. It is this neutral which is put into “being” by the subject of feminism – and I write “being” and not being, since the set of beings as object of ontology is precisely bracketed here, as through the subjectifying. The queer theory is the truth of feminism: that’s why, ontologically, those two are indiscernible, even though representations of those discourses may have been challenging each other (Love 2007; Jagose 2008).

It becomes therefore self-evident that the genuine subject of feminism is the “many” that is negatively referred to through the “count-as-one” posited by the gendering of “the” woman. This “many” stands as a “many” only in reference to the count-as-one, to the extent that it has been uttered; out of that, it is a non-many as well as a many – exactly like in quantum physics terms are themselves and their other, prior to the decoherence process that arbitrarily cuts them from themselves – but, as soon as it is named or referred to, it becomes, of course, “the many”. The subject of feminism is this many, to the extent that it is left out of predication. The “many” is the set of all differences prior to their instauration as sets and differences of sets – through the axiom of choice (Bernays 1991; Badiou 2009).

What Badiou’s ontology and theory of the subject entitled us to formulate is thereby threefold: it sets out the subject of feminism from ontology and opens it to its inner manifold, as a non-countable manifold; it shows that the truth of feminism is queer theory, as a (non)-predication of the neutral, and at the same time, manifests the kind of
truth the feminism as subject is capable of (recall that the Badiouian subject is always, in principle, the subject of a truth); and it turns us toward the ontological meaning of the social and political theorising, once it acknowledges that neutrality is more than an avoidance of the count-as-one and the logics of difference, but, moreover, is the political horizon searched for by the forces that are left out the political process of instituting the differences. This process, as it has been alluded to, is what is called gendering (Butler 2004, Germon 2010).

This “many” does not exist, since it is what is left out of any count-as-one instituting sets. All that is are men and women, homosexuals and cis-white heterosexuals, and so on. Actually, no one better than Jean-Luc Nancy captured the ontological impact that this “many” has upon any origin as origin of the subject:

‘If the origin is irreducibly plural, if it is the indefinitely unfolding and variously multiplied intimacy of the world, then not gaining access to the origin takes on another meaning. Its negativity is neither that of the abyss, nor of the forbidden, nor of the veiled or the concealed, nor of the secret, nor of the unrepresentable. It need not operate, then, in the dialectical mode where the subject must retain itself in its own negation (since it is the negation of its origin). […] The origin is inside; it is the spacing of our dis-position of the world […] the origin is, together with other origins, originally divided.’ (Nancy, 2002, 128)
The “many” is not but *happens* in the mode of the subjectification – and has to be nominated or named as the subject of feminism. To paraphrase Badiou, when asked “Of what “queer” is the name?”, one should answer – it is the name of this “many”, if it could have a name, which of course is not ontologically possible. This *many*, as being prior to any count-as-one, is exactly what happens as the *event of feminism*, and, since any event (as Marx taught us) happens twice (Žižek 2008), it happens again, as the same and as different – being beyond “sameness” and difference – *as queer theory*.

No vindication of the existence of this many – meaning, being neutral regarding cis- and trans- or male and female - can be articulated since being is not its affair. But it can be named, as a non-being, through any queer discourse, and, moreover, achieved through any queer political position. This is why maintaining the openness of this “many” is intertwiningly a philosophical endeavour and a political task for any theory receptive to the oppressive load proper to the institutions of sexuation *qua* gendering, as they have been deployed through modern capitalism (Povinelli 2011) – that is, any queer theory. To this extent, we are left with the following task: within this ontological grounding, on the background of the event of feminism and its ontological lack of predication, we should articulate the field of a genuine queer nomination. This looks like a theoretical task. Yet, it takes place, and the (non-)place where the name of feminism has been traced by the subjectification of the subject of feminism, where all differences are non-posited and therefore indifferent regarding themselves within the deployment of the many. In this atopian location thereby, the difference between theory and practice, theoretical
practice and practical theory, and moreover, ontological discourse and political fight, is overcome, or, so to say, aufgehebt: therefore this task is not theoretical, it is at the same time, through its ontological predication, a task proper to any subjectification protocol, and therefore, a political one.

3. The queer nomination: an attempt of (un)-gendering the (non)-philosophy

There is no queer ontology because the predicates that would be articulated there are not yet available since what is uttered by the queer nomination is necessarily ne-utral. For this reason, the subject of feminism, as subjectifying the “many” involved in the possibility of the count-as-one and in the same time left aside through the count-as-one (or in general, aufgehen, in a deviant sense of Hegel’s Aufhebung that has been scripturally exposed / exploded by Derrida in Glas- de la philosophie), should be untouched by any institutional procedure of gendering (Derrida 1986a). Hence, gender-reversing the capitalist institutions of sexuation appears as the hallmark of any genuine feminist utterance (Butler 2004). This utterance paves the way for the queer nomination, whose character has been stated above.

This leads us to a striking Badiouian paradox. Before stating it, it is worth saying that Badiou’s philosophy, from the perspective of a feminist questioning of metaphysics, appears as a philosophy of paradox, no less than Russell’s or Quine’s. More than that, it exposes the processes that govern any paradox qua paradox, which means that out of the
Badiou's assimilation of ontology to set theory, paradoxes may emerge out of the blue, with no access to what makes them paradoxical in the first step. The effect of Badiou's claim is therefore to produce insights into the production of paradoxes – through the necessary exhibition, by virtue of its axiomatic, of the tension between the count-as-one and the many, or, better said, the “uncounted as many” (Badiou 2009). This is at the same time ontological and political, since the political side of Badiou's ontological claim exposes capitalism itself as the other face of the dialectics confronting the “many” and the “count-as-one”; in the political side, paradoxes appear as contradictions, and therefore what is exposed by Badiou is not any more theoretical but is the violence intrinsic to the difference-instituting procedures, which generates classes (Rancière 2006), sexes, age classes and genders as ontic differences in the capitalist épistémè (to speak with Foucault).

The Badiouian paradox proper to the queer nomination is, to his extent, an original paradox – in other words a paradox that stands where all logical paradoxes as well as all political fights do arise (Žižek 1999). It is the paradox of the ever-sought name for neutrality in the field where the very utterance of names excludes the promises of neutrality. This paradox is not a statement – it is a field, a theoretical location, and at the same time, a resource for political positions. As such, this paradox is enacted through the subjectification of the subject – but only when the subject is faced with the prospects of genuine feminism. This paradox stems from the apparently non-gendered formulation of set theoretical axiomatic in Badiou’s ontology. Set theory and its subject are in principle,
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as it is usually said, non-gendered (Meillassoux 2008). How can it be the case that, to some extent, the event of genuine feminism as exposed in the queer nomination, the nomination for and through the ne-uter (i.e., neutrality) is proved to emerge though the shadowing of the “count-as-one” – that is, through the spacing of the event of feminism? At this point, we reach the limits of the insight that Badiou’s ontology provided us with, when it comes to the status of feminism considered as both a political and an ontological event.

What has been shown to arise from the dialectics of the count-as-one and the many, namely, the outside of the gendering institutions of capitalism, is exactly what, reading Badiou in the text itself, is not written within the theory. The event of feminism makes it obvious that the Badiousian turn in ontology is exceeded by its promises of neutrality. In other words – those words that Derrida’s exegesis of Rousseau made transparent in the *Grammatologie* – it (i.e., the neutrality of feminism as a genuine event articulated in the queer nomination) – comes as a *supplement to the ontological turn that achieved Badiou*. It is a supplement that is – according to the logics of the *supplément* (Derrida 1976, 1986a) – both unnecessary, and purely intrinsic, because the turn itself reaches its truth only through the supplement. But the truth, here, should be, after the turn, understood only in Badiou’s sense of what comes to the fore in and through the subject (i.e., the subjectification of the subject). The truth is of course not the degenerated, ontic (as Heidegger said) notion of logical truth; it is the truth in its original ontological sense, constituted through the triad of the subjectification of the subject, the advent of the 

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event, and a given truth protocol (according to Badiou’s theory of the ways to truth). It appears thereby that the queer nomination, as this neutrality made possible in and through the subjectification of the subject of feminism, is both captured through a Badiouian theory of ontology, and out of it (as its supplement). It is neutral not only as the ne-utral, but also as neutral regarding the (Badiouian) ontology itself (construed according to the set theoretical claim on ontology).

We are left with a second level paradox here, or a metaparadox: the neutrality proper to the queer nomination could only appear through the Badiouian turn in ontology, but cannot be located within it or accounted for exactly in its term. Our last question consists therefore in understanding this “in and out” character proper to the neutrality as the object of the queer nomination (i.e., as the truth of the subject of feminism). It is, in other words, a question about, precisely, the neutrality (regarding the ontological turn, understood as undissociably political and logical) of the neutral.

What matters to this truth is a faithfulness to the “many” that was un-named but arising in the event of feminism. It is the faithfulness to the Impensé of the gendering institutions proper to late capitalism - in other words, a faithfulness to the (non)-gender (Bersanti 1987; Magnus 2006). Here, we reach the limits of what philosophy – conceived of in Badiouian terms, as exposing the conditions of an authentic event of truth through the subjectification of a subject – can frame, or, more generally, can utter.
To sum up, non-gender – cannot but only be thought of, by a radical philosophical gesture, as a supplement of this philosophy itself. As such a supplement, non-gender has to be where philosophy is not meant to be, even when it shows instead of saying (according to the well known Wittgensteinian distinction) – or, shows through its non-saying – that this situation is a non-situation, or, in Badiou’s terms, that we have the situation of a condition that is a non-condition. What philosophy can do, therefore, is as we tried to do it until now – articulate this paradox at the very limit of the paradox-producing procedure, that is, at the closest one can be to the original emergence of the “count-as-one” against what’s left of the many. Then, the question we are asking concerns what happens after – an “after” that is both chronological and non-chronological, as well as logical – philosophy (exactly in the sense that Meillassoux [2008] questions what happens after finitude, finitude being what proved itself as the topical object of philosophy until the ontological turn Badiou achieved).

An indication of an answer has been given some time ago by François Laruelle’s conception of non-philosophy (“non-philosophie”, Laruelle 1991, 1996, 2010). It is, of course, not “not philosophy”; it is philosophy at the same time, but in the exact sense of what philosophy shows of itself when it strives to say what philosophy is not. As a “theoretical pragmatics” (Laruelle 1996, 74), non-philosophy is precisely neutral regarding all philosophical distinctions: stating the “transcendental identity (and unilaterality) in the last instance of the a priori and the object, of the beingness and the being (“l'être et l'étant”), of the noesis and the noeme” (ibid, 314). Its neutrality therefore...
overcomes crucial distinctions that were constitutive in philosophy up to the Badiouian ontological turn – Badiou included. Such a neutrality is the corollary of the decision of radical radicalism that initiates non-philosophy: “There is an instance that is more radical than logic, and this is the real” says Laruelle. This “real”, understood in a post-Lacanian way, is precisely what is left out of the “count-as-one” when it comes into its dialectics with the “many”. Therefore, this real, in a Laruellian sense, is exactly the un-nominated correspondent of what the subject of feminism referred to as its inaugural truth. This real is neither male nor female, neither cis- nor trans-, and so on. This real is neutral.

Having stepped to the limits of the shore of philosophy, we faced the metaparadox of a Badiouian ontology that was at the same time showing the truth of feminism as a queer nomination of the neutral – and obfuscating it (since it is an ontology). It is thereby manifest that this confrontation ends up in the opposite and non-opposite of philosophy (including the Badiouian turn), i.e. the acknowledgement of the “real” (“le reel”) – not “the reality” – that is called “non philosophy”. The non-philosophy, here, comes exactly to supplement philosophy. It speaks the “idiom of the One”, as Laruelle said, and this “One”, is exactly what was precisely left out of the “count-as-one”: this “One”, is the many, acknowledged as the reference of the subject of feminism, but the many endowed of an ability to be posited in and through the real (especially, in and through the political real). And this is why non-philosophy appears as exactly isomorphic to the supplement to ontology that neutrality realised, as neutral.
The project of finding the atopical location of the neutral, measured by the experience of the event of feminism, is only indicated or shown through Badiou’s ontology. This indication indicates its limits, according to the purest logics of *supplement*. Through its indication, it is shown that non-philosophy holds the promises of providing us with a status for the neutral, understood as the event of the subject of feminism, in other words, as the focal absence of any queer nomination.

Non-gender is a name for this neutrality; it is especially its name when it transcends the sphere of metaphysics into actual fights in politics. Here, it designates the lines of resistance to any post-capitalist body (Chambers 2007), including all its machineries, as they have been analyzed and theoretically dismantled by Foucault – the *panopticon* of gender and sex, so to say, which ascribes any individual, as a potentiality for subjectification of the many, into visible, explorable, indexable, exploitable differences (Foucault 1981). In this field of post-capitalist politics of the body, non-gender instantiates exactly what Laruelle (1996) designated as “non-philosophie” within the field of metaphysics. As Laruelle says, this non-philosophy speaks ‘a language-which-does-not-speak (to itself) but which is *jouie-en-dernière-instance*’ (ibid., 275), and through this *jouissance*, the discourse of the non-philosophy occurs precisely as an event of the body, that is, as an advent within the biopolitics of late capitalism. One – non-philosophy – is the political truth of the other – non-gender –, and reciprocally – or, more precisely, each one *in-exists* the other, through a Möbius-stripe-like unity of politics and ontology.
Conclusion

In this paper, I tried to push the Badiouian turn in ontology to its limits. This limit appears to be the non-philosophy, as the acknowledgment of the real, which can be neither said, nor shown, but only speaks by itself as the “One” (Laruelle 1991) and unsubscribes to any philosophy. But through this journey, it appeared that the gender difference as it has been critically addressed by post-feminism is the heart of the dialectics of the “count-as-one”, a dialectics for the first time exposed by Badiou’s claim about ontology understood set-theoretically.

The resources of Badiou’s ontology for making sense of the event of feminism are therefore innumerable. Especially, it exposes the logics of the “many” and the “count-as-one”, and captures it as the conceptual space for any arising of the subject of feminism. This subject experiences a truth that has no name because this truth is neutral. Such neutrality is instantiated through a genuine queer nomination – as it has been labelled here – and the prospects of the queer nomination bear upon politics as well as ontology.

This paper explored, finally, the intrinsic features of this nomination, i.e., of a possibility for neutrality to be actually experienced as event and invented as truth. It appeared that the (non)-gender, as effectiveness of the neutral in the field of post-capitalist gendering institutions, is exactly the instantiation of non-philosophy in the Laruellian sense, and, at the same time, its revelation. The practical consequences of this finding should be addressed in another study.
References


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